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Abstract  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the contemporary relevance of Kant’s 
transcendental psychology against the orthodoxy of the dominant analytic school of 
philosophy, in an aim to salvage it from criticisms that resulted in the widespread 
view that Kant had little to say about the mind that was correct or useful. 
Historically, this had led to the near exclusion of Kant’s views of the mind from 
mainstream philosophical debate; those who acknowledged intellectually the 
psychological import of the work deemed as having transgressed the bounds of 
proper philosophy.  It is argued that this was, and still is, an unfortunate and narrow 
view, since an interpretation which fully embraces the transcendental aspect can 
provide invaluable insights and direction for contemporary research in cognitive 
science and cognitive neuroscience.  A major focus of this work is to provide a 
rigorous conceptual analysis of the modern problem of consciousness and to show 
that every approach has become a response, positive or negative, to the Cartesian 
distinction between body and mind. Today, more than three hundred years after 
Descartes’ philosophical dualism, this powerful and persuasive argument still 
continues to hold fast. Cognitive neuroscientists have amassed a deep and detailed 
understanding of how our brains process information from the external world, but 
the question of how this information is transformed into conscious experience is 
deemed an unsolved problem. It is proposed that, although Kant never uses the 
concept of consciousness in the now dominant sense of phenomenal qualia, his 
theory of the transcendental subject is a valuable tool in unravelling the 
philosophical complexities that are commonplace in current theories. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the contemporary relevance of Kant’s 
theory of mind, his “transcendental psychology” to cognitive science and cognitive 
neuroscience and also to the modern problem of consciousness, arguably the central 
issue in contemporary philosophy of mind today. Although written over two hundred 
years ago, his critical philosophical writings indicate that he had profound and 
original insights about mental functioning and cognition that have considerable 
significance. He held ideas about the nature of mental processing, the unity this 
requires, and also of consciousness and self-consciousness; some of which have 
already been assimilated into the cognitive sciences whereas others have only quite 
recently started to be appreciated.  This thesis examines the relevance of Kant’s work 
in this regard in order to bring out the particular influences that these ideas have had 
as well as what can still be learned from them.  
       One idea that has had a particularly strong influence is his central method of 
transcendental argument, which has become a major methodological tool, and is 
known more readily as “inference to the best explanation”.  This is the view that if 
we are to study the mind, we must infer the conditions necessary for experience by 
means of the postulation of unobservable cognitive mechanisms which explain 
outwardly observable behaviour. Kant, in his major work The Critique of Pure 
Reason, had delineated in the abstract these cognitive conditions: It is, for example, a 
methodological requirement for cognition that what he termed “the manifold” of 
sense data form a temporal series, have spatial contiguity, and causal connectedness. 
These are necessary conditions for all cognitive pursuits without which nothing is 
experienced. In short, his examination of the necessary prerequisites for cognition 
has the structure of a transcendental argument from which the justification of our 
abstract cognitive apparatus can be inferred (See Lyre, 2006).   
      As Lyre states “the reconstruction of transcendental arguments as inferences to 
the best explanation heavily undermines Kant’s own far more rigorous understanding 
of his enterprise” (Lyre, 2006 p. 493). Nevertheless, the inference to the best 
explanation lies at the core of his critical enquiry and as such is regarded as 
providing the necessary link between two disparate realms, of outwardly observable 
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behaviour and meaningful discourse and occult psychological or mental correlates or 
antecedents. Regardless of its non-empirical Kantian roots, contemporary cognitive 
scientists, in a similar vein, also try to justify their assertions by showing that they 
provide the necessary presuppositions for the possibility of meaningful discourse 
about certain aspects of the mind and of observable behaviour, presuppositions 
which cannot be denied without contradiction. In other words, in order to give 
epistemic justification to their claims, they also try to show what must be the case in 
any system in order for a particular phenomenon to occur, and to do so without 
appealing to psychological “facts”, but rather by appealing to certain “conceptual 
prerequisites”. Kant, in The Critique of Pure Reason, identifies a number of these 
conceptual prerequisites, in terms of a priori cognitive functions that are necessary 
for the possibility of cognition. These include certain “faculties”,  the “pure forms of 
intuition”, space and time, and the twelve “categories” of the understanding, which 
are the most fundamental concepts of thought, without which nothing could be 
intelligible (A93–94/B126).  
       Kant distinguishes between “transcendental” or “pure” and “empirical” aspects 
of human cognition (A20/B34, A34/B60, A51/B75, B81-82) and describes 
transcendental functions as configuring the empirical faculties of human 
consciousness by providing the structure they need to become faculties of cognition. 
The empirical faculties concern our receptivity to the action of affecting objects on 
our minds (objects are given through sensibility in “intuitions” (A19/B33)) and are a 
posteriori; the transcendental features are a priori, since they cannot be derived from 
sensation, but represent the ways in which sensation is necessarily ordered in 
experience. According to Kant, the transcendental features are part of, or derived 
from “spontaneous” cognitive capacities, whereas the empirical features are directly 
related to, or derived from, what is given in sensibility. Thus, Kant offers an account 
of how we are passive in our perceptual experience of the world whilst active in how 
we conceptualise it, through what he calls the spontaneity of “judgment” in 
perceptual experience.  Kant maintains that our understanding of the world has its 
foundations not merely in “intuitions”, but in both intuitions and the a priori 
concepts which order it.  As he put it, famously, “Thoughts without content are 
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (A51/B75).   
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       It has been noted by several philosophers viz: Wilfrid Sellars (1974), Jay 
Rosenberg (1986), Ralf Meerbote (1989), Thomas Powell (1990),   Patricia Kitcher 
(1993, 2006) Andrew Brook (1994, 2004, 2008) that Kant’s ideas bear a remarkable 
similarity to contemporary functionalist explanation in cognitive science, and each 
have explored different functionalist interpretations of Kant. It was first argued by 
Wilfrid Sellars that this is Kant’s “unknowability thesis” we “do not know [mental] 
processes save as processes which embody these functions” (Sellars, 1974, pp. 62-
90).  Andrew Brook, in a similar vein, claims that this is a part of his doctrine of 
noumenalism about the mind, that Kant was the first to articulate the methodological 
insight into the relation of “concepts” and  “percepts”, and that his general picture of 
the mind was as “a system of concept using functions” (Brook, 1994, p. 14). 
Similarly, Patricia Kitcher describes Kant’s theory of mind as an account of the 
representational content of judgments “like that defended by contemporary 
functionalists”, an abstract theory, and a product of an essentially interconnected 
causal process, of the combination of separate mental states into other mental states 
(Kitcher, 1993, p. 111)
1
. Thus, there has been recognition by scholars of the common 
ground that exists between contemporary functionalist explanation in cognitive 
science and Kant’s own project. The claim is that the Kantian notion that sense 
experience has to be conceptually ordered if there is to be the possibility of coherent 
thought is alive and well in the fundamental tenet and methodology of cognitive 
science and cognitive neuroscience. 
       Functionalism, as a theory of how to model the mind is the most influential 
contemporary empirical theory, and has given rise to a huge amount of research 
claiming to be able, eventually, to explain much about the mind that presently 
remains beyond our understanding. There are two serious research programs into the 
nature of cognition, the classical “language of thought” paradigm, introduced by 
Jerry Fodor in his 1975 book The Language of Thought and the later “connectionist” 
research program which resulted from two large volumes of work completed in 1986 
by David E. Rumelhart, James L. McClelland and colleagues in the Parallel 
Distributed Pressing (PDP) research group. Both assume that the scientific basis of 
cognition is computational. The theory comes in several other forms, but the central 
idea is that what matters is how the mind works at an abstract level rather than how it 
is constituted in a physical system. According to functionalism, the essential nature 
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of mental states such as desires, pains, itches, “inner feelings”, the sensation of 
green, etc., what philosophers call qualia, does not reside in any material that they 
may be found in, but rather in the function that each performs. The phenomenal, 
experiential or the oft-mentioned “what it’s likeness” 2 aspect of cognition is 
disregarded, as in all reductive, materialist accounts. Mental states are constituted by 
their functional role within a cognitive system at a theoretical level where they are 
identified by their role within the whole system rather than on any material or 
introspected or felt natures.  Kant’s view of the mind can also be regarded as a 
system of functions (as aforementioned, he calls them “faculties”) for applying 
“concepts” to “percepts”.  In the first Critique, he explicitly rejects the Cartesian 
conception of the mind as a “substance”, particularly in the Paralogisms (a list of 
logical fallacies that arise when reason erroneously tries to operate beyond the limits 
of possible experience) where he argues that at this theoretical level we cannot know 
the nature of any substrate of this system which is the mind. Mental states can be 
sufficiently explained without taking into account any underlying medium, physical 
or otherwise. All we can know is what the mind must be like in terms of its 
organisation and function, i.e. the necessary prerequisites of cognition at an abstract 
or theoretical level.  No conclusions can be drawn about the subject’s underlying 
nature. For example, in the third Paralogism, Kant corrects the Cartesian view of 
personal identity by stating that the “consciousness of myself at different times” is 
only a “formal condition” for personality or personal identity (A363). It is not a type 
of “substance”, as Descartes had claimed. In other words, the unity of an individual 
is merely that of  a single, thinking, temporally successive subject that, in the jargon 
of computer science, is multiply realisable over personally discontinuous 
psychological states. This is akin to the fundamental tenet of functionalism “the 
mind is what the mind does” as well as the negative dictum “function does not 
determine form”.    
       A further Kantian idea, noted by Andrew Brooks and Patricia Kitcher, is the 
notion of synthesis, which is nowadays termed “the binding problem”. This is the 
problem of accounting for the ways in which the separate features of objects, such as 
colour, shape, boundary, and texture are integrated to produce a recognisable whole. 
Ann Treisman, emeritus professor of psychology at Princeton University, developed 
a solution to this called the Feature Integration Theory (1980, 1996, 2003, 2005, 
 5 
 
2006) which is akin to Kant’s theory in quite significant ways and is regarded as one 
of the most influential psychological models of human visual attention in the field, 
forming the basis for thousands of experiments in cognitive psychology, cognitive 
science and cognitive neuroscience. According to the Feature Integration Theory, the 
mind must synthesise or bind representations of the world into single objects by 
means of a three-stage processing mirroring Kant’s own notions of apprehension, 
reproduction and recognition in concepts (see Brook, 2004). 
                  Until fairly recently, cognitive science had been more concerned with mental 
content and the processing of content rather than on phenomenology or 
“consciousness” per se; for example, Treisman’s binding problem is concerned with 
our awareness of objects, how object recognition proceeds in three stages, but not in 
consciousness itself. So whereas there had been a lot of progress in investigating 
empirically those aspects of human behaviour that is ordinarily linked to 
consciousness, such as attention, memory, the ability to discriminate, categorise, and 
react to environmental stimuli, etc., consciousness itself  was left out of the picture as 
it does not fit neatly into empirical science. It had been ignored because it had 
appeared so clearly impossible to say anything constructive about it within the 
materialist presuppositions of cognitive science. Proper respect for the objective, 
empirical nature of science seemed to require the denial of the very existence of 
consciousness. During the last twenty or so years, however, there have been renewed 
attempts to account for the “mystery” of consciousness within a scientific paradigm. 
But this has given rise to the “hard problem of consciousness”, viewed by many as 
“the last great mystery for science” (Chalmers, 1995). In fact, the study of 
consciousness, once considered taboo, since it was too abstract, too subjective or too 
difficult to study scientifically, re-emerged as one of the hottest new fields in 
neuroscience, particularly in neurobiology; it has become a much discussed topic in 
philosophy also, and has resulted in the publication of hundreds of thousands of 
papers, articles and books.  Indeed, the “hard” problem of consciousness has 
perplexed philosophers and scientists ever since: Where does consciousness come 
from? It seems to “exist”, at least in our own case. We cannot deny or doubt that we 
are conscious: when we introspect, there is an ever-changing flux of sensations, 
thoughts, memories and feelings that comprise our world. But, the question posed is, 
“how does all this arise from the nerve cells, chemistry and electricity in the brain?”  
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                   Nowadays, a common view among proponents is that everything to do with the 
mind, including consciousness, will eventually turn out to be explicable in terms of 
neurophysiology,  or that it may even lie within the domain of physics (Roger 
Penrose & Stuart Hameroff, 2011; Henry Stapp, 2009, 2014).  It is also an area of 
intense philosophical debate with opinions as polarised as the disciplines themselves.  
Zombie thought experiments are offered, i.e. there could be beings that are 
behaviourally, cognitively, and even physically identical to us, yet lacking conscious 
experience, there is “no one at home” (Chalmers, 1995).  Or inverted spectrum 
thought experiments; where it is imagined that people have radically different 
conscious experiences of colour; for example, they might see red where everyone 
else sees green but, due to their linguistic training in the use of colour words, they 
react to coloured objects and even process information about colour in exactly the 
same way as everyone else. These thought experiments are intended to show that 
mental representations can have functionality as representations without the input of 
consciousness, which means that there is something crucial left out, viz., first-person 
phenomenal experience. Theories attempting to account for this deficit are almost 
too numerous to mention. They range from attention theories to global work space 
theories, to recent neuroscientific programs aimed at identifying certain regions and 
systems in the brain most closely associated with consciousness of various kinds, the 
so-called NCCs, short for the “neural correlates of consciousness”.          
                   Francis Crick and Christof Koch were the first to explicitly connect neural 
synchronisation with a theory of binding and consciousness, their hypothesis being 
that binding involves an attentional mechanism that temporarily binds the relevant 
neurons together. In their seminal paper “Towards a neurobiological theory of 
consciousness” (1990) they hypothesised that neurones generate consciousness 
through coherent semi-oscillations spiking at a frequency within the 40-70Hz range.  
The vast plethora of books, papers and research articles produced in its wake, means 
that looking for the NCCs is now the dominant scientific method of investigating 
consciousness, (see Crick and Koch, 1995, 1998; Chalmers, 2000; Metzinger, 2000, 
2003, 2011; Koch 2004; Block, 2005; Bayne, 2007, 2010; Tononi and Koch, 2000, 
2008, 2015; Hohwy, 2007; 2009; Kiverstein, 2009. Oizumi, Albantakis, Tononi  
2014, Hohwy & Bayne, 2015). A fairly recent theory is the Integrated Information 
Theory or ITT, developed by Giulio Tononi (Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2015) at the 
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University of Wisconsin, that assigns to the brain, or any complex system, a number 
denoted by the Greek letter Φ that tells you how integrated a system is, or how much 
more the system is than the union of its parts. Any system with integrated 
information different from zero has consciousness. Information theorists measure the 
amount of information in a computer file in bits, and, according to Tononi, we could, 
in theory, also measure consciousness in bits, by means of a consciousness metre. 
When we are wide awake, for example, our consciousness should contain more bits 
than when we are asleep.  
                   No matter the scientific model of the mind, it seems that the charge can always 
be made that the model is studying function, information or at most mere correlates, 
that it is not uncovering the nature of consciousness itself. Yet, others claim that 
function is all that is required to understand mind, and that we can dispense with 
consciousness altogether. This area of intense philosophical disputation with its 
deeply polarised opinions shows little sign of abating - the problem of consciousness 
is firmly entrenched in the scientific research arena as the vast amount of literature 
on the topic shows. Yet it seems that the more we study the brain and its functions 
and processes, the less we understand the reasons for its connection to the conscious 
mind, as the multifarious attempts to close the so-called “explanatory gap” (Levine, 
1983, 2001) attests to. This fact by itself would seem to strongly indicate that 
somewhere along the line there has been a fundamental error or false assumption. 
However, it is a testimony to the power of the grip of old ideas on the minds of 
scientists and philosophers alike that this has been paid scant attention to in the 
literature,  and is perhaps it is also where scientists’ “lay” intuitions have been the 
source of the confusion. We tend to  indulge our culturally acquired, socially upheld 
habit of treating commonly used words as descriptive of something that exists quite 
independent of what we say, that they refer to something, i.e. they are somehow 
“objectified” and this can cause conceptual problems, particularly so with such a 
slippery term as “consciousness”. The word is a murky one. What exactly is it? What 
does it refer to; does it pick out any properties? Does it reside in the brain?  
       Philosophers and non-philosophers alike differ in their intuitions concerning 
what consciousness is. Given the slipperiness of the concept one would expect that 
advocates of the existence of a “hard problem” of consciousness would have 
considerable arguments backing up their use of the term. Often, however, the nature 
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of problem is treated as self-evident and not argued for at all, and the existence of 
consciousness is posited as a brute fact. This has led to some quite radical 
speculative metaphysics of the kind Kant warns us against, such as that of pan-
protopsychism (Chalmers, 2003, 2013) and epiphenomenal property dualism 
(Chalmers, 1996 and early Frank Jackson, 1982). Kant’s transcendental method, 
however, allowed him to analyse the metaphysical requirements of cognition without 
venturing into such speculative and ungrounded metaphysics. According to Kant, 
since the mind itself plays an active role in constituting the very features of 
phenomenal experience and therefore of empirical knowledge, it cannot itself be a 
known “object” of that knowledge, as some kind of “thing” but is known a priori.       
                   Put another way, if the “transcendental unity of apperception” is a necessary 
condition for experience, it cannot then be given in experience. Such a mind does not 
belong to the world and cannot be studied empirically, at least not as something that 
resides “in the head”. In relation to this, because many if not most aspects of neural 
dynamics, structure, and function can be modelled computationally, the question has 
been posed of whether there could be an equivalent of a conscious mind in silico? 
Could a machine have a mind in the same way that humans do and feel how things 
are? As Susan Stuart notes in a paper on the subject “[I]n the area of machine 
consciousness there have been and are efforts to create consciousness artificially”, 
citing Cotterill, J. 1995, 1998; Haikonen, 2003, 2007; Aleksander and Dunmall  
2003; Sloman, 2004, 2005;  Aleksander, 2005; Holland and Knight, 2006 and Chella 
and Manzotti, 2007.  She also notes “that a  similar amount of effort has gone in to 
demonstrating the infeasibility of the whole enterprise” citing  Dreyfus, 1972, 1979, 
1992, 1999; Searle 1980, Harnad, 2003; Sternberg, 2007 (Stuart, 2010, p. 37).     
                   Although artificial models of consciousness have replicated certain functions of 
the brain, and may have applications for neurological research, there has not been 
nor is there likely to be in the foreseeable future, a phenomenally conscious machine, 
although some AI scientists are optimistic about its possibility, even stating that 
“machine consciousness will almost certainly be achieved perhaps as soon as in the 
next two decades” (Reggia, 2013, p. 129). It has also been speculated, by futurists, 
that the enterprise of developing an understanding of machine consciousness could 
enable us to upload a conscious human mind onto a machine, thereby prolonging 
infinitely a human’s life (Goertzel and Ikle, 2012). However, it is a matter of dispute 
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whether there is any sense in which artificial, computationally based constructs could 
ever be the loci of meaning and of phenomenal consciousness. One of the many 
problems is that, although there may be certain behaviours associated with 
consciousness, there is unlikely to be a way in which objective third-person tests 
could ever have access to first-person phenomenological experience, whether in a 
human or machine. This is related to the “other minds” problem and also to the 
question of whether objective, scientific theorising about consciousness,  where we 
view the world as we normally do, as a mind-independent “real world” comprising 
the totality of objects, can ever adequately conceptualise what it is to have 
meaningful conscious experience within its categorical framework.
3
                       
                   This brings us to one of the main arguments of this thesis, namely, that the 
scientific/ materialistic, neurobiological/functional paradigm that lies at the root of 
cognitive science, combined with a fair deal of over-intellectualising has led to the 
creation of the hard problem of consciousness, which is continually reproduced by 
those who adhere to it, and made harder by attempts to solve it. It is suggested that 
this is also because the computer model of the mind has held cognitive scientists 
captive, and has metaphorically structured debates and discussions such that it hides 
the very peculiar nature of the question being asked. According to the Turing-Church 
principle that lies at the  foundation of traditional cognitive science, we live in a 
Cartesian mechanical universe, and our minds are replicable within reasonable 
accuracy on a universal Turing machine; we are simply Cartesian machines, with no 
place for the mind. The problem that has resulted from this is how to account for 
mind?  
       It is suggested that this is a problematic understanding of human nature. We are 
not simply machines, as Kant, not only in the Critique of Pure Reason, but also the 
Critique of the Power of Judgement and other writings before and afterwards, is at 
pains to point out. Although he may not have used the concept of consciousness in 
the now dominant sense of phenomenal qualia, his theory of the transcendental 
subject is a valuable tool in addressing the philosophical complexities that have 
arisen in the field. His is a theory of active agency, involving “judgment”, 
recognition and awareness of objective content as well as of the “apperceiving” 
subject, which is quite radical. Kant was interested, in particular, with the need for 
acts of synthesis or binding and the kind of unity required for such acts and in this he 
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has much to offer contemporary debate.  His “transcendental psychology” is an 
account of the faculties that are required for a mind to be an agent or subject of 
cognition as much as it is an account of the conditions that are required universally 
and necessarily for something to be an object of cognition, as in traditional accounts. 
Kant stresses this need.  Not only does he stress this but he also stresses the unity of 
the subject and of the subject’s experiences. Kant thought that human self-
consciousness can be regarded from two perspectives: as the “logical subject” of 
thought or “transcendental subject” and as the “object of inner sense”, the empirical 
self.  He writes of “transcendental apperception”, or “the transcendental unity of self-
consciousness” (B132) as the fundamental condition for the cognition of objects in 
the phenomenal world. The fact that we can make a judgment at all presupposes this 
unity of consciousness in a subject who is synthesising or combining representations 
or percepts according to the categories of experience, which are the a priori rules of 
the understanding. Empirical apperception, on the other hand, refers to 
consciousness of the particular contents of the subject’s own mental states (A107). 
When we talk about the transcendental subject, or the “transcendental unity of self 
consciousness”,  however, such consciousness is not of a kind of intelligible object, 
but of oneself as “subject”  through “spontaneous” acts of synthesis. When one is 
aware of oneself this way, one is aware of one’s mind “as it is”, by being a 
spontaneous synthesising agent. Self-consciousness as inner sense or receptive 
consciousness of what we passively “undergo” (as we are affected by the play of our 
own thought) is differentiated from consciousness of our activity, i.e. of what we are 
“doing” in synthesising or unifying our experience (1798, Ak. vii, p. 161).4 The 
latter is not consciousness of the self as object, of the ordinary, changing self, but as 
“subject’” through which experience is unified.  Kant’s point is that we must be able 
to have some kind of cognitive access to ourselves as a condition of our ability to 
perceive objects; that is, as a condition of our capacity to “apply the categories” to 
“the manifold of intuition” which is independent of and logically prior to such 
ability.
5
 For Kant it is essential for the whole idea of the spontaneous activity of 
synthesis that experience is not something passive that happens to us. Perceptual data 
has to be ordered and classified and this is something we do. Kant held the view the 
“manifold” must conform to the rules of the human mind, and that it is the knowing 
subject who, through the spontaneous activity of the mind creates order within 
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nature.  Importantly, this introduced the picture of a human mind as an active 
originator of experience rather than just a passive recipient of perception.  
       So here we come to the heart of the matter, what does all this mean for cognitive 
science? Kant,  it would seem, had  recognised over two hundred years before the 
cognitive revolution of the twentieth century that the word consciousness has a 
number of different connotations, ranging from awareness of one’s perceptions and 
sensations, what he would call “empirical apperception”, to “transcendental 
apperception”, the perception of oneself as an agent endowed with intentionality and 
free will.  Viewed this way Kant’s theory is amenable to the idea that empirical 
awareness of what we “undergo”6 is workable under a materialistic neurobiological/ 
functional descriptive system because the problem can be reduced to questions about 
how cognitive processes are organised.  However, in contrast, the latter connotation, 
of oneself as agent, transcends such a description. In relation to the binding problem 
mentioned above, for example, perceptions are bound together, whether they are 
conscious perceptions or not. As was mentioned, the processes that bind the percepts 
occur independently of consciousness, are subconscious processes, so this aspect of 
unity is not one that a theory of consciousness per se has to explain. The questions 
that remain to be explained and that do not fit easily into the classical scientific 
paradigm are: Why is it that my conscious perceptions belong, as it were, to me?  
What is the nature of this “I” that the perceptions belong to? And the most 
problematic: How can a physical brain made of matter give rise to conscious 
experiences or ineffable qualia?   
       During the last twenty years or so, the study of consciousness, eliminated from 
the field due to the rise of behaviourism and the overarching difficulty of accounting 
for it within a materialist science, has again become part of current research agenda, 
and as mentioned, a vast body of literature has been written. However, Kant’s 
insights into the synthesis and combination of mental content that are required for 
this unity, as well as the kind of unity this entails, have been under-appreciated. This 
thesis is an attempt to bring to the fore Kant’s original contributions, especially in 
relation to “the hard problem of consciousness”,  the problem of integrating 
consciousness into our conception of nature; the problem of why, besides the 
“intentional states” and “informational processes” that are said to be the underlying 
mechanisms responsible for cognition, there should be actual conscious events and 
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feelings, and why there seems to be an unbridgeable chasm between the mental 
realm and the physical medium in which it is instantiated. There appears to be a gap 
in our understanding. This is considered by some to be the most important scientific 
question to be solved in this present age. As John Searle has put the matter: 
The most important scientific discovery of the present era will come when 
someone - or some group - discovers the answer to the following question: How 
exactly do neurobiological processes in the brain cause consciousness?  (Searle, 
1993, 2008, p. 61). 
 
Kant’s epistemological solutions, systematically inferred via his central 
methodological innovation, his method of transcendental argument, are of 
contemporary significance to this debate. According to Kant, although we are prone 
to separate objective spatial experience and inner subjectivity, rendering the former 
“the world of things”, the other the world of consciousness, these are not two  
different realities that might somehow come together, but at a fundamental level they 
cannot be defined separately from each other.   
       As Daniel Dennett notes, cognitive scientists are in the grip of delusions and 
confusions about human cognition and that cognitive science is “a land of plenty for 
philosophers” since so many of their questions are “ill thought out” (Dennett, 2009, 
p.  232). 
7
 If Kant were alive today he would surely agree, for he can be viewed as 
not only the “intellectual godfather of contemporary cognitive science” (Brook, 
1994, p. 12; 2004, p.1) but also a fellow worker in the field.  However, he held a 
fundamentally different view of human nature in stark contrast to the reductionist, 
deterministic, and mechanistic picture that is painted by cognitive scientist today. He 
was a revolutionary, with novel and compelling ideas about the mind, human 
freedom, and the place of mankind in nature, and of the irreducible but also non-
dualistic mindedness of embodied creatures, whose mental properties are as basic in 
nature as biological properties, and metaphysically continuous with them. It 
therefore behoves us to give Kant his due and recognise his profound insights into 
the nature of human cognition.  
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1.1. Overview 
 
This thesis represents a challenge to the orthodoxy of the dominant school of 
analytic philosophy which has coloured Kantian exegesis, as well as much of 
philosophy of mind, throughout most of the last century up until the present day. 
Although there is no one single defining feature of analytic philosophy, and it can 
perhaps be best understood as a tradition linked together by ties of influence and 
family resemblances (see Glock, 2008, p. 204), it commonly involves the application 
of certain logical techniques with the aim of attaining conceptual clarity. Thus, there 
are many variations of analytic philosophy, but as a general picture, all adherents to 
the tradition tend to hold that conceptual analysis is a central part, if not the only 
part, of philosophy.  Initially, analytic philosophy involved a turn towards linguistic 
analysis as the subject matter of philosophy that embodied an accompanying 
methodological turn towards the clarification of the meaning of statements and 
concepts by breaking them down into parts so as to reveal sharply and perspicuously 
what can and cannot be said.  Originating in Cambridge in the late 1890s as a revolt 
by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore against the neo-Hegelian absolute idealism that 
had dominated philosophy during the latter part of the nineteenth century, it is still 
regarded as the predominant philosophical tradition in the English-speaking world, 
and over the last two decades its influence has been steadily growing. As Michael 
Beaney, Professor of Philosophy at the University of York and editor of The Oxford 
Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy, writes in his introduction to the 
volume:  
Analytic philosophy is now generally seen as the dominant philosophical 
tradition in the English-speaking world, and has been so from at least the middle 
of the last century. Over the last two decades its influence has also been steadily 
growing in the non-English-speaking world (Beaney, 2013).  
 
Analytic philosophy is also often combined with the belief that philosophy itself 
should be consistent with the successes of modern science, and is linked historically 
to logical positivism and logical empiricism and the idea that mathematical logic and 
observational evidence is indispensable for knowledge of the world. In early 
formulations the well-known “verification principle” determined that a proposition is 
meaningful only if there is a finite procedure for conclusively determining whether it 
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is true or false. It, therefore, originally rejected outright a transcendental realm of 
being or metaphysics, which was regarded as having led to much fruitless 
speculation, and was strongly committed to the view that any and all genuine 
questions of truth or existence belonged totally within the realm of science. 
However, although proponents originally viewed all metaphysical claims as 
meaningless, they later made efforts to re-construe them as significant assertions 
concerning language.  
     The year 1959 signalled a return to metaphysic when Peter Strawson, wrote 
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. Firmly rooted in the analytic 
tradition, he introduced his “descriptive metaphysics”, which he regarded as fruitful 
in revealing the structure of our conceptual scheme, the fundamental aim of which 
was to clarify fundamental conceptual frameworks. (It was called “descriptive” as 
opposed to “revisionary metaphysics”, the aim of the latter being to revise our 
ordinary way of thinking and our ordinary conceptual scheme in order to provide an 
intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world). 
8
 In his later seminal book, 
The Bounds of Sense, Strawson uses this to develop “austere” versions of six Kantian 
themes: objectivity, space, the unity of space and time, substance and causation 
(Strawson, 1966, p. 24) which he claims lie at the core of what he calls “Kantian 
descriptive metaphysics” as opposed to the “revisionary” metaphysics of his 
transcendental idealism, which he rejects.  The Critique of Pure Reason was thus 
retranslated into an analysis of the concepts of the possibility of experience that 
hinges on the Transcendental Deduction, which for Strawson is an analytic argument 
aimed  at proving the “objectivity thesis” that experience necessarily involves 
knowledge of objects.
9
  Strawson’s book became extremely influential and gave rise 
to many others based on the same interpretive model, thereby sparking a trend 
whereby philosophers came to regard the subjective aspect of the Critique as 
incoherent and as founded on a conceptual confusion, viz: that of psychologism.  For 
Strawson, The Bounds of Sense presents a philosophical analysis of the Critique in 
which he roundly charges Kant with the excesses of “transcendental psychology”. 
The claim was that it is possible to formulate a version of the argument of the 
Transcendental Deduction that abstracts entirely from the subjective aspect, and that 
considers only the objective aspect. In Strawson’s view Kant’s attempts to interpret 
the transcendental conditions of empirical knowledge as elements in our subjectivity 
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does not add anything to “descriptive metaphysics” and can be dismissed. 
“Psychologism” is a tricky concept to define, but at its simplest it is a form of 
philosophical fallacy that attempts to reduce diverse forms of knowledge, including 
concepts, principles of logic and mathematics, to psychology. It is a derogatory term, 
a kind of blanket condemnation capable of being used for significantly different 
types of argument. Kant’s version of psychologism was deemed to be the illicit 
explanatory reduction of the necessary, a priori, and universal subject-matter of 
logic to the merely contingent, a posteriori, and relativised subject-matter of 
empirical psychology.   
    Thus it was that the analytic tradition, dominating as it did, much of Western 
academia,  eventually led, through the publishing of powerful and influential studies 
of Kant, to the vilification and subsequent demise of his “transcendental 
psychology”, the subjective part of the Critique. Although Kant’s efforts to curtail 
speculative metaphysics and place rigid boundaries around the domain of 
philosophical inquiry were welcomed by the analytic movement, his apparent 
transgressions of those boundaries into psychology were not, and coloured Kantian 
exegesis, so that talk of the subjective side became philosophical taboo.
10
  However, 
the foundational premise of this thesis; in fact, the basis on which it is written, is that 
this is a mistaken and narrow view. Whereas the transcendental aspect has, in 
general, been dismissed by philosophers of the analytic persuasion who have tended 
to reject such readings as unworthy of serious philosophical analysis, this thesis 
breaks with that tradition.  Rather,  it shares the viewpoint of Norman Kemp Smith, 
(who published, in 1929, the original standard English version of the text), and who 
complained “No interpretation which ignores or underestimates the psychological or 
subjective aspect of [Kant’s] teaching can be admitted as adequate” (Kemp Smith, 
1962, p. 51).   
       As mentioned in the introduction, Kant was particularly concerned with the need 
for acts of synthesis (or combination) and with the kind of unity required for such 
acts and his transcendental analysis of the prerequisites of our cognition gave rise to 
many original philosophical insights pertinent to several ongoing debates in 
contemporary philosophy of mind. Although Kant’s transcendental psychology 
remains taboo for some mainstream contemporary analytic philosophers, it is 
contended that perhaps they need to get over this unreasonable prejudice. As Robert 
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Hanna so cogently reminds us “[t]he Kant we study nowadays is manifestly a Kant 
who has been reworked and represented to us by those who participated directly in 
the analytic tradition’s long and winding struggle with the first Critique” (Hanna, 
2004, p. 5), a tradition that “has now reached a stage of crisis”, and is “speeding 
towards a crash”, the origins of which can be traced back to analytic philosophy’s 
rejection of Kant “via its intimate but stormy relationship with logical positivism” 
(ibid., p.11) 
11
 Analytic philosophy has not been without its detractors. Famously, 
Quine has argued that there is good reason to doubt that there is a special truth 
attached to analytic truth; in Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951), he demonstrates, in 
two important theses, that there is no such thing. Steven Schiffer, in Remnants of 
Meaning (1987) also questions whether the semantic project that lies at the heart of 
contemporary analytic philosophy is not itself incoherent and impossible.
12
  It is 
therefore argued that we should think beyond the rigid narrowness of technical 
proficiency of the analytic tradition in interpreting Kant, since there is a more 
profitable interpretation of the text, revealing invaluable insights that, when brought 
to the fore, can contribute much to current debates about the mind and cognition. It 
also has the potential to counter an increasingly emerging stark picture of humanity 
that threatens to undermine the sense of our own freedom and agency. The 
reductionist, deterministic, and mechanistic picture of human nature, in which a 
person’s mental activities boil down to a multi-realisable functional system or as 
“entirely due to the behaviour of nerve cells, glial cells and the atoms, ions and 
molecules that make up and influence them” (Francis Crick, 1994),  can be 
supplemented by a new, potentially liberating one, which provides room for 
freedom, morality and which reaffirms our understanding of what it is to be human - 
as individual, self-legislating or autonomous, intentional agents.   
       Although the original grand mission of analytic philosophy, that of laying out 
clearly and sharply what can and cannot be said,  has faded over time, the basic idea 
of using precise language and logic to delineate philosophical problems remains. 
Pertinent to the topic of this thesis is that recent decades have seen the growth and 
flourishing of boldly speculative metaphysics within the analytic tradition and there 
is a strong trend today within philosophy of mind. Specifically, David Chalmers 
adopts the analytic framework using a form of modal logic borrowed from Saul 
Kripke, a sophisticated semantic theory in the philosophy of language, which he 
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regards as useful for clarifying the mind-body relationship, and uses it to embellish a 
Cartesian argument in an attempt to create something close to a proof of 
dualism. Chalmers’ modal framework of primary/secondary intension is combined 
with a quite esoteric 2-dimensional semantic theory of possible worlds scenarios. 
There are necessary truths that apply to all possible worlds. However, his arguments 
share the tendency with the tradition of analytic philosophy of providing a rigid 
framework, fixing the meaning of words and providing precise definitions. The 
framework and the assumptions are set out from the start and given the premisses the 
conclusions automatically follow.  In the tradition of analytic philosophy “intuitions” 
are taken as evidence for philosophical conclusions.  All is carried out from the 
armchair, through gut intuition and a priori philosophising. At the other extreme, 
Daniel Dennett, also an analytic philosopher, is disparaging of “intuitions”, denies 
the relevance of armchair theorising, speculative metaphysics, and rejects dualism,  
i.e. that there is something “extra” that needs explaining over and above function, 
and takes on a Humean position, as a  type of scientifically-oriented empiricist, for 
whom the self does not, in some sense, “exist”.  For Dennett there is no “hard 
problem” of consciousness:  the fact we think so is a consequence of misdirection by 
philosophers such as Chalmers and others as well as cognitive illusions created 
within our own brains; he claims the brain’s computational circuitry fools us into 
thinking we know more than we do. Dennett’s main idea is that computers can help 
realise one of the goals of analytic philosophy, namely, to produce unambiguous 
statements about behaviour, and dismisses reference to “mind” as meaningless. 
Anything meaningful we can say about mind or consciousness can be explained 
purely in computer functionalist or biological terms.
13
  This has resulted in an 
ongoing and apparently tireless game of what Dennett has called “burden tennis” 
(Dennett, 1993) where the field of play is conceptual space and each side claims that 
the ball is in the other’s court.  
       Other philosophers are also increasingly disparaging of analytic philosophy’s 
obsession with intuitions, possible worlds, and two-dimensional semantic theory, 
which has been referred to, disparagingly, as “the industry of modal intuition 
mongering”14 (Mandik and Weisberg, 2008, p. 20).   Bruce Wilshire in a book on the 
subject declares: “Analytic philosophers are self assuredly smug in that they claim to 
know the real problems and the proper methods for investigating them, which 
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amounts to scientism, i.e. uncritical acceptance, amounting to worship, of the 
methods and outlooks of science”. They “divide the emotive from the cognitive, and 
the moral from the factual,” and it is their “endemic weakness” to make “overly 
simple and rigid distinctions” (Wilshire, 2002, p. 8).15 Even Brian Lieter, long time 
defender of the analytic tradition writes in his Leiter Report: 
16
 
Analytic philosophers generally become unbearably trite and superficial once 
they venture beyond the technical problems and methods to which their 
specialized training best suits them, and try to assume the mantle of “public 
intellectual” so often associated with figures on the Continent. The best analytic 
philosophers are usually very smart (clever, quick, analytically acute), but less 
often deep (Leiter, 2001). 
 
       Accordingly, Chapter 2 presents a sustained defense of Kant’s transcendental 
psychology against its many detractors within the analytic tradition,  and is 
concerned with rescuing it from the charge that it is unworthy of serious attention. 
Transcendental psychology is Kant’s theory of mind, his critical analysis of the 
necessary a priori faculties required for cognition.  Much of it is to be found in the 
so-called “subjective” part of the Transcendental Deduction, the second chapter of 
Transcendental Analytic section of the Critique, where Kant brings both the 
perceiver and subjective experience into accounts of the world.  Kant’s investigation 
of the psychological prerequisites of cognition, although deemed secondary to his 
main purpose, which was to justify our conviction that physics, like mathematics, is 
a body of necessary and universal truths (B19-21), was truly a remarkable feat in its 
own right. What is more, it has stood the test of time; it furnished him with several 
insights concerning cognition and mental functioning which were not only important 
in his own era, but which are still relevant today. He held that all contents of 
cognition are determined by the activities of a set of primitive, a priori and universal 
and spontaneous cognitive capacities, also known as “cognitive faculties”  
(Erkenntnisvermögen) which order experience.  Kant was by no means an empirical 
psychologist; his cognitive theory was motivated by epistemological and 
metaphysical concerns. He distinguishes this from introspection-based empirical 
psychology and also from rational psychology (see Hatfield, 1992).
17
  Nevertheless, 
his transcendental psychology is a kind of psychology, which, when rightly 
understood, can contribute much in terms of  conceptual clarity and direction for 
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contemporary research in the cognitive sciences and the neurosciences, where some 
of the most puzzling philosophical problems have arisen and remain.  
       Moreover, considered as a general movement, analytic philosophy has had an 
uneasy relationship with historically oriented philosophy, and it has tended to 
proceed without recourse to the past. Philosophers of the analytic tradition have 
tended to think that conceptual analysis is a central part (if not the only part) of 
philosophy and whilst it may be true that it can do some good philosophical work, it 
should be realised that philosophy is not without a history; it is a historical 
movement as well as one concerned with more technical problems of logic and 
epistemology.  Glock poses the question of what attitude philosophers should take 
towards the history of philosophy, the history of ideas and history in general, and his 
answer is what he calls “weak historicism” where the study of the past is seen as 
useful without being indispensable. Other philosophers argue that there should be a 
rather stronger form of historicism than the one he recommends (Williams, B. 2002, 
p.173; Alvarez, M. 2011, pp. 95-102)
18
. For Karl Ameriks, too, the question of the 
role of the past is no idle matter; but stands as the central problem that philosophy as 
a whole must answer (Ameriks, K. 2006). Philosophy is not simply a method of 
thought, but requires a sense of the distinctive issues that have developed over time 
and cannot be said to truly understand the problems it sets itself without an 
appreciation of the historical context in which these problems evolved.                       
       Consequently, Chapter 3 turns to the problems in philosophy that were a legacy 
from Kant’s predecessors, Rene Descartes and David Hume.  The purpose of this 
analysis of the philosophy of Kant’s forbears is to bring to light the particular 
problems that were bequeathed by them to philosophy, which Kant addresses 
through his “Copernican Revolution” (Bxvi), as there are parallels with the problems 
confronting him, the steps he took to resolve them and conceptual problems in the 
philosophy of cognitive science today.  Some of these puzzles are, for example:  
How does a mind a res cogitans act on matter, a  res extensa, or in contemporary 
terms, how do mental states causally interact with physical states of the brain?
 
  How 
do we account for the unity of consciousness; where is the “I” that Descartes says is 
so immediately known? What sense is there to freedom of the will in the face of a 
deterministic and mechanistic world? This is related to the notion of “causal closure 
in the brain” (Kim, 1993).19 Thus, the analysis of the philosophy of Kant’s forebears 
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is provided by way of a critique of the scientific materialism that lies at the 
foundation of cognitive science; since, it is suggested, the latter has its origins in a 
fundamental misconception or error of thought, a legacy from the former. This is the 
often implicit, unrecognised assumption of the Cartesian/Humean view of the mind 
in which consciousness is conceived of as a kind of entity (or quasi entity), which 
either “contains” experiences (Descartes) or which “consists” of  them (Hume).  It is 
proposed that although no theorist explicitly propounds this view, a residual alliance 
to this way of thinking about the mind instils confusion in many of the current 
approaches in the science of the mind. Adopting a historical perspective is 
particularly called for because contemporary problems in the field are the result of 
the lasting influence of this largely forgotten or neglected philosophical heritage. It is 
argued that Kant was the first to deal rigorously with this model or picture of the 
mind but his solutions have been broadly overlooked and this is a situation that 
should be rectified.  
       As discussed earlier, the main difficulty with functionalism in cognitive science 
is that it does not give sufficient justice to qualitative phenomena or qualia and omits 
several crucial elements that are necessary for cognition.  This is because our 
perceptions and feelings have a qualitative character to them - there is something “it 
is like” to be in those states or, stated differently, they are phenomenally conscious to 
the subjects who undergo them. But this subjective realm is not accounted for in a 
functionalist/materialist explanation and is what ultimately leads to “the hard 
problem of consciousness” (Chalmers, 1995, 1996) since it opens up an “explanatory 
gap” (Levine, 1983), the problem of how “physical processes in the brain”  give rise 
to subjective, phenomenal, experience; it involves the inner aspect of thought and 
perception: the way things feel for the subject. In his seminal paper “Facing up to the 
Problem of Consciousness” (1996), Chalmers resurrects this ancient puzzle of 
philosophical perplexity that was brought into sharp focus by Descartes. In 
Descartes’ view the mental is absolutely distinct from physical processes; the two 
take place in different and distinct “substances”. Today there is a new form of 
dualism, “property dualism” where the mind is viewed as existing in parallel with the 
body, but in a “dimension” that is separate from the material world.  Chalmers has, 
in effect, merely substituted an explanatory dualism for Descartes’ original substance 
dualism. Since in his view, a neuro-reductionist/functionalist explanation of mind is 
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rendered “scientific” at the cost of removing from it its most basic and fundamental 
characteristic: consciousness, or phenomenal, first-person experience, and this is 
what eventually leads to the view that consciousness is merely epiphenomenological, 
i.e. an accompanying event to cognition that lies outside the chain of physical 
causation and something which has to be explained. Chalmers writes:  
Experience is the most central and manifest aspect of our mental lives, and   
indeed is perhaps the key explanandum in the science of the mind. Because of 
this status as an explanandum, experience cannot be discarded like the vital spirit 
when a new theory comes along (Chalmers, 1995, p. 206). 
 
       It is contended that Chalmers, at least in some of his thinking, is the modern 
counterpart of Descartes, and espouses an updated form of dualism, namely 
“property dualism”, the view that there are two metaphysically distinct kinds of 
properties in the world, mental and physical, whereas Daniel Dennett takes on the 
role of  Hume, as a  type of scientifically-oriented empiricist, for whom the self does 
not, in some sense, “exist”. Since the cognitive revolution, philosophy of mind has 
become one of the main concerns of analytic philosophy. Both Dennett and 
Chalmers are analytic/ functionalist philosophers of mind. Dennett, however,  denies 
there is a hard problem, and regards the self as nothing beyond the various 
“subagencies and processes” (Dennett, 1998, p. 105) in the nervous system that 
compose us and thinks of qualia as the part of an experience left over once all the 
objective parts are eliminated, and which are illusory.  In particular, he denies there a 
medium of consciousness or as he likes to call it, “the Medium”, which is why 
qualia, “conceived of as states of this imaginary medium, do not exist” (Dennett, 
2015, p. 2). Thus, the Cartesian and Humean approaches to cognition continue to 
hold sway today; functionalist approaches to cognition are, more or less, updated 
Hume, and Chalmers’ “hard problem” is Cartesian; in fact it is a reworking of 
Descartes’ argument for substance dualism in the Sixth Meditation (1641) where he 
notes that since he can “clearly and distinctly” conceive of himself existing apart 
from his body (and vice versa), and since the ability to clearly and distinctly 
conceive of things as existing apart guarantees that they are in fact distinct, he is in 
fact distinct from his body.   
       Sections 5 and 6 introduce the idea that Kant may have been the first to describe 
the peculiar logical semantics of self-reference, and how this philosophical analysis 
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of the nature of reference to self has profound contemporary relevance. For example, 
leading contemporary theories of consciousness, “Higher Order Theories” (HOTs) 
construe a mental state as self-aware, and hence conscious, in virtue of being an 
object of a numerically distinct second-order state. According to HOT theories, a 
phenomenally conscious experience of red would be based on the content of a 
mental state red with a direct relationship to the meta-thought red (Rosenthal,1997, 
2005). That is, the higher level meta-thoughts or representations are distinct 
representations, the latter being phenomenally conscious in virtue of the former 
which represents it.  This, however, does nothing to account for the distinctive 
feature of phenomenal awareness the “for-me-ness” of the experience. To be 
something it is like requires “for me” to “grasp” it in consciousness. For Kant, 
conscious awareness of an object has an implicitly dual nature, such that to be 
conscious of an object is also to be aware that one is in that very state. But this 
awareness is not, itself, a separable feature of the first order state. One has explained 
consciousness precisely when one has explained this dual feature. Such 
consciousness is more aptly described as a mode of being in a contentful state 
directed at the world, rather than it being so in virtue of a relationship to a 
numerically distinct second order state. Kant terms this “transcendental 
apperception” and it is linked to his idea of “transcendental designation” and the 
peculiar logical semantics of self-reference.  
      Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the extent to which Kant’s transcendental 
psychology can be considered compatible with modern functionalist theories. As 
mentioned, several philosophers have brought attention to the incipient 
functionalism that can be discerned in the Critique, following the lead of Wilfrid 
Sellars in 1970.  Ralf Meerbote, Patricia Kitcher, C. Thomas Powell,  and Andrew 
Brook belong to this group. According to Brook, for example, the Paralogisms  
(crucial chapters in the Dialectic section of the Critique, where Kant criticises faulty 
arguments about the mind made by the rationalists (A298/B354)) 
20
 can be construed 
as one long argument that how the mind functions tells us nothing of its nature, 
which, he claims, is akin to the negative doctrine of contemporary cognitive science 
encapsulated in the dictum “function does not determine form” (Brook, 1994, 2004).   
He refers to Kant’s famous tenet, “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions 
without concepts are blind” (A51/B76), which he says encapsulates the necessary 
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cognitive complementary and semantic interdependence of intuitions (percepts), 
which derive from experience and concepts, which come from the understanding. 
This relationship between percepts and concepts, he argues, has become as central 
within contemporary cognitive science as it was vital to Kant’s purpose in the 
Critique.  Patricia Kitcher also claims Kant is very much a forerunner of the 
functionalist program in cognitive science to describe the mechanisms that underlie 
cognition and states that “the easiest way to think about syntheses may be to regard 
them as processes that realize (mathematical) function. Given a set of input states a 
synthesis produces a certain output state” (Kitcher, 1993. p. 74). Thus, several 
contemporary scholars see Kant as giving abstract descriptions of cognitive 
mechanisms akin to functionalism in cognitive science.  The general claim is that the 
unknowability of “things in themselves” which entails neutrality concerning the 
underlying composition of the mind means that he would have had to allow that 
multiple realisability is at least open to intellectual possibility.   
       However, Section 4.3 presents the argument that whereas Kant’s a priori 
analysis of mentality bears a strong resemblance to functionalist theories, and can be 
considered an early form, it also diverges from and transcends it in several crucial 
respects. Not only does his analysis transcend functionalism, but valuable insights 
are obscured by such an interpretation. This is an important caveat against regarding 
Kant as a kind of “functionalist avant le mot” as Brook describes him (see Brook, 
1994, p.13). Although Kant’s theory is conformable to the idea that empirical 
awareness is workable under a functional descriptive system, his work concerning 
the mind has much more to offer, and reading him as such obscures the many 
positive contributions that can be made. For, as aforementioned, functionalism 
eventually gives rise to a seemingly unsurpassable problem which has become the 
focus of unending debate, the “hard problem of consciousness”.  According to David 
Chalmers, everything about human cognition apart from for the fact of  qualia or 
subjective phenomenal experiences can be or will one day in the future be explained 
in reductive (computational or neural) terms, what he terms “the easy problems”.  
But this leaves the problem of explaining subjective, phenomenal experiences 
themselves, the “what it’s likeness” of experience. This is deemed by many to be the 
pre-eminent philosophical problem of today, the ignorance of which may be “the 
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largest outstanding obstacle [to] a scientific understanding of the universe” 
(Chalmers, 1996,  p. xi).   
     Chapter 5 fleshes out the modern hard problem of consciousness and describes 
the historical and philosophical background from which it emerged. It further 
discusses how Chalmers reverts the philosophy of mind back to Cartesianism since 
he views the mind as neither physical nor material, but a fundamental “property”, 
which gives rise to his “property dualism”.  This is because, according to Chalmers, 
there must be an “extra ingredient” in any explanation of phenomenal consciousness 
that goes beyond descriptions of functions and physical processes. Chalmers’ 
analysis exemplifies a trend in philosophy of mind that puts phenomenal 
consciousness or “what it feels like to be a cognitive agent” at the centre of our 
understanding of mind.  However, this presents us with the same problem as 
Cartesian dualism: the question of how non-material or non-physical mental 
properties interact with matter.  Chalmers, as a functionalist, virtually equates the 
terms “functionalism” and “physicalism” in his ontology of mind. Everything apart 
from consciousness is physical, yet consciousness is taken to be a natural 
phenomenon, falling under natural laws. Thus, the hard problem that arose from 
functionalism is concerned with how processes in the brain are supposed to give rise 
to subjective experience, and is the view that consciousness is something extra which 
is somehow produced by neural states beyond the functional cognitive processes 
realised in the brain. This notion, that there is somehow an “explanatory gap” 
between the physical and the mental that needs to be closed, is the leading challenge 
to materialist views about the mind, and is an updated version of the Cartesian mind-
brain problem, a resurrection of a conceptually flawed understanding.  The central 
mystery about a hard problem of consciousness supposedly in need of explanation is 
also a reaction to and an artefact produced by adherence to the functionalist 
orthodoxy in which consciousness is reducible to or explicable by a set of functional 
cognitive processes realised in the brain. Such a view or picture creates an artificial 
explanatory gap between function and phenomenology in the first place. Kant’s 
insights indicate that accepting that there really is a “hard problem” of 
consciousness, in the way that is stated, is a philosophical mistake. 
      Section 5.4 contrasts proponents of a hard problem of consciousness with the 
“no-self theorists”, eliminative materialists, analytic reductionist/ functionalists for 
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whom the self/consciousness is an illusion. Daniel Dennett regards himself as the 
modern counterpart of Hume, as a type of scientifically-oriented empiricist, for 
whom the self does not, in some sense, “exist”; there are only various “subsystems” 
and “processes”. Similarly, in his magnum opus Being No One, Thomas Metzinger’s 
approach is based on a teleo-functionalist and naturalist view of consciousness. His 
thesis is that what we think of as the self is nothing beyond a special kind of dynamic 
representational content. He claims that “no such things exist in the world: nobody 
ever had or was a self ” (Metzinger, 2003, p.1) - what we take as a self is no more 
than an appearance produced by the operations of a complicated information 
processing system that simulates and represents aspects of the system’s states to 
itself. This follows from a specific neurobiologically grounded theory of 
consciousness, which Metzinger terms the Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity or 
SMT. The self and the world it perceives are illusions; the self is a “virtual self-
model” (ibid., p. 544), and neuro-physiological processes are all that really exist. 
Metzinger claims that a disembodied but appropriately stimulated brain in a vat 
could, phenomenologically, enjoy exactly the same kind of conscious experience as 
an embodied one. The body can be separated off from brain processes which are 
metaphysically conceptualised as the minimal constitutive supervenience locii of 
experience, a set of minimally sufficient neural correlates. 
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       It is argued that Kant’s depth of insight into the sources of our cognition can 
address the impasse between those who claim there is a “hard problem” to be 
addressed by a science of consciousness (Chalmers) and reductive or eliminative 
materialists who deny there is anything of the sort - consciousness is an “illusion” 
(Dennett,  Metzinger).   Although his theory can be construed as a set of abstract 
functional constraints valid to all cognisors, in keeping with functionalism,  it can 
also be construed as a more “global” realisation in time and space of a complicated 
system of mental as well as bodily operations.  Of particular significance in this 
regard, and something which cannot be emphasised enough, is that Kant had an 
ontological commitment that functionalism overlooks, in the sense that there is a 
positive metaphysical thesis deeply connected to Kant’s theory of mind.  For Kant, 
space and time are the “forms” of our intuition or sensibility and they are also 
constitutive of objects for us, the world of experience we inhabit must necessarily be 
a world of material objects.  And as a member of that world, at least insofar as there 
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are bodies in that world that interact with and sense material objects, the “knowing 
self of apperception” must have a material body too. That is to say, the possibility of 
knowing objects in the empirical world necessitates that I have a material body in it.   
      Consequently, Chapter 6 presents an analysis of enactive, embodied, cognition 
which replaces the representational/functional model with agential activity and 
emphasises the role of the body and its place in the environment in creating 
cognition, arguing that even the most abstract of concepts are rooted in 
characteristics of our bodies and in our embodied interactions with the environment. 
Lived experience is at the heart of this enterprise, an experiential starting point that 
lies in stark contrast to traditional functionalist accounts that posit internal processes 
or representations as a starting point for explaining cognition and frame questions 
accordingly. As the originator of the theory stated: “Lived experience is where we 
start from and where we all must link back to, like a guiding thread” (Varela, 1996, 
1999). Varela’s conception of enactive embodied cognition is based on his work 
with biologist Maturana and the development of autopoiesis theory (Varela, 
Maturana and Uribe, 1974; Maturana and Varela, 1980, 1992). Within this quite 
recently emerged and developing embodied perspective, cognition appears as a 
dynamical process of real time variables with the capacity for self-organisation, not 
as  a syntactic set of rules defining combinations of symbols that structure 
representational machinery, nor involving “neural representations in the brain”  as on 
traditional accounts. Cognition is embodied when it is deeply dependent upon 
features of the physical body of an agent. Moreover, the mind is not “in the head” 
since its roots are in the body as a whole and also in the extended environment where 
the organism finds itself. This means that the constitution of a mind is always 
concurrent with the extended presence of other minds in a social network and the 
world. One of the key thoughts here is that if we want to understand consciousness it 
is not enough to simply look at the brain, and a set of functions or representational 
mental processes. We need to look to the embodied, situated life.  
       This goes beyond both functionalism and also the “consciousness in the brain” 
or “brain bound” paradigm (Thompson and Cosmelli, 2011). The biological 
substrate of consciousness is the whole organism in its dynamic interaction with the 
environment, not the brain taken in isolation from the bodily situatedness in which it 
finds itself.  According to enactivism, we also need to take into consideration the fact 
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that living beings are autonomous agents that actively generate their own identities 
through sense-making rather than being the passive recipients of sensation. 
Moreover, as agents enact or engage with the world, they generate or bring forth 
their own cognitive domains.  It is not enough to simply look at abstract information 
processing models of the mind, whether computational or neurological; rather, what 
is of importance to cognition is the embodied, situated life. The idea is that the 
situatedness in which a body finds itself is a necessary condition for cognition - the 
hypothesis that the biological machinery of consciousness will most likely turn out 
to be brain activity coupled to a body in interaction with its environment. Enactivism 
is pursued in two different styles: sensorimotor enactivism (Alva Noë et al) and 
autopoietic enactivism (Evan Thompson et al).
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  Both types take it to be a 
fundamental commitment that cognising agents are to be viewed as situated in an 
irreducibly meaningful world, where meaning is “enacted” or constituted through the 
tightly-coupled dynamic relationship between an agent’s brain, body, and 
environment.  
       This chapter focuses on the recognition that a great deal is implicit in Kant’s 
notion of ordering and unifying that is only recently in the process of being 
rediscovered in this newly emerging theory of embodiment. Kant’s work, 
particularly his later work, goes beyond the abstract ordering and unifying of 
conceptual machinery that is put forward in the first Critique and considers the body. 
In his later unfinished project, the “Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Sciences to Physics” to be found in the Opus postumum, published after his 
death, Kant theorises the dual emergence of natural mechanisms and organismic life 
(including mind) alike from a single ontologically neutral but dynamic material 
substrate, the dynamic aether, the so-called Aether Deduction  (OP XXII: pp. 206-
233, and 241). This all pervasive and self moving aether, which can be considered a 
vis vivifica or life-force is sufficient to explain the phenomenon of all organic life 
(ibid., p. 219).  This consideration of organic life has been termed his organicism, 
which adds “meat” to the conclusions of the first Critique, with the thesis that the 
transcendental aspect of cognition is to be understood in terms of the model of 
biological epigenesis, a theory of biological formation, which lies at the heart of 
Kant’s conception of reason.  In fact, it has been convincingly argued that the idea of 
epigenesis guided and underpinned his critical philosophy, and in particular, the 
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relationship between reason and the categories of the understanding (Mensch, 
2013).
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 It is the very fact of embodiment and orientation in the world that makes it 
possible to experience objects in the first place, and it is suggested that since 
embodiment can neither be reduced to the forms of intuition nor to a merely 
empirical fact, Kant must have conceived of the spatially oriented human body as a 
“transcendental ground for our cognition” in its own right. That is, it develops the 
thesis that for Kant, as with modern enactive theories, mind was explanatorily and 
ontologically continuous with life, in the sense that whatever is metaphysically 
required for a human mind is also ontologically present in its organic life.  
       Today, it is believed by many scientists that consciousness, including 
phenomenal consciousness itself, will sometime in the future, turn out to be 
completely explicable through the natural sciences, in terms of mechanisms, 
mathematics, computational logic and all that the scientific conception of the world 
includes, and that the task for a supposed “science of consciousness” is to try to 
explain the first-personal conception of the world completely in terms of it. It is also 
often simply taken for granted that it is only a matter of time before satisfactory 
machine models of human intelligence are produced. Cognitive scientists as well as 
philosophers refer confidently to “the mechanisms of cognition”: the point  can be 
brought home by the way that one leading  eliminative materialist summarises this 
sentiment, stating that to abandon mechanism is tantamount to embracing magic, 
“since it cannot be magic, there must be mechanisms” (Churchland, 1986,  p. 461).  
Kant’s critical philosophy can contribute important and ingenious insights to the 
debate, one of the most significant being that mechanistic, computational, 
materialistic, natural science is not, to borrow Wilfrid Sellars’ famous phrase, “the 
measure of all things”.  For if scientific or reductive naturalism is true, then indeed, 
in the words of Robert Hanna “we are nothing but naturally mechanized puppets 
epiphenomenally dreaming that we are real persons” (Hanna, 2006b, p. 436).   
       It is noteworthy that when we think of ourselves as embodied agents, we have a 
very different sense of “self-consciousness” than when we think of ourselves as 
simply introspectors. If we take this sense of bodily agency as the primary form of 
self-consciousness, then we are able to see self-consciousness not as a clear and 
isolated imaging or objectifying of a self, but as a lived sense of practical 
engagement.  This entails that there is an intrinsic connection between the 
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cognitive/affective psychological life of the mind and the biological life of the body. 
Kant’s thesis on embodiment has been termed “transcendental embodiment” which, 
for Angelina Nuzzo, is “the unifying thread of Kant’s epistemology, moral 
philosophy, aesthetics and teleology of living nature” (see Nuzzo, 2008, pp. 8, 9).  
Other philosophers have expressed similar views (Steven Palmquist, 2013; Matthew 
Rukgaber, 2009; Susan Stuart, 2007, 2007a, 2008). Here the body is not simply the 
locus of the empirical senses, but rather the reference point of the formal sense for 
spatial orientation.  This suggests that the body for Kant is the “transcendental 
ground” for our cognition, the locus or site for our “sensibility”, or so it will be 
argued.  
 
The next section provides some initial comments that will lead the reader into the 
main body of the thesis.  
 
1.2. Kant and Cognitive Science – initial comments  
 
Cognitive science is defined as “the interdisciplinary study of mind and intelligence 
embracing philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, linguistics, 
and anthropology” (Thagard, 1996, 2014). The predominant approach in the field is 
that of functionalism, its central hypothesis being that thinking can best be 
understood in terms both of representational structures in the mind and of 
computational procedures that operate on those structures.  The functionalist 
paradigm has been the prevailing model of the mind for around sixty years, its 
emergence coinciding with the rise of computing machines that were developed 
during the 1950s and 1960s, and which were inspired by Alan Turing’s earlier work 
on machine tables. It was between 1960 and 1967 that Hilary Putnam developed his 
famous theory of functionalism, based on the idea that mental states are to be 
identified with respect to the causal or functional role they mediate between 
sensations and behaviour.  As is well known, computational states are defined, not in 
terms of specific hardware configurations, but in terms of their relations to inputs, 
outputs, and their relationships to other computational states. Thus, in the case of 
functionalism of the mind, to talk of mentality is merely to talk of material systems 
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at a “higher level” (i.e. beyond biology or any kind of physicality); proponents hold 
that the way to model the mind is through its functions, what it does and can do. To 
quote arch-functionalist Daniel Dennett: “Functionalism is the idea that handsome is 
as handsome does, that matter matters only because of what matter can do” (Dennett, 
2005, p. 17). This means that as far as functionalism is concerned the mind could be 
“copper, soul, or cheese” (Putnam, 1975);  there is no need for any special mental 
stuff or underlying stratum (such as a brain) in order to account for particular 
psychological states. Another way of putting this is through the fundamental tenet of 
functionalism, “function does not determine form”. Mental functioning can be 
realised, in principle, in objects of many different forms, what is termed “the multi-
realisability thesis”.  
       The multi-realisability thesis is the metaphysical claim that mental processes are 
the operations themselves and are not to be identified with anything material that 
realises them. Cognitive science has mushroomed rapidly on the basis of this 
paradigm, resulting in detailed theories of cognitive processes including perception, 
attention, memory, language and decision-making.  The functionalist model is the 
prevailing model today within both cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience, 
where it has expanded beyond formalist cognitive psychology to include neural 
models. What underlies the technical jargon of both is that mental states are, in fact, 
or should in principle be, defined on the basis of causal connectedness and relation to 
other states, and to stimuli and responses between them. As was mentioned earlier, 
Kant’s view of the mind can be regarded as compatible with contemporary 
functionalist theories in the sense that his views were also centred on how the mind 
works at an abstract level, rather than on how it might be physically/materially 
constituted or on its introspective contents.  Kant was concerned with the “functions” 
or conditions needed for functions to work. Unlike his predecessors, he did not ask 
how we come to have knowledge of the world. He starts with the fact that we do 
have knowledge, i.e. have the ability to make conceptual judgements, and asks how 
this can be the case. He is uninterested in what knowledge we can derive from 
experience but in the a priori rules and conditions that govern our understanding. 
Using his method of transcendental argument or enquiry, it was his purpose to 
discover from our experience and judgements what the necessary features of these 
must be in all cases.  He concludes several things, viz., that our knowledge is the 
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result of “acts of synthesis”, that judgements have the particular content they do  
have in virtue not of  their immediate causal  relationships to objects, but only 
through their dependence on intuitions (A68/B93); that in order that representations 
of objects be anything to anyone they must belong with others “to one 
consciousness”(A116) i.e. they must be synthesised or combined with others into 
one unified representation, and that this, in turn, requires the application of concepts, 
what he terms “the categories of the understanding” which order and unify 
experience. His emphasis throughout is on the workings of the mind. Kant’s 
functionalism is of a very general kind, however. Unlike contemporary cognitive 
scientists he was uninterested in specifics. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to state that 
this aspect of his theory can be viewed as an early form of functionalism, what we 
might term a proto-functionalism. 
      Kant’s question was how is knowledge possible? Or to put it in the language of 
the Critique: “What are the a priori conditions upon which the possibility of 
experience rests?” (A96).  As stated earlier, several scholars have noted that Kant’s 
views are compatible with contemporary functionalist theories, in the sense that they 
too allow consciousness to be characterised at a high level of abstraction that would 
allow instantiation into any number of physically realisable systems. Wilfrid 
Sellars,
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 oft credited with originating the theory of functionalism in the philosophy 
of mind, referred to Kant’s “revolutionary move”,  which was “to see the categories 
as concepts of functional roles in mental activity”, and claimed that for Kant “we do 
not know these [mental] processes save as processes which embody these functions”  
(Sellars, 1974, pp. 66-68). Similarly, Ralf Merboote claims that “Kant’s 
transcendental psychology, often maligned, is a cognitive psychology. More 
specifically, it is a faculty psychology which speaks of capacities and abilities of 
various sorts which are needed for empirical cognition” (Meerbote, 1989, p. 161).  In 
fact, a vocal minority of philosophers have been at the centre of attempts to salvage 
Kant’s transcendental psychology from the criticisms of more positivist minded 
interpreters, and to revive it for its insights to cognitive science. Andrew Brook, in 
Kant and the Mind, advocates this construal and maintains that Kant’s insistence on 
the unknowability of the mind implies a broad agreement with functionalism that: 
“(i) mental functioning could be realised in principle in objects of many different 
forms; and, (ii) we know too little about the form or structure of the mind at present 
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to say anything useful at this level in any case, except that mental functions will 
never be straight-forwardly mapped onto any forms that may be associated with 
them, whatever these forms might be like”  (Brook, 1994, p. 13). He claims that Kant 
accepted a variant of both these positions and that he not only accepted the notion 
that function does not dictate form, but “accepted a very strong version” of it (Brook, 
1994, p.14).  
        Thus, it has been recognised that Kant’s insistence on the unknowability of the 
noumenal mind implies a broad agreement with the main functionalist claims. 
Functionalist readings of Kant emphasise the fact that he frequently treats concepts, 
both the a priori categories and ordinary empirical concepts, as functions that make 
it possible to transform the content of sensory experience into judgments. In the 
Critique Kant claims that we can know nothing about the “substrate” that underlies 
our mental functioning (A350). It follows that if the mind is unknowable, then it 
could take different forms. We cannot determine form from function; indeed, we 
cannot determine from function something even as basic as whether the mind is 
simple or complex (A353). As he writes: 
Through this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented than 
a transcendental subject of the thoughts = X. It is known only through the thoughts 
which are its predicates, and of it, apart from them, we cannot have any concept 
whatsoever, but can only revolve in a perpetual circle, since any judgment upon it 
has always already made use of its representation (A346/B404). 
 
As with modern functionalist theories Kant’s “transcendental” model can be viewed 
as centred on how the mind works at an abstract level, without reference to its 
material constituents.  He organises the mind into certain “faculties”, i.e. sensibility, 
(Sinnlichkeit), or the capacity for spatial and temporal representation (A22/B36), 
understanding, (Verstand), or the capacity for thinking or conceptualising 
(A51/B75), imagination (Einbildungskraft), or the capacity for the connecting of 
elements by forming an image (A120) and reason (Vernunft) or the capacity for 
logical inference and practical decision making.
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 Each of these faculties can be 
described, in functionalist terminology, as responsible for different phases of the 
constructive process that takes raw sensory experience as input and produces 
thoughts or judgments as outputs.  A functionalist interpretation of Kant, therefore, 
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would focus on the theory of “synthesis” that contains Kant’s division of mental 
labour into these more elementary tasks that are necessary for cognition, where he 
systematises the mind into functional “modes” responsible for different stages of the 
cognitive process that receive the disorganised influx of sensory experience as input, 
and which produce thoughts or “judgments” as output. Kant characterises synthesis 
as the activity by which the understanding runs through and “gathers together” the 
elements given by sense experience in order to form concepts, judgments, and 
ultimately, for any cognition to take place at all (A77-8/B102-3).  
        Interestingly, there are two broadly different kinds of synthesis in the Critique: 
the first is the synthesis of the various elements of experience, i.e. colours, edges, 
textures, shapes etc. into representations of single objects. The second kind of 
synthesis is the question of how the various represented objects must be bound 
together into a single representation of a world. This is akin to a key question in 
cognitive science of how the unity of perception is brought about by cognitive and 
neural mechanisms in the brain, the so-called “binding problem” (Treisman and 
Gelade, 1980). Discrete sensory features have to be bound together to form coherent 
perceptual objects, and these objects have to be bound to a common spatial 
framework so as to appear as parts of one globally unified perceptual world. 
Although there are only two broadly different kinds of binding, it is thought to occur 
at virtually all levels of perceptual processing, and thought, by some, to be a crucial 
event for unified phenomenal consciousness itself (Crick and Koch, 1994). In fact, 
this question, concerning perceptual binding and how it is linked to subjective 
phenomenal experience is regarded as one of the foremost problems in the scientific 
study of consciousness today: how does the human mind synthesises its modal and 
sub modal processes to generate a unity of conscious experience? (Zmigrod & 
Hommel, 2011, 2013). The binding problem is, at root, the problem of how the unity 
of conscious perception is brought about by the distributed activities of the central 
nervous system (Revonsuo & Newman, 1999).    
       At this stage it is necessary to explain how “cognitive neuroscience” is 
connected to “cognitive science”.  Neuroscience was first on the scene, the term 
“neuroscience” emerging as a label for the interdisciplinary study of nervous systems 
during the 1960s; the title “cognitive science” was not adopted until the mid 1970s, 
as the label for interdisciplinary studies of cognition. Until the 1980s, there was very 
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little interaction between the two disciplines. This lack of interaction was bolstered 
by the view of certain early functionalists,  e.g. Hilary Putnam (1967) and Jerry 
Fodor (1974) that, since cognition could be multiply realised in many different 
neural as well as non-neural substrates, nothing essential to cognition could be 
learned by studying the  brain, and all that really mattered was function.  However, 
due to the development of new and much more powerful tools for studying brain 
activity, such as PET (positron emission tomography) and fMRI, (functional 
magnetic resonance imaging) this dogma was questioned and “cognitive 
neuroscience” was born. Harvard psychologist George Miller and neurobiologist 
Michael Gazzaniga coined the term “cognitive neuroscience” specifically for the 
study of brain implementation of cognitive functioning, the goal of which was now 
to address the biological foundations of human cognition.
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 Cognitive neuroscientists 
are able to study cognition in the brain by means of new imaging technology which 
enables them to see how behaviour and cognition, as studied by cognitive scientists, 
is expressed in functions in the brain, as studied by neuroscientists.  What matters in 
terms of this thesis is that both are forms of functionalism, where cognition is 
necessarily reductionist; mind is akin to some form of computational mechanism, i.e. 
the mind is the “software” and the brain the “hardware” or “neural mechanisms”. 
Cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience are guided by the paradigm of 
information-processing systems. In fact, computational cognitive neuroscience 
encourages reductionism by taking the mind to be software running on the brain.  
The object of study of cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience is the same, 
except that each focuses on different “levels” of explanation. A crucial component of 
this vision is that states of the system carry information about or “represent” aspects 
of the external world. The basic tenet is that all cognitive functions are at bottom a 
set of rules for handling symbolic entities that represent items of the world.  
      A consequence of computationalist/ functionalist, and also “neuro-reductionist” 
approaches is that they generally lead to a strange eliminativism, that is, to the 
paradoxical elimination of consciousness as the domain of subjective experience 
during the very process of explanation.  From this point of view, the mind, although 
still thought of as “in the head”, is reduced to representational mechanics, defined as 
a system of inputs and outputs. The problem that eventually arose from this was the 
question of how to account for consciousness, defined as subjective, first-person 
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phenomenal experience. As aforementioned, David Chalmers coined the phrase that 
describes it -“the hard problem of consciousness”, and thanks mainly to him, the 
study of consciousness is now one of most vibrant fields in neuroscience, 
particularly in neurobiology. Frank Jackson (1982) and Joseph Levine (1983) had 
already claimed that there is an “explanatory gap” between the mental and the 
physical, and that there are reasons of principle why phenomenal consciousness 
cannot be reductively explained; a purely objective account of phenomenal 
conscious experience in terms of functions and processes cannot give an 
understanding of “what it is like” to have that experience.  This is now regarded as 
the leading challenge to functionalist/materialist/ neurobiological views about the 
mind; an explanatory gap seems to open up since nothing in the functional or 
physical correlates of  mental states explains why this state subjectively feels a 
certain way; it does not explain “what it’s like” to have the experience.  The claim is  
that all reductive strategies to explain how something feels a certain way seem to 
leave a gap in the explanation, in that, strictly speaking, such explanations cannot 
really be understood. This is an updating of the Cartesian notion that every property 
is either a mental kind or a physical kind, and where the extensions of those kinds 
are mutually exclusive.  This resurrection of the Cartesian mind-brain problem, and 
the proposal of the existence of an unbridgeable gap between the physical world and 
the realm of phenomenal consciousness, is seen as a challenging argument against 
reductionist science.  Three hundred years since the original Cartesian model 
initiated an earlier problematic dichotomy between mind and matter, Chalmers puts 
this ancient tangle of philosophical and scientific perplexity into sharp focus for 
modern researchers. In his seminal book, Facing up to the Problem of 
Consciousness, he frames the situation thus:  
 
I think it is widely acknowledged that consciousness is the biggest obstacle to a 
reductionist program in neuroscience, and I think most people in the field, both in 
science and in philosophy, agree that so far neuroscience has at most addressed 
the easy problems of consciousness and not the hard problem (Chalmers, 1996, p. 
xi). 
“Easy problems” are so called because the specification of a mechanism that can 
perform the function is all that is required to solve it. That is, their proposed 
solutions, regardless of how complex or poorly understood they may be, can be 
 36 
 
entirely consistent with the modern materialistic conception of natural phenomena.  
However, claims Chalmers, the “hard problem” is distinct from this, for even when 
the performance of all the relevant functions is explained, the problem of subjective 
phenomenal experience will still persist. This has become the most persistent 
philosophical question in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience since the 
1990’s; whether and how subjective mental properties or qualia can be explained in 
terms of physical properties of the brain, or matter. This “hard problem of 
consciousness” which is linked to the “mind-body problem” is taken to be virtually 
the pre-eminent philosophical problem of today.  
       The principle tenet of a “science of consciousness” is that there is “something it 
is like” to have an experience, that consciousness is essentially characterised by 
reference to there being “something it is like” to be in certain mental state. To those 
who take there to be a real problem,   everything about human cognition apart from 
for the fact of qualia can be or will one day in the future be explained in reductive 
(computational or neural) terms, the “easy” problems.  But this leaves the hard 
problem of explaining the subjective phenomenal experience, or “what it’s likeness” 
of experience.  Others claim that function is all that is required to understand mind; 
anything meaningful we can say about mind or consciousness can be explained 
entirely in computer functionalist terms. In fact, every approach to the “problem of 
consciousness” has become a response, positive or negative, to the Cartesian 
distinction between body and mind. Today, centuries after Descartes philosophical 
dualism, the powerful and persuasive argument still continues to hold fast. Many 
theories of consciousness have emerged: with  operations in the global workspace 
(Baars, 1988;  1996, Dehaene & Naccache, 2001), or with competition for action 
control (Shallice, 1988), or with informational content (Chalmers, 1996; Tye, 1995, 
2005; Dretske, 1995; Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012) or with higher-order thought 
(Armstrong, 1968; Rosenthal, 1997, 2005; Lycan, 1996; Carruthers, 2006; Byrne, 
1997, 2004). Also, motivated by the notorious interpretation problems and the 
“measurement problem” in modern physics, there have been numerous attempts to 
modify or “complete” quantum mechanics through a theory of human consciousness 
by means of a combination with gravitation theory (Roger Penrose/Stuart 
Hameroff’s Orch OR model, 1996, 2011, 2014), with quantum information theory 
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(Caves, Fuchs & Schack, 2007) or with psychology and brain science (Stapp, 2009, 
2014).  
        It is proposed that paying attention to the insights of Kant  would  show that 
accepting that there actually is a  problem of consciousness, in the way that is stated, 
is a philosophical mistake; it is not only insoluble as its stands, but that all efforts to 
solve it intrinsically risk both perpetuating its pre-eminence and further guaranteeing 
its insolubility. There is no solution to the hard problem of a consciousness, nor a 
way of getting rid of the problem, at least in not the way that it is currently 
presented. In fact, it guarantees, in a particularly powerful way, the perpetuation of 
the problem, of keeping it alive indefinitely.  This is why the hard problem of 
consciousness, as it is presented in much of the literature, seems as intractable as 
ever.   
       Recent empirical work in cognitive neuroscience claims to be able to support the 
continuing endeavour to find consciousness in the brain through discovering the so-
called “neural correlates of consciousness” or NCCs  (Koch, 2004, Lamy, D., Salti, 
M.,  Bar-Haim, Y., 2009) i.e. the neural representational systems the activation of 
which is sufficient to bring about the occurrence of a specific conscious experience 
when certain specific, identifiable neural background conditions are in place.
27
 The 
first main task for the neuroscience of consciousness, according to proponents of this 
view, is to find these neural correlates, specifically the minimal neural correlates for 
the phenomenal contents of consciousness.  It had been discovered, in some early 
work in neuroscience on epileptic patients, that direct stimulation to the cortex in 
conscious subjects had certain highly individualised effects; it had been shown that 
stimulation of certain areas bring about experiences with a very particular 
phenomenology ( Penfield, 1954, 1958). The fundamental idea of finding the NCCs 
is that this can be applied more generally; and once more is known about the brain, 
scientists will be able to discover precisely how consciousness comes about; i.e. 
there will be an isomorphism between phenomenal experience and these NCCs.  
This endeavour to find the neural correlate of consciousness has become a sustained, 
intense focal point for scientific research on consciousness.  In fact, Crick and Koch, 
on presenting their conception of an NCC in 1998, stated that “[w]henever some 
information is represented in the NCC it is represented in consciousness” (Crick and 
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Koch, 1998, p. 98). That is, the main purpose of a science of consciousness is to 
uncover the neural representational systems whose contents systematically match the 
contents of consciousness.  The aim is that this will eventually lead to a scientific 
theory of that will explain how consciousness relates to the brain.  
       This is an area of intense philosophical disputation with deeply polarised 
opinions, and it shows little sign of abating - the problem of consciousness is firmly 
entrenched in the scientific research arena as the vast amount of literature on the 
topic attests to, with others claiming that function is all that is required to understand 
mind, and that we can dispense with consciousness altogether, that anything 
meaningful that can be said about mind or consciousness can be explained purely in 
computer functionalist terms. It is suggested that this understanding of cognition has 
been heavily and sometimes unwittingly influenced by the Cartesian intuitions about 
inner and outer, the ontological divide between the mental and physical, which is 
reinforced by ordinary, everyday mentalistic discourse.  It is also a reaction to, and 
an artefact produced by, adherence to the functionalist orthodoxy in which 
consciousness is reducible to or explicable by a set of functional cognitive processes 
realised in the brain. On Kant’s view, mistaken beliefs about the mind and 
consciousness arise from reification of first person phenomenal experience because 
certain philosophers (Descartes) have projected the particularity of private, first 
person experience onto a third person entity called “the mind”  or “thinking 
substance”. 28 Chalmers reinvents that dichotomy by claiming that science needs to 
give an account of how certain neural processes give rise to qualia described as 
something extra on top of brain functionality.  This picture reasserts the Cartesian 
dichotomy between the mental and the physical/functional domain - consciousness is 
still some sort of non-extended, non-spatial property that eludes current scientific 
explanation. This dualism is denied by others who take the Humean position that 
there is nothing to explain over and above function, and has resulted in the endless 
intellectual parlour game that Dennett terms “burden tennis” where the field of play 
is conceptual space and each side claims that the ball is in the other’s court. In fact, 
the consciousness debates have provoked more angst than most as opposing sides 
tend to find the others positions not simply wrong but manifestly preposterous. Due 
to its perceived intractability, others, for example, Colin McGinn, have claimed that 
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we are “cognitivily closed” or constitutionally incapable of ever solving the hard 
problem (McGinn, 1989). 
       Recently, a novel view of the mind has emerged as an alternative to 
representational theories of cognition, that of embodied or enactive cognition, first 
proposed most explicitly by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991). This is a gradual 
move away from the still widely-held functionalist approach to cognition that 
presents the manipulation of inner symbols or mental representations as the mark of 
the mental. From this perspective the mind appears as a dynamical process, and not a 
merely a syntactic one; a dynamic of real time variables with the capacity for self-
organisation. As noted above, cognitive science encourages reductionism by taking 
the mind to be software running on the brain, but according to embodied cognitive 
science the object of study is not mental representation, but the non-linearly coupled 
body-environment system. Most importantly, the mind is not “in the head” (Alva 
(Noë, 2009) since its roots are in the body as a whole and also in the extended 
environment in which the organism finds itself. To the extent that embodied 
cognitive scientists do study brains, they study them only as parts of behaving 
animals in information-rich environments. This means that the constitution of a mind 
is always concurrent with the extended presence of the environment and of other 
beings in the world. This idea has strong roots in Kant. In fact, what is present in 
Kant, also finds a convergent development from current philosophy of biology and 
the scientific notion of autopoiesis. On this view, instead of either trying to solve the 
hard problem of consciousness, (Cartesian) or describing consciousness as an 
illusion, (Humean) as is commonplace in reductionist, functionalist accounts, a new 
understanding of a form of immanent teleological “presence” involving truly 
biological features is now on the horizon, inevitably intertwined with the self-
establishment of a conscious identity which is at the same time the living process, a 
“teleological circle”.   
       It is argued that Kant was committed to an active, sensorimotor view of 
consciousness, realising the spontaneity of rational agent through acts of “synthesis” 
or binding in an embodied biological system. His views, to be found in his later 
work, the Critique of the Power of Judgement, depict the human mind as 
metaphysically continuous with biological life, and display his recognition that 
rational human agents are necessarily also rational human living organisms, i.e. 
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biological animals capable of intentionality whose rational mindedness and rational 
directedness towards objects in the world, other real persons, and themselves, is fully 
continuous with this (see Hanna R and Maiese M, 2009). Moreover, in his last 
philosophical writings, the Opus Postumum, Kant refers to the work undertaken in 
the Critique of Pure Reason. Without invalidating the a priori categories that had 
been the possibility of all knowledge, he finds an entirely new foundation for them, 
the lived body. The moving forces of matter, the prime subject of natural science, are 
not deduced from the a priori categories of reason but themselves are a basic 
experience underlying all a priori categories.  
       In the Critique of Judgement Kant classifies various biological theories on offer 
and endorses epigenesis (CPJ 5: 422- 424); he also extends this theory analogically 
to his theory of cognitive innateness and the “epigenesis of pure reason” (B167). In 
fact, the concept of epigenesis lies at the heart of his conception of reason. Jennifer 
Mensch (2013) has written extensively about this, and the use of the biological term 
in Kant’s work, drawing on a substantial body of philosophical and scientific works, 
including his published writings, correspondence and Nachlass, to substantiate her 
claim that Kant’s engagement with the life sciences shaped his philosophical 
development even prior to the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason. She notes 
that even  before his critical period, in “The Only Possible Argument in Support of a 
Demonstration of the Existence of God,” 1763, Kant explicitly rejects the 
preformationist conception of biological generation and embryogenesis, according to 
which biological individuals and their complex structures are  “pre-formed” (and 
require only the mechanical addition of bulk through nutrition in order to develop)  
in favour of the epigenetic view, whereby the basic forms or structures of creatures 
themselves are emergently generated by the spontaneous operations of a “generative 
force, and two kinds of internal constraints on the generative force, “germs” and 
“dispositions” which determine the outcome of the developmental process. 
Furthermore, she points out that in 1771, at the very beginning of his Critical period, 
Kant wrote: “Crusius explains the real principle of reason on the basis of 
[preformationism], Locke on the basis of [physical influx] like [Aristotle]; Plato and 
Malebranche, from [intellectual intuition]; we, on the basis of epigenesis from the 
use of the natural laws of reason” (Immanuel Kant, Kants gesammelte Schriften, 29 
vols. (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1902–), vol. 17, p. 492; quoted in Mensch, Kant’s 
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Organicism, p. 83). According to Mensch “[t]his (...) allowed Kant to think of reason 
as a creature of its own making, as something self-born yet containing germs and 
predispositions for the possibility of its completion within an organic system that had 
been generated by itself. This model of epigenesis “allowed the openness of reason’s 
possibilities to be maintained” (Mensch, 2013, p. 153). 29   
       Thus, although Kant is often conceived as having offered little attention to the 
fact that we experience the world in and through our bodies, there is evidence that 
not only does he, throughout his career and in works published before and after the 
Critiques, reflect constantly upon the fact that human life is embodied, but the 
Critique of Pure Reason itself may be read as a critical reflection aimed at exploring 
some significant philosophical implications of this fact.  In his later work Kant 
extends such notion to non-human animals, i.e. living beings in general.  In the spirit 
of the modern perspective of enactivism, his thesis is that each organism brings forth 
his own embodiment to face the world, thus creating its own umwelt or 
consciousness. This is a further example of how Kant’s insights continue to be of 
relevance in current debates in cognitive science and neuroscience about the mind 
and its place in nature.  
        The following chapter begins the work of defending Kant’s transcendental 
psychology against a purely analytic reading. This is necessary because the 
foundational premise of this thesis is that a purely analytic interpretation is mistaken 
and narrow; and that there is much need for an understanding which fully embraces 
the “subjective” aspect of the Critique. Taking seriously the transcendental aspect is 
truly warranted because it can be made fruitful in addressing several conceptual 
puzzles and problematic ideas which have arisen in the cognitive sciences due to the 
subliminal grip of Cartesian and Humean assumptions about mental life in general 
which continue to hold sway today.  This is related to the fact that analytic 
philosophy has moved on from its original concerns in the philosophy of logic and 
mathematics, and currently “possible world semantics” is regarded as useful in 
addressing the mind-body problem. As stated earlier, a 2D possible worlds semantic 
framework has been used to promote a type of conceivability argument in connection 
with metaphysical possibility in relation to this (Chalmers, 1996). The core notion is 
that for phenomenal concepts, conceivability implies possibility, and that whatever is 
logically possible is also metaphysically possible. The argument is also based on the 
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Cartesian-like “intuition” of distinctness between consciousness or qualia and 
physicalism, and on inference from an epistemic gap between them to an ontological 
one, that there really is a gap, and not just a gap in our understanding.  A “hard 
problem of consciousness” thus arises because consciousness or qualia cannot be 
given a functional analysis, but is conceived as something “extra” which 
accompanies or is produced by neural states, and which lies beyond any functional 
organisation of the brain. This “conceivability argument” as it is termed is, in truth, a 
rehashing of the Cartesian real distinction between mind and body in the Sixth 
Meditation
 
retrofitted for compatibility with contemporary modal logic by Chalmers 
(and indeed Kripke before him 
30
) and amounts to new form of dualism (property 
dualism) which substantialises or objectivises mind as well as matter. This is the 
kind of problematic understanding of mind that Kant addresses in his analysis of the 
philosophy of his forebears. In light of this, the following chapter begins the defense 
of Kant’s transcendental psychology against its many detractors within the analytic 
tradition, and is concerned with rescuing it from the charge that it is unworthy of 
serious attention. Transcendental psychology is Kant’s theory of mind, his critical 
analysis of the necessary a priori faculties required for cognition that, when rightly 
understood, can assist considerably in providing conceptual clarity and direction for 
contemporary research in the cognitive sciences and the neurosciences, where some 
of the most puzzling, and ancient,  philosophical problems have resurfaced and 
remain. 
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2. In Defence of Kant’s Transcendental Psychology. 
 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is universally regarded as a watershed in the history 
of philosophy, since it radically transformed the nature of Western thought.  One of 
the main reasons for this was that it changed the philosophical conception of a 
human being from that of a passive spectator of the natural world, who, in a sense, 
exists apart from it, to that of an autonomous  agent  who has a necessary part to play 
in the construction of that very world. In this first Critique Kant sought to explain 
the objectivity of our understanding by describing the operation of certain human 
cognitive activities; that is, he sought to explain objectivity by appealing to features 
of the mind.  Philosophers of the dominant positivist analytic school of philosophy, 
however, claimed that it is possible to formulate a version of the argument that 
abstracts entirely from the subjective aspect, and considered only the objective 
aspect.  Analytic philosophy split from Kantian thought and from continental 
philosophy through the logical positivists’ association with Frege, who was 
instrumental in putting a rigorous logic at the heart of philosophy. He was influential 
in the philosophy of mathematics, logic and language and held two fundamental 
tenets: a) that the basis for mathematics could be securely derived from logic and b) 
that a rigorous analysis of the underlying logic of sentences or propositions would 
enable us to judge their truth-value. This resulted in a turn towards language as the 
subject matter of philosophy that involves an accompanying methodological turn 
towards linguistic analysis. This manner of doing philosophy has dominated 
academic departments in various regions, most notably Great Britain and the United 
States, since the early twentieth century.  
        Initially, the logical empiricists of the Vienna Circle strongly rejected the 
aspirations of metaphysics, and more or less restricted philosophy to what they 
called “the logic of scientific language”,  using the principle of verification as the 
key to the notion of linguistic meaning and invoking verifiability as a criterion of 
meaningfulness. In the United Kingdom, where Logical Positivism was the product 
of the analytic tradition of the Vienna Circle, Russell, and A.J. Ayer constructed 
various theories of knowledge and methods of logical analysis aimed at making 
philosophy purely scientific, using the tools of scientific testing and procedure to 
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avoid the unprofitable web of speculative metaphysics. As a result of the influence of 
the new trend, logic and psychology went their separate ways; the mind, which was 
rightly considered central to Kant’s account of objectivity, was expunged from it. 
The mind simply had no place in philosophical accounts of the objectivity of 
knowledge. On their positivist list of priorities was the elimination of traditional 
metaphysics and the main complaint of analytic philosophers concerning the 
Critique was that Kant’s transcendental psychology was incoherent and founded on a 
conceptual confusion,  that of psychologism, i.e. the illicit explanatory reduction of 
logic to empirical psychology. Ever since the onset of analytic philosophy, 
“psychological” readings of the Critique have been discouraged; those who have 
acknowledged intellectually the psychological import of the work have been charged 
with lapsing from philosophical sanity. This being so, the Transcendental Deduction,  
the second chapter of Transcendental Analytic section of the Critique, where Kant 
investigates the psychological prerequisites of cognition, was retranslated by various 
analytic philosophers into different kinds of analytic argument.   Although differing 
in detail, what united them was that each of them sought to prove the anti-sceptical 
conclusion that empirical objects have a necessary categorical structure, whilst 
simultaneously avoiding any unnecessary and “irrelevant” reference to the subjective 
or to psychology.  For example, Peter Strawson’s famous Objectivity Thesis states 
that  “for a series of diverse experiences to belong to a single consciousness it is 
necessary that they should be so connected as to constitute a temporally extended 
experience of a unified objective world” (Strawson, 1966, p. 97).   
       The purpose of this chapter is to show that this is a mistaken and narrow view.  
Indeed, contra the charge of irrelevance, questions concerning the status of Kant’s 
transcendental psychological claims lie at the heart of the critical project. For the 
Critique, according to Kant, is precisely the abstract investigation of human 
cognitive capabilities in order to determine the scope of objective human knowledge. 
This was his “Copernican Revolution” (Bxvi) that turned the focus of philosophy 
away from metaphysical speculation on the nature of reality to a critical examination 
of the nature of the thinking and perceiving mind. An analytic interpretation that 
retranslates the work simply in terms of the objective conditions for the justification 
of empirical knowledge claims, (the objective side) is inadequate; there needs to be 
recognition of a further, equally important dimension, that of Kant’s detailed 
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examination of the mental capacities that make cognition possible, (the subjective 
side).  Kant’s transcendental psychology, despite his claim that he deemed it 
secondary to his main concerns, which was to justify our conviction that physics, 
like mathematics, is a body of necessary and universal truths, is invaluable, not only 
in terms of  the insights it can contribute to contemporary cognitive science but also 
within the discipline of philosophy itself. Kant was by no means an empirical 
psychologist; his cognitive theory was motivated by epistemological and 
metaphysical concerns. Nevertheless, his transcendental psychology is a kind of 
psychology, which, when properly understood, can provide insights and direction for 
contemporary research.  
 
2.1. The Subjective and Objective Deductions 
 
Analytic philosophy as an academic discipline or tradition finds its origins in the 
work of Gottlob Frege (1848-1925),  Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), G. E. Moore 
(1873-1958), and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) and has developed into a 
complex movement (or set of interconnected sub-traditions) that dominate academic 
philosophy today - although, as mentioned earlier, there is no single defining feature 
of analytic philosophy, and it can be perhaps best understood “as a tradition tied 
together both by ties of influence and by family resemblances” (Glock, 2008, p. 
204).
31
 During the 1960s a trend was initiated within this broadly defined analytic 
tradition that coloured Kantian exegesis, so that talk of the subjective side of the 
Critique became philosophically questionable. Kant had claimed there could be no 
perception of reality unmediated by human conceptualisation; that knowledge 
requires the application of categories which mould and shape experience into 
coherent form. All knowledge is necessary relative to a conceptual scheme, beyond 
which knowledge is impossible. Whereas Kant had located this in the mind, the 
positivists saw it as embodied in the language of logic or science. As already stated, 
the main complaint about the Critique is that Kant’s transcendental psychology was 
founded on a conceptual confusion, that of psychologism which is related to his idea 
of the transcendental. Kant uses the label transcendental for “all knowledge which is 
occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so 
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far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori” (B 25/A12).  In the 
Transcendental Deduction he distinguishes between the “objective” and the 
“subjective” deductions (Axvii). The objective and subjective deductions present 
arguments about the transcendental structure of the representations of objects and the 
transcendental structure of a mind that has those representations, respectively. All 
commentators agree that the purpose of the Critique is to investigate the a priori 
conditions that are necessary for the possibility of knowledge, and also that this 
involves the conceptual and other cognitive conditions of having representations of 
object. However, analytic philosophers denied that this necessarily entails an 
analysis of what the mind, the “subjective sources” of understanding (A97), must, as 
a consequence, be like. It is suggested that this widespread contempt for this latter 
“psychological” or “subjective” aspect of the work, by philosophers of the dominant 
analytic traditional persuasion represents a blinkered view. As stated in the 
introduction, Norman Kemp Smith, the translator of the Critique into its original 
English Standard version, complained in 1918,  “No interpretation which ignores or 
underestimates the psychological or subjective aspect of [Kant’s] teaching can be 
admitted as adequate” (Kemp Smith,1962, p. 51).  In fact, the Subjective Deduction 
is every bit as essential to the goal of the Deduction as the Objective Deduction. 
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Without the arguments put forward in the Subjective Deduction, the whole of the 
Deduction will not work. Kant was interested, in particular, with the abstract nature 
of mental processing, requiring the need for acts of synthesis and the kind of unity 
required for such acts, and interpreted properly, his work contains a wealth of 
insights that were not only important in his own time but which continue to have 
relevance today. The following section presents a short history of the debate. 
 
2. 2. The History of the Debate  
 
Even from a perfunctory reading of the Critique, one would be hard-pressed to deny 
its psychological content.  Kant talks about psychological matters regularly, 
particularly in the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Deduction, 
which contain many discussions concerning psychological processes and powers. He 
also discusses psychology in the Paralogisms (chapters where he discusses faulty 
arguments about the mind mounted by his predecessors, notably Descartes). Yet not 
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only in these parts of the Critique do we find psychological language. For Kant 
adopts an implicitly psychological vocabulary even in the most philosophical parts 
of his work. In fact, so pervasive are Kant’s “psychological” discussions, that, as 
several recent Kant scholars have pointed out, if we fail consider this aspect of the 
work then there is not really much remaining to discuss. As one prominent Kant 
scholar has expressed it, “if interpreters (…) excise or ignore all the discussions of 
cognitive processes and powers then they will have very little left to read” (Kitcher, 
1993. p. 4). Nevertheless, contempt for this psychological aspect of the Critique has 
resulted in most commentators either ignoring or dismissing such readings as beyond 
the pale of serious philosophical analysis.  Moreover, this interpretative model has 
been so dominant that, as Kitcher notes, “even recent philosophy of mind has been 
anti-psychologistic” (ibid., p. 8.).  This is not a new phenomenon: despite the 
prominent and extensive use of psychological language in the Critique there has, 
historically, been a misunderstanding of its role. In fact, from the time of Kant 
himself, the role of psychology in the Critique has been much discussed and 
opinions have varied. Some have considered that the book is primarily a work in 
psychology, although assessments about its precise nature and its propriety for 
Kant’s purposes have differed. There are those that are happy to find a full-blown 
empirical psychology in the work (even though Kant did not recognise this). 
However, most have contended that the psychological content is a demerit, and 
evidence that Kant was in the grip of a deep-seated conceptual confusion.  In fact, 
from Karl Leonard Reinhold, (1758-1823), who popularised his views, through until 
Henry Allison (Allison, 1996), and Paul Guyer (1987, 1989) the view has often been 
expressed that Kant’s  “psychological” subject matter is incoherent, and that he had 
erred in casting his arguments in this form. Scholars in general have tended to steer 
clear of this aspect of the Critique, regarding those who choose not to do so as 
having lapsed from philosophical sanity and as having committed the error of 
“psychologism”. But what exactly is “psychologism”? Psychologism is a derogatory 
term, a kind of blanket condemnation capable of being used for significantly 
different types of argument. It is for this reason, not a simple concept to define. 
However, in its central usage it is the logical fallacy of confusing the normative with 
the factual or, to put it in more perspicuous terms, in Kant’s case, it is the 
explanatory reduction of the necessary, a priori, and universal subject-matter of 
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logic to the contingent, a posteriori, and relativised subject-matter of empirical 
psychology.  Kant, along with those who dare to take his psychology seriously, in 
being charged with “psychologism” are regarded as having been guilty of 
transgressing the proper bounds of philosophy.   
       Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl were jointly responsible for instigating this 
strong anti-psychological stance within philosophy, and initiated a trend which 
became a dominant influence on its subsequent development. In The Foundations of 
Arithmetic, Frege writes, as a first principle of his method, that is “crucial always to 
separate sharply the logical from the psychological, the subjective from the 
subjective sources of understanding” (Frege, G., 1884, p. xxii). Frege was concerned 
to provide a philosophical defence of the claims of mathematics to be a system of 
objective knowledge. He was against, on the one hand, mathematicians who treat 
knowledge as a matter of relating ideas, and on the other, those “conventionalists” 
that claim that they have the right to create new mathematical concepts. Frege’s 
conception of mathematical knowledge is of an objectively existing reality which 
exists or, rather, “subsists” independently of psychology or human cognitive 
capacities. Language serves to represent this domain by means of sentences which 
say either truly or falsely how things are. The meanings of words cannot, therefore, 
be a function of how things are “in the mind”, i.e. of ideas and thought processes, but 
rather, their meanings are grounded in the contribution they make to fixing the truth-
conditions of those sentences in which they occur.  In this way Frege turned the 
focus of philosophical attention away from “thought processes” to language and its 
function in the communication of knowledge. The language he is referring to is not 
actually existing natural language, but the ideal logical language which links human 
beings to the structures of  “objective reality”.  Although he only attacks the use of 
psychological concepts in the philosophy of mathematics and logic, this conception 
of the principles to be used when conducting philosophical investigations became a 
dominant influence on the subsequent development of philosophy.
33
 For his views 
influenced Russell, Wittgenstein and Carnap, the three founders of analytic 
philosophy, who were instrumental in establishing logic and Fregean philosophy of 
language as the paradigm of proper philosophy, thereby perpetuating this way of 
thinking. Through them the practice of psychologism became a serious philosophical 
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faux pas, one which drew scorn and pity, anyone making any significant association 
of logic with psychology regarded as almost beyond redemption.   
       A contributing factor leading to the demise of Kant’s psychology was that 
interest in Frege was revived in 1950 when prominent philosopher  J.L. Austin 
published an English translation of the Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. This led to a 
new generation of philosophers who were influenced by Frege. Peter Strawson was 
one such scholar, and in The Bounds of Sense, in which he presents a philosophical 
analysis of the Critique, he roundly charges Kant with the excesses of  
“transcendental psychology”. This book became extremely influential and gave rise 
to many others based on the same interpretive model. Although Strawson admits of 
the Critique that “the idiom of the book is throughout a psychological idiom” 
(Strawson, 1966 p. 19), he refuses to read the book psychologically and either 
ignores Kant’s frequent references to psychological processes or dismisses them as 
irrelevant, reprimanding him for not practising serious philosophy, writing of Kant’s 
transcendental psychology that “there is no doubt that this doctrine is incoherent in 
itself and masks rather than explains the real nature of Kant’s enquiry” ( ibid.,  p. 
16).  Moreover, he writes of synthesis that “the whole theory (...) like any essay in 
transcendental psychology, is exposed to the ad hominem objection that we can 
claim no empirical knowledge of its truth; for this would be to claim empirical 
knowledge of the occurrence of that which is held to be the antecedent condition of 
empirical knowledge” and that “the entire theory is best regarded as one of the 
aberrations into which Kant’s explanatory model inevitably led him” (ibid., p. 32). 
The propositions of the doctrine of synthesis “belong neither to empirical 
psychology nor to an analytic philosophy of mind” (...) “they belong to the 
imaginary subject of transcendental psychology” (ibid., p. 97) [my italics]. Kant’s 
attempt to interpret the transcendental conditions of empirical knowledge as 
elements of our subjectivity does not contribute anything to the project of descriptive 
metaphysics with which he is engaged.  The Bounds of Sense spawned what has been 
termed “analytic Kantianism”, a descriptive metaphysics that is taken to be a good 
model of what Kant was really up to, and which claims that therefore his philosophy 
should be reconstructed accordingly.  
       Thus it was that powerful intellectual forces both within and without Kantian 
scholarship resulted in the exclusion of Kant’s transcendental psychology from 
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mainstream philosophical debate. Strawson had the strong conviction that the 
analytic approach in philosophy was the most fruitful one, and all of his work 
exemplified it. For him, the Critique is best understood as a purely analytic argument 
and he viewed his task as one of disengaging the analytic from the psychological 
side with a view to bypassing the psychological altogether.  He supposes that what 
he is dismissing is mere idiom on Kant’s part and that the true insights of the work 
lie in an “analytical argument which is in fact independent of [the doctrine of the 
faculties]” (ibid., p.16). 34 In his attempt to distance the apperception thesis from 
undesirable psychological connotations Strawson reconstructs it into the analytic 
argument that in order to have self-consciousness, subjects must be able to ascribe 
mental states to themselves, in what has become known as the “self-ascription 
thesis”. He writes: 
Unity of consciousness to which a series of experiences belong implies...the 
possibility of self-ascription … [that is] the possibility of consciousness, on the 
part of the subject, of the numerical identity of that to which those different 
experiences are by him ascribed (ibid., p. 98). 
 
Strawson’s aim is to “disentangle” the logical or analytic from the psychological 
aspects of the Critique  in order to present it as an “analytic argument” (ibid., p.16). 
As Patricia Kitcher (1993, 2006) has noted, he does not so much “disentangle”, 
however, as raise psychological arguments only to dismiss them as useless. 
Examples of other philosophers with similar views abound. Jonathan Bennett, for 
instance, in Kant’s Analytic, published at the same time as The Bounds of Sense, also 
shied away from a psychological reading of the Critique. Instead of charging Kant 
with “psychologism”, however, he courteously attributes to Kant a Wittgensteinian 
view, rather than one concerned with “psychological” issues such as synthesis. 
Moreover, Henry Allison and Paul Guyer, although offering dramatically opposed 
interpretations of the Critique, at least agree on the issue of  Kant’s psychology, and 
that is, to avoid it at all costs. Other commentators also argue along similar lines. 
T.E.Wilkerson writes that “self-consciousness is more happily described as the 
ability to identify one’s own experiences as one’s own” (Wilkerson, 1976. p. 52). In 
fact, Wilkerson really combines a self-ascription reading with a specifically “logical” 
one. He writes “the unity of self-consciousness is (…) a formal unity consisting in 
the formal fact that experiences are mine” (Wilkerson, op. cit., p 52) [my italics]. In 
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these ways the doctrine of apperception is reconstructed in terms of the logic of self-
ascription and “psychology” is avoided.         
       The transcendental unity of apperception poses a substantial problem for such 
interpretations, since it is the necessary attribute of a “thinker”, and a “thinker” is a 
being capable of cognitive experience, who is self-conscious and who has a mental 
life. Nevertheless, so concerned are scholars of the analytic tradition to downplay the 
subjective side of the deduction that they have argued that it is either a non-
psychological or an innocuously psychological claim about thinkers.  However, in 
neglecting this aspect of the Critique and adhering to an analytic interpretation, they 
lose the richness of Kant’s analyses into various aspects of human cognition. They 
also miss out on the opportunity to contribute to contemporary philosophical and 
scientific debate about the mind. During the latter part of the last century the face of 
psychology has changed.  Behaviourism has declined. Cognitive psychology and 
cognitive science are now areas of rapid growth and exciting discoveries. It would be 
a shame if, through uncritical adherence to the analytic tradition, the opportunity to 
participate in philosophical discussions concerning these discoveries were lost. As 
mentioned earlier, Kant was by no means an empirical psychologist; his cognitive 
theory was motivated by epistemological and metaphysical concerns. Nevertheless it 
is a different kind of psychology and understood properly it can provide insights and 
direction for contemporary research.  
 
       Thus far this chapter has examined how certain interpretations of the Critique 
have, in the past, led to the charge of the fallacy of “psychologism” of which analytic 
philosophers have been wary. This is, in part, due to the Frege’s anti-psychologism, 
which influenced the rest of philosophy. The core meaning of psychologism is that 
some important aspect of the realm of normative logic relies upon or is constituted 
by facts about human cognition; or, in simpler terms, it is the explanatory reduction 
of logic to empirical psychology. Kant scholars believed that the less they said about 
Kant’s “transcendental psychology” the better. In referring to it they tended to 
highlight Kant’s own negative comments about the value of psychology whilst 
ignoring the many references that are made about psychological processes.    
       Psychology may very well be inappropriate in logic; however, it is somewhat 
extreme to banish it from the rest of philosophy. It is true that Kant analyses the 
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“concept” of objective experience and the “logic” of various knowledge claims yet 
also refers to psychological features and processes. This does not mean that Kant’s 
use of psychological language reveals a deep seated confusion on his part. His 
project was to determine how it is that we come to have certain types of knowledge 
or of how we come to reason and know. In so doing he naturally considers the 
cognitive apparatus that humans standardly possess. Kant did not feel the need that 
more recent scholars have to separate strictly “logically necessary” from “causal” or 
psychological conditions. Although there is a tendency among scholars to place 
studies under the heading of one discipline or other, there is no reason why they 
cannot belong to both. In other words, there is no need to be confined to “logically 
necessary conditions” or to “psychology”. For there is an alternative possibility, 
which construes Kant as examining both the necessary conditions of the mind’s 
operations and the actual psychology involved in them. This type of account neither 
limits itself to “logically necessary condition” nor commits the “fallacy” of 
psychologism. Although analytic commentators have taken Kant’s notion of the 
transcendental or logical to exclude the empirical, so that if we take A as being 
logically necessary or a transcendent feature of B, A cannot be an empirical fact 
about B, Kant did not feel the need of those philosophers to separate the necessary 
from causal and other empirical conditions, for he felt that his enterprise concerned 
both.  The purpose of the next section is to rethink some of the major areas of 
contention.  
 
2.3. Rethinking the Transcendental Deduction 
The central and most important section of the Critique is the Transcendental 
Deduction of the Pure Categories of Experience. The “transcendental unity of 
apperception” lies at the heart of the Deduction as Kant’s principle doctrine 
concerning the necessary requirements for cognitive experience. As Kant defines it: 
[It] is that self-consciousness which, while generating the representation “I think” 
(a representation which must be capable of accompanying all other 
representations, and which in all consciousness is one and the same), cannot itself 
be accompanied by any further representation (B 132).  
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A transcendental deduction in general is a justification of the employment of a priori 
concepts that render experience intelligible for a subject. This being the case the 
Deduction would appear to be a doctrine the subject matter of which is concerned, in 
some sense, with human psychology. However, Kant was very clear that his 
philosophical aim was to be distinguished from that of empirical psychology.  For 
example, he states that empirical psychology, what he termed “the physiology of 
inner sense” (A347/B119), a psychology based on introspective observation, could 
never gain “knowledge (...) of any object” (A381) i.e. determine any underlying 
structure in the flux of inner sense.  He also declares, in a famous passage in the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, that empirical psychology can never 
achieve the status of a science and should be banished from metaphysics (AAIV, p. 
471).  Yet, problematically, he also made extensive use of psychological vocabulary, 
even in the self-proclaimed philosophical parts of the book. This is what has led to 
the dispute among scholars as to the extent to which Kant used psychological 
grounds as a basis for his arguments.  
       That Kant made extensive use of psychological language is impossible to deny. 
Throughout the Critique he made frequent appeals to psychological processes, in 
particular in discussing his doctrine of synthesis which he writes about as if it were a 
causal process in the mind. As he puts it, synthesis requires that the manifold “be 
gone through in a certain way, taken up and connected”. It is “the act of putting 
different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one 
[act of] knowledge” (A77/B103). He also appeals to introspection, often appearing to 
say that it is the having of direct knowledge of a self as the subject of the synthetic 
activities that underlies the unity of apperception. Although he is clear that the only 
knowledge we have of ourselves is as “appearance” through empirical apperception, 
we, nevertheless, in transcendental apperception, are able to have “consciousness” of 
ourselves as the locus the activity of synthesis. This he calls a “thought”. As he 
writes: 
In the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representations in general, and 
therefore in the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am conscious of 
myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. This 
representation is a thought, not an intuition. Now, in order to know ourselves, 
there is required in addition to the act of thought, which brings the manifold of 
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every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, a determinate mode of 
intuition whereby this manifold is given…The consciousness of self is thus very 
far from being a knowledge of the self...(B157/8) [my italics]. 
 
Kant also refers to the “I think” as “the logical subject of thought” (A350), a “formal 
unity of consciousness” (A105) or a “formal proposition of apperception” (A354). 
Again, at A398 he writes that “the ‘I’ in ‘I think’ is only the formal condition, 
namely the logical unity of every thought”. However, what he meant by “formal” or 
“logical” is not entirely perspicuous. The approaches of Strawson and other Kantian 
analytic philosophers make sense only on a sharp distinction between what Kant 
meant by “logical” and what we now mean by “psychological”, a presupposition 
which does not bear much scrutiny. In the Transcendental Deduction Kant seeks to 
prove that the pure concepts of the understanding, the twelve categories, identified 
earlier in the Metaphysical Deduction, are objectively valid for empirical objects, 
and this is the problem of whether it is legitimate to use categories like cause-effect 
to think about empirical objects, and the solution Kant gives is that the categories are 
the very conditions of the possibility of experiencing objects at all. We cannot 
experience objects unless we experience them as falling under these a priori 
principles. He also discusses the necessary interdependence of object consciousness 
and the transcendental unity of apperception, which is the ultimate condition of the 
possibility of experience. There could be no experience of objects at all if the 
manifold of representations were not synthesised or combined by the mind through 
the unity of apperception (A108/135). This means that there can be no experience of 
objects without experiencing them as falling under the categories and no self-
consciousness without experiencing objects as falling under the categories.  The 
“transcendental unity of apperception” is the point where the self and the world 
come together.   
      The transcendental unity of apperception is, therefore, both the name for a 
faculty of synthesis and also the for what he referred to as the “I think”, 
consciousness of oneself as subject. So, when Kant says that “I” of “I think” is the 
“logical subject of thought” (A350) or a “formal subject of thought” (A105) or a 
“formal proposition of apperception” (A354) what does he mean by this? As 
discussed above, Wilkerson explains it by saying that that the unity of consciousness 
is a “formal” unity “consisting simply in the formal fact that experiences are mine” 
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(Wilkerson, op. cit., p 52). However, it is not at all clear what he can mean by this. 
He cannot mean that it is a fact of formal logic that mental states belong to a thinking 
subject. For Kant logic investigates the rules governing understanding in general, 
whereas Transcendental Logic “concerns itself with the laws of understanding and 
reason solely insofar as they relate a priori to objects” (A57/B82). Kant held that 
logic is part of what we would nowadays call “psychology”. The following passage 
from the Anthropology illustrates how Kant saw the contrasting domains of logic and 
psychology.  It shows that we would nowadays include both his logic and his 
psychology as being in the domain of psychology. 
  
The lower cognitive power is characterised by the passivity of the inner sense of 
sensations; the higher by the spontaneity of apperception - that is of pure 
consciousness of the activity that constitutes thinking - and belongs to logic (a 
system of rules of the understanding) just as the former belongs to psychology (to 
a sum total of all inner perceptions under laws of nature) and establishes inner 
experience (An Ak VII, pp.140-41).    
 
In other words, there is no sharp distinction between what we mean by psychology 
and what Kant means by logic. Logic, for Kant, is the abstract study of the mind. As 
Robert Pippin, who prefers a metaphysically neutral rather than a Strawsonian 
logical analysis, points out, the contrast between logical and psychological was 
hardly as clear-cut for Kant as it supposedly is for us,  (Pippin, 1987, 2014, see also 
Hatfield. G, 1992). He did not understand logic as rules for well formed formulae 
and rules for truth preserving inferences, as in Porte Royal logic.  For Kant logic sets 
out the rules that constitute thinking as such, and so its scope is far wider. Kant 
clearly holds that his “logic” of the mind is part of what we would now consider 
psychology - his theory of logic is an abstract theory of thinking. 
35
 There is no need 
for Strawsonian concerns about the naturalistic fallacy of confusing the normative 
with the factual, or the logical with the empirical. For Kant, to explore the “logic” of 
experience is simply to explore how the mind works.  In fact, Kant went further than 
claiming that the abstract study of the mind is part of logic. He also thought that 
“general logic”, which determines the basic structure of the way we think, in that it 
specifies the forms of judgement on which the categories are based, is part of the 
structure of the mind. In this case A being necessary for B is not incompatible with 
A being the cause of B. Traditional logic and “transcendental logic” are not to be 
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considered separate domains, but are better characterised in terms of the particular 
aspect of understanding at issue. Whilst traditional logic investigates the form of 
understanding, “transcendental logic” is concerned with content. Kant claims that the 
traditional logical forms and the transcendental logical categories completely 
coincide. He writes: “In the metaphysical deduction the a priori origin of the 
categories in general has been proved through their complete agreement with the 
general logical functions of thought” (B159) [my italics]. 
       Kant deduces the conceptual structure of experience from traditional logic, 
which is based on the Aristotelian syllogistic system. In the Introduction section of 
the Transcendental Logic he writes that traditional logic treats thinking in complete 
abstraction from all content.  He then takes the core of traditional logic as providing 
a “general logic” in that it concerns itself with just those general conditions that are 
necessary for any thinking to take place at all. General logic concerns these rules 
“without any regard to the difference in the objects to which the understanding may 
be directed” (A52/B76) and merely “treats of the form of thought in general” 
(A55/B79).  In other words, thinking, being exclusively discursive, can provide itself 
with no content at all, which can be given only through sense experience, or 
“experience in general”, i.e. the range of our experiences independently of particular 
content. Kant’s transcendental proofs are then meant to show that experience would 
be impossible but for the a priori origins of certain features of cognition. These are 
not innate features but epistemological in nature. Kant writes in the Introduction: “In 
what follows (...) we shall understand by a priori knowledge, not knowledge 
independent of this or that experience, but knowledge absolutely independent of all 
experience” (B2-3). A priori knowledge is knowledge that is established 
independently of experience, but it is nevertheless tied to our cognitive capacities 
and is what is common to all experience. Thus, the generality of logic is a normative 
generality: logic is general in the sense that it provides constitutive norms for 
thought as such independently of subject matter. This is contrasted with “applied 
logic” which is “a representation of the understanding under “accidental, subjective 
conditions”, i.e. empirical and subject to causal laws.  
       In order to further illustrate that what Kant means by logic is quite different to 
what it means in contemporary usage, it will be helpful to examine what he says in 
his lectures on Logic, the Jäsche Logic, since most of the subjects found in the 
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Critique can be traced back there, which is hardly surprising since Kant read it for 
forty years during which time he was also developing his system. The 
Transcendental Doctrine of Method, the second part of the Critique in which Kant 
explains the purpose of the work and provides the framework for understanding it,  is 
of particular relevance here, for it can readily be seen to be a distillation of the Logic, 
which means that it is a fundamental and indispensable background to any proper 
understanding of the Critique, in the sense that it provides the original format of 
Kant’s architectonic system of which the methodology of the Critique is a specific 
case. That is, it exemplifies the pure method of enquiry of which the Critique is 
merely (although this is surely not the right word!) an example.  In the Jäsche Logic 
lectures Kant presents an introduction to logic which is founded on “the objective 
unity of the manifold in cognition”, i.e. a logic based on transcendental apperception. 
Kant begins these lectures by declaring that “the understanding is bound in its acts to 
rules we can investigate” (Jäsche Logic, intro, p. 13).  However, it is interesting to 
note that the topics of these lectures include consciousness, empirical concepts 
arising from sense experience, comparison and abstraction, which are in the domain 
of what we would consider psychology.  It is important to realise that Kant, along 
with others of his time, did not regard these topics as merely providing psychological 
backing for the principles of formal logic. If we take Antoine Arnauld, for example, 
he describes logic as “reflecting on these natural operations” (i.e. conceiving, 
judging, reasoning, ordering) which helps us to  reason better to correct defects in the 
mind’s operation and claimed, further, that “we become better aware of the 
operations of the mind by reflecting on its operations” (Antoine Arnauld, trans.1964, 
pp. 29-30). Kant’s meaning of “logic” is similar. He takes the understanding itself to 
be a logical or epistemic power. Therefore, when he came to write the Critique it is 
reasonable to presume that in his quest to determine what our cognitive make-up had 
to be like in order for us to be capable of knowing what we do, he again took the 
understanding to be a “logical” power and his aim was to study that power itself. The 
following remarks illustrate how confusion leading to different readings of the 
Critique might arise: 
As pure logic (...) has nothing to do with empirical principles, and does not, as 
has sometimes been supposed, borrow anything from psychology, which 
therefore has no influence whatever on the canon of the understanding. (...) What 
I call applied logic (…) is a representation of the understanding and of the rules 
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of its necessary employment in concreto, that is under the accidental subjective 
conditions which may hinder or help its application and which are given only 
empirically. It treats of attention, its impediments and consequences, of the 
source of error, of the state of doubt, hesitation and conviction, etc. Pure general 
logic stands to it in the same relation as pure ethics, which contains only the 
necessary moral laws of a free will in general, stands to the doctrine of the virtues 
strictly so called - the doctrine which considers these laws under the limitations 
of the feelings,  inclinations and passions to which men are more or less subject 
(A54-5 / B78-9).   
 
       According to the anti-psychologism lobby, Kant, in contrasting “applied logic” 
with “pure logic” is contrasting it with something merely “logical” or “conceptual” 
i.e. empty of empirical meaning, and nothing to do with real minds, i.e. as something  
analogous to the way that the “necessary moral laws”  of  “pure ethics” are non-
empirical laws to be considered independently of particular human actions. 
However, for Kant, whereas “applied logic” is “a representation of the understanding 
under “accidental, subjective conditions”, i.e. empirical and subject to causal laws, 
“pure logic” is a representation of the understanding as abstracted from the effect of 
these conditions. He is talking about the general features of a mind capable of 
cognitive experience. In this case the representation in question is not “non-
empirical” and purely “formal” or “conceptual”, but is in fact what is common to all 
experience, experience in general. This is also Kant’s reasoning when he talks of the 
“moral laws of a free will in general”. Again, he is not talking about non-empirical 
laws in the sense that we could not observe them in particular acts of virtue, for 
indeed they what is are common to all virtues.  Although these general features are 
certainly more than merely empirical, being also necessary, and are also incapable of 
being established by empirical means, they can still be considered empirical in the 
sense specified.  Thus,   the initial remark “pure logic (…) has nothing to do with 
empirical principles and does not borrow anything from psychology” is not to be 
understood in the way that proponents of anti-psychologism understand it.  It cannot 
be used to support analytic or “logical” interpretations. For it is, despite protests to 
the contrary, compatible with empiricism in the sense specified.  For Kant this means 
that although pure logic cannot be shaped by experience, it still specifies the general 
structure of experience.  Proponents of anti-psychologism would no doubt object that 
all this makes Kant’s psychology too empirical to count as philosophy. However, as 
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was mentioned earlier, Kant, in the first Critique, is not interested in the actual 
physical embodiments of mental processes or faculties, but in the very general 
requirements of a mind capable of performing various cognitive tasks and in this his 
work is different from empirical psychology and is, in fact, very much centred in 
epistemology.  That is, in investigating our cognitive faculties, the forms of sensitive 
intuition, the categories and transcendental synthesis, Kant is seeking conditions for 
knowledge the subject matter of which is epistemic as opposed to psychological.   At 
any rate, there are other reasons for resisting an analytic interpretation of the 
Critique. As mentioned earlier, Kant did not feel the need to separate causal from 
necessary conditions, for he felt his enquiry concerned both.    
       Moreover, if we go one step further and cast doubt on whether there even is a 
special kind of truth attached to analytic truth, such interpretations lose their 
attraction.  This century Quine has done just this. He has argued that there is good 
reason to doubt that there is a special truth attached to analytic truth. In fact, in Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism (1951) he demonstrates, in two important theses, that there is 
no such thing. If this position is granted then, far from an analytic interpretation 
rescuing Kant from the charge of psychologism, the opposite is true. Arguments of 
the Critique are diminished if they are cast in analytic form. More recently, Robert 
Hanna has also argued that, despite the fact that logical psychologism is false, there 
is an essential link between logic and psychology, in the sense that logic is 
intrinsically psychological and human psychology intrinsically logical, and defends 
the Kantian thesis that logic is intrinsically psychological in a way which does not 
make it vulnerable to the charge of psychologism. The reason for this is that logic is 
cognitively constituted by all rational animals, who possess an a prior cognitive 
“logic faculty” (Hanna, 2007).  His logical cognitivism says both (i) that there is an 
essential connection between the logical and the psychological, and (ii) that logic is 
not explanatorily reducible to empirical psychology. The latter claim is an anti-
psychologistic, and more generally an anti-naturalistic claim, in the manner of 
Quine.  In other words, as Sher remarks, “logic is globally explained and globally 
justified by our cognitive constitution” (Sher, 2006).36  
       As mentioned previously, Hanna is sympathetic to Jennifer Mensch’s Kantian 
“organicism” (Mensch, 2013) for whom “not only Kant’s pure general and 
transcendental logic, but also the underlying conception of rational systematicity that 
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guides his dialectical logic, are all grounded on a deeper “organic logic” of 
teleological development and conceptual integration”(Hanna, 2014, p. 8). This 
hinges on the claim that the biological theory of epigenesis guided and underpinned 
Kant’s critical philosophy, in particular, the relationship between reason and the 
categories of the understanding.
37
 In Kant’s Organicism Mensch writes that Kant 
“was prepared to borrow freely from the models and vocabulary of the 
embryological debates underway. Indeed (...) it was these models that would 
eventually help Kant discover the origin of knowledge itself” (Mensch, 2013. p. 53). 
She argues that the significance of epigenesis for Kant goes beyond the claim in the 
Transcendental Deduction that reason is self-generating, and the categories self-
thought,  and that epigenesis implies a “transcendental affinity” within cognition 
itself “an affinity which grants unity to “the experience of nature’s coherence” (ibid., 
p. 134). Hanna describes it thus:  “According to this “organic logic,” holistic 
purposive schemes in nature, theory, and morality are all immediately grasped by 
what Kant in the third Critique calls an “intuitive understanding” ” (op. cit., pp. 8-9) 
and what this means, in the words of Thomas Nagel, is that “rational intelligibility is 
at the root of the natural order” (op.cit., p. 11) This issue will be explored in Chapter 
6. 
      
2.4. How Kant Does not Undercut his own Psychological 
Claims.    
 
Scholars of the analytic philosophical persuasion, who dismiss “psychological” 
readings of  the Critique support their arguments by emphasising the fact that Kant 
himself had reservations about psychology and that consequently any material which 
is “psychological’ in character should be dismissed as irrelevant or else translated 
into a non-psychological or innocuously psychological claim about thinkers.  They 
point out that Kant dedicates a whole chapter to defeating the pretensions of the 
rational psychologists and also to declaring that empirical psychology can never 
attain to the level of a proper natural science, for its domain is introspective 
observation, the contents of “inner sense” and is therefore not quantitative, or at least 
the contents of inner sense can be quantified only in one dimension, which means 
that no informative mathematical model of them is possible. (For Kant science 
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“proper” must be based on the model of mathematics, since this is the only method 
in which it is possible for a science to achieve the necessity and certainty required). 
Moreover, they claim, he seems to undercut his own psychological claims. For 
instance, he says of the subjective aspect of the Transcendental Deduction, what he 
terms “the investigation of the understanding itself”, that it is “hypothetical”, i.e. 
inessential to his main goal (Axvii), although it is omitted that Kant also mention 
that it is of “great importance”. They also allude to the fact that he reminds logicians, 
seemingly in anticipation of Frege himself, that “pure logic has nothing to do with 
empirical principles, and does not, as has sometimes been supposed, borrow 
anything from psychology…” (A54/B78). In addition to this they point out that Kant 
explicitly contrasts his doctrine with the psychology of Locke (A86/B118-19), 
preferring to call his area of study “transcendental logic”.  They claim that although 
the Critique contains many references to psychological features and processes it also 
contains several criticisms of psychology and negative comments about its 
significance. These are emphasised in order to back up the claim that Kant’s 
transcendental psychology should be disregarded.  
 
       The following is the passage in the Preface to the First Edition where Kant 
points out that his quest for the limits of human reason has both an “objective” and 
“subjective” aspect.  The objective side... 
 ...refers to the objects of pure understanding, and is intended to expound and 
render intelligible the objective validity of its a priori concepts. It is therefore 
essential to my purposes. The other seeks to investigate the pure understanding 
itself, its possibility and the cognitive faculties upon which it rests; and so deals 
with it in its subjective aspect. Although this latter exposition is of great 
importance for my chief purpose, it does not form an essential part of it. For the 
chief question is always simply this: - what and how much can the understanding 
and reason know apart from experience? not: how is the faculty of thought itself 
possible? (Axvi – xvii).  
This is an oft-quoted passage from Kant where he is at pains to point out that the 
emphasis of his investigation is not psychological but epistemic in that it seeks to 
determine the objective conditions and constrains on knowledge. The “subjective” 
side is of secondary importance to this goal. This declaration has been regarded by 
many Kant scholars as a retractory statement, and as evidence that Kant himself saw, 
at least vaguely, that he had made a mistake in casting his arguments in 
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psychological form. This is then regarded as justifying the view that Kant’s  
discussions of psychology are not worthy of serious attention at all. After all, does 
not Kant say, in the very next sentence, that the subjective side of the deduction is 
“somewhat hypothetical in character”?  They also point to the fact that Kant himself 
had clear reservations about psychology.  For example, he states that empirical 
psychology, what he termed “the physiology of inner sense” (A347/B119), a 
psychology based on introspective observation, gains knowledge “not of any object”, 
i.e. can never determine any underlying structure in the flux of inner sense (A381).  
He also declares, in a famous passage in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural 
Science, that it can never achieve the status of a science and should be banished from 
metaphysics (AAIV pp.471). Furthermore, he devotes a whole chapter, the 
Paralogisms of Pure Reason, to deflating rigorously the pretensions of rational 
psychology. These negative comments are emphasised in order to plead the case for 
the impropriety of psychology for Kant’s purposes. The claim is that his reservations 
about it indicate that he himself came to doubt his own.   
       At first sight there does seem to be ambivalence and confusion, even on Kant’s 
own part, about the status of his cognitive claims. For on the one hand, his 
arguments undeniably contain cognitive subject matter, yet on the other he explicitly 
denies the relevance of psychology for his purposes, thus seeming to undercut own 
psychological claims. However, the crucial point of the matter is that Kant’s use of 
psychological concepts is different from that of empirical and rational psychology.  
The Critique contains its own psychology divorced from empirical and rational 
psychology. To repeat, the cognitive subject matter Kant refers to is not strictly 
“psychological”.  He merely borrows modes of explanation from psychology in 
order to construct his explanations. He does not appeal to psychological 
argumentation in order to do so. Kant’s arguments are neither directed at the 
phenomena of “inner sense”, as are those of empiricist psychology, nor  the “soul” as 
“substance”, as are those of rationalist psychology. However, they still constitute a 
psychology of sorts. His arguments are “transcendental”. Transcendental psychology 
does not belong in the domain of psychology proper, neither rational nor empirical.  
In fact, one of Kant’s main aims in the Paralogisms chapter is to distinguish his own 
transcendental enquiry from that of rational psychology.  For, as he sees it the claims 
of rational psychology are transcendent, i.e. beyond what possible experience could 
 63 
 
verify. Therefore they are unwarranted. Transcendent is the term used by Kant to 
describe those principles which “profess to pass beyond” the limits of experience as 
opposed to those principles “whose application is confined entirely within the limits 
of possible experience” (A296/B352). (Such claims are also founded on faulty 
syllogistic reasoning and are fallacious, as will be discussed in Chapter 3.2.).  He is 
also adamant that empirical psychology is irrelevant to his own project. He sets his 
project apart from it at the beginning of the Deduction where he insists that accounts 
of the empirical origins of concepts and beliefs are without philosophical interest. 
Empirical psychology, for Kant, is incapable of serving the purposes of the 
Deduction, since it is of no use in dealing with philosophical questions about the 
“validity” of cognitive claims. Kant used an analogy from law to describe the project 
that lay before him. In a court of law, a distinction is made between “questions of 
fact” and “questions of right”. For questions of fact, the court appeals to testimony 
and material evidence, both of which are appeals to experience; with regards to 
questions of right, however, the court appeals to rules of law. Establishing, on the 
basis of rules, whether an action is right is called, by Kant, a “deduction.” Thus the 
Deduction addresses the questions of  “quid juris”  the “question of right” as 
opposed to the  “quid facti”, “question of fact”. Using the legal terminology of his 
day, Kant asks by what right we apply the categories in an a priori manner, i.e. he 
asks a justificatory question about the right to apply the categories independently of 
experience. He is not concerned with empirical questions of fact which essentially 
appeal to experience, as these lie outside this domain. They are inadequate to deal 
with the problem Kant is addressing. Thus, Kant clearly distinguishes his psychology 
from that of his contemporaries. His aim is not to study the mind as it is in itself. In 
investigating “the cognitive faculties”, he is seeking to determine a priori conditions 
for knowledge, an enquiry into the logical, conceptual and justificatory order of 
thought, not an investigation into actual thought processes. The result is an abstract  
description of the capacities a mind must have in order to have knowledge of the 
world, not speculation about actual psychological processes, as Kant is uninterested 
in the actual physical instantiation of  mental or psychological processes. His aim is 
to show that the application of the categories to all objects of experience is justified. 
This entails a conceptual exploration into the prerequisites of cognition in order to 
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determine the necessary and universal elements that must be presupposed in all 
cases.    
       Yet, although Kant’s psychology differs from the mainstream psychology of his 
day, it is still a psychology of sorts; it is the psychology of the thinking or knowing 
self, the “I” of “transcendental apperception”.  Kant uses the language of psychology 
regularly, for instance, in his discussion of cognitive faculties, powers and activities, 
such as our capacity to synthesise mental states and the unity that is required for this. 
This is particularly so in the chapter on the Deduction of the categories. He also 
makes frequent negative attacks on the value of both empirical and rational 
psychology. However, we can reconcile the apparent discrepancy and ambivalence 
by recognising that Kant clearly distinguishes the aims and methods of his 
transcendental enquiry from the mainstream psychology of his day. It consists of 
abstract descriptions of features that a mind must have to be capable of certain types 
of knowledge, not explanations of how it has them. Kant’s overall aim in the 
Deduction is with determining the conditions and constraints on knowledge and with 
the justification of the objective validity of our knowledge claims, particularly claims 
to synthetic a priori knowledge. However, this entails a transcendental investigation 
into the necessary conditions of having experiences structured the way they are, a 
crucial one being the capacity to “synthetically bring into being a determinate 
combination of the given manifold” (B137), i.e. to unify representations and relate 
them to an object. We cannot study the connections among introspective contents of 
inner sense, but we can study what the mind must be like and able to do to have 
them.   
       Thus, Kant’s negative comments about the value of psychology throughout the 
Critique leave his transcendental psychology intact.  His reservations about it do not 
indicate that he came to doubt his own. Rather his problem is how to express novel 
ideas in a language insufficient to express them.  Kant scholars have tended to give 
prominence to Kant’s negative comments about the value of psychology in order to 
plead the case that he saw, at least vaguely, that he had erred in casting his 
arguments in psychological form. However, Kant makes it clear that he regards his 
discussion of psychology as playing a significant role. Although he says that he 
regards the subjective side as “not an essential part” of his enterprise, he also 
declares in the same sentence that it is of “great importance”. Furthermore, in the 
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next sentence, immediately after saying that the subjective side is “somewhat 
hypothetical in character”, he states that he will “show elsewhere, it is not really so” 
(Axvii).  
        What then, are we to make of the “subjective” or psychological aspects of the 
Critique? The crucial point is that the objective and subjective sides of the Critique 
are really part of the same argument, the latter being part of the former. The 
“objective” side was Kant’s main concern, being a means to an understanding of 
how physics can be synthetic a priori knowledge. The “subjective” side enters the 
picture because one of Kant’s strategies for dealing with the objectivity of our 
knowledge claims was to examine what a mind must be like to have them. Kant felt 
that since the categories must be applied there will always be a subjective element. 
He tells us at the beginning of the Deduction that in order to show how the categories 
could “relate to objects”, i.e. be applied, he will examine the “subjective sources 
which form the a priori foundation of the possibility of experience” (A97). The main 
requirements of a mind capable of objective knowledge, he argues are its abilities to 
synthesise diverse states and the unity required to use them. Objective experience 
requires not only the capacity to unify representations and relate them in a 
determinate way to an object, but also the condition that they are brought together in 
one mind.  As he writes: 
 [A]ll unification of representations demands unity of consciousness in the 
synthesis of them. Consequently it is the unity of consciousness that alone 
constitutes the relation of representations to an object, and therefore their 
objective validity and the fact that they are modes of knowledge and upon it 
therefore rests the very possibility of the understanding (B137). 
 
       Kant’s theoretical analysis of cognition is that the synthesis that produces the 
unity of apperception also produces all representations of objects. He also claims that 
“the synthetic unity of apperception is the highest point to which we must ascribe all 
employment of the understanding” (B134 note), and that “the principle of the 
synthetic unity is the supreme principle of all employment of the understanding” 
(B136, title). That is, although the aim of the objective deduction is to establish the 
legitimacy of the categories by showing that we could not have objective knowledge 
without them; this leads Kant into a discussion of the capacities of a mind capable of 
using them.  Kant’s ideas about synthesis and unity are an important part of the 
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deduction of the categories. Just as our knowledge requires the conceptual 
framework provided by the categories and the forms of Space and Time, it also 
requires synthesis and a unified mind. It is in this sense that Kant’s considers his 
discussions of “psychology” as secondary to his main concern. Such discussions, 
although a by-product of his epistemology, are still an important part of his overall 
enquiry. So, although Kant’s emphasis is on the objective side, i.e. the conditions of 
representations having objects, this entailed, absolutely, the subjective side, i.e. a 
deduction of the subject’s transcendental nature. In fact, his conceptual analysis of 
human mental capacities is crucial to his transcendental enquiry. In Kant’s opinion 
only an analysis of our cognitive experience can justify our epistemic powers. For 
example, that we can determine that one of our mental states follows another in time 
shows that we have a fundamental concept of cause. We cannot account for this as 
an acquisition of causality through the senses, for as Hume would agree it never was 
“in the senses”. But this suggests that there must be something “in the mind” that 
supplies it. Even though Kant’s primary interest may not have been in his 
“transcendental psychology” i.e. the abstract necessary structure of the mind, but in 
the objective conditions of knowledge, he nevertheless clearly acknowledges that 
such discussions are an important part of his enquiry and this suggests that he 
deemed it worthy of serious attention. In fact, his insights about human cognition 
and the self were extraordinary. Most importantly, they were not only remarkable in 
his own time but continue to have particular relevance today.  
       Fortunately this is now being recognised: philosophers have become 
increasingly critical of this tendency of past scholars to re-describe the Critique and 
squeeze it into the mould of post-Fregean philosophy and insist Kant’s 
transcendental psychology can be an enlightening approach. 
38
 That Kant made 
frequent appeals to psychological processes is hard to deny, yet in actual fact he 
explicitly rejects psychologism (A52-54/B76-79).  Also in the Jäsche Logic, he 
writes: 
 
This science of the necessary laws of the understanding and of reason in general, 
or what is one and the same, of the mere form of thought as such, is what we call 
logic…. Some logicians, to be sure, do presuppose psychological principles in 
logic. But to bring such principles into logic is just as absurd as to derive morals 
from life. If we were to take principles from psychology, i.e., from observations 
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concerning our understanding, we would merely see how thinking does take 
place and how it is under various subjective obstacles and conditions; this would 
lead then to cognition of merely contingent laws. In logic, however, the question 
is not about contingent but about necessary rules; not how we do think, but how 
we ought to think. The rules of logic must thus be derived not from the 
contingent but from the necessary use of the understanding, which one finds in 
oneself apart from all psychology (Jäsche Logic, 9: 13-14). 
 
He is not interested in the psychological manifestations of particular mental 
processes per se; his purpose is, rather, to explore the necessary conditions required 
for cognition, the generic conditions for the intentionality of thinking about objects 
in general.
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 In this sense his work contains a “psychological” element, which cannot 
be neglected.  Kant’s was interested, in particular, with the need for acts of synthesis 
and the kind of unity required for such acts and in this he has much of value to offer. 
Ignoring or dismissing this aspect of the Critique is a philosophical mistake, for in so 
doing the opportunity to contribute to current debates is wasted; not only within 
philosophy of mind, but also within cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience, 
where a picture of humanity is emerging that threatens to undermine the sense of our 
own freedom and agency. It therefore behoves us to give Kant his due and recognise 
his profound insights into the nature of human cognition. 
 
       In concluding this section, considered as a general movement, analytic 
philosophy has had an uneasy relationship with historically oriented philosophy, and 
it has tended to proceed without recourse to the past. As mentioned in Chapter 1, it 
has been frequently criticised for lack of historical awareness, ranging from what 
Hans Johann Glock calls “historiophobia” to  “anachronism” (Glock, 2008, p. 90). 
According to Glock, this charge of historical neglect comes from several directions, 
and even “unites its two main rivals within contemporary Western philosophy, 
continental and traditionalist philosophy”. Moreover, “this criticism is also shared by 
some who by common consent are analytic philosophers themselves” (ibid., p. 89).  
The reason for this was that the availability of a new tool, modern logic, meant that 
historically inclined philosophy could be dispensed with; indeed all earlier work 
could be dismissed in the name of a radical new beginning. There was also the 
perhaps rather arrogant tendency to regard philosophy proper as not even beginning 
until analytic philosophy came on the scene.  Frege, the father of analytic philosophy 
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had himself distinguished between the analysis of thought, concepts and inferences 
and “either the study the history of our knowledge of concepts or of the history of 
our meaning of words” (Frege, 1884, p. vii).  He regarded the former as the task of 
the philosopher, whilst discarding the latter as superfluous. Not only is analytic 
philosophy generally viewed as having a tendency to ignore the past, but also to 
distort it. Whenever analytic philosophers have engaged with past philosophers, they 
have tended to offer “rational reconstructions”, ignoring or dismissing the parts 
which didn’t fit in, as with Peter Strawson’s analysis, among others.  However, 
rational reconstruction of this kind, often leads to restricted focus, a narrow view and 
can also twist the views of the earlier works so much that they bear little 
resemblance to the original. Proponents of the analytic tradition may well think that 
conceptual analysis is a central part of (if not the only part of) philosophy, and whilst 
it may be true that it can do some good philosophical work, analytic philosophers 
should realise that philosophy is not without a history; philosophy is a historical 
movement as well as one concerned with more technical problems of logic and 
epistemology. As Robert Hanna has so cogently stated, “We cannot do philosophy in 
the present without implicitly adopting an understanding of philosophy’s past and 
also that we cannot properly do philosophy in the present without making this 
implicit historical understanding explicit” (Hanna, 2004, p. viii).  Richard Rorty has 
also accused analytic philosophy of being an attempt to escape from history (1979, 
pp. 8-9) and Bruce Wilshire has criticised its “radically ahistorical and modern 
progressive point of view” (Wilshire, B. 2002, p. 4). Moreover, Bernard Williams, 
one of the most respected and venerated practitioners of the analytic tradition, has 
urged analytic philosophers to adopt a more genetic and historical perspective 
(Williams, B. 2002).  It is doubtful whether one can really do philosophy without 
engaging, not at a merely superfluous, but a deep level with at least some parts of the 
history of the subject.  Philosophical thinking does not occur in a vacuum and more 
or less deliberately and explicitly, and with various degrees of awareness, we are 
always reacting to the problems, positions, concepts and arguments of our 
predecessors. Philosophers of the past, both recent and remote still have much to 
offer, and the better we know and understand their concepts the better off we will be 
in our own analyses of philosophical problems.  This perspective is particularly 
called for in the philosophy of cognitive science, since, it is argued, present 
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difficulties in the field are a result of lasting influence of a largely forgotten or 
neglected philosophical heritage. A considerable number of philosophical writings, 
especially those connected to a science of consciousness, rest on fundamental 
conceptual confusions as a result of this philosophical neglect. As Charles Taylor, 
professor emeritus at Mc Gill University reminds us: “Philosophy and the history of 
philosophy are one. You cannot do the first without also doing the second. Otherwise 
put, it is essential to an adequate understanding of certain problems, questions, 
issues, that one understand them genetically” (Taylor, 1984, p. 17).  The tendency to 
ignore or to show a disregard for historical issues is also prevalent within the 
sciences in general, where so often scientists’ lay intuitions prevail. Perhaps this lack 
interest in the history of philosophy is due to a perceived irrelevance to the subject 
matter at hand, which then renders them unaware of the philosophical assumptions 
that might underlie a particular theory. With this in mind, the following chapter 
examines the fundamental problems in the history of philosophy that Kant was 
reacting against, with a view to articulating his radical views against them, in order 
to be able to assess the similarities to, and parallels with, contemporary issues within 
cognitive science. The essential focus of this thesis is that Kant was the first to deal 
rigorously with a certain model or picture of the mind and that this has implications 
for contemporary discussions of functionalism, the ensuing “hard” problem of 
consciousness and the problem of indexical self-reference. 
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     3. A Historical Perspective 
 
The previous chapter was concerned with defending Kant’s transcendental 
psychology from dismissal by the mainstream analytic philosophical movement 
where it is commonly regarded as being unworthy of attention. Since the aim of this 
thesis is to examine the contemporary relevance of Kant’s theory of mind, such a 
task was necessary to counter this claim and to eliminate any doubts there may be 
that it is worthy of such serious consideration. The current chapter turns to the 
problems in philosophy that were a legacy from his predecessors, notably Descartes 
and Hume, the purpose of which is to bring into focus the fundamental problems in 
philosophy that Kant addresses. For mainstream cognitive science has retained a 
large part of its Cartesian and empiricist legacy which has contributed to the 
perpetuation of a problematic picture of human mentality whilst also significantly 
shaping the contemporary understanding of human nature.  It has been suggested that 
a certain lack of awareness of the history of philosophy might be to blame, rendering 
cognitive scientists the passive or unknowing captives of the Cartesian/Humean 
framework. Science relies on multiple layers of hidden assumptions, and scientists 
and practitioners, although they may be specialists in their field, are often unaware of 
the subliminal ways in which these assumptions guide their thinking, direct their 
explanations and eventually mould their understanding of the phenomena of study.     
       The word “consciousness” arrived rather late in the philosophical arena.  The 
sages of ancient Greece had no such term. The word Sunoida, like its Latin 
equivalent conscio, meant the same as “know together with” or “having joint or 
common knowledge with another” (con-“together” and scio “to know”). The 
expression “conscious” was introduced into philosophy by Descartes (Principles of 
Philosophy (1640)
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; who used the terms conscientia, conscius, and conscio to 
signify a form of knowledge, i.e. the direct knowledge of what is passing in our 
minds. What we are consciously aware of are “thoughts”, and these include ordinary 
thinking, sensing or perceiving, understanding, wanting and imagining. Fifty years 
later John Locke, in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), defines 
consciousness as “the perception of what passes in a man’s own mind”, which we 
access by means of “inner sense” (Essay, II-i-19). For Descartes we do not 
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immediately perceive the external world. Perception takes place in the soul 
(nowadays, the brain) only and is caused by the movements caused in the brain 
(soul) by vibrations affecting the sense organs. Empiricists Locke, Berkeley and 
Hume adopted this view as more or less self-evident (see Locke, 1690/1959, Bk II, 
Ch. IX, §3; Berkeley, 1710/1975, Pt I, §1; Hume, 1748/1962, Bk I, Pt IV).  For both 
Descartes and the empiricists, perception or cognition pertains to “ideas”, and not 
directly to external objects.  Ideas are modes of thought that, Descartes writes in the 
Third Meditation, “represent” or “present” or “exhibit” (he uses these words 
interchangeably) objects to the mind (see Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, S.,  Murdoch, D. 
1992, pp. 88-9). Descartes provides multiple definitions of the term idea, which he 
divided into six distinct kinds of entities. Locke defines idea as “that term which, I 
think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a 
man thinks”[my italics]. Hume agrees with Locke but limits ideas to mental 
reconstructions of perceptions caused by “impressions” of the senses. This notion, of 
ideas representing or standing for something in the mind was adopted, again 
uncritically, by scientists at the start of the mid 20
th
 century cognitive revolution, 
where it was combined with ideas of modern computer technology, and where these 
ideas were translated into the mental representations of cognitive science, and 
conceived of as “mental causes”, the interactions of which are said to constitute 
mental processes that constitute a mind. According to this picture, the human mind 
just is a complex system constituted by mental representations, operating on or 
computing information, whether in abstract workings or functions of the mind or 
later, in cognitive neuroscience, in the “wetware” of the brain.   
       Thus, when Descartes invested the Western world with an immaterial res 
cogitans and a material res extensa, he initiated a host of seemingly insurmountable 
philosophical and scientific problems that have plagued philosophers and scientists 
since. For the contemporary “hard problem of consciousness” is the legacy of this 
world view; it is, in effect, an updating of the same conceptual model, and gives rise 
to similar problems, one of which is of explaining how an immaterial mind (now a 
material brain) can give rise to ineffable, first person, phenomenal consciousness; the 
puzzle of how to fit a subjective conscious mind into the realm of objective empirical 
science. Descartes thought of the body as a machine and the mind as an immaterial 
entity or substance which animates it. This led to the problem of interaction, of how 
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an immaterial mind could cause changes to the physical body and how a physical 
body could cause changes to the mind.  Although many have doubted his theory of 
mental animation, the idea of the body as machine has been retained and with it the 
same question of interaction - how such a machine could produce consciousness, 
subjectivity and phenomenal experience in general. 
41
  
        Hence the scientific materialism which lies at the root of cognitive science and 
cognitive neuroscience has its origins in this fundamental misconception or error of 
thought, the often implicit, unrecognised assumption of the Cartesian/Humean view 
of the mind, in which phenomenal consciousness is conceived of as a kind of entity, 
(or quasi entity) that either “contains” (Descartes) experiences or which “consists” of 
them (Hume’s bundle of experiences). Mind thus conceived is a kind of inner 
repository where informational content originating from the external world can be 
transferred and manipulated. There is also the Cartesian idea of the body as a 
machine separated from the non-mechanistic, immaterial entity, the mind. Cognitive 
scientist and cognitive neuroscientists who are interested in the mind, have a set of 
questions that they want to understand: what is thought, what is consciousness, and 
what is cognition? How can the electrical firing of millions of neurones in the brain 
create conscious experience of the world?  Human consciousness seems to be 
unified, some things seem to be in awareness and others not. They seem to be 
presented before the mind as a stream of consciousness within a theatre, there is 
continuity over time, and they are experienced by the same subject.  Scientists and 
philosophers attempt to come to some agreement about these issues. Some scientists 
claim that now there are new technologies of brain science, there is no longer a need 
to pay attention to what philosophy has to say about these questions, and dismiss it 
as irrelevant. Prominent examples of these kinds of scientific thinkers are molecular 
biologist turned neuroscientist, Francis Crick and neuroscientist Christof Koch, 
(currently chief scientific officer of the Allen Institute for Brain Sciences) whose 
combined research aims at discovering the neural correlates of experience (NCCs) in 
order to find the difference between neural activity that produces consciousness and 
that which does not with the aim to get nearer to what consciousness is.  As Crick 
put it “No longer need one spend time attempting … to endure the tedium of 
philosophers perpetually disagreeing with each other. Consciousness is now largely a 
scientific problem” (Crick, 1996, p. 486). However, crucially, most of what 
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empirical science has to say about consciousness, language, memory, perception and 
emotion is the expression of a particular philosophy that is unquestioned, the quasi 
Cartesian/Humean view that the mind is something inner; (the brain/ mental 
processes) disconnected from other people and from the outer world.  Also there is 
the Cartesian manner of thinking about consciousness as a stream of consciousness 
in the “theatre” (Dennett, 1991) of the mind. A successful science of consciousness 
must be able to give an account of the contents, the stream, the unity and the 
continuity. As was mentioned above, there is the notion that the external world gives 
rise to a particular state in the brain, which will be subjectively experienced as a 
conscious representation or model of the external world. This internal representation, 
whatever it amounts to, is the principal subject matter of an emerging “science of 
consciousness”, the salient point being that there is “something it is like” to have an 
experience, that consciousness is essentially  characterised by reference to there 
being “something it is like” to be in certain mental state.  
       It is suggested that the “hard problem of consciousness”, along with the related 
quest to discover the NCCs, is based on a confused understanding of mentality, and 
far from the charge that cognitive science and neuroscience has no need for 
philosophy, it needs its guidance now more than ever (see Bennett and Hacker 2003; 
Thagard, 2009; Hacker, 2012).
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 Whilst conceding that cognitive scientists and 
neuroscientists have made significant discoveries concerning the workings of the 
brain and cognition, these discoveries have been obscured by their presentation 
within an incoherent conceptual framework that, despite its professed materialism, is 
fundamentally Cartesian/Humean in the sense mentioned above. Although some 
contemporary philosophers do recognise and criticise these hidden assumptions 
underpinning much of cognitive science and neuroscience, it has gone largely 
unrecognised that the radical critique of  this model or understanding of the mind 
began with Kant, whose powerfully innovative transcendental inquiry into the 
necessary a priori conditions for cognition was not only a major philosophical 
breakthrough in his own time,  but  still surpasses contemporary anti-Cartesian 
efforts today. It is important to recognise the innovation of his thought and give his 
profound philosophical insights into the nature of human mindedness their just due. 
With this in mind, the following section provides an analysis of the fundamental 
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problems in the history of philosophy that Kant was reacting against, with a view to 
articulating perspicuously his radical views against them. 
 
3.1. Fundamental Problems in Philosophy 
 
Beginning with his Inaugural Dissertation (1770) on the difference between right and 
left-handedness and spatial orientation, Kant produced one of the most 
comprehensive and influential writings in the history of philosophy. His central 
thesis, that the possibility of human knowledge presupposes the active participation 
of the mind, is to be found in the Critique of Pure Reason, which is universally held 
to be a watershed in metaphysics and epistemology. His “Copernican Revolution”, 
as he proudly termed it, is a reversal of approach to the thinkers before him.  Kant 
claimed that just as Copernicus had reversed the assumptions of classical astronomy 
that the sun moved around the earth, his project set out to turn around the 
assumptions of his predecessors, which was that “representations” must conform to 
an object independent of the mind in order to constitute knowledge.   For Kant, the 
converse was true; any possible object of experience must conform to a priori 
conditions of knowledge. It must reflect the constitution of the cognitive faculties 
brought to experience by the subject, his “transcendental psychology”.     
       Transcendental psychology is Kant’s theory of mind, the study of those faculties 
that are a priori required for cognition. What this means is that cognition is taken as 
fundamental and then it is worked out through critique, a process of critical analysis, 
what makes that possible. Prior to this, theories of mind had centred on the 
epistemological question of whether knowledge was a product of senses (broadly, 
Hume and the Empiricists) or a product of pure thought (broadly, Descartes and the 
Rationalists).  Empiricism is the theory that experience rather than reason is the 
source of knowledge; Rationalism,  that it is reason alone that is the source. Kant’s 
question, in a nutshell, was “What are the a priori conditions of the possibility of 
experience”? He overturns the relationship between knowing subject and 
experienced object, arguing that the properties that we can assign to the object are 
nothing but the very preconditions for knowing the object itself: in other words, the 
world is populated by objects only inasmuch as they fit our predetermined sensory 
and cognitive apparatus. Although Kant shared with his forebears an interest in the 
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foundations of knowledge, he thought that something was lacking with the 
enterprises of them both. He offered a solution to this deficiency that combined 
elements of each position yet passes beyond them. For unlike his predecessors, it is 
the “representation”  itself that makes the object possible rather than the object that 
makes the representation possible. This introduced the human mind as an active 
originator of experience rather than just a passive recipient of perception.   Kant was 
concerned with the epistemological issue of how it is that our cognitive claims are 
vindicated. As discussed in the previous chapter, this was articulated through his 
famous quid juris question (A84/B116), which asks by what rights or legitimacy do 
we apply concepts, which are not acquired from experience, to the contents of 
experience? (A85/B117). This philosophical quest led him to draw the limits of 
human reason through his emphasis on the “transcendental” and “necessary 
conditions” for all cognitive pursuits. Any knowledge claim which went beyond 
these conditions is deemed illegitimate.  
       Despite his sense of the limits of human reason, however, Kant’s insights were 
seminal, and transformed the nature of Western thought. Although, like philosophers 
before him, he sought to explain the possibility of new scientific knowledge and the 
possibility of human freedom, his solutions to such problems were radically different 
to those of his predecessors. He thought that what was wrong with previous 
philosophical enquiry was that philosophers had not seen the necessity of a very 
general inquiry into what makes sense. Those prior to him had attempted to explain 
our knowledge of the world in terms of a passive reception of an external reality or 
truth, an objectively perfect realm that was only confusedly apprehended by the 
senses. Kant redefined the concepts of “truth”’ and “reality” and with them the task 
of philosophy. The purpose of philosophy is not to arrive, by a process of intricate 
inference, at knowledge of an objective truth not directly accessible to experience. 
Indeed, he took it for granted that we have objective knowledge and that sensible 
experience is a foundation of such knowledge. What interested him was how the 
various types of knowledge hung together; and in order to come up with a solution to 
this he set out to define the very conditions that make cognitive experience itself 
possible. Thus, Kant’s main concern, unlike those thinkers before him, was not with 
what knowledge we can derive from experience, but in human understanding itself 
and whatever conceptual principles or rules there may be that govern that 
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understanding. That is, his purpose was not to discover how we infer reality from 
experience but to examine the necessary conditions involved in us “having cognitive 
experience” or knowing anything at all. This examination was revolutionary, and it 
transformed the Western conception of a human being from that of a “spectator” of 
the natural world, who, in a sense, exists apart from it to that of an “agent” whose 
spontaneous activity is necessary to its very creation. For the subject of experience, 
although not entirely producing its own experience, contributes so much to it that 
without this input no experience is possible. As he wrote in the preface to the Second 
edition of the Critique: 
 
Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But 
all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in 
regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in 
failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in 
the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our 
knowledge (Bxvi). 
 
       To begin with the Cartesian picture: Descartes had set out on a quest for 
absolute certainty. His purpose was to place knowledge on a sure foundation by 
“out-doubting the sceptics”; to show that all our knowledge is based on rational 
foundations and that these involve self evident truths from which everything we 
know can be deduced. His method was one of universal or hyperbolic doubt. Thus, 
in Meditations I and II he writes that he is going to reject as false all that he has been 
taught about the world as well as his own experience: 
I shall go on setting aside everything which might, in the slightest degree be 
supposed to be doubtful, just as if I had found out that it was completely false; 
and shall continue to follow in this path until I find something which is certain, or 
at least, if I am unable to do anything else, until I have learned that it is certain 
that there is nothing in the world that is certain (Meditations 1). 
However, although his method was to doubt “everything (...) which might in the 
slightest degree be supposed to be doubtful”,  his  purpose was to find an absolutely 
secure foundation, an Archimedean point for human knowledge and something that 
we could be absolutely certain  of and which could never be false or doubtful. This 
was to be “so certain and of such evidence that not even the most extravagant of 
suppositions entertained by the sceptics would be capable of shaking it” (Discourse 
on Method, Part IV). After casting doubt on sense experience, scientific information 
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and mathematics, Descartes found the certainty that he sought in the Cogito. As soon 
as one tries to conceive any condition under which “I think therefore I am’” could be 
false one is reassured of its very truth. There can be absolutely no dispute about the 
existence of the Cogito, for his existence as a thinking thing is presupposed in the 
very act of doubting. As he writes in the Discourse: 
I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely 
necessary that I, who thus thought should be somewhat; and as I observed that 
this truth , I think, hence I am (cogito ergo sum) was so certain and of such 
evidence that no ground of doubt, however extravagant could be alleged by the 
sceptics, capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it 
as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search (Discourse on 
Method, Part IV). 
 
       Moreover, the nature of the self is revealed to us in an immediate way. For 
Descartes then asks “What am I?” and concludes, from the fact that he can “clearly 
and distinctly” conceive it, that he is a “thinking thing” or “substance”. From this 
one truth Descartes claims that we can discover a criterion about all truths, namely 
clarity and distinction. On the basis of “clear and distinct ideas”, the truth of which is 
guaranteed by a perfect, benevolent and undeceiving God, we are able to have 
absolute certainty about the external world.  So, according to Descartes we can have 
absolutely certain knowledge of ourselves and certain aspects of the external world, 
for from an analysis of our rational faculties and by employing particular procedures 
of reason alone we can make judgements that cannot possibly be wrong. In fact, we 
are compelled to make them; for what is “clearly and distinctly” conceived imposes 
themselves on us in such a way that we must accept them as true.  
       Let us compare this with the Humean position. Hume’s epistemological concern 
was also with “knowledge” but he rejects the Cartesian methodology of universal 
doubt and in so doing is forced into adopting an attenuated scepticism of his own. 
For Hume denies that there is direct access to a continuous self, the primary and 
certain foundation on which Descartes builds his edifice of knowledge. On the 
contrary, there is no such self and no such certainty. We are doomed to be cut off 
from knowledge both of the external world and of the self. We have no rational 
foundation for knowledge of the external world, for as he puts it:  
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The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot 
possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of 
such a connexion is, therefore without any foundation in reasoning (An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding, section VII, part 1).         
 
Furthermore, philosophy teaches us that: 
Nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the 
senses are the only inlets through which these images are conveyed, without 
being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the 
object. The table, which we see, seems to diminish as we move farther from it; 
but the real table which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration; it was 
therefore nothing but its image, which was present to the mind (ibid. §12. 8). 
 
 So, according to Hume’s empiricism, just as we have no rational foundation for an 
external world that is separate from us, neither do we have certain introspective 
awareness of a self.  Hume says that when he introspects he cannot perceive a self at 
all. As he writes in the Treatise of Human Nature, when he turns his reflection on 
himself, he can never perceive a self without one or more perceptions; nor  “can 
perceive anything but the perceptions”: 
I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or 
shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time 
without a perception, and never can perceive anything but the perception 
(Treatise Book I, Section IV, Ch. vi). 
 
For Hume, the self or mind is nothing but a “bundle of perceptions” just as external 
objects are “bundles of perceptions” and it is incoherent to suppose that it is a 
substantial unity whose nature could be grasped  by any kind of “rational intuition” 
of the sort that Descartes claims.  
       Now let us consider the Cartesian and Humean positions together in order to see 
more perspicuously how Kant supplements their accounts: The aspect of the self 
which the rationalists emphasise is being a subject aware of its own existence, its 
true nature being comprehensible only in consciousness. For Descartes, the one thing 
we could be absolutely certain of was the self and its existence.  As he says in the 
Discourse on Method, although he could doubt everything in the world, the one thing 
he could be certain of was that the “I” that thinks should be “somewhat” (Part IV). 
Thus, Descartes’ epistemology starts out from a picture of the self as a solitary mind 
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having certain knowledge only of its immediate apprehension. From this direct 
awareness, what he terms his Archimedean point, it is able (with some help from a 
benevolent God) to find itself in a world grasped both as external and real. Against 
this Hume makes the point that in introspection we are not aware of a “subject” at all 
but an “object” like any other. For Hume this object is a mere “bundle of 
impressions” just as what we are immediately aware of in experience are not external 
objects but “bundles of impressions”, which in turn give rise to ideas on the basis of 
which, in combination with the mental habit or custom and the “association of 
ideas”, we derive our knowledge of the phenomenal world.  For Hume, our natural 
instinctive belief that there is a real world external to our senses cannot be rationally 
justified. Since all we are aware of are “perceptions” or “images”, we cannot know 
that they correspond to anything in the external world. The same applies to our 
existence as persistent unitary selves. We have no experience apart from the 
“bundle”; therefore we cannot infer such entities.   
      Kant considers Descartes’ reasoning “transcendent” and incapable of being 
verified in experience, whereas Hume’s account is reductivist and lacking in 
explanatory power.  He also felt that it undermined both scientific thinking and the 
moral claims of human reason. Something deeper than mental habit or custom and 
the association of ideas is necessary, for one cannot attempt to infer reality from 
experience when experience itself stands in need of explanation. He therefore uses a 
reversal of approach by removing the primacy of our sensorially derived experience 
and rendering it peripheral.   Rather than attempting to infer the existence of the 
empirical world from direct apprehension of his own existence, as had Descartes, or 
from our perceptions, as had Hume, Kant takes the self-evident truths of empirical 
experience and deduces a metaphysical subject who necessarily exists as their 
counterpart.  For Kant if the phenomenal unity of experience is to take place, 
subjective unity must first be presupposed.  
       Although Kant agrees with Hume that when we introspect we find no unitary 
self or ego, but at most a bundle of impressions, he argues that a unitary active self 
must, nonetheless be postulated in thought. For Kant, the elements in Hume’s bundle 
of perceptions has a unity, a unity which results from the amalgamating activity of a 
subject, a thing (an x) of which we can say nothing but which plays a certain role in 
our cognitive abilities and which  necessarily exists and provides the explanatory 
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power missing in the Humean account. This Kant termed the “transcendental 
subject”.  Both Descartes and Hume held “representationalist” theories of perception 
and their associated “problem of the external world” and this has been bequeathed to 
contemporary cognitive science and neuroscience where they have lodged again in a 
wide variety of sense data theories and reductionist programmes. Kant was the first 
to provide a radical critique of this understanding of the mind.  
       Thus, although Kant thought that there were serious errors in the views of his 
predecessors, he also thought they were partially correct.   He agrees with Descartes 
that the actuality of self awareness is indubitably present and also with Hume that 
sensibility provides us with a bundle or “manifold” of impressions. However he 
combines both to conclude that we have to connect these impressions in a 
determinate way and thus impose a necessary order on them through which the 
objective world is rendered intelligible.  According to Kant, there are twelve logical 
functions of judgment necessarily presupposed in the human mind, the “categories of 
the understanding”, which can only be used in legitimate cognitive judgments if and 
when they are used to identify particular objects or events in space and time.  
Moreover spatio-temporal designation is essential to the presentation of objects in 
the world that are experienced, and also to our cognitive reference to them. The 
twelve categories, identified in the Metaphysical Deduction section of the Critique, 
are objectively valid for empirical objects because they are the very conditions of the 
possibility of experiencing objects at all. We cannot experience objects unless we 
experience them as falling under these a priori principles. There is, therefore, a 
necessary a priori interdependence of object consciousness and the transcendental 
unity of apperception, the ultimate condition of the possibility of experience. There 
could be no experience of objects at all if the manifold of representations were not 
synthesised or combined by the mind through the unity of apperception (A108/135). 
He also points out that an important source of confusion inherent in the Cartesian 
picture is that it overestimates its epistemological position with respect to the self by 
claiming that introspection presents us with epistemic contact with “a thinking 
substance”. Rationalists freely used a priori concepts in metaphysics without asking: 
How can a priori concepts be referred to any particulars about which we purport to 
make metaphysical claims? All that could be said of the introspective experience is 
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that there is thinking going on, not that there is a metaphysical subject that can be 
known. As he writes: 
[I]t is evident that rational psychology owes its origin simply to mis-
understanding. The unity of consciousness (...) is here mistaken for an intuition 
of subject as object and the category of substance is then applied to it (B421-2) 
[my italics]. 
       As Kant diagnoses it, we do not and cannot have any such intuition of a self. 
Our knowledge of the world and also our awareness of ourselves has a different 
foundation. It is founded on the “transcendental” ground (grund) of the unity of 
consciousness, what Kant terms the “transcendental unity of apperception”. He also 
describes it as a “pure unchanging consciousness”, a unity which is a necessary 
condition of objective experience and objective cognition or knowledge, since 
without it no object could be thought.   
       Descartes had stressed that the self is a subject of experience. For Hume any self 
that we encounter is an “object”, a “bundle of impressions” just as other objects are 
“bundles of impressions”.  Kant’s critical philosophy can be seen as an attempt to 
settle the matter to the satisfaction of both parties and to do justice to both empiricist 
and rationalist accounts of self-knowledge, whilst also passing beyond them.  For 
Kant, the self is to be regarded as both “subject” and “object”. Unlike his 
predecessors he elaborates a dualistic yet monist theory of the nature of cognition. 
There is a distinction between the “phenomenal” self and the self of transcendental 
apperception. The phenomenal, empirical or experiential self is an object in the 
world and is a product of the process of “objectification”, as are other objects in the 
world. Objects in the world present themselves to us as outer appearances and are 
always changing and, likewise, the phenomenal self.  As Kant puts it “No fixed and 
abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner experiences” (A107).  Thus, Kant 
agrees with the empiricist claim that we can have a kind of knowledge of ourselves 
through “inner sense”. However, he also agrees with the rationalists that this does 
not end the matter.  For as well as the phenomenal self or self as “object” we must 
also recognise the self as subject, the “transcendental subject” or “transcendental 
unity of apperception”, which he describes as “a pure unchanging consciousness”. 
This is not a sense of self occasioned by experience but is the ultimate condition of 
all experience or knowledge of the objective world. In fact, it is a necessary 
prerequisite of our having any sort of experience at all that the self for which the 
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experience exists should be thought of as a unitary and unchanging subject. 
Otherwise put; it is a presupposition of experience itself that every object should 
relate to a subject and that this subject should be aware of its own identity.  
      Kant makes clear that it is illogical to claim that this “transcendental subject” is 
the experiential self, since if it is the ultimate prerequisite of experience, it cannot 
then itself be defined by appeal to experience. Unlike Descartes, Kant does not 
attempt to establish his philosophical system on an Archimedean point, on an 
allegedly absolutely indubitable foundation. Instead, he begins with the objective 
reality of experience and explores the conditions for its possibility. The objective 
reality of experience does not necessitate any external proofs, since “the possibility 
of experience is … that what gives objective reality to all our a priori modes of 
knowledge” (B195-6/A156-7). Kant’s point, in a nutshell, is that it logically follows 
from the premise that the apperceiving self is the condition of all experience that one 
cannot become aware of it through our ordinary cognitive capacities since this would 
be to objectify it which is logically incoherent. For  to conceive the apperceiving self 
as such is to make it an item within consciousness,   and thereby to remove it from 
its role as subject.  As he says in the Preface to the second edition of the Critique:  
My soul (...) cannot indeed be known by means of speculative reason (and still 
less through empirical observation) (…) For I should then have to know such a 
being as determined in its existence, and yet not determined in time - which is 
impossible,  since I cannot support my concept by any intuition (B xxviii).  
Nevertheless there is, for Kant, a way in which we can become aware of the 
transcendental self, through a direct unprocessed recognition. For he also says:  
[I]n the synthetic original unity of apperception I am conscious of myself, not as I 
appear to myself, nor as I am in myself,  but only that I am (B157).  
Kant does not mean that we can infer from the unity of apperception, the “I think” 
the certain existence of a Cartesian conscious subject. The immediate awareness we 
have of the subject self in apperception does not give us “knowledge” of the nature 
of the self in the way that Descartes claims.  As he says: “We do not have, and 
cannot have, any knowledge whatsoever of any such subject” (A350).  The “unity of 
apperception” is the mark not of the consciousness of a Cartesian self but of the 
consciousness of anything at all.     
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      In Descartes’ view the mental is absolutely distinct from physical processes; the 
two take place in different and distinct “substances”. To account for their interaction 
Descartes asserted that the pineal gland was where the thoughts enter the body. 
Today a new form of dualism (property dualism) also substantialises or objectivises 
mind as well as matter, and eventually leads to an explanatory gap (Levine, 1983) 
and a modern-day version of the mind-body problem. It also leads to Cartesian-like 
attempts to prove the existence of a non-physical fact about consciousness; that there 
must be something real beyond the known physical world that must account for it. 
On the other hand, in the manner of Hume,  modern functionalist explanations deny 
there is a problem;  that any explanation in terms of processes would leave exactly 
nothing further to be explained,  no “hard problem” exists above and beyond the 
explanation in terms of mechanical processes.  In other words, the Cartesian and 
Humean approaches to cognition continue to hold sway today. Functionalist 
approaches to cognition are, more or less, updated Hume. Although it was Thomas 
Hobbes who was first to theorise about the mind as a computational device, it was 
Hume who first devised a “mental mechanics” inspired by Newton’s mechanical 
philosophy of (non-human) nature. It was also Hume who shed the theological 
baggage which had encumbered his rationalist predecessors and founded a true 
science of human nature. Daniel Dennett is an avowed Humean and is highly vocal 
in his contention that cognitive science retains the often unacknowledged remnants 
of Cartesian dualism, which he calls Cartesian Materialism. Tellingly, he regards 
Hume as pivotal in the history of functionalism and credits him with formulating the 
central problem of cognitive science, which he calls Hume’s problem, which is how 
to discharge the homunculus or little man. According to Dennett, Hume’s trouble 
was that it did not occur to him that simple homunculi might work, small 
subsystems, the sum total of which gives us the illusion of consciousness. The mind, 
for Dennett contains several sub-persons or agents and each of those in turn contains 
other agents and so on, right down until we reach individual neurons which Dennett, 
following McCulloch and Pitts, conceived of as being simple logical switches. This 
is known, famously, as Homuncular Functionalism, the postulation of a hierarchical 
series of mind levels (homunculi) which become simpler and simpler in terms of 
complexity and organisation until at the level of neurons the homunculi are 
discharged.  
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       On the other side of the debate, those who think there is a “hard problem of 
consciousness” simply take Descartes’ notion of immediate thought as given as a 
brute fact.  Chalmers writes, for example, that “if it were not for the fact that first-
person experience was a brute fact presented to us, there would seem to be no reason 
to predict its existence” (Chalmers 1990). Whatever the theory of consciousness 
proposed, the core idea that there is a hard problem of consciousness that needs 
explaining eventually leads to the modern view that consciousness is merely 
epiphenomenological, an accompanying event to cognition that lies outside the chain 
of physical causation. Like the Cogito, consciousness is something that evades all 
causal explanation. However, this way of thinking gives rise to a host of 
philosophical perplexities that are as intractable today as they were in the past. Much 
of the contemporary discussion of consciousness remains mired in conceptual 
problems from centuries ago that should by now have been left behind. 
       Kant was sharply aware of this tendency to be misled by this kind of 
reasoning and called Descartes’ position “sceptical idealism”. The sceptical idealist 
holds that whilst one may be certain about the existence of one’s own states of 
consciousness, the external world will remain an unproven assumption. For 
Descartes it is the direct knowledge of one’s own existence, the Cogito, that will 
supposedly furnish the starting point for any attempts to establish the existence of 
other objects, but never manages to re-establish the connection. Hume, on the other 
hand, although sceptical of the Cartesian self, was also sceptical of the external 
world since all there are are sense impressions. Our natural instinctive belief that 
there is a real world external to our senses, however, cannot be rationally justified.  
Perception for the empiricists pertains to “ideas” or sense experience, not directly to 
external objects.  From this point onwards, there appears to have been an undisturbed 
tradition of these central methodological commitments right up to present-day 
cognitive science.  It is for this reason that Kant’s reversal of approach to those 
thinkers before him can provide genuine insight. Although his psychology was 
secondary to his main concern and a mere by product of his epistemology, his 
refutations and solutions to what he saw as the problematic philosophy of his 
predecessors were not only important in his own time but continue to have relevance 
today. They have immense value in helping unravel the philosophical perplexities 
that have arisen in contemporary science of the mind.  In particular, they are able 
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shed light on the modern day problem of consciousness, because they address the 
sense in which one can say that a person is a subject of his own awareness. They 
focused on the question of whether one is one ever directly aware of such a subject. 
These questions have to do with actual phenomenal consciousness per se, what we 
find when we introspect, when as Hume put is “we enter most intimately into 
ourselves”.  Hume’s denial that there is introspective awareness of a subject is based 
on the model of sense-perception. Thus, he argues that although we are aware of 
perceptions of objects, we are not aware of a perception of a self among them.   
       This method of characterising self-awareness has been repeated ever since by 
philosophers and cognitive scientists of various persuasions. Many inadvertently and 
unknowingly support the view that introspection is to be conceived on the model of 
perception and accept the Humean model that the self is not among the objects 
perceived. This has also been regarded as having important implications concerning 
such topics as the nature of self-reference and self-knowledge.  Thus, Hume’s denial 
that we can have perceptual knowledge of a self, that we perceive a self by what 
Kant termed “inner sense” has been influential and continues to beguile and perplex.  
Empiricists during the earlier part of the last century followed his interpretative 
model and claimed that when we introspect we are not aware of a self but only of 
“sense data”.  This view is to be found, for example, in the works of Bertrand 
Russell, (1912, 1927); Broad, (1925); G. E. Moore, (1953), and Ayer, (1956).  
Indeed, this is the natural conclusion of the idea that access to our own minds is to be 
conceived on the model of sense perception.  Kant saw the error of this way of 
thinking about the mind; for, as discussed, if perceptions are mental particulars other 
than the self which serve as objects of introspective awareness then the self cannot 
itself be such an object.  He recognises that  we are all prone to an all-pervasive 
“transcendental illusion”, which is very hard to recognise, let alone to compensate 
for, which is a pervasive intellectual illusion, modelled on the perceptual, which 
predisposes  even the  “wisest” of people to accept as sound certain invalid 
arguments for substantive theses about the nature of the self. Kant claims that human 
reason is inevitably caught up in this highly problematic way of thinking: one that it 
cannot dispense with, even though it is entirely groundless as a description of reality. 
He says in the Preface of the first edition of the Critique that his purpose will be to 
help the reader at least be aware of transcendental illusions, even though their effects 
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on their thinking will remain unchanged.  The core idea is that because metaphysics 
by its nature exceeds the bounds of experience, it is easy, in fact all too easy, to take 
the mere logical coherence of a position as a sign of its truth, which leads us into 
“transcendental illusions”: the substitution of logical for real possibility.  
 
3. 2. The Paralogisms - apperceptionis  substantiatae  
The Paralogisms of  Pure Reason are a series of chapters which concern Kant’s 
views on the self, where he seeks to contrast them with his predecessors, Descartes, 
Leibniz and Hume.  To return to Hume, his argument, simplified, is:  I can only be 
aware of objects via impressions, I am not an impression, and therefore I cannot be 
aware of “a self’”. Nevertheless, Hume appears to have some conception of what a 
self might be despite his denial that he is aware of it because having a mental state 
(an impression) consists in perceiving it and the act of perceiving is relational. There 
cannot be a perception without a perceiver. Awareness of objects via impression 
implies a relationship between perceiver and perceived. Hume seems to have taken it 
for granted that all mental states are relational; impressions are had, but is puzzled 
that he finds no impression of a “haver”. In an appendix to the Treatise, he writes: 
 
When I turn my reflection on myself, I never can perceive this self without some 
or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive anything but the perceptions. ‘Tis 
the composition of these, therefore, which forms the self (A Treatise of Human 
Nature, Appendix). 
If he is aware of any self at all it is “a bundle of perceptions”. However, he is 
puzzled because he cannot find the “principle of connection” that unites this bundle. 
Hume is looking for “something”. In other words, he supposes that awareness of self 
is akin to perceptual awareness of objects. This can be seen by the fact that the 
conclusion of the above argument would only follow if for “self” we could substitute 
“object”.  He also writes the following in the later Inquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding: 
As our idea of any body, a peach, for instance is only that of a particular taste, 
colour, figure, size, consistency, etc. so our idea of any mind is only that of 
particular perceptions without the notion of anything we call substance, either 
simple or compound.  
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       The Humean conception of introspection or self-awareness is analogous to 
seeing. Seeing something is relational. For Hume when we see a peach there is a 
relation set up between the properties of the peach and whatever it is that perceives 
them, although he is perplexed because we can find no impression of that which 
perceives, no impression of “substance”, just as there is no impression of a substance 
in which the properties of the peach inhere. Descartes also models self-awareness on 
perception. Implicit in the Cartesian picture is the assumption that in the “I think” we 
are aware of some entity. Hence Descartes’ move from the Cogito Ergo Sum  “I 
think therefore I am” to “What am I?” and his answer, that he is “a thinking thing”, a 
“res cogitans”. On the Cartesian picture awareness of self is analogous to awareness 
of any other particular. This is a result of the natural tendency to reify the “I” into a 
kind of intuitable non-bodily entity. The reasoning would be as follows: Bodily 
entities are individuated by their properties and relations to other things.  Since the 
self or soul is a non-bodily entity it must be individuated by non-bodily properties. 
This is evident from the way that Descartes describes the self in negatives of the 
descriptions given to bodies, as non-spatial, non-observable, and non-material.  Kant 
talks of our natural tendency to fall prey to this illusion which he calls 
apperceptionis  substantiatae (A402), the reification of the “I think”  into a kind of 
object. Because we can speak about the self both empirically and “transcendentally”, 
we are prone to confusion and often speak about the self in an empirical way. In so 
doing we make the “I” into a thing, reify it and speak of it as if it were an object.  
Although it is legitimate to speak of the “I” of the “I think” we must do so 
“transcendentally”. We must not make the mistake, a mistake to which we are so 
prone, of speaking about the self as if it were an entity or thing.  Kant says in the first 
Paralogism that although the “I” of “I think” is formal, the mere “form” of 
consciousness and therefore insubstantial, it must nevertheless be conceived as 
substantial. The formal condition of experience involves an inbuilt illusion, viz. that 
my experiences seem to be had by a genuine unitary subject. 
       A paralogism is a syllogism, and a syllogism is a mode of deductive 
argumentation consisting of three propositions, the third being a deduction from the 
first two, one of which is a major premise under which everything is subsumed 
“under the condition of the rule”. 43 However, despite giving the initial appearance of 
a valid argument because both the premisses are true, it is fallacious.  The four 
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psychological paralogisms that Kant examines are all said to have the form of a 
sophisma figurae dictionis in which the middle term is used ambiguously. According 
to Kant we are liable to mistakenly reason the following: 
That which is a subject is substance. 
The “I” of “I think” must be represented as a subject. 
Therefore the “I” of “I think” is substance. 
However, Kant shows that it does not follow from the premise that the “I” is 
necessarily conceived or represented as a subject, that it is a subject, and therefore it 
does not follow that the “I” is substance. The fallacy rests on the ambiguity of the 
middle term, “being a subject” and “being represented as a subject”.  What Kant 
terms the  “analytic unity of apperception” is the subjective unity which underlies  all  
experience of objects, and where reason goes astray  is in postulating a real self  as 
corresponding to this merely “formal” unity of the self.  As he writes:  
[T]here is nothing more natural and more misleading than the illusion which 
leads us to regard the unity in the synthesis of thoughts as a perceived unity in the 
subject of these thoughts. We might call it the subreption of the hypostatised 
consciousness [apperceptionis substantiatae] (A402). 
 
Nevertheless this is a natural illusion that “even the wisest of men cannot free 
himself from” (A339/B397). Wittgenstein says something similar in the Blue Book:  
We feel … that in cases where “I” is used as subject we don’t use it because we 
recognise a person by his bodily characteristics, and this creates the illusion that 
we use the word to refer to something bodiless, which however, has its seat in 
our body. In fact this seems to be the real ego, of which it was said Cogito, Ergo, 
Sum (Wittgenstein, 1972, pp. 69-70). 
       The difficulty is that both Descartes and Hume make the mistake of assuming 
the “I” functions like the objects of “outer sense”. Hume’s difficulty arises from the 
fact that he constantly seeks for evidence of a subject, an impression from which the 
idea of a self can be derived. But although the relations between our ideas may be 
traced through time by memory there is no evidence of any self that connects them. 
No impression of a core self that ties them together. Descartes’ error lies in 
supposing that in introspection one is aware of “a thinking thing”. Thus the mistake 
of both Descartes and Hume derives from the supposition that consciousness of self 
must be an experience of “something”. Descartes inflates it into a res cogitans, a 
thinking thing or “substance” whereas Hume, finding no impression of it concludes 
 89 
 
that it does not, in some sense, “exist” or if it does there is no more than the bundle 
of impressions.  Both Humean scepticism and Cartesian dualism are based on the 
perceptual model. The implicit assumption underlying both is that in introspection 
we must be provided with identifying facts about ourselves and because we are not 
we either assume we are non-bodily entities (souls) or that we do not in some sense 
“exist” save as an idea of a bundle of impressions. Kant diagnoses the error in both 
cases. We are not presented with identifying features at all. Kant tells us not only 
that we have no evidence for a self (agreeing with Hume) but that there can be no 
such evidence.  
       Descartes, along with other rationalist philosophers mistakes the absence of any 
intuitions for the intuition of something with remarkable properties, the empiricists 
(Hume) that there is no introspective awareness of a self at all.  In fact, Kant agrees 
with Hume that there is no perceptual awareness of a persisting self by “inner sense”. 
He writes: “For in what we entitle soul everything is in continual flux and there is 
nothing abiding” (A381).  He also agrees with Descartes that  there is  a kind of 
awareness of a self, for he continues “except (if we may so express ourselves) the 
“I”,  which is simple solely because its representation has no content, and therefore 
no manifold, and for this reason seems to represent, or (to use a more correct term)  
denote, a simple object (A381-2).  However, for Kant, we must be careful of our 
tendency to confuse speaking about the “I” in a transcendental way with speaking 
about it as if it were a kind of object, for this would be to characterise the “I” as it 
exists beyond our possible knowledge of it and is a mistaken inference from a 
transcendental to an empirical claim.  Against this tendency Kant frequently reminds 
us: 
The consciousness of myself in the representation “I” is not an intuition, but a 
merely intellectual representation of the spontaneity of a thinking subject. This 
“I” has not, therefore, the least predicate of intuition (B278).   
  
[T]he synthesis of the conditions of a thought in general…..is not objective at all, 
but merely a synthesis of the thought with the subject which is mistaken for a 
synthetic representation of an object (A397). 
 
The “I” is indeed in all thoughts but there is not in this representation the least 
trace of intuition, distinguishing the “I” from other objects of intuition. Thus we 
can indeed perceive that this representation is invariably present in all thought, 
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but not that it is an abiding and continuous intuition, wherein the thoughts, as 
being transitory, give place to one another (A350).  
 
      Moreover, crucially, from a Kantian perspective, there is an intimate reciprocal 
relationship between phenomenal consciousness and the intelligent thought and 
activity of human beings. The human capacity for conceptual understanding or 
thought is so inextricably bound up with the very capacity for phenomenal 
consciousness, that each necessarily presupposes the other. For Kant the original 
consciousness of the identity of the self is at the same time a consciousness of the 
world. Conversely, the same consciousness which reveals the world also reveals the 
subject. The self becomes conscious of itself by seeking out and bringing into 
consciousness its own contents. That is to say, by synthesising the manifold of 
spatial conceptions we gain knowledge of things outside us and it is through this 
knowledge of outer things that the self can know itself. Kant writes: 
I am just as certainly conscious that there are things outside me which are in 
relation to my senses, as I am conscious that I myself exist as determined in time 
(Bxii, note).  
       Thus, for Kant, the world both requires and guarantees the subject. Moreover, 
his methodological idealism states that human cognitive subjectivity and empirical 
objectivity are mutually interdependent for their very intelligibility.  This is what Jay 
F. Rosenberg calls Kant’s mutuality thesis:  
[T]he conditions according to which an experienced world are constituted as an 
intelligible synthetic unity were [on Kant’s view] at the same time the conditions 
by which an experiencing consciousness was itself constituted as a unitary self. 
That an experience represents the encountered world as catagorially structured in 
space and time, Kant claimed to show, was a condition of the very possibility of 
his representing himself  as a unitary subject of his experiences of that world, or 
indeed any world at all! At the centre of Kant’s critical philosophy, then lies a 
thesis of self and world...subject and world are two inseparable poles of a single 
dynamic process of representation (Rosenberg, 1986, 2008, p. 6). 
Rosenberg argues that three levels or grades of apperception: situatedness in time 
and space, multi-positionality, and “x- objectivity”, i.e. the impersonal representation 
of the world that  selves gain when they adjust their personal representations to 
harmonise with reported representations of other selves. Furthermore, these three 
grades of apperception guarantee that one can distinguish oneself from others. For 
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Rosenberg, a being who is capable of apperceptive consciousness just is one that 
possesses a conceptual system rich enough to afford a global representation of the 
world, through three levels or grades i) situatedness in time and space, ii) pure 
positional awareness (he uses the example of a cat stalking a quail which, although 
object-directed is not an apperceptive, self-conscious kind of consciousness, but non-
conceptual) and iii) since, conceptual capacities are, for Rosenberg, connected to 
linguistic development, also part of a linguistic community. For Rosenberg, non-
conceptual representations of objects are an integral part of both human and animal 
perceptual experience. Our reflective consciousness is grounded in the non-reflective 
consciousness we share with other animals. According to Rosenberg “our own form 
of self consciousness is an elaboration” of  the cat’s “pure positional awareness” 
(ibid., p. 103). Conceptual representation rests on a “fundamentum of non-
conceptual representation” - the cat’s pure positional awareness  “has the structure of 
a perceptual field partitioned into figure and ground”. This is not simply a fact about 
the cat’s “inner states” but can also be construed as involving embodiment and 
situatedness-in-a-world. In fact, Rosenberg offers a plausible account of the sense in 
which non-conceptual animal cognition in humans and other animals succeeds in 
representing and tracking a world of objects in space and time. (This notion of 
embodiment and situatedness-in-the-world will be discussed further in Chapter 6). 
       According to Rosenberg’s mutuality thesis, then,  an objective “synthetic unity 
of experience” is correlative to the subjective “transcendental unity of apperception” 
(ibid., pp. 6-7). Synthesis or “the combination of the manifold of sensory 
experience”  produces not only the objective world, but at the same time analyses out 
the experiencing subject. Thus, consciousness of self and consciousness of the world 
are born together through the spontaneous activity of synthesis.  The output of our 
synthesising activities implies both a concrete empirical subject in time and space 
and the concrete world of objects of experience. The empirical subject and empirical 
object are thus reciprocally generated through the transcendental actus or act of 
synthesis, in the sense that even though we do not introspect such a continuing 
subject of thought, the existence of a thinker of thoughts is inferred from the very 
mental states with which we are presented.  This leads us nicely into the topic of the 
next section. 
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3.3. Synthesis, Relational Unity, and Consciousness of Self. 
     
As discussed, Descartes had claimed that although he could doubt everything in the 
world, the one thing that he could be sure of was that the “I” that thinks should be 
something. Although everything that he is aware of in the external world is a dream, 
or a deception resulting from the work of an evil genius, he cannot doubt that he, 
himself, exists as a “thinking thing”, a res cogitans. As he declares  “whilst I thus 
wished to think all things false it was absolutely essential that the “I” who thought 
should be somewhat” (Discourse on Method, Part IV).  Of note here is that a key 
feature of his position is that the self, insofar as it encounters the world, is itself 
unencounterable through experience. Being thus unencounterable then it cannot be 
encountered falsely. Hence the immunity of the Cogito from the hyperbolic doubt 
that afflicts all experience.  From this indubitable truth Descartes then goes on to 
derive a number of a priori truths about the self, viz: that it is simple, substantial, 
unitary and persistent.  This notion of the encounterability of the self in experience is 
reaffirmed by Leibniz. He agrees with Descartes that the “I” is able to be 
apprehended by the mind directly and not through sensation. It can be known 
through what he termed  “acts of reflection” which are akin to Descartes’ a priori 
reasoning and through which we are able to know that the self is simple and 
substantial (Monadology 30). However, for Leibniz there is also knowledge of a self 
gathered from one’s experiences, for he adds to this that when we consider the 
constitution of the mind there is nothing besides “perceptions and their changes” 
(Monadology 17). In other words, Leibniz introduces a relation between the “I” that 
encounters and that which it encounters. He writes “It is well to make a distinction 
between perception, which is the internal condition of the monad representing 
external things, and apperception, which is consciousness or the reflective 
knowledge of this internal state (Leibniz, The Principles of Nature and Grace, sec. 
4). He makes the same distinction almost word for word in the Monadology (14). It 
is interesting that he makes this distinction between the  “I”  that encounters and that 
which it encounters, and that he terms such awareness,  respectively, “apperception” 
and “perception”. This terminology is later taken up by Kant. Consideration of this 
distinction leads Leibniz to conclude that if over time minds have no distinct 
perceptions then they are “monads which are wholly bare” (Monadology 24). For 
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Leibniz, then, the “I” without distinct perceptions is a “bare” mind. In a certain 
sense, it is  “knowable”  only insofar as it encounters the world; there is an emptiness 
in the idea of the self considered apart from its role as experiencing subject. Hume 
takes this notion further and propels it to its natural empirical conclusions. He argues 
that the self is not only unencounterable in the world, as the rationalists claim, it is 
also unencounterable introspectively, not even as a “bare self”. He writes:  
 
For my part when I enter most immediately into what I call myself, I always 
stumble upon some perception or other…. I never catch myself at any time 
without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception (A 
Treatise on Human Nature p. 252).   
 
Hume sees it the self is a nothing but a mere “bundle or collection of different 
perceptions which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity”. The unity of 
the Cogito is an illusion. There is no diachronic unity, (unity over time) for the self is 
not a continuant subject but only a sequence of representations. Neither is there 
synchronic unity (unity at a time) but a complex of ontologically more basic entities 
with no necessary connection between them.  As discussed, Kant can be viewed as 
adjudicating the claims of his predecessors, synthesising  their views and passing 
beyond them; he also takes some inspiration from Liebniz.  He agrees with Hume 
about the unobservable character of the “I”. Empirical self-consciousness or “inner 
sense” presents us with no “abiding” self but a complex of representations only. In 
fact, he points this out in terms reminiscent of Hume’s own discussions on the 
matter, that:  
 
Consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner 
perception is merely empirical, and always changing. No fixed and abiding self 
can present itself in this flux of inner appearances (A107).  
 
However, that the unity of consciousness cannot be determined by anything in the 
contents of consciousness is not the whole story. Kant thought that it must be 
considered as something more than this; the self does exist and that we are, in some 
sense, “conscious” of it. As he writes: 
 
I am conscious of the self as identical in respect of the manifold of 
representations given to me in an intuition, because I call them one and all my 
representations (B135) [my italics].  
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As Rosenberg points out, Kant regards the unity of consciousness at a time as 
necessarily involving self-consciousness, or at least as involving the potential 
ascription of contents to itself by the subject: 
 
The “I think” must be capable of accompanying all my representations for 
otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought, in 
other words, the representation would either be impossible or else would be 
nothing to me……The unity of this apperception I call the transcendental unity 
of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of a priori knowledge 
arising from it. For the manifold representations which are given in an intuition 
would not all of them be my representations if they did not all belong to one self-
consciousness  (B132-3).    
 
The “I” of “I think” is a problematic concept, given the philosophical 
presuppositions and constraints of Kant’s predecessors. Since the self is never 
encountered in experience yet is always present in every experience,  what are we to 
make of it? I am aware of myself as “something” which has my thoughts but in what 
way am I so aware and what account are we to give of this “something”? Kant, in 
fact, recognises that the views of his predecessors present us with an antimony which 
is both instructive and illuminating. Descartes’ conception of the self is that of a 
unitary simple substance, Hume’s that the self that experiences is nothing over and 
above a set of those experiences. Kant accepts the Cartesian concept of the self, but 
only as a “form of representation” that is necessary for us given the character of our 
experiences. However, he also agrees with Hume that the knowledge of the actual 
character of the “I” is inaccessible to us. However, this is not because it does not in 
some sense “exist” as Hume claims, but  because the “I” is not an intuition, and since 
our knowledge is restricted to intuitions “thought through the understanding” (A19/ 
B33)  nothing can be known about it in the strict sense, although there is cognitive 
access of a different kind. From this it follows that we cannot know the self to be 
substantial in the way that Descartes claims. On the Cartesian picture awareness of 
oneself is analogous to awareness of any other particular. This is evident from the 
way that Descartes describes the mind, in negatives of the descriptions given to 
objects, viz., as non-spatial, non-observable and non-material. For him mind and 
body are both “substances”, both “things” with attributes and properties. However, 
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Kant claims that to assert that the soul is substance is to make “an empirical… but,  
in this case inadmissible, employment of the category” (A403).   
       Gilbert Ryle in his famous 1949 book The Concept of Mind is regarded by many 
thinkers as having eliminated the immaterial mind and dissolved the mind-body 
problem. In it he also accused Descartes of error, and in particular, of making a 
category mistake - the conceptual fallacy of putting mind in the same category as 
body.  He called Cartesian Dualism “the official doctrine” and claimed that it 
represented the facts of mental life “as if they belonged to one logical type or 
category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another”. 
Ryle alleged that it was a mistake to treat the mind as an object made of an 
immaterial substance because predications of substance are not meaningful for a 
collection of dispositions and capacities. He also termed it the Dogma of the Ghost 
in the Machine. There is therefore prima facie similarity between what Ryle later 
called a category mistake and what Kant calls the fallacy of “subreption” (A402). 
The difference is that Kant has deep epistemological reasons for this, whereas for 
Ryle it is simply a mistaken language application.  Kant’s great insight was his 
recognition that one gains awareness of oneself as subject, in a different manner 
from the way in which one gains awareness of one’s own psychological states.  
Rather than appealing to “clear and distinct ideas” and the introspective awareness of 
a simple unitary “substance”,  as had Descartes ( “substance” for Descartes is a thing 
that does not depend on anything else for its existence, i.e. it is a self- subsisting 
thing or entity), Kant regards spontaneous synthesis as the source of this unity.  His 
point is that it is a kind of category mistake to claim that the subject is “knowable”, 
by means of a kind of rational intuition, in a way analogous to the way that we 
“know” objects as Descartes insists. For Kant the subject should not be considered as 
substantial but as a “formal” unity preceding experience as its necessary condition 
and capable of knowing its identity through its spontaneous acts.  
        The transcendental unity of apperception is distinguished from empirical 
apperception in order to account for the possibility of subjective experience which 
must display a relational unity between the “I” that experiences and what is 
experienced. The claim that subjective experience must display a relational unity 
(rather than simply Hume’s “bundle of perceptions” held together by the principles 
of association) is justified because the use of the a priori categories of the 
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understanding is shown to be necessary. Hume’s “principles of association” are too 
impoverished and too subjective as an account of the object of experience to be 
capable of explaining its unity. The difficulty with it is that whilst it purports to 
explain why it is we might take various qualities to constitute one object, it is 
insufficient to show how these qualities are related together in the object, but only 
how perceptions are connected together in our minds; in addition, it fails to explain 
why certain qualities are invariably found to be united together in our experience of 
the object. Kant’s solution is that if consciousness is to be unified in such a way as to 
mean anything to me, i.e. to be a single complex thought, then it must be possible for 
a subject to be aware of the “I” that thinks each of the elements of an object (in 
general)  together with the I that thinks them all together. I must be able to think of 
each element, and each of them as mine.  In the manifold of both synchronic and 
diachronic representations, consciousness of each element is inseparable from 
consciousness of each as belonging to me. Thus, the subject must be able to be aware 
of each of the elements in the contents of consciousness, both diachronic and 
synchronic as belonging to him. This, however, requires an awareness of the act of 
combination or synthesis by means of which the elements are thought together:  
 
I am conscious of the self as identical in respect of all the manifold of 
representations that are given to me in an intuition, because I call them one and 
all my representations, and so apprehend them as constituting one intuition. This 
amounts to saying that I am conscious to myself a priori of a necessary synthesis 
of representations - to be entitled the original synthetic unity of apperception - 
under all representations that are given to me must stand, but under which they 
have also first to be brought by means of synthesis (B135-136).   
 
       Thus, the transcendental unity of apperception involves a kind of awareness, i.e. 
consciousness of oneself as active in synthesis, which is different from 
consciousness of oneself as empirical in inner sense. Self-consciousness as inner 
sense or our awareness of what we passively “undergo” as we are affected by the 
play of our senses is distinguished from consciousness of  “what we are doing”  i.e. 
spontaneously synthesising.  For Kant the self of apperception involves the notion of 
the existence of a unitary subject.  He writes in the Paralogisms  “The proposition “I 
think” insofar as it amounts to the assertion “I exist thinking” determines the subject 
(B429),  and that the “I think”  is “something real that has been given (…) something 
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that actually exists” (B423n). In the Transcendental Deduction he states “my 
existence is not mere “appearance” (much less mere illusion) (B157). However, he 
then qualifies this in a footnote: 
 
The “I think” expresses the act of determining my existence. Existence is already 
given thereby, but the mode in which I am to determine this existence (...) is not 
thereby given (B157n) [my italics]. 
 
Apperception does involve the “real” existence of a unitary self but does not present 
that existence in “determinate form”. For this, representations of objects other than 
oneself are required. We are conscious of our existence as active agency. This 
existence is not existence as a category. The self whose existence is indicated by the 
“I think” is not known in the way that Descartes claims because it does not involve 
an intuition. If one were to know oneself in this way then one would need a special 
intuition of oneself “which gives the determining in me (...) prior to the act of 
determination, as time does in the case of the determinable” (B157n). However, no 
such intuition is forthcoming and one must conclude that one does not have 
knowledge of oneself as substantial in the way that Descartes insists.  
Kant makes a similar point in the first Paralogism: 
 
The ‘I’ is indeed in all thoughts, but there is not in this representation the least 
trace of intuition, distinguishing the ‘I’ from other objects of intuition. Thus we 
can indeed perceive that this representation is invariably present in all thought, 
but not that it is an abiding and continuing intuition, wherein the thoughts, as 
being transitory, give place to one another (A350). 
 
 
And he concludes: “We have no knowledge of the subject in itself, which as  
substratum underlies this ‘I’ as it does all thoughts”. We cannot perceive the “I” 
because it is not an intuition (intuitions are representations of empirical objects as 
indeterminate appearances). Since this is the case we cannot ascribe to it the 
permanence and simplicity which is constitutive of substance. If we do so we are 
making an empirical but illegitimate use of the a priori category of substance. The 
proposition that the self is substance implies that the mind is representable as 
empirical intuition. If this were the case this would mean that one must be able to 
pick it out by means of “predicates of its intuition” (A399-400). However, this is 
 98 
 
exactly what we cannot do with the “I” of “I think”. The consciousness of myself in 
the representation “I” is not an intuition, but the merely intellectual representation of 
the spontaneity of a thinking subject. This “I” has not therefore the least predicate of 
intuition (B278).  Thus, there is no representation of the mind as it is by inner sense.  
In this Kant agrees with Hume, as discussed earlier. At most introspection gives us 
the phenomenal self which is appearance only. If we take away from this content we 
are left with a “bare representation”.  Nevertheless, Kant writes “I am conscious of 
my own existence as determined in time” (B 275) and that “I exist as an intelligence 
which is conscious solely of its power of combination” (B158-9).  I take it that for 
Kant the fact of self-consciousness is in itself sufficient to establish the existence of a 
self. As he says “My existence is (...) already given by the act of consciousness” 
(B157n). For, without the active agent of synthesis, neither knowledge nor 
experience would be possible at all.  We have no right to claim that we know the 
subject as it is in itself, however. As he puts it  “It is (...) very evident that I cannot 
know as an object that which I must presuppose to know any object”(A402). Being 
aware of oneself as subject through acts of synthesis is very different from awareness 
of oneself as object. Kant asserts that “consciousness”  of oneself is very different 
from “knowledge” of oneself (B157). All we know of the self is what is formally 
identical in our various acts of synthesis. Abstracting from these acts we are left with 
bare consciousness, no content at all. For Kant unity of consciousness depends on 
synthesis, this consciousness is not akin to perceptual experience. We are, Kant says, 
“conscious” of the existence of the apperceptive self in the spontaneous activity of 
synthesis. He writes “Synthesis (...) as an act is (...) conscious to itself, even without 
sensibility” (B153).  One is aware of oneself as “subject” by doing acts of synthesis 
not via intuitions. In fact, it is on this self-consciousness that the unity of the contents 
of consciousness necessarily depends. The clearest statement of this comes at B133-
4: 
[The] thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a manifold which is given in 
intuition contains a synthesis of representations, and is possible only through the 
consciousness of this synthesis. For the empirical consciousness, which 
accompanies different representations, is in itself diverse and without relation to 
the identity of the subject. That relation comes about, not simply through my 
accompanying each representation with consciousness, but only in so far as I 
conjoin one representation with another, and am conscious of the synthesis of 
them.  
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3.4. The Transcendental Subject. 
Kant proposes that there are certain principles given a priori  on the basis of which 
we acquire knowledge of all possible objects of perception. Knowledge must, 
however, be confined to what is given in experience. Any attempt to introduce into 
thinking what lies “beyond sensation”, that is, metaphysical entities such as “value” 
and “freedom” necessarily lead to antinomies and error. Kant reasoned, against his 
predecessor, Hume, that something (an “x”) exists that unifies our discrete sense 
impressions, an enduring and coherent subject that is a necessary precondition of 
experience. Kant called this unifying self the “transcendental subject”. But at the 
same time he stressed that although we can have reasonable faith in the capacity of 
the transcendental subject to order our experience, we still can never apprehend it 
directly. It is always beyond the reach of our empirical capacity to “know”. In the 
course of addressing Hume’s scepticism in his Critiques, Kant distinguishes the 
phenomenal aspect of empirically knowable things (the world measurable by 
Newtonian physics) from the noumenal aspect of things-in-themselves.  He claimed 
that although we can “know” a lesser faculty of our minds, the “empirical self’, 
through introspection or inner sense, the transcendental subject is beyond this, thus: 
Through this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented 
than a transcendental subject of the thoughts = X. It is known only through the 
thoughts which are its predicates, and of it, apart from them, we cannot have any 
concept whatsoever (A346/B404). 
It is Kant’s aim in the Transcendental Deduction to explain what is meant by this 
“transcendental subject” of thought. What he says is that although it cannot have 
empirical predicates applied to it, it can have “transcendental predicates” (B114), 
that is to say, all we can say about it concern the limits and conditions of validity of 
knowledge of the most universal kind. Nothing whatsoever of an empirical nature 
can be predicated of it, and this is against both the Cartesian and Empiricist notions 
of the subject, which model such knowledge on sense perception. For Kant, the 
grund or ground of all experience is the experiencing subject considered 
transcendentally, and the constitution of the subject is such that all thought is rule-
governed in accordance with the categories of the understanding.  
 100 
 
      As has been emphasised, it is significant that Kant also argues for a deep 
interconnectedness between the ability to have self-consciousness and the ability to 
experience a world of objects. It is through the a priori process of synthesis, that the 
mind spontaneously generates both the structure of objects and its own unity. The   
“I think” is an act of spontaneity, or pure apperception, not a state of passive 
empirical observation or empirical apperception. In the Anthropology Kant discusses 
the role of apperception in relation to the Gemut (inner sense)  and makes it clear that 
we are to differentiate inner sense from pure apperception, and judges “psychology” 
on the basis of its failure to apply this distinction. This is articulated in a long 
footnote in the first book in the Anthropology: 
 
If we consciously imagine for ourselves the inner action (spontaneity), whereby a 
concept (a thought) becomes possible, we engage in reflection; if we consciously 
imagine for ourselves the susceptibility (receptivity), whereby a perception 
(perceptio), i.e. empirical observation, becomes possible, we engage in 
apprehension; however, if we consciously imagine both acts, then the 
consciousness of one’s self (apperceptio) can be divided into that of reflection 
and that of apprehension. Reflection is a consciousness of the understanding, 
whilst apprehension is a consciousness of the inner sense; reflection is pure 
apperception, but apprehension is empirical apperception; consequently, the 
former is falsely referred to as the inner sense. In psychology we investigate 
ourselves according to our perceptions of the inner sense; but in logic we make 
the investigation on the grounds of what the intellectual consciousness supplies 
us with. Here the self appears to us as twofold (which would be contradictory): 
(1) the self, as the subject of thinking (in logic), which means pure apperception 
(the merely reflecting self) of which nothing more can be said, except that it is 
entirely simple perception. (2) The self, as the object of the perception, 
consequently also part of the inner sense, contains a multiplicity of definitions 
which make inner experience possible. To ask whether or not a man conscious of 
different inner mental changes (either of his thoughts or of fundamental 
principles assumed by him) can say that he is the selfsame man, is an absurd 
question. For he can be conscious of these changes in the first place only on 
condition that he represents himself, in the different situations, as one and the 
same subject. The human ego is indeed twofold as regards its form (manner of 
representation), but not with respect to its matter (content).  (An Ak. I. V. pp. 17-
18, footnote).  
 
       Thus, Kant illustrates that awareness of a particular conscious experience 
includes a tacit awareness of oneself as subject of that experience, a “bare 
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representation”  x . This means that a subject, in perceiving Q  is also tacitly aware 
of itself perceiving Q. In other words all conscious states involve the possibility of 
self-awareness, though this is not awareness of a “self” in the substantial sense, as a 
thinking thing or Cartesian  res cogitans: the “self” is not an entity or quasi entity 
that exists apart from, or above, the phenomenal experience. Descartes had declared, 
famously, “I think, therefore I am” cogito ergo sum but for Kant, such knowledge of 
a self is impossible. The “I” is simply a “logical” requirement of the “unity of 
apperception” and lacks the experience of direct intuition that would make such self-
knowledge available. Although “I” seems to refer to the subject of experience, it is 
not really a permanent feature but simply the formal characteristic of a unified 
consciousness. For Kant we have a sense of self, which forms an integral and 
ubiquitous part of our experiential life. This is the “transcendental unity of 
apperception” which is at the same time the “synthetic unity of apperception” that 
unites sensory experience. Indeed, there is no experiential dimension whatever 
without this sense of self.   It is useful here to consider the following remark from 
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophics, where he discusses this sense of 
self on analogy with the eye and the visual field: “[T]his case is altogether like that 
of the eye and the field of sight. But you do not really see the eye. And from nothing 
in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is seen from an eye (Tracatus 5.633). 
 
        A notable advantage of Kant’s view, then, is that it can deflect the various 
difficulties of theories of consciousness that are entangled in the conceptual 
confusions of the “object” consciousness paradigm, requiring a complex theory in 
order account for the so-called “explanatory gap”  between mind and matter. If 
conscious states are not construed as kinds of secondary “objects” relative to a 
conscious mind; and conversely, if self-awareness is an intrinsic feature of those 
states that possess it, there is no need for complicated theoretical tactics to account 
for the intuitive immediacy of those conscious states. It also prevents infinite regress. 
If consciousness of a thought is supposedly different from the thought, then an 
infinite regress is generated, for if I have the thought of x then I must be conscious of 
x, but this consciousness of x is also a thought, requiring a further thought, that I am 
aware of x, and so on ad infinitum. However, Kant’s view avoids this problem of 
infinite regress, since there is no Cartesian homunculus, the  “little man”  in the head 
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observing mental states in the theatre of the mind. Rather, Kant claims that 
consciousness is best understood as involving a non-objectifying self-givenness 
which is the ground of all experience of the world. That is, an object of phenomenal 
experience is not simply a “this,” but rather, a “this-such-for-me,” by which is meant 
an intuition which has already been conceptualised.  And understanding something 
(it becomes an object for me) is only possible because I classify it in some way, 
through the pure categories of the understanding by which I make a judgment that 
brings the intuition under the concept. According to the Transcendental Deduction, 
objects can only become objects for us insofar as they conform to the conceptual 
structures with which we cognise objects.  As Kant remarks:  
 
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is, 
therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the 
object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring 
them under concepts (A51/B75). 
 
Thus, Kant thought that human self-consciousness can be regarded from two 
perspectives, as the logical subject of thought and as the object of inner sense, the 
empirical self.  How can this dual unity of consciousness be brought out in full?  
Transcendental apperception, the transcendental unity of self-consciousness is the 
fundamental condition for the cognition of objects in the phenomenal world. The fact 
that we can make judgments at all presupposes this unity of consciousness in a 
subject who is synthesising or combining representations according to the categories. 
Empirical apperception, on the other hand, refers to consciousness of the particular 
contents of the subject’s own mental states.  When we refer to the self 
“transcendentally”, such consciousness is not of a kind of intelligible object and 
Kant admits that it is difficult to describe exactly what it is. The kind of 
understanding to which it could belong is itself a problem. But it is “a kind of 
understanding”, i.e. consciousness of oneself not as an object but of oneself through 
acts of synthesis. It is difficult to characterise this special kind of self-awareness. 
One way of characterising it is to say that when one is aware of oneself this way, one 
is aware of one’s being, or one’s mind “as it is”, by being a spontaneous synthesising 
agent, and not by being intuitively aware of contents of a representation for such, 
that may or may not present me as I am.  Another way of putting it is to say that it is 
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a “mode of being” in a contentful state which is known instrinsically through 
reflective judgement. Kant’s point is that we must be able to have some kind of 
cognitive access to ourselves as a condition of our ability to perceive objects, i.e. as a 
condition of  our capacity to  “apply the categories to the manifold of experience”, 
which is independent of and logically prior to such ability.   
 
Put in a nutshell, Kant’s claim is that a unity of consciousness is possible only on 
condition that we have a consciousness of unity, and vice versa. His argument for 
our being able to conceive of ourselves as unities of consciousness, that is, as 
temporally determined conscious agents, is based on our being able to discern and 
distinguish a real world of moving objects through the application of a priori 
concepts which order and unify our perceptual input. According to Kant, we are 
logical subjects of thoughts, “transcendental unities of apperception” that are 
“logically” necessary for the very possibility of coherent cognition. We look for the 
self, we reflect, and we try to find something there as the locus of thought. We may 
conjure it up in the concept of a mental “thing” (Descartes), or a “bundle of 
perceptions” (Hume). But we would be mistaken, because we are looking in the 
wrong direction. Self-consciousness requires the existence of a perceiving and 
conceiving being that acts and interacts with other objects and the environment in an 
objective world. The self is not the mind: the self is active agency within the world. 
Descartes had declared, famously, “I think, therefore I am” cogito ergo sum, but for 
Kant, such reasoning is faulty. For him the “I” is simply a “logical” requirement of 
the “unity of apperception” and lacks the experience of direct intuition that would 
make such self-knowledge available. Although “I” seems to refer to the subject of 
experience, it is not really a permanent feature but simply the logical characteristic of 
a unified consciousness, the “transcendental unity of apperception”.  
       For Kant the transcendental unity of apperception, which involves synthesis,  is 
an actus. It is something we do.  It is by means of the act of synthesis, the combining 
of the raw data of experience,  that the unity of apperception is simultaneously made 
manifest. The concept of an “object in general” signifies the generic product of this 
synthesis (which takes place according to the categories). The manifold given in 
intuition has categories applied to it, rendering it possible to think of what is given in 
that manifold as an object (something given to a subject). The transcendental unity of 
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apperception is not a thing, however rarified; rather, it is the “formal” condition of 
synthesising a manifold into a cognition of an object. Such a synthesis could not take 
place unless done within a single consciousness, which requires a special kind of 
unity. The self, in other words,  is not an object of which one can become conscious 
like other objects, and we can only become conscious of it as that which unites all 
the representations.  Kant adds that we can only think of a number of representations 
as belonging to the same self in this way through being conscious of, or seeing them 
as, an act in which we synthesise (or combine) these representations with each other.  
       Kant puts it another way, to apperceive a representation is roughly to see it as 
mine, or to say to myself of it “I am having this representation” or “I am thinking 
this” (thus Kant refers to the act of apperception as the “I think”). The analytic unity 
of apperception is the unity or united character that a number of my representations 
have through my seeing them as all belonging to one and the same “I”. The synthetic 
unity of apperception (or original-synthetic unity of apperception) is the unity that 
they have through my being conscious of an act of synthesising or combining them 
with each other, which is a necessary condition of the analytic unity of apperception. 
So,  for Kant the pure concepts of the understanding (of which all our everyday 
concepts are specifications or combinations) are grounded in self-consciousness, 
which in turn is grounded in an original act of synthesis. Here is how he summarises 
his view: 
[A]n object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is 
united. Now all unification of representations demands unity of consciousness in 
the synthesis of them. Consequently it is the unity of consciousness that alone  
constitutes the relation of representations to an object, and therefore their 
objective validity and the fact that they are modes of knowledge; and upon it 
therefore rests the very possibility of the understanding (B137). 
 
       On the Cartesian picture subjectivity is somehow inner,  independent, private 
and unsupported;   conscious states, thoughts and experiences, can be the whole of 
what is real, without requiring the reality of anything else, and in particular without 
requiring the reality of the objects of our thoughts and experiences. Descartes had to 
postulate a benign God in order to guarantee the objectivity of the external world.  
For Kant, however, the first-person point of view does not alone determine a domain 
of objects of awareness. This is because subjectivity is impossible without 
objectivity; the one presupposes the other. For it is a necessary condition of our 
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having thoughts and experiences at all, that the objects of those thoughts and 
experiences have a certain character.  Understanding something (it becomes an 
object for me) is only possible because it is classified in some way, by an act of 
judgment which brings the intuition under the concept. In the Transcendental 
Deduction, Kant declared that objects can only become objects for a subject insofar 
as they conform to the conceptual structures with which we cognise them. At the risk 
of belabouring the point, he writes, we must “make our intuitions intelligible, that is, 
to bring them under concepts” (A51/B75). Moreover,  to apperceive is to recognise 
the experience as mine, it is something “for me”; in other words, there is a “for me” 
factor that necessarily accompanies all our awareness of the world. What makes this 
for-me factor possible is a kind of action that is performed, viz., the act of judgement, 
and this is a matter of synthesising, or bringing together, the manifold of intuition 
(i.e. the totality of the separate elements of sensation) through certain logical 
operations, i.e. the categories. In judgement, a unity (a sense, or a meaning) is 
created, i.e. the (synthetic) unity of consciousness itself. As Kemp Smith noted in his 
Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, published in 1918: 
 
Kant maintains that human consciousness is always an awareness of meaning, 
and that consequently it can find expression only in judgments which involve 
together with their other factors the element of recognition or self-consciousness 
(Kemp Smith, 1918, pp. 47-8.)  
 
       To judge is also to invoke both the productive and reproductive functions of the 
imagination. 
44
 Without this, nothing can mean anything to a subject, there can be no 
representation of anything, no intentional object for consciousness.  Spontaneity is 
an act of the imagination described in both editions as “a blind but indispensible 
function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of 
which we are scarcely ever conscious” (A77-78/B104); this is not because it is 
unconscious, but rather, as the engine of synthesis, it is the very ground or grund of 
such consciousness. Transcendental imagination is what Kant refers to as the 
unknown common root uniting sense and understanding.  It seems clear that 
imagination is viewed by Kant as pre-conceptual and non-intellectual, especially in 
the A edition of the Critique, where it has the important function of “mediating” 
between sensibility and understanding (A124). The proper domain of the 
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imagination is a contentious issue in Kantian scholarship. But it is being increasingly 
recognised that it is related to the body - specifically that Kant’s categories of 
experience are derived from the architectonic structure of embodiment.  Although 
imagination’s use in the Transcendental Deduction is not to do with physiological 
bodily activity per se,  what it achieves is a remarkable bodily understanding of the 
world. In fact, recent scholarship has seen the development of several accounts of 
Kant’s theory of the imagination as embodied imagination.45 This will be the focus 
of Chapter 6. 
 
       The following section is a consideration of the problem of indexical self-
reference, the idea that Kant may have been the first to describe the peculiar logical 
semantics of self-reference,  and how this philosophical analysis of the nature of 
reference to self, has profound contemporary relevance.  It is suggested that taking 
advantage of it might have helped avoid some of the problems that have beset 
contemporary theories of consciousness that have emerged in the wake of and in 
reaction to functionalism. 
  
3.5. The Peculiar Logical Semantics of Self-reference 
 
As discussed above, mainstream cognitive science has retained a large part of its 
Cartesian and empiricist legacy in the sense that they take as the root notion the 
distinction between the mental and the physical, the mind and the world, the subject 
and the object. This is precisely what leads to the notion that cognition must be 
representational and must involve the notion of intentionality or aboutness.  It is the 
view that the mind cannot reach to the objects themselves, and that it is therefore 
necessary to introduce some kind of representational medium or interface between 
mind and world if we are to explain intentionality.  (Later, it will be argued that 
Kant’s ideas can be seen to challenge the thesis of this functionalist mechanistic-
symbolic intentionality). Moreover, a neuroscientific theory of consciousness is 
always a theory of the empirical subject of consciousness, one that analyses a kind of 
“central executive” (to borrow a phrase from Daniel Dennett) implied in the unity of 
experience into its constituent parts, none of which can itself be a proper subject. As 
has been discussed thus far, this omits the Kantian insight of “transcendental 
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apperception” and the spontaneous agent of synthesis.    Kant’s insight is that a unity 
of consciousness is only possible on condition of consciousness of a unity and vice 
versa. That is, the possibility of our being able to understand ourselves as temporally 
determined conscious agents is founded on the ability to discern a real world through 
the application of the concepts or categories which order and unify perceptual 
experience. Furthermore, for Kant, the empirical must be differentiated from the 
transcendental in order to guarantee the objectivity of our world (and also of the 
moral law, but that is another topic) as opposed to the merely empirical and 
contingent, i.e. that which remains bound to sense experience. Kant argues for a deep 
interconnection between the ability to be self-consciousness and the ability to 
experience a world of objects. One of the central theses of Kant’s critical philosophy 
is that the conditions that make the unity of objective experience possible also make 
the unity of apperception (self-consciousness) possible. As was discussed earlier, 
Rosenberg terms this Kant’s “mutuality thesis”: through a process of spontaneous 
synthesis, the mind generates both the structure of objects and its own unity. This is 
an important insight; all consciousness of an objective world involves a certain type 
of self-consciousness, the awareness of the self as neither a quasi-object (Descartes) 
nor as one’s mental states (Hume), but rather, as the intellectual thought of the 
identity of the self through time.  
       On the Kantian account of the infallible self-ascription of judgements, judging is 
a matter of consciously combining or synthesising some mental states in others and 
of recognising that combination as such, and it is also to be aware of the unity of 
these different states in a single subject. He demonstrates how we are apt to easily 
confuse this transcendental unity of our perceptions and thoughts with the perception 
of a unity.  Although he was writing over two hundred years ago,  Kant anticipated 
some of the most important ideas about the mind of the last forty or so years. For he 
addressed the sense in which a person be said to be a subject of his own awareness, 
when as Hume put it, “we enter most intimately into ourselves”. As noted, Hume’s 
denial that there is introspective awareness of a subject was based on the model of 
sense-perception. Thus, he argued that although we are aware of perceptions of 
objects, we are not aware of a perception of a self amongst them.  This method of 
characterising self-awareness has been carried on and repeated ever since by 
philosophers and contemporary cognitive scientists up to this very day, who 
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implicitly  support the view that introspection is to be conceived on the model of 
perception and unwittingly accept the Humean model that the self is not among the 
objects perceived. For instance, Elizabeth Anscombe had taken it to support the view 
that the “I” does not refer (Anscombe, 1975, p 58). Bertrand Russell had claimed 
that the self is not “empirically discoverable” (1921, p. 5) and Carnap (1928) that 
“the given is subjectless” (2003 [1928], pp. 103-6). Thus, Hume’s denial that we can 
have perceptual knowledge of a self, that we perceive a self by what Kant termed 
“inner sense” has been influential.  
       Kant agrees with Hume that whatever we are aware of when we introspect it is 
always in the form of some content or another. But he makes the point that the 
notion of content assumes or presupposes the existence of an “x”,  that is conscious 
of it. Hume looks for a self among the contents of inner sense and finds no evidence 
of one.  For Kant, however, self-awareness is a spontaneous act which is independent 
of all evidence. There is a distinction between the self as it is apart from our modes 
of apprehension and the self as it appears to those modes, the empirical self. The 
empirical self like any other object is apprehended successively in a “manifold of 
representations”. The self that apprehends the manifold, however, must be 
apprehended some other way. If this were not the case we would be unable to 
identify any “manifold” as belonging to our experience.  But I must be able to be 
aware of the fact that what I combine in a succession of representations belongs to 
one and the same self: 
Only in so far, therefore, as I can unite a manifold of given representations in one 
consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to myself the identity of the 
consciousness in [i.e. throughout] these representations (B133)     
 
       Kant also describes self-awareness in a different way, what we might call the 
self-ascriptive sense of self-awareness, the sense of self-awareness in which I ascribe 
a set or series of perceptions to myself. “Only in so far as I can grasp the manifold of 
the  representations in one consciousness do I call them one and all mine” (B134).  I 
must have the ability to identify the mental contents I do have as belonging to my 
own mental history. But the self that is temporally continuous and which lies at the 
foundation of our ability to synthesise any manifold cannot itself be an object of 
intuition. This requires a self that is numerically one throughout time yet is not 
perceivable.  All we perceive is that certain contents belong to our mental histories 
 109 
 
but we are not acquainted with the self to which these contents belong. Objects are 
known by applying the categories to a manifold of intuition.   In order to know 
myself as object I must be able to apply the categories to a manifold. However, since 
the self “in itself” is the ground of the possibility of the categories it cannot know 
itself through them, but “knows the categories, and through them all objects, in the 
absolute unity of apperception, and so through itself” (A401).  Kant writes “I cannot 
know as an object that which I must presuppose in order to know any object” 
(A402). By this he means that whatever I must use to know something as an object 
cannot, without circularity, be an object for me. The claim that the self is an object of 
consciousness is circular since it appeals to the application of the very characteristics 
of what we want to know as conditions of our knowing it.   However, this does not 
mean that we do not have cognitive access to ourselves at all. The categories are 
presupposed in us knowing perceptual objects but they are not presuppositions of 
every act of awareness. Rather, Kant’s point is that we must be able to have some 
kind of cognitive access to ourselves  as a condition of our ability to perceive 
objects, (i.e. as a condition of  our capacity to apply the categories to the manifold of 
experience) which is independent of and logically prior to such ability. Traditional 
cognitive science has little say about this kind of consciousness, focusing instead on 
consciousness of psychological states.   
 
       Let us recapitulate to get our bearings:  Kant’s work can be seen as an attempt to 
reconcile the claims of reason and experience in order to do justice to both rationalist 
and empiricist accounts of self knowledge. He therefore elaborates a dualistic theory 
of the nature of consciousness. He agrees with Hume that we have a kind of 
knowledge of ourselves through inner sense. But he also agrees with Descartes that 
this does not end the matter. For as well as the empirical self we must recognise the 
self as subject. However, this is not a Cartesian  subject that exists in the world as a 
kind of conscious object, but the “transcendental subject”.  This is not a sense of self 
occasioned by experience but the ultimate condition of all experience. As he puts it 
in the Anthropology: 
 
Inner sense is not pure apperception, consciousness of what we are doing, for this 
belongs to the power of thinking.  It is, rather, consciousness of what we undergo 
as we are affected by the play of our own thoughts (An Ak. VII p. 161). 
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In the first Critique he writes: 
 
[A]s regards inner sense, that by means of it we intuit ourselves only as we are 
inwardly affected by ourselves; in other words, that, so far as inner intuition is 
concerned, we know our own subject only as appearance, not as it is in itself. On 
the other hand, in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representations 
in general, and therefore in the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am 
conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only 
that I am (B156-7). 
     
       The difficulties of Cartesian and Humean pictures are the result of confusion 
between the self as encountered empirically or quasi-empirically and the self of 
transcendental apperception. The belief that the numerical identity of the “I” is 
determined by something analogous to perception is an illusion caused by the 
confusion between the “I” of inner sense (in which I am aware of mental states 
(Hume’s bundle) or an immaterial substance (Descartes) and the “I” of 
transcendental apperception. We do not determine our own identity by some kind of 
inner perception. To think that we do is to succumb to an illusion caused by a 
confusion between empirical and transcendental claims. Implicit in Kant’s reasoning 
is the recognition that there is a disanalogy between perception and self-awareness.  
Perceived objects can be identified or misidentified as being a one of a particular 
thing or of a certain kind. They can also be, (to use  Strawsonian terminology)   “re-
identified”, identified at one time with something perceived earlier. All these facts 
are based on relationships between the observed properties of individual objects or 
groups of objects by means of which they are individuated. None of this applies in 
the case of introspective awareness of a self.  We do not pick out and distinguish 
ourselves by means of properties. We only apply the categories where there are 
individuated temporally located objects, where by means of their properties we are 
able to identify them as being particular things or of certain kinds. To be of a 
particular thing or of a certain kind is also to be different from others.  However, in 
apperceptive self-awareness we do not distinguish a self as a subject from any other.  
This means that neither is there the possibility of misidentification. There is no sense 
to my saying when I have stubbed my toe. “Someone’s toe is hurting all right, but is 
it mine?’ Or consider the statement “I see a house in front of me now”. This 
statement is true just in case there is a house there in front of me and I am looking at 
it, paying attention, etc. I cannot be mistaken about the fact that it is me so doing. No 
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possibility of misidentification exists.  Kant calls the unity we find in awareness of 
self more than numerical unity, being one and the same as oneself.  Rather it is 
“synthetic”   unity which is difficult to characterise. He writes “This unity is not the 
category of unity” (B131) i.e. it is not a matter of being one of something. Rather it 
is a representation which has no properties. The unity of the subject is not like the 
unity of a chair as a chair which can be individuated by means of its properties. 
Unlike representations of particular objects it  “does not contain in itself the least 
manifold” (A355). My self-awareness is not the result of any individuating 
judgement, any application of the category of unity to myself. Indeed my self-
awareness is the very precondition of my making any judgement at all.    
       This is akin to the notion of “self-reference without identification” found in the 
writings of Chisholm, Castañeda, Perry, and Sydney Shoemaker. As Shoemaker has 
pointed out, it is pointless to suppose that there is introspective perception of a self 
unless it plays some part in explaining our introspective self knowledge. However, 
such reasoning leads to absurdities.  He writes in The First Person Perspective and 
Other Essays: 
The introspective observation of a self being hungry is not going to yield the 
knowledge that I am hungry  unless I know that that self  is myself. How am I 
supposed to know this? If the answer is that I identify it as myself by its 
perceived properties, we have to point out that this requires that I already know 
that I have these properties. Indeed it requires that I know that I am the unique 
possessor of that set of properties because otherwise the observation that the 
perceived self has them would not suffice to identify it as me. So I would already 
have to have some self-knowledge, namely the knowledge that I have certain 
identifying properties in order to acquire any self knowledge by self observation. 
If it is supposed that this self knowledge is in turn acquired by self observation, 
then still other knowledge is required, namely the knowledge that one has 
whatever identifying properties one used to identify as oneself  that one observed 
to have the first set of identifying properties  And so on. On pain of infinite 
regress it must be allowed that somewhere along the line I have some self 
knowledge that is not gotten by observing something to be true of myself 
(Shoemaker, 1996. p. 13).  
 
       Shoemaker is making the point that in order to know that anything is true of me I 
must first know that it is me of whom it is true. This knowledge is not gained by 
identifying myself  via a further set of properties. Put otherwise, in order to be aware 
of any property of myself I must first be aware of myself independently of this. I do 
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not know that “I”  am hungry  or in pain because I observe my mental states. I do not 
become aware that I am hungry or in pain because I find that “someone”  is hungry 
or in pain and then identify that individual as myself. In the case of standing before a 
tree, my experience cannot represent someone standing before a tree without also 
representing myself as so standing. 
 
As he writes in an earlier work:  
If I say  “I feel pain” or  “I see a canary”,  I may be identifying for someone else 
the person of whom I am saying that he feels pain or sees a canary. But there is 
also a sense in which my reference does not involve an identification. My use of 
the word “I” as the subject of my statement is not due to my having identified as 
myself something of which I know, or believe, or wish to say, that the predicate 
of my statement applies to it (Shoemaker, 1968, p. 558).  
 
Shoemaker calls the usage of “I” in such cases as “self-reference without 
identification” and as involving  “immunity to error though misidentification relative 
to the first person”. Kant appears to be an early proponent of this view. His writings 
strongly indicate that he had insights into the nature of reference to self, that he was 
aware of the peculiar semantics of self-reference. This is because his arguments 
strongly suggest if not entail that introspective self-awareness could not be inferred 
from any property of myself unless I already “know” that it is me who has the 
properties. Kant’s genius was to have seen that there are two ways in which we can 
refer to ourselves. In one way self-reference depends on identification of oneself as 
“object” and on identification and re-identification.  The other does not.  It is in the 
First Edition version of the Paralogisms that he writes: “I cannot know as an object 
that which I must presuppose in order to know any object” (A402) whereas in the 
Second Edition version he elaborates the point thus:  
The subject of the categories cannot by thinking the categories acquire a concept 
of itself as an object of the categories. For in order to think them, its pure self-
consciousness, which is what was to be explained, must itself be presupposed (B 
422).   
      Shoemaker argues that it is incoherent to base introspective self-awareness on the 
model of sense perception.  Kant says the same - the condition of the possibility of 
all judgements relies on the act “I think” which at this level designates only  
transcendentally, no conceptual mediation is involved. As has been discussed, Kant 
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recognised two types of self-awareness. The first is direct awareness of properties to 
oneself. This is empirical awareness of particular psychological states such as 
sensations, memories, beliefs, which is akin to the Humean and Cartesian model of  
introspection and is a picture of self-awareness similar to that underlying most 
contemporary accounts. Kant called this “empirical apperception”, “inner 
perception” or “inner sense” (A107).  In addition to this is a sense of awareness of 
self which is quite different from normal perception. It is the knowledge and belief 
that one is the very entity to whom those properties belong. In fact, the former 
depends on the latter, for in order for anything to “be something” to someone there 
must be at least potential for recognition of the properties as one’s own.  For, in 
order to make reference to oneself via ascribing properties one must first be able to 
make reference to a self that does not ascribe properties. This is the difference 
between “empirical” and transcendental or “apperceptive” self-awareness. In the 
case of empirical self-awareness one is aware of oneself as having certain 
experiences or properties. When one is aware of the subject of transcendental 
apperception one realises that one is the single thing or “x” that has them. One is 
aware, for example, not only of believing f but of oneself having the belief. One is 
also aware of oneself as the subject of other psychological properties, that one is the 
single unified being that not only believes f, but sees g, imagines h and so on. One 
does not have to rely on “intuitions” in order to come to see this. One has only to 
consider it to see that it is true. Kant writes “In the synthetic original unity of 
apperception I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in 
myself, but only that I am” (B157).  No recognition of properties is required for 
reference to oneself as oneself.  In ascribing properties to oneself one distinguishes 
one set from another. But in referring to myself “transcendentally” I am simply 
aware of myself... “without noting in it any quality whatsoever” (A355).   
       Some commentators take Kant’s rejection of intuitional object awareness of 
ourselves as amounting to a claim that the I of “I think”  is not a referring expression, 
that it does not refer to one and only one particular individual.  Allison (1983), 
Kitcher (1993), and Powell (1990) all subscribe to a version of this view. For 
example, Allison writes  “ ‘I’” designates only “something in general”, which is to 
say that it does not refer to anything at all” (Allison, 1983, p. 282).   Patricia Kitcher 
writes that “our knowledge of the self does not rise to the level of knowing that it is 
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an ineffable something” (Kitcher, ibid. p. 194). All I can be aware of is a collection 
of representations in inner sense. The rest is an illusion engendered by the formal 
prerequisites of experience. Is it reasonable to attribute to Kant this view? Whether 
or not “I” is a referring expression has been debated by a number of philosophers, 
both past and present. Descartes certainly held that it is so. It refers to a “substance”, 
a “thinking thing” that necessarily exists and which can be known absolutely through 
introspection. The truth of the Cogito is one that cannot be shaken by even the most 
extravagant of sceptics. Hume on the other hand claims that it he is not aware of any 
such entity. If “I” refers at all,  it does not refer to a persisting thing, but a bundle of 
perceptions.  Perhaps one of the most famous papers on the topic is Elisabeth 
Anscombe’s The First Person  in which she denies that “I” is a referring expression. 
As part of her argument she asks the question “how even could one justify the 
assumption, if it is an assumption, that there is just one thinking which is this 
thinking of this thought that I am thinking, just one thinker?” How do I know that “I” 
is not ten thinkers thinking in unison? (Anscombe, 1975, p. 31). Kant has a response 
to this which lies in his particular characterisation of the unity of consciousness. On 
the Kantian account judging is a matter of consciously combining some states in 
others and of recognising that combination as such and at the same time also being 
aware of the unity of different states in a single subject. However, I am mistaken if I 
think that when I introspect I can be aware of myself as object. As discussed,  the 
unity of consciousness Kant talks about is not a matter of being one of something, as 
opposed to ten, one thinker as opposed to ten thinkers thinking in unison. The unity 
he is talking about is “not the category of unity” (B131).  Rather,  his point is that 
from my own point of view, I cannot think of my experience as other than one. I 
may, in fact, be “ten thinkers thinking in unison”  but this is besides the point.  Kant 
writes in his attack on the Paralogisms that when I am aware of myself as subject, I 
cannot picture myself as a plurality of any sort.  In fact, Kant himself argues that “the 
unity of a thought (…) may relate just as well to the collective unity of different 
substances acting together” (A353). In other words, he makes a similar point to 
Anscombe, i.e. there is no reason against a composite subject having the unity 
required to synthesise representations into a single intentional object. However, from 
the point of view of myself as subject I cannot picture myself as other than a unity. 
Whether or not a self is composite in fact is irrelevant.  
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As he writes: 
We are talking about a “merely logical qualitative unity of self consciousness 
(…) which has to be present whether the subject is composite or not (B413).  
Although the whole of [a] thought could be divided and distributed among many 
subjects, the subjective ‘I’ [the ‘I’ pictured from its own point of view] can never 
be thus divided and distributed (A354).   
 
 In fact,  to even think of myself as a plurality of beings requires that I am aware of 
this plurality and this requires an undivided “me”. I cannot imagine going into a 
fissioning machine and coming out with two streams of consciousness. This is 
because appearing to myself as a single subject is a prerequisite of my thinking about 
myself at all.  Kant says of the “I think”: 
It must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations; for 
otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at 
all, and that is equivalent to saying the representation would be impossible, or at 
least would be nothing to me (B131-2).  
 
Here Kant is speaking metaphorically of what happens in conscious awareness of an 
object. Firstly the subject is aware of a representation. The representation is such that 
if one has it and if one considers that one has it then one will believe oneself to have 
it, and the subject is aware of that representation.  One is aware of the state but one is 
must also at least potentially be able to be aware that one has the state. This is the 
“transcendental unity of apperception”, the act of judgement by which I take 
representations to be mine. When a person is aware that he is seeing something he 
may also be simultaneously aware of other things. He may also be aware that he is 
touching something and perhaps hearing something. He is also able to be aware that 
it is he, himself doing the seeing, hearing, and touching. He must also have a notion 
of himself as experiencing different things at different times. These facts lie at the 
basis of Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception and describe the sense in which 
a  subject can be said to be the subject of their own awareness. This is that one must 
not only be aware that one is experiencing certain properties, but one must also be 
capable of knowing and believing that one is the one to whom the properties belong. 
There must be potential “recognition” of the fact that these attributes belong to them. 
That is, thinking something necessarily involves self-ascription. If I have a thought it 
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is necessarily my thought. However, the “I think” is the “analytic unity of 
apperception”. This presupposes the “synthetic unity of apperception”. The “I think”, 
the unity of apperception, displayed by the fact that it must accompany all my 
representations is a spontaneous act of combination or synthesis. This act, that 
synthesises the representations in one consciousness, is the very same act that 
analyses out a common subject. For the self and the object of experience are co-
determinative; each is a necessary condition for the other.   As Kant writes  
Only in so far, therefore, as I can unite a manifold of given representations in one 
consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to myself the identity of the 
consciousness in [i.e. throughout] these representations (B133).     
 
       Kant states that if it is the case that a subject has both A experience and B 
experience then there is one thing that has both A and B experiences, namely that 
subject. The subject of experience A has been identified with the subject of B 
experience. Kant tells us that if this were not the case he should have “as many 
coloured and diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious to 
myself” (B134).  However,  the “I” of  “I think” is not one with which we have direct 
acquaintance. The self is not part of the content of experience but the “transcendental 
subject”. Kant referred to the unity of this subject as “the unity of consciousness” 
(A107), “the unity of apperception” (A105, A108) and “the absolute unity of the 
thinking being” (A353). In the B edition he claimed that it is “not the category of 
unity”  i.e. not a matter of being one of something. My unity as one subject is not the 
result of any individuating judgement or any application of the category to myself. 
Of course, there are cases of perceptual knowledge in which awareness of oneself 
does provide a way of self-identifying such as when we try to pick ourselves out in a 
group photograph or spot ourselves among an audience on television.   Kant’s point 
is that the unity of the apperceiving subject is different. One’s awareness of oneself 
in this sense, unlike awareness of objects, is “non-ascriptive”.  The self is not a 
strange kind of entity to which we ascribe properties. Neither is it the unity of a set 
of relations. It is not like the unity of the categories which consists of the way their 
semantic relations to one another make it possible for me to conceptualise the world 
and which Kant says is a perfect unified system. This is a unique kind of unity that is 
difficult to characterise. He writes:  
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Man, [...] who knows all the rest of nature solely through the senses, knows 
himself also through pure apperception; and this, indeed, in acts and inner 
determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses 
(A546/B574).  
       It is argued that Kant saw that “I” is a referring expression and takes as a 
premise for his transcendental arguments the undeniable fact that he is aware of his 
own existence “as determined in time” (B275), something no sceptic could take issue 
with. However, to suppose that “I” is a special sort of demonstrative pronoun used to 
refer to an introspectively perceived self which I then identify as myself is 
incoherent. Awareness of ourselves as subject or “intelligible object” rests on facts 
about oneself that does not conform to the perceptual model of Descartes or Hume. 
Rather, such self-reference is based on the special unity of the “I think” which for 
Kant transcends description. As he puts it:   
 
In attaching “I” to our thoughts we designate the subject (…) only 
transcendentally, without noting in it any quality whatsoever - in fact without 
knowing anything of it either by direct acquaintance or otherwise (A355).  
 
In the A edition he wrote “of the absolute unity of this subject (…) I possess no 
concept whatsoever (A340-B398). There is something about this kind of unity which 
cannot be expressed in concepts. Other philosophers have expressed similar views 
about other things. Saint Augustine, in the Confessions for instance, who said of time 
that he knows what it is until he tries to explain it, then words fail him. A similar 
point is made by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus when he 
remarks that “What the solipsist means is quite correct …only it cannot be explained 
but makes itself manifest” (5.26). Like Kant, they are both saying that there is 
something that can be grasped by the mind but which we cannot sufficiently 
describe. It is suggested that Kant was the first to describe the peculiar logical 
semantics of self-reference, and that this philosophical analysis has profound 
contemporary relevance. Taking advantage of it would help avoid some of the 
problems that have beset leading contemporary theories of consciousness, such as 
Higher Order Theories of consciousness (HOTs), examined below.   
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3. 6. Higher Order Theories of Consciousness 
 
Higher Order Theories (HOTs) are functionalist cognitive/representational theories 
of mind which assume there is a level at which an explanation of phenomenal 
consciousness can be derived. For example, David Rosenthal’s (1991, 1997, 2005) 
HOT states that to be conscious of some representational state A, one must have 
another higher representation (a meta-thought) of which the former state is the 
object. Rosenthal has made significant contributions to philosophy of mind, 
particularly in the area of consciousness. However, his Higher Order theory of 
consciousness resembles in many ways the traditional empirical inner sense theory, a 
direct descent from Descartes and Hume, in which we are aware of conscious states 
by some kind of inner perception.  Higher Order theorists argue that conscious 
awareness crucially depends on higher order representations that represent oneself as 
being in particular mental states, in the sense that to be in a conscious state is to be 
the object of another mental state.  Yet for Kant, as discussed, there is only one state: 
the first-person givenness of experiential phenomena is not merely incidental to their 
being, but is what makes experience possible at all. That is, phenomenal experience 
entails a built in self-reference, a primitive self-referentiality, that Kant calls the “I 
think”.  Put differently, a purported “representation” would itself have the power to 
make us aware of it and of ourselves.  Kant’s synthetic apperception and the analytic 
unity of apperception are isomorphically correspondent elements of, and also 
reducible to the transcendental unity of apperception, the grund or ground that 
connects together awareness of all distinct particulars. Moreover, the unity of 
apperception is not only a necessary but also sufficient condition for our representing 
of objects, as many Kantian scholars have noted: Jay Rosenberg, 2005, p. 135; 
Henry Allison, 1983, pp. 142–4; Richard Aquila, 1989, p. 159, and Dennis 
Schulting, 2013. 
46
  
       Proponents of HOTs often mention Kant as an inspiration for their theories,  
since Kant claims that for a mental representation to be something for me it must be 
possible for the “I think” to accompany  that representation (see Gennaro, 2004); but 
a proper analysis of Kant’s  claim shows that this is wrong.  HOTs construe a mental 
state as self-aware, and hence conscious, in virtue of being an object of a numerically 
distinct second-order state. The idea is that conscious mental states, by which is 
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meant sensory states possessed of phenomenal feel, (or as Chalmers puts it “what it’s 
like” to be in those states) are conscious in virtue of being the objects of other 
higher-order mental states. This is what it is for a mental state to be conscious: to be 
accompanied by a higher-order thought about that mental state. This, however, 
neglects the way Kant divides two senses in which we may be said to be self-
conscious. The first is through empirical apperception, the attribution of properties to 
oneself, the self-ascription of items of inner sense which correspond to Hume’s 
bundle of impressions. Here we are aware of representations which are our own.  
However, there is a second sense of self in which we recognise that we are the 
subject to whom the properties belong.   
[I]n the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, not as 
I appear to myself,  nor as I am in myself, but only that I am (B157). 
 
This is a sense of self which does not conform to the perceptual model of Hume. In 
fact, here we have epistemological access to ourselves which is fundamentally unlike 
perception of an object, yet is also inexorably linked to the objective. Although Kant 
wrote that we possess no “knowledge” of such a self; it is not the kind of cognitive 
“illusion” that many philosophers of mind claim. For example, Daniel Dennett holds 
the view that once we have explained functions of the mind such as accessibility and 
reportability there is nothing further to explicate. As he views it, the self is really an 
“abstraction”  brought about by what he terms “the Center of Narrative Gravity”,  
which gives rise in us a spurious sense of a unitary self (Dennett, 1991).
47
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Minsky, also argues self-awareness is a complex, but carefully constructed illusion, 
(Minsky, 1980). In The Society of Mind he argues that minds are simply “what brains 
do” (Minsky, 1985, P. 287), and proposes that it is the interaction between many 
functional “autonomous agents” that gives rise to intelligent behaviour. Similarly 
Thomas Metzinger’s thesis is that the self is nothing beyond a special kind of 
“dynamic representational content” (Metzinger, 2003).  No such things as selves 
exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal 
selves or “appearances” as they appear in conscious experience.  
       However, for Kant, there are two quite different kinds of consciousness of self, 
and for a correct model of the mind it is important to distinguish between them, and 
not to dismiss one aspect. Few theorists have followed Kant in doing so, however, 
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and it is suggested that this is due to materialist presuppositions that ignore 
everything that does not fit into empirical constraints, and a manner of doing science 
that can be seen as following directly in the footsteps of the empiricist Hume.  Yet, 
Kant’s theory of the dual yet unitary nature of self-awareness is a valid alternative to 
materialist empirical science and compares and contrasts in interesting ways with 
contemporary theories.  These contrasts bring out some of the originality and power 
of Kant’s theory. The main problem with HOTs is how it could be possible that the 
possession of a higher order state confers subjectivity or consciousness on a lower-
order state that did not otherwise possess it? How or why does a mental state come 
to have a first-person qualitative “what it is like” aspect by virtue of the presence of a 
HO directed at it? In fact, HOTs seem to turn everything upside down; thoughts 
about something seem to depend on a subject already having conscious experience of 
that thing in the first instance. For Kant, just recognising the object of a 
representation is sufficient for the subject to be aware of it and also that it is they 
themselves who are aware of it. When we look at an object, we are not conscious of 
our experience of looking at the object, we are conscious of the object itself.  What 
makes a mental state conscious is not the subject’s awareness of the state, rather, it is 
the way in which the state makes the subject conscious of something in the world. 
The basis of awareness of an object (and also of oneself) does not involve some 
separate “higher order” mental state. 
       Rosenthal thinks it is self evident that a mental state’s consciousness consists in 
our being aware of that state in the same sense that we are aware of external objects, 
i.e. sensing them or having thoughts about them. However, for Kant, all we need is 
one state. Moreover, the first-person given-ness of experiential phenomena is not 
merely incidental to their being, but is what makes experience possible at all. Put 
differently, a purported representational state “A” would itself have the power to 
make us aware of the object and of ourselves as the subject of the experience. 
Rosenthal’s view is vulnerable to a number of objections such as that of explaining 
non-human animal consciousness, which conflict with our common-sense intuition 
that such animals enjoy phenomenally conscious experience, yet are unlikely to have 
the conceptual sophistication required by HOTs (Jamieson and Bekoff, 1992; 
Dretske, 1995;  Tye, 1995; Seager, 2004). The model also readily leads to a regress 
of thoughts about thoughts about thoughts, and since there is little independent 
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reason to postulate such a hierarchy of thoughts, this is a serious weakness. Kant’s 
theory neatly avoids this:  Apperception is the taking up and thinking through of 
content in which the self is given to itself neither as an object or subject but as a 
mode of being in a state directed to the world, which is known instrinsically through 
reflective judgement. Only an intrinsic or “one-state” theory, according to which the 
self-awareness involved in conscious states is intrinsic to those states, can explain 
this distinction. In this way, one’s conscious experience and one’s tacit awareness of 
that experience form a single mental act, the spontaneous act of synthesis.  
       A number of contemporary philosophers have suggested that Franz Brentano’s 
theory is a viable one-state alternative to higher-order theories.
48
  It was Brentano 
who first introduced the notion of intentionality or “aboutness” to contemporary 
philosophy and psychology. But Brentano’s theory, just like higher-order theories, 
also characterises self-awareness in terms of conscious states being objects to which 
subjects stand in a certain kind of relation. As Dan Zahavi has noted, “Brentano’s 
claim that every conscious intentional state takes two objects, a primary (external) 
object and secondary (internal) object, remains committed to a higher-order account 
of consciousness; it simply postulates it as being implicitly contained in every 
conscious state” (Zahavi, 2006, p. 5).  According to Kant, however, even though our 
subjective states themselves are “manifested” in experience, they do not become 
objects of consciousness except in the phenomenal sense: intentionality is coessential 
with the pre-reflective awareness of transcendental apperception, since any 
consciousness at all exists qua conscious of existing. For Husserl too, who was a 
Kantian, our experiences are conscious not in virtue of being taken as secondary 
objects, but rather in virtue of being “lived through”.  
       Thus, Kant (and Husserl) did not deny that consciousness involves self-
awareness, but they deny that self-awareness can be accounted for on analogy with 
our consciousness of extra-mental objects, i.e. in terms of a subject-object 
relationship. To be “something it is like” requires “for me” to grasp it in 
consciousness.  In simple terms, conscious awareness of an object has an implicitly 
dual nature, such that to be conscious of an object is also to be aware that one is in 
that very state. But this awareness is not, itself, a separable feature of the first order 
state. One has explained consciousness precisely when one has explained this dual 
feature. Such consciousness is perhaps more aptly described as a mode of being in a 
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contentful state directed to the world, rather than it being so in virtue of a 
relationship to a numerically distinct second order state. By “mode of being” is 
meant that which expresses the tacit phenomenological veracity of the inherent pre-
reflectiveness of conscious experience. 
       Kant was the first to recognise that phenomenal conscious awareness is 
essentially bound up with spatial orientation and temporal asymmetry. Spatio-
temporal designation is essential to the singular presentation of objects in the world 
that are experienced, and also to our singular cognitive reference to them. This 
spatiotemporal orientation is what gives the peculiar subjectivity of experience its 
own   “unique point of view”. This is what determines the “what it is likeness” of  
being in a mental state, e.g. just “what it is like” to smell the aroma of coffee or to 
have  toothache, or to see the redness of a rose that is in front of me now. He also 
saw that this is in two parts, a duality, yet a unity. There is the qualitative character, 
the redness, the pain and the aroma in the object that is presented to the senses and 
the subjective character of the experience - “what it is like” to experience them. How 
best to capture that ineffability of subjective phenomenal experience is what is at 
stake.  Kant recognises the “for-me-ness” aspect of subjective experience but not 
only this,  he recognises that this is that which makes the conscious state phenomenal 
at all. An experience of smelling the coffee is different from that of toothache, but 
what they have in common is the first person perspective in which qualities of a 
certain kind are presented to the subject. This contrasts with HOTs whereby the 
subjective character of experience is a higher order access to a lower order one, or a 
relationship between a higher and lower representation. As discussed, according to 
HOTs, a phenomenally conscious experience of red would be based on the content of 
a mental state red with a direct relationship to the meta-thought red (Rosenthal,1997, 
2005). That is to say, the higher level meta-thoughts are distinct representations, the 
latter being phenomenally conscious in virtue of the former which represents it. This 
does absolutely nothing to account for the distinctive feature of phenomenal 
awareness, the “for-me-ness” of the experience. To be “something it is” like requires 
“for me” to grasp it in consciousness. Thus, to account for the first person, subjective 
grasp of the experience, there needs to be a subject of that experience situated in time 
and space. A subject must be something that holds the mental states together. Simply 
being represented by a higher order state is insufficient to explain the something it is 
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like, or “for me-ness” of phenomenal consciousness. Kant terms this “transcendental 
apperception” and it is linked to his idea of “transcendental designation” (A355), 
[see p. 117]. That is to say, all conscious states involve self-awareness, although this 
is not awareness of a “self” in any substantial sense of the word such as Descartes 
had claimed: the self is not something that “exists” apart from, or above, the 
experience and, for that reason, something that might be encountered in separation 
from the experience. Rather, we have an awareness or sense of self that is described 
by Kant in terms of the kind of unity we have, and which is an integral and 
ubiquitous part of our experiential life. Indeed, there is no experiential dimension 
whatever without this sense of self.  
       Kant is thus making the revolutionary move that this kind of awareness is best 
understood as involving a non-objectifying self-givenness which is the ground of all 
experience of the world. This is linked to his particular notion of unity and of the 
special sense in which he uses the term “existence”.  In traditional accounts, 
experience, including sense perception, is assumed to consist of a succession of 
states of the subject, conscious states being objects to which subjects stand in a 
certain kind of relation. And that once that is accepted, it will be natural to expect 
descriptions  of perceptual experience to focus on something within the subject.   For 
Kant, however, this neglects “time” as the form of inner consciousness that 
structures appearances in a series (A37/ B54) and, in the schematism of imagination, 
is the ultimate form of synthesis that enables experience in general.  Olli Lagerspetz, 
noting that “the mainstream of cognitive science has retained Descartes’ core 
methodological commitments, but in a setting that renders them largely 
meaningless”, puts the matter well: 
 The category of “existence” implies determination in time. Whatever exists 
subsists over a time span. I establish the passage of time by using some enduring 
object as a point of reference. Crucially, this object must exist independently of 
my consciousness in order for it to constitute a real and not just an imaginary 
object of comparison. Hence, I can have any positive knowledge of myself as 
subsisting in time “only through the existence of actual things that I perceive 
outside me” (Lagerspetz, 2002, p. 12). 
 
This is due to the fact that the a priori principle of causal interaction immediately 
links our inner representations with objects outside of us. Without this objective 
basis for their associability, we would not be able to conceptualise experience. 
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Neither would we be able to represent ourselves as a numerically identical subject 
through different experiences.  
To conclude this chapter: Descartes, in speaking of the existence of a thinking thing 
or entity, had made the logical fallacy of deducing, from the logical analysis of the 
concept of thinking, the metaphysical hypothesisation of an immaterial object. Hume 
had derived from this the supposition that any consciousness of self must be an 
experience of “something”, a bundle.  As Kant diagnoses it, a Copernican 
Revolution or reversal of approach is needed. Self-awareness involved in conscious 
states cannot be construed along subject-object lines. The unity of intuition is subject 
to the synthetic unity of apperception because the unity of the act of combining is the 
unity of consciousness, the “I think”. This is the identity “at a time” that goes with 
the unity of a subject, and it is very different in kind to the unity of the rationalists, 
the unity of a persisting “substance”. This is related to his doctrine that existence is 
not a predicate (A598/B626) and also to what Kant says about reference to self. 
Being aware of oneself as oneself is something that “transcends” being aware of 
“qualities” of oneself.  Thinking, consciousness or, to put it in the idiom of cognitive 
science, the having of conscious states, obviously involves someone who does the 
thinking. What does not follow from this is that there is a substance, or any of its 
contemporary equivalents: a representational medium, level of organisation, or 
neural correlates of consciousness operating behind the scenes as the locus of 
thoughts. The unity of apperception transcends such empirical considerations. 
Physicist Erwin Shroedinger pondered on this problem in the epilogue of his classic 
What Is Life? and his answer is remarkably Kantian:  
Consciousness is never experienced in the plural, only in the singular. Even in 
the pathological cases of split consciousness or double personality the two 
persons alternate, they are never manifest simultaneously. In a dream we do 
perform several characters at the same time, but not indiscriminately: we are one 
of them; in him we act and speak directly, while we often eagerly await the 
answer or response of another person, unaware of the fact that it is we who 
control his movements and his speech just as much as our own.  
He concludes:  
(i)  My body functions as a pure mechanism according to the laws of nature.  
(ii) Yet I know, by incontrovertible direct experience, that I am directing its 
motions, of which I foresee the effects,  that may be fateful and all-important, in 
which case I feel and take full responsibility for them (Shroedinger, 1944, pp. 86-
88). 
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        It has thus far been argued that a certain picture of the mental has given rise to a 
host of contemporary philosophical problems.  This is largely the result of the lasting 
influence of a generally forgotten or neglected philosophical heritage which has led 
to the situation where the many significant and far reaching discoveries concerning 
cognition and the workings of the brain have been obscured by their presentation 
within an incoherent conceptual framework. It is proposed that although Kant’s 
views about consciousness and “the self” may differ drastically from the ways in 
which these topics are currently discussed, his theory of the transcendental subject is 
an invaluable tool in unravelling these philosophical complexities. Kant claimed that 
the rationalists,  in particular Descartes (and Leibniz) were seduced by what he calls 
a Transcendental Illusion, a pervasive intellectual illusion, modelled on the 
perceptual, which predisposes  even the  “wisest” of people to accept as sound 
certain invalid arguments for substantive theses about the nature of the self.  Kant, in 
the Paralogisms, provides an ingenious account of how the rational psychologist 
might arrive at such a view. He identifies the source of the fallacy as concerning the 
very nature of conceivability itself and in this identification makes a philosophical 
contribution of lasting significance. Kant’s intellectual insights concerning the mind 
have stood the test of time, and are able to shed light on the modern day hard 
problem of consciousness, deemed the most puzzling scientific problem of this age. 
They provide a conceptual tool for making sense of consciousness, the “what it’s 
like-ness” of phenomenal experience, the me-ness that accompanies all thought. He 
shows that the nature of  subjective experience and its phenomenal qualities is 
impossible to understand in terms of dualism of substances or properties and 
addresses the problem of trying to explain introspective first-person aspects of 
mental states (the mind) and consciousness in general in terms of third-person 
quantitative neuroscience (the brain/body). For Kant, there is a confusion with the 
idea of “mind” and “body” as conceptually separable in the first place. The nature of 
the question is misleading and leads us to believe that there is something tractable 
that can be substantiated in the realm of empirical knowledge. He held that certain 
mistaken beliefs about the mind and consciousness arise from reification of first 
person phenomenal experience, because certain philosophers (Descartes) have 
projected the particularity of private, first person experience onto a third person 
entity called “the mind”  or “thinking substance”. This is not to deny that 
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consciousness involves self-awareness, it is to deny that self-awareness can be 
accounted for on analogy with our consciousness of extra-mental objects, i.e. in 
terms of a subject-object relationship. The modern day mind-body problem is 
therefore the result of a kind of category error, where the a priori, transcendental 
character of subjectivity is confused with psychological “facts” that are amenable to 
scientific explanation.  The insights of Kant applied to the contemporary mind/ body 
problem reveal that the problem is the very disease of which it takes itself to be the 
cure. The very debate, the actual effort to find the “solution” to the various 
fragments of the hard problem, indeed the conceptualisation of the problem itself, is 
based on faulty foundational premisses, premisses which not only ensure that “the 
hard problem” remains insoluble, but perpetuate its existence, seemingly ad 
infinitum.      
       Thus, Cartesian and Humean approaches to cognition continue to hold sway 
today; functionalist approaches to cognition are, more or less, updated Hume, and 
Chalmers’ “hard problem of consciousness” is Cartesian. This has resulted in an 
ongoing and apparently tireless game of what Dennett has called “burden tennis” 
(Dennett, 1993) where the field of play is conceptual space and each side claims that 
the ball is in the other’s court. Kant’s intellectual genius and depth of insight into the 
sources of our cognition can be of great significance in addressing this impasse; 
between those who claim there is a “hard problem” to be addressed by a science of 
consciousness and those who deny it, (Dennett) since this picture of mentality is a 
resurrection of the conceptually flawed understanding that Kant addresses in the 
Critique. Although Kant may not have used the concept of consciousness in the now 
dominant sense of phenomenal qualia, his theory of the “transcendental subject” is a 
valuable tool in unravelling the philosophical complexities and confusions that are 
the bane of current theories. In order to begin this enterprise, the following chapter 
examines the extent to which Kant’s transcendental psychology can be considered 
compatible with modern functionalist theories and, most importantly, where it 
diverges. 
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4. Transcendental Psychology and Functionalism  
 
It has become more and more respectable to claim that Kant’s ideas about the mind 
are consistent with functionalism, the prevailing approach in cognitive science at 
present, and consequently it has become more commonplace for commentators to 
regard Kant a functionalist of some sort and to identify accounts of the 
transcendental psychology with an accommodation of it to some of the central tenets 
of traditional cognitive science.   Patricia Kitcher, Andrew Brook, Ralf Meerbote, 
Wilfred Sellars, Daniel Dennett and C. Thomas Powell are among the members of 
this group; although differing in details, their common general view is that Kant can 
be viewed as early proponent of functionalism, what might be termed a proto-
functionalist.  For Kant, the way to understand mind was through a priori reasoning, 
the analysis of what the mind must be like and what capacities it must have to 
represent things as it does. This is his “transcendental method” which is seen by 
contemporary philosophers to have had a major influence on the research 
programme of contemporary cognitive science.  Kant’s question was how is it 
possible for something to be a thought? What are the a priori conditions of the 
possibility of experience?  Contemporary cognitive scientists, in a similar vein, also 
try to justify their assertions by showing that they provide the necessary 
presuppositions for the possibility of meaningful discourse about certain aspects of 
the mind. In other words, in order to give epistemic justification to their claims, they 
also try to show what must be the case in any system in order for a particular 
phenomenon to occur, and to do so without appealing to hidden psychological 
“facts”, but rather by appealing to certain “conceptual prerequisites”.  
 
4.1. What is Functionalism? 
 
Functionalism is a philosophical theory or family of theories according to which 
cognitive or psychological states are essentially states of whole systems. As 
discussed in Chapter 1. 2., the first formulation of a functionalist theory of mind was 
put forward by Hilary Putnam 
49
 in 1960 and was inspired by the analogies which 
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Putnam and others noted between cognition and the theoretical or hypothetical 
“machines” or computers capable of computing any given, and which had been 
developed in 1936 by Alan Turing, called Turing Machines.  Turing machines 
compute various tasks deterministically, given certain instructions and a machine 
table that specifies how various states of the machine relate to one another and to 
inputs. Turing himself was of the opinion that a machine operating this way would 
quite literally be performing the same computations a human performing 
computations would. He claimed that the brain must be organised for intelligence, 
that all mental operations are computable and hence realisable on such a machine, 
and that all mental functions of the brain could be accommodated within this model 
and not merely those of a mind following definite rules (Turing, 1950). Two years 
after Turing’s hypothetical computing machines, Claude Shannon (1938) 
demonstrated that simple on-off electrical circuits could carry out basic mathematical 
procedures, an idea that ultimately led to the development of “information theory” 
(Shannon, 1938, 1948; Shannon and Weaver, 1949, 1998). Five years later Kenneth 
Craik wrote a book entitled “The Nature of Explanation” (Craik, 1943) in which he 
discusses possible ways to link mental and mechanical operations, and settled the 
notion of internal models, as he wrote: 
Thought is a term for the conscious working of a highly complex machine, built 
of parts having dimensions where the classical laws of mechanics are still very 
nearly true, and having dimensions where space is, to all intents and purposes, 
Euclidean. This mechanism, I have argued, has the power to represent, or 
parallel, certain phenomena in the external world as a calculating machine can 
parallel the development of strains in a bridge (p. 85). 
 
       Craik’s vision was that minds create models and use them to predict the future, 
the idea being that the organism is able to choose, from the array of possible futures, 
the one that would be the most adaptive. Putnam’s extension of this idea was that 
mental states or representations can be thought of as having functional roles within a 
system, where a system, in the case of human beings, is a Turing Machine with a 
probabilistic transfer between different states (rather than a deterministic one) called 
a Probabilistic Automaton, probabilistic because human beings are not predictable in 
the way a Turing Machine is. Since Putnam’s original formulation, its apparent 
sturdy empirical grounding is viewed as providing a solid foundation on which to 
build a more concrete conception of mind than the earlier “brain state” theories of 
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U.T. Place, Herbert Feigl, J.J.C. Smart and David Armstrong (see Chapter 5). As a 
result of this, cognitive science proceeded within a symbolic framework that required 
little or no contact with the brain.  Functionalism offers convincing arguments as to 
why any physico-biological implementation of cognitive functions is derivable from 
an abstract picture of the logical structure of the mental representations and 
transformations involved in those functions (Block, 1980).  
       Functionalism was first systematically developed as a response to questions 
about the relationship between mind and body, in the context of a debate between 
two opposed views in the philosophy of mind, dualism and materialism or 
physicalism. It was derived in order to be compatible with materialism, whilst 
avoiding the difficulties of behaviourism and the identity theory of J. J. C. Smart, 
among others, whose theories entail that for every type of mental state there 
corresponds a type of physiological brain state with which it is identical.  Putnam 
and others were arguing against the view that every mental kind is identical to some 
as yet undiscovered neural kind. There were several serious problems with this 
“brain-state” view and this is what motivated the idea that the relation between mind 
and body is analogous to the relation between software and hardware in a computer. 
For example, Putnam argues, against the brain state theorists: 
1. The brain state theorist maintains that every psychological state is a brain state in 
the sense that there will always be one and the same physical “correlate” of the same 
psychological state. 
2. But we can find at least one psychological state (such as “feeling hungry”) which 
can clearly be applied to both a mammal and an octopus, but whose physical-
chemical “correlate” is different in the two cases. 
3. Therefore, the brain state theory must be false. 50  
The advantage of functionalism was that mental states are describable in terms of 
what the functions bring about, what they do in a whole organism or system rather 
than what they are. Computational states are defined, not in terms of specific 
hardware configurations, but in terms of their relations to inputs, outputs, and other 
computational states. According to functionalism, the phenomenon to be explained is 
usually defined as a logical function, e.g., the logical inference reported by a subject 
who is having at that moment a particular experience, say discriminating a colour or 
noting a flashing light. Any machine able to make the same inference (through the 
manipulation of symbols in a language translatable to the subject’s) can be said to 
simulate or predict it, without having the phenomenal experience of the colour or the 
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flashing light. The functionalist concept of explanation is one that takes such logical 
simulations/predictions as sufficient to explain cognitive phenomena, and 
consciousness or phenomenological experience is secondary and of little or no 
consequence.  
       As a theory of mind, functionalism is very appealing to scientists. This is 
because firstly, it has scientific rigour since it is grounded in mathematical proof and 
secondly, it provides a means of constructing analogies to aid guidance through a 
systematic, abstract understanding of cognition. Computation-representation 
functionalism is thus a clear example of a scientifically “rigorous” model; the core 
presumption is that digital computers and people are both Turing machine 
describable, and because of this, the computer/brain analogy can be supported by 
direct reference to computational theory. This is how Turing machine equivalence 
has played such a central role in supporting functionalist intuitions (Fodor, 1981).    
       This idea has been transported into cognitive neuroscience, and has its roots in 
the proposal advanced by D. Marr (1982) who, along with Tomaso Poggio, treated 
cognition as an information processing system that can allow cognition to be studied 
on the basis of three complementary “levels” of analysis whereby it can be explained 
in terms of: computation, algorithm, and implementation (Marr's Tri-Level 
Hypothesis).  The methodology itself is founded upon four main pillars: 
i) The measurement of behaviour. 
ii) The attempts to find empirical correlation (using EEG, invasive electrodes, or, 
more recently PET, MEG or fMRI) of such behaviour with brain regions or networks 
allegedly responsible for them. 
iii) The formulation of mathematical/computational functions able to account for 
them. 
iv) If the simulations of such functions satisfy the measured behaviour, it is taken as 
a proof that the activity of the correlated brain regions/networks “implements” the 
mathematical computational function. 
This methodology is said to make available a complex map of the “localisation of 
function” that are within the brain, along with a set of mathematical/computational 
functions that formally describe the inner “mechanics” of the correlated brain 
regions.  This functional, computational or “information processing” view aims to 
understand the mind in terms of processes that operate on “representations”. The 
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underlying assumption is that any cognitive process, animal, machine, human, could 
be thought as a computable function.  It entails that cognition is explicable in terms 
of discrete, mental representations (symbols) and that cognitive processes are 
transformations of such representations or symbols described in terms of rules or 
algorithms. As professor of cognitive science at Rutgers University, Zenon W. 
Pylyshyn writes:   
[T]hat certain behavioural regularities can be attributed to different 
representations (some of which are called “beliefs” because they enter into 
rational inferences) and to symbol-manipulating processes operating over these 
representations, is a fundamental assumption of Cognitive Science. This idea is 
an instance of what is a fundamental claim about intelligent systems: Intelligent 
systems (including animals and computers) are governed by representations 
(Pylyshyn, 1999, pp. 7-8).  
Also:  
What makes it possible for systems - computers or intelligent organisms - to 
behave in a way that is correctly characterized in terms of what they represent 
(say, beliefs and goals), is that the representations are encoded in a system of 
physically instantiated symbolic codes. And it is because of the physical form 
that these codes take on each occasion that the system behaves the way it does, 
through the unfolding of natural laws over the physical codes (ibid., p. 4). 
 
Moreover, Pylyshyn is adamant that computation should not be regarded as merely a 
handy metaphor for cognitive activity, but as a definite scientific empirical 
hypothesis: 
The question of what’s in the mind should be answered in psychology the same 
way that the parallel question is answered in physics. There, a question such as 
what’s in this table or what’s in the sun is answered by looking for properties, 
entities and causal laws which explain the important regularities that define that 
particular science (ibid., p. 1). 
 
This understanding of cognition was shared by Alan Turing, Allen Newell and 
Herbert Simon, Marvin Minsky, Hilary Putnam, and Jerry Fodor.  Newell, for 
example, couched cognition in terms of the physical symbol hypothesis, according to 
which being a physical symbol system (a physical computer) is a necessary and 
sufficient condition of thinking. Marvin Minsky claimed, famously, that “the brain is 
just a computer made of meat.” (Minsky, M. Quoted in: Michalowski S. Science, 
Man, and the International Year of Science).  In fact, ever since the development of 
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powerful modern computing machines around the 1940’s and the beginning of the 
computer age,  many scientists (and some philosophers) have simply taken it for 
granted that it was only a question of time before satisfactory machine models of 
human intelligence were produced.  
       Cognitive science mushroomed rapidly on the basis of this paradigm, resulting 
in detailed theories of cognitive processes including perception, attention, memory, 
language and decision-making.  Rather than using mental representations, another 
kind of model, proposed by cognitive linguist Ray Jackendoff, focused on mental 
“structures” which differ from mental representations in terms of their intentionality 
or “aboutness”.  Intentionality is a philosophical concept regarding the power of 
minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of 
affairs. According to Jackendoff our use of language already presumes such rich 
representational structures that can be linked to what we see, so that “there is no 
reason to be paralysed by the absence of a solution to intentionality, as Fodor seems 
to be”  (Jackendoff, 2002, p. 280). In other words, meaning is a separate 
combinatorial system not entirely dependent upon syntax.  However, whatever the 
particular flavour of the symbolic modelling approach, the foundational claim is that 
an algorithm can be used to model or simulate cognitive processes and produce 
output that corresponds with human behaviour. In fact, Jackendoff staunchly defends 
functionalism and the symbol manipulation paradigm and claims that although 
“some neuroscientists say we are beyond this stage of enquiry, that we don’t need to 
talk about “symbols in the head” anymore, I firmly disagree” (see Lakoff, 2008). 
       A further type of functionalist model, that has become more commonplace, is 
the connectionist kind which focuses on what are termed “neural networks”, i.e. 
networks comprising neurons or neuron-like elements and the description of 
connections between these elements (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). These later 
connectionist models were inspired by the neural architecture of the brain, where the 
neurons they employ are a much simplified version of the real thing and relegated to 
the role of “mere implementation”.  Connectionism also entails the commitment to 
mental representations as the distributed patterns of neural activity. These kinds of 
“neural network” models proceed according to “feed forward” or recurrent 
connections, all based on algorithmic computation. In fact, David Chalmers is a 
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connectionist functionalist, and writes the following of the implementation of 
computation in a system: 
 
The relation between an implemented computation and an implementing system 
is one of isomorphism between the formal structure of the former and the causal 
structure of the latter. In this way, we can see that as far as the theory of 
implementation is concerned, a computation is (...) an abstract specification of 
causal organization (Chalmers, 2011, p. 6). 
 
       Steven Pinker, Harvard Professor in the Department of Psychology at Harvard 
University also adheres to a connectionist, computational theory of mind. Relying on 
the work of Newell and Simon, Minsky, Putnam, Fodor  and Marr, he defends the 
view that the human mind is a naturally selected system of “organs of computation”. 
In How the Mind Works he frequently refers to “the mechanisms of cognition”, and 
considers computation or  “information processing” as simply what the brain does to 
allow us to see, feel, think, choose, and act. Pinker claims  both i) that thinking is a 
kind of computation used to work with configurations of symbols, and ii) that the 
mind is organised into specialised modules or mental organs. Pinker also explains 
the mind according to the supposed principle of “reverse-engineering”; that is 
scientists are able to come up with the evolutionary narrative of what nature intended 
the mind to be able to do as it evolved, simply through tracing the process of natural 
selection. The mind, he writes, is a system of “organs of computation” that allowed 
our ancestors to understand and outsmart objects, animals, plants, and each other.  
He also repeats this computational language in a later article defending his theory, So 
How Does the Mind Work?  
Mental life consists of information processing or computation. Beliefs are a kind 
of information, thinking a kind of computation, and emotions, motives, and 
desires are a kind of feedback mechanism in which an agent senses the difference 
between a current state and goal state and executes operations designed to reduce 
the difference (Pinker, 2005, p. 24). 
 
       In short, Pinker retains a computational theory of mind, one premised on the 
idea that information processing is the fundamental activity of the mind and it is 
“function” that makes human beings intelligent. The mind is akin to an information 
processing machine,  a kind of biological Turing machine or “virtual mental 
computer” (Pinker, 1997, p. 69).  The central point of his neural computation model 
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is “that symbols both stand for some concept and mechanically cause things to 
happen” (ibid., p. 71). Cognition works, in part, via combinatorial symbol-
manipulation, not just associations among sensory features, as in many connectionist 
models. Moreover, he avers, “what makes a system smart is what the parts of the 
machine stand for and how the patterns of change inside are designed to mirror truth 
- preserving relationships” (ibid., p. 77).  
 
Whatever the functionalist theory of mind, all share the common assumption that our 
cognitive activities and mental life can be reduced to information processing, a 
deterministic, scientific, materialistic, mechanistic explanation.  This is the core 
premise -  an almost universally held general belief that there are no a priori reasons 
why thought processes are not reducible to materialist, information processing, 
mental representations, and that the question of whether or not they are is purely an 
empirical matter. Daniel Dennett, a well known adherent to the functionalist 
endeavour, who, with Jackendoff, is co-director of the Centre for Cognitive Studies 
at Tufts, puts the matter clearly when he claims that “the materialistic, empirical 
study of mind aims to find reductive explanations that make mental representations 
“demystified, unified, [and] placed on more secure foundations” (Dennett, 1995, p. 
89) and do so in order to demonstrate why a particular physical state counts as a 
mental state. Dennett asserts that this is the correct view of human cognition and 
human nature, and it is one where consciousness itself should be left out of the 
picture, because it does not do anything at all.  In a paper illustrating two opposing 
teams tackling the problem of consciousness, he writes: “Turing’s great contribution 
was to show us that Kant’s question could be recast as an engineering question. 
Turing showed us how we could trade in the first-person perspective (...) for the 
third-person perspective of the natural sciences and answer all the questions–without 
philosophically significant residue (Dennett, 2001, p.1).  According to Dennett, 
Turing’s Kantian question is “How could we make a robot that had thoughts, that 
learned from experience and used what it learned the way we do?”  The next section 
evaluates this claim. 
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4.2. Kant and Functionalism 
 
A major doctrine of functionalism is encapsulated in the fundamental dictum 
“function does not determine form”. Contemporary functionalists hold four main 
principles: 
i)   We know very little about the mind as it is structurally. 
ii)  Therefore the way to model the mind is on what it does or can do, on how it 
works or functions, rather on how it is constituted or on its introspective contents.   
iii)  Given this functionalist explanation nothing follows concerning its actual nature. 
 iv)  Therefore, mental functioning could, in principle, be realised in systems of   
       many different forms.  
Putnam defined the “functional organisation” of minds or “mental systems” in terms 
of their role within a representational system and characterised them in terms of their 
function within that system. Moreover, he points out, descriptions of the functional 
role of a system are of a logically different kind from descriptions of its actual 
nature, i.e. nothing follows from them concerning any underlying composition. 
Therefore, to use his own words, “any physico-chemical system” (that can be 
represented functionally, by a machine table)  “is functionally isomorphic to a 
denumerable infinity (at least) of systems with quite different physical-chemical 
constitutions” (Putnam 1967, p. 242.) This is broadly akin to Kant’s own conception 
of what we can and cannot capture in a model of the mind.  As mentioned, Kant 
claimed that we know little of the mind’s structure. Thus he writes:  
Through this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented 
than a transcendental subject of the thoughts = X. It is known only through the 
thoughts which are its predicates, and of it, apart from them, we cannot have any 
concept whatsoever (A346/B404). 
As discussed earlier, Andrew Brook likens this to Kant’s “doctrine of the noumenal” 
-  that for Kant we know absolutely nothing of the noumenal mind, the “substrate” 
that underlies functioning, of which the senses give no knowledge but whose bare 
existence can be inferred from the nature of experience, which he says gives 
credence to a functionalist interpretation of the Critique.  Wilfred Sellars also points 
 136 
 
out that according to Kant we do not know mental processes “save as processes 
which embody these functions” and that his “revolutionary move was to see the 
categories as concepts of functional roles in mental activity” (Sellars, 1974, pp. 62-
90).  In the Second Paralogism Kant writes that we do not know whether “the 
thinking “I”  is different from or the same as body.  It may be the same as body but 
to assert this is to move fallaciously between different logical categories, 
descriptions of composition and descriptions of function.  That is, a synthetic 
description of the composition of the “I” of “I think” involves an illicit slide between 
statements of different logical types given the purely analytic, functional, a priori 
characterisation of the mind with which Kant is concerned. Brook claims that Kant’s 
attempt to characterise the necessary characteristics or prerequisites of a thinking 
subject led him to the recognition that through such analysis nothing about the actual 
composition of the subject need be inferred; in other words, that Kant’s attempts to 
characterise such prerequisites within the framework of his transcendental idealism 
led him to a recognition of the dichotomy between function and material or physical 
composition, which is akin to the functionalist claim, that mental functioning could 
be realised in a denumerable infinity of different forms, the argument from multiple-
realisability.   
So, to recapitulate in order to get our bearings: the functionalist model of the mind is 
the prevailing model in cognitive psychology.  Proponents hold that the way to 
model the mind is through its functions, what it does and can do. The claim is that 
this general picture is akin to Kant’s own model which was also centred on how the 
mind works at an abstract level rather than on how it is constituted or on its 
introspective contents; that like modern cognitive scientists, Kant was concerned 
with the “functions” or conditions needed for functions to work. Concepts are 
functions based on acts of unity of judgement.  Kant writes about concepts as 
functions as follows: 
Whereas all intuitions, as sensible, rest on affections, concepts rest on function. 
By “function” I mean the unity of the act of bringing various representations 
under one common representation. (...) Now the only use which the 
understanding can make of these concepts is to judge by means of them (B 93) 
[my italics]. 
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  As discussed in Chapter 3, Kant claimed that knowledge is the result of “acts of 
synthesis”, that judgements have the particular content they do  have in virtue not of  
their immediate causal relationships to objects but only through their dependence on 
intuitions (A68/B93); that in order that representations of objects be anything to 
anyone they must belong with others “to one consciousness”(A116), i.e. they must 
be synthesised or combined with others into one unified representation, and that this 
in turn requires the application of concepts. His emphasis throughout is on the 
workings of the mind.  
 Kant’s functionalism is of a very general kind, however. Unlike contemporary 
cognitive scientists he was uninterested in specifics. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to 
state that this aspect of his theory can be viewed as an early form of functionalism, 
what we might term a proto-functionalism. One of the most intriguing aspects of 
Kant’s alleged proto-functionalism, is that it can be viewed as akin to the negative 
doctrine of contemporary cognitive science encapsulated in the dictum “function 
does not determine form”. Contemporary functionalists hold that we know very little 
about the mind as it is structurally, and Kant’s own conception of what we can and 
cannot capture in a model of the mind appears to attest to the same. Andrew Brook 
claims this is an aspect of his doctrine of the “noumenal” and  maintains that Kant’s 
insistence on the unknowability of the noumenal mind implies a broad agreement 
with functionalism, viz., that (i) mental functioning could be realised in principle in 
objects of many different forms; and, (ii) we know too little about the form or 
structure of the mind at present to say anything useful at this level in any case, 
except that mental functions will never be straight-forwardly mapped onto any forms 
that may be associated with them, whatever these forms might be like (Brook, 1997, 
p.13).  He writes that Kant accepted a variant of both these positions; that concerning 
(ii), Kant maintained not just that we know little about the “substratum” (A350) that 
underlies mental functioning but that we know nothing (or we can never know that 
we know anything) about it.  If the noumenal mind is unknowable, however, (i) 
immediately follows; the mind “as it is” could take different forms. Indeed, “function 
imposes so few constraints on form that, so far as we can infer from function, we 
cannot determine even something as basic as whether the mind is simple or complex 
(A353)” (ibid., p.12). In short, Brook claims, Kant not only accepted the notion that 
function does not dictate form, but “accepted a very strong version of it” (ibid., p. 
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14).  For Kant not only do we now know little of the mind’s structure - we will never 
know it.  As far as the nature of the mind is concerned Kant advocated strict 
ontological neutrality.
51
 
Discussing the subject of the role played in thought by the “I” of transcendental 
apperception Kant writes: 
 
Since, in thinking in general, we abstract from all relation of the thought to any 
object (…) the synthesis of the conditions of thought in general (...) is not 
objective at all, but merely a synthesis of thought with the subject, which is 
mistaken for a synthetic representation of an object (A397).  
 
The “I” of transcendental apperception is not objective, i.e. something to which we 
could ascribe properties.  For Kant, thought of what is objective must be 
conceptualised by the categories, which are the very conditions of our knowing 
anything at all. Moreover, the categories themselves are not to be considered entities 
of any kind but the most general logical constraints on anything that can function as 
a mind. They are concepts of functional roles in mental activity formed by 
abstraction, not by reflecting on the self as “object” but from consideration of the 
mind’s conceptual capacities. That is to say, the categories are not “things” of any 
kind however rarefied, but are characterisable purely in terms of their function 
within a system of representation. Their material composition cannot be inferred, just 
as the nature or “substrate” of the “I” cannot. Kant’s description of the mind in the 
Critique is quite readily translatable into functionalist terminology, since all the 
conceptual terms he uses can be construed in terms of their role within a 
representational system and characterised in terms of their function within that 
system.  For Kant, as for modern functionalist theories of mind, abstract descriptions 
of mental content are logically different from descriptions of actual material 
composition.  Kant claimed that nothing can be inferred from them of the actual 
composition of that which realises these states.  
 
Putnam writes the following on the idea of multi-realisability: 
 
The functional organisation (...) of the human being or machine can be described 
in terms of the sequences of mental or logical states respectively (...) without 
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reference to the nature of the “physical realisation” of these states (Putnam, 1975, 
p. 373.). 
 
 [D]escriptions of the functional organisation of a system are logically different 
in kind from descriptions of psycho-chemical composition (ibid., p. 424).  
 
Echoes of Putnam’s thoughts can be discerned in the 18th century  language of Kant, 
when he writes: 
If anyone propounds to me the question: What is the constitution of a thing which 
thinks, I have no a priori knowledge wherewith to reply. For the answer has to be 
synthetic - an analytic answer will perhaps explain what is meant by thought but 
beyond this cannot yield any knowledge of that upon which all thought depends 
for its  possibility (A398). 
 
       The notion that Kant propounded a proto-functional doctrine of the mind is 
compelling. For from the Kantian characterisation of a mind that is advanced in the 
Critique, nothing follows concerning its actual nature. It does not tell us whether the 
“I” is the same as or different from the body. It may be the same but to assert as such 
is to move illicitly between talk of composition and talk of functions. Putnam wrote 
that “any physico-chemical system which possesses a “functional organisation” 
which can be represented by a machine table is functionally isomorphic to a 
denumerable infinity (at least) of systems with quite different physical chemical 
constitutions”(Putnam, 1974, p. 242). Similarly, for Kant, the cognitive acts of the 
self qua representational system are independent as to the type of physical mind of a 
subject that might engage in them. We do not even know something as basic as 
whether or not it is simple or composite. If we know nothing at all about the mind 
“as it is” it seems to immediately follow that there are an infinite number of ways in 
which it could be instantiated. Kant does give a detailed account of the functions of 
the “I think”, but from this nothing follows regarding the compositional basis of the 
mind.  
 
Kant attacks the assumptions of the proponents of rational psychology (Descartes) 
who claim as the foundation of their beliefs that in the “I think” one must be aware 
of an actual substantive thing. He wites: “I do not know an object merely in that I 
think (...) I do not know myself through my being conscious of myself as thinking 
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(B406). Kant insists that the “I” of “I think” or “the unity of consciousness” is not 
substantial in the way rational psychology claims.  Neither is awareness of such 
unity analogous to our perceptual experience of objects; rather it is the very 
condition of all such perceptual experience. Kant’s claim is that the use of  “I” does 
not involve any intuition of a subject of experience because the “I think”  is not an 
inner perception of an immaterial object at all. What we are aware of in the “I think”  
is a not an entity or “substance” with special properties of unity, simplicity and 
absolute persistence, as Descartes had hypothesised. As discussed, earlier, Kant 
argues in the Second Paralogism that the unity of thought “may relate just as well to 
the collective unity of different substances acting together”  (A 353). Knowing that 
the elements in cognition need to be synthesised into a single object by a single 
subject tells us little about what kinds of structure might instantiate a subject with 
such abilities.  The rationalists had taken their claims to be a demonstrative science 
the propositions of which were analytic.  However, Kant makes the point that no 
substantive claim about thinkers can be derived from analytic propositions. Rational 
psychology is mistaken. Kant diagnoses the error in both editions, where in the B 
edition he writes:  
From all this it is evident that rational psychology owes its origin simply to 
misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which underlies the categories, is 
here mistaken for an intuition of the subject as object and the category of 
substance is then applied to it (B421-2). 
 
...whilst in the A edition he writes: of the “thinking  I”:  
[T]he thinking ‘I’ (...) does not know itself through the categories, but knows the 
categories, and through them all objects, in the absolute unity of apperception, 
and so  through itself. Now it is indeed very evident that that I cannot know as an 
object that which I must presuppose to know any object. (...) Nevertheless there 
is nothing more natural and more misleading than the illusion which leads us to 
regard the unity in the synthesis of thoughts as a perceived unity in the subject of 
these thoughts (A402). 
And again,  
In attaching “I” to our thoughts, we designate the subject of inherence only 
transcendentally, (…) without noting in it any quality whatsoever—in fact, 
without knowing anything of it either by direct acquaintance or otherwise 
(A355). 
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      There can be seen to be several threads of functionalist thought in Kant; the 
parallels are clearly there.  Firstly, Kant frequently treats concepts, both the 
“categories of the understanding” and ordinary empirical concepts, as functions that 
make it possible to transform the raw content of experience into judgments.  
Secondly, and perhaps more relevant to cognitive science, Kant organises the mind 
into “faculties”, responsible for different phases of the constructive process that takes 
raw sensory experience as input and produces thoughts or judgments as outputs.  A 
functionalist interpretation of Kant would focus on the theory of synthesis that 
contains Kant’s division of mental labour into the more elementary tasks that are 
necessary for consciousness to occur. Kant’s views are also compatible with 
contemporary functionalist theories in the sense that they allow consciousness to be 
characterised at a high level of abstraction that would allow instantiation into any 
number of physically realisable systems. They are also compatible with the 
functionalist endeavour to describe the causal dependencies and relationships 
between various mental states, as well as system inputs and outputs.  This is Kant’s 
theory of “synthesis” which is his division of cognitive labour into more elementary 
tasks necessary for cognition; where he systematises the mind into functional modes 
responsible for different stages of the cognitive process that  receive the disorganised 
flux of sensory experience as input which correspondingly  produce thoughts or 
judgments as  output.  It is therefore reasonable to credit Kant’s insights into the 
nature of cognition as a kind of proto-functionalism and compatible with 
contemporary functionalist theories. His a priori characterisation of our human 
cognitive faculties certainly gives prima facie evidence for this. The unknowability 
of things in themselves which entails neutrality concerning the underlying 
composition of the mind means that he would have had to allow that multiple-
realisability is at least open to intellectual possibility. The Kantian notion that sense 
experience has to be conceptually ordered if there is to be the possibility of coherent 
thought is also evident. However, crucially, and this is an important caveat, 
functionalist interpretations of Kant tend to uncouple his transcendental psychology 
from his epistemology and metaphysics and do not do full justice to Kant’s overall 
strategy. Therefore, it is important to emphasise that this is only a part of Kant’s 
legacy. In fact, insofar as we are talking about the mind of a human being and not a 
mere machine, some of the crucial ways in which his views depart from 
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functionalism,  illuminated through a proper examination of transcendental method 
he employed, can continue to provide significant guidance to cognitive science that 
is obscured by such an interpretation. For  functionalism persists as a backdrop to a 
range of puzzles and obsessions in the philosophy of consciousness that are ongoing, 
in particular, “the hard problem of consciousness”, puzzles which a more fruitful 
interpretation of Kant can address.   
4.3. Beyond Functionalism  
 
So Kant’s “transcendental psychology” is regarded by many to be, in several 
important respects, an early form of functionalism or a proto-functionalism, the 
merit of which is that it allows a better understanding of Kant’s theory of mind, 
whilst simultaneously isolating it from the scorn of analytic positivist philosophers 
such as Peter Strawson and others who dismiss it as incomprehensible, speculative 
and unverifiable. Reinterpreted as proto-functionalist, Kant’s “transcendental 
psychology” or his theory of a priori synthesis is enabled to enjoy a legitimised 
status that was impossible during the era of behaviourism and positivism which 
allowed no discussion about the mind.  As Ralf Meerbote writes in the introductory 
section of his influential book Kant’s Functionalism: 
 
Kant’s transcendental psychology, often maligned, is a cognitive psychology. 
More specifically, it is a faculty psychology which speaks of capacities and 
abilities of various sorts which are needed for empirical cognition. The exercise 
of such capacities and abilities typically consists in mental actions of several 
types. An activity-characterization of cognitive mental life is the indispensable 
core element of transcendental psychology (Meerbote, 1998, p. 161). 
 
       Kant characterises human cognitive capacities, apperception, synthesis and a 
prior structure this way, provides prima facie evidence and justification for a 
functionalist interpretation. However, one limitation of this construal is that this does 
not appear to sit easily with Kant’s overall purpose, i.e. his transcendental idealism. 
As such, interpreting Kant’s theory of mind as purely functionalist in nature does 
him several injustices.  One reason for this is that, as a consequence of his 
transcendental idealism, his transcendental method for analysis of the mind’s 
activities is importantly different from the methods of contemporary functionalism in 
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several regards. This is in relation to the transcendental unity of apperception, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. There it was noted that Kant’s view was that although we 
cannot “know” anything about the self in apperception, as it has an unknown nature, 
it does have transcendental “properties” that we cognise not by being passively 
aware of the contents of consciousness but by being “active”. We are “aware” of our 
spontaneous synthesising activity,  and to be so is also to be aware of an actor. There 
can be no activity without an agent and to acknowledge the existence of an activity is 
to acknowledge the existence of “something that acts”.  This suggests that human 
cognition involves a necessary relation between the elements of cognition and its 
overall grasp by a human subject or active agent. This is an integral relationship, and 
one which is often described by Kant as “purposive”. Another important reason is 
that this is linked to the notion of human freedom.  Kant identifies spontaneity as the 
theoretical analogue of freedom in the discussion of the third antinomy where he 
discusses the problem of free and natural causality. Here he tries to show that there is 
no logical contradiction between taking something as causally determined and as 
free at the same time, insofar as a distinction between the dual aspects of phenomena 
and noumena is accepted. The idea from Kant is that causality and freedom refer to 
two different ways of viewing things. Although under the “phenomenal perspective” 
mental activities are causally determined, to engage in cognitive activities means to 
consider ourselves not as “objects”, but as “subjects” of experience. This means that 
we must therefore consider ourselves apart from the conditions to which all objects 
of experience are subject, as rational free agents.  Spontaneity is “the mind’s power 
of producing representations from itself” (A51/B75); more generally, it is the 
capacity for creative mental activity that is either strictly underdetermined or else 
wholly unconditioned by natural or physical causation (A448/B476). Here the 
definition of freedom is purposive, the power to spontaneously originate behaviour 
and generate a new causal series. Therefore, Kant’s views differ profoundly from 
functionalism in its direct appeal to spontaneity, a naturally occurring indispensable 
feature of the mind without which subjective thought would be impossible. Kant 
terms this power of self consciousness variously as “the original synthetic unity of 
apperception”, “the transcendental unity of self consciousness”, the “I think”, and 
“pure apperception”.   
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       Functionalism is more or less updated Hume. Hume’s bundle of perceptions is 
held together through the principle of association, with no necessary causal 
connection between them. However, for Kant, causal interaction immediately links 
our inner representations with objects outside of us. Without this objective basis for 
associability, there would be no means of conceptualising experience. You would 
not be able to represent yourself as a numerically identical subject through different 
experiences without this. Kant argues in the Second Analogy of Experience, that we 
can know a priori that “[all] alterations take place in conformity with the law of the 
connection of cause and effect”(A189/B232). For example, that we can determine 
that one of our mental states follows another in time shows that we have a 
fundamental concept of cause.    For Hume, the order of time is empirically given as 
a sequence of ideas and impressions and the associations between them, which Kant 
says is “something merely subjective, determining no object, and may not, therefore, 
be regarded as knowledge of any object, not even of an object in the (field of) 
appearance” (A195/B240). Causality requires a necessary rule of connection 
between events which transforms a merely subjective temporal sequence into an 
objective one.  To illustrate this Kant compared the perception of a house with that 
of a ship moving downstream. There is a series of perceptions changing in time,  but 
the house itself remains unchanged, just as the position of the ship changes, but that 
does not reflect a change in the subject which is the same throughout (A191-2/B236-
7).  He says in his proof that the concept of causality is necessary for distinguishing 
an objective sequence of events in the world from a subjective sequence of 
perceptions.  In the case of the ship, what we apprehend is an objective process, and 
its order cannot be arranged otherwise than in this very succession; we first see the 
ship up river and then we see it down river. Also in the case of a seeing a house: “the 
apprehension of the manifold in the appearance of a house which stands before me is 
successive” but “no one will grant” that “the manifold of the house is also in itself 
successive” (A190/B235). The progression of the perceived parts of the house is not 
due to those parts coming to be and then passing away, but rather to the movement 
of the eyes in a particular body in space and time. (However, this does not 
contravene the strictures of his transcendental idealism since the causal link is not 
something we perceive, but is an a priori principle, and the transcendental self is 
never itself directly present as an object of empirical inquiry, since this self is 
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essentially, or transcendentally, the point of view from which any inquiry can take 
place).  
       Thus Kant showed that any unity such that might be said to be a product of 
sense alone presupposes a “transcendental affinity”, that is, the power to distinguish 
a mere succession of perceptions from a representation of objective succession. 
Knowing that the successive perceptions of a house do not count as the perception of 
a succession in the world requires this kind apperceptive unity: 
 
This objective ground of all association of appearances I entitle their affinity. It is 
nowhere to be found save in the principle of the unity of apperception, in respect 
of all knowledge which is to belong to me (A122). 
 
       From this it is clear that for Kant, the activity of a mind turning its own powers 
of thought onto itself creates a set of issues that are not found in functionalist 
accounts.  And although modern cognitive science might benefit from the depth of 
Kant’s insights gleaned through the functionalist reading, at least some of the 
differences evident in his transcendental method can provide guidance to cognitive 
science that is obscured by such a reading.  Of particular significance in this regard 
is that Kant’s ideas can shed light on the philosophical perplexities that arise from 
functionalism itself, especially in relation to the “hard problem of consciousness” 
(Chalmers,  1995) and the related problem of an “explanatory gap” (Levine, 1983). 
This is the problem of how physical processes in the brain are supposed to give rise 
to subjective experience. According to Chalmers, one of the main difficulties with 
functionalism in describing the mind is that it does not give sufficient justice to 
qualitative phenomena.  This puzzle involves the inner aspect of thought and 
perception: the way things feel for the subject.  In his seminal paper “Facing up to 
the Problem of Consciousness”, he resurrects this ancient puzzle of philosophical 
perplexity that was brought into sharp focus by Descartes. Chalmers argues that 
there really is an “explanatory gap” from the objective to the subjective, and 
criticises all scientific explanations of mental experience that eliminate or ignore the 
subjective aspect of cognition.  This has led to the numerous attempts to try to solve 
what is seen as a real problem, currently considered by many as one of the most 
important unsolved problems in contemporary science. Twenty or so years ago 
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neuro-functionalist Thomas Metzinger,  commonly regarded as one of the foremost 
contemporary thinkers and researchers in the philosophy of mind, wrote:  
 
Today, the problem of consciousness — perhaps together with the question of the 
origin of the universe — marks the very limit of human striving for 
understanding. It appears to many to be the last great puzzle and the greatest 
theoretical challenge of our time (Metzinger, 1995, p. 3).   
 
Twenty years later, despite the tremendous scientific advances since then, the hard 
problem of consciousness seems as intractable as ever.  For decades, the study of 
phenomenal consciousness had been shunned within functionalist oriented cognitive 
science; the then prevailing view being that science, which depends on objectivity 
and third person verifiability could not accommodate something as subjective as that. 
The principle of objectivity, on which the sciences are based, required the avoidance 
of all first person perspectives and distancing oneself as far as possible from all 
individual points of view.  All this changed during the latter part of the last century; 
as John Searle wrote,  “raising the subject of consciousness in cognitive science 
discussions is no longer considered to be  “bad taste”, causing graduate students to 
“roll their eyes at the ceiling and assume expressions of mild disgust” (Searle, 1990 
p. 585). In fact, not only is consciousness no longer considered a taboo subject, but 
quite the reverse; it has become a vibrant topic in both philosophy of mind and the 
sciences: in psychology, neuroscience and even quantum physics. This is mostly 
down to David Chalmers and his framing of the “hard problem” of consciousness.  
Because of his arguments many now see fundamental problems with the 
functionalist theory of the mind and all reductive explanations and ask: How can it 
be possible that as a means of investigating cognition, its leading characteristic is the 
elimination of all subjective perspectives? How can that help us to understand the 
mind? Something crucial is left out, and that is the mind itself.  For functionalists the 
mind just is the functioning of the brain, which appears to process information 
mechanically.  But “the hard problem of consciousness” is the question of why, in 
addition to the information processing that the brain engages in, there is a feeling of 
“what it’s like” associated with it. It is also the related problem of how conscious 
experience can “emerge” from the grey matter of the brain.  Thus, David Chalmers, 
along with predecessors, Joseph Levine and Frank Jackson, is most responsible for 
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the outpouring of work on this issue, and of opening up a seemingly unbridgeable 
gap between the physical world and the realm of phenomenal consciousness.  Each 
made use of different arguments and thought experiments that purport to 
demonstrate that functionalist/physicalist stories about the mind cannot capture the 
qualitative features of experience.  This caught the imagination of philosophers and 
scientists alike and thousands of articles and papers have been written which attempt 
to solve the problem. The association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness  
(commonly referred to as the ASSC), was set up in 1997 with the aim of 
encouraging such research on consciousness,  through organising annual meetings, 
and promoting the academic study of consciousness in a number of ways, including  
the  publishing of articles and papers in their open-access journal Psyche, now 
Neuroscience of Consciousness, and also  in a freely accessible e-print archive of 
papers. There is also the Journal of Consciousness Studies, currently edited by 
Professor Valerie Gray Hardcastle of the University of Cincinnati, (who views 
consciousness as a “lower level dynamical structure underpinning information 
processing in the brain” (Hardcastle, 1995). One of the most famous books 
published, The Astonishing Hypothesis, focused on how the activity of the brain’s 
neurons might give rise to conscious experience - the view that consciousness is 
correlated with a biological state of the brain, the so-called neural correlates of 
consciousness or NCCs (Crick and Koch, 1994). There is also the “global 
workspace” perspective of Bernard Baars (1988), further explicated his book In the 
Theatre of Consciousness (Baars, 1997) and various accounts in terms of higher 
order states, called HOT theories, discussed in the previous chapter. There are other 
quite radical solutions, including assigning to consciousness one of the most 
fundamental and mysterious causal roles in quantum physics, that of “collapsing the 
wave packet” in physical measurement, where a  causal gap within quantum theory 
makes it an open system into which free choice can enter (Henry Stapp, 2009, 2014) 
or by assigning quantum  mechanics a causal role in brain function through 
orchestrated collapse in the brain’s microtubules, as in Hameroff and Penrose Orch 
Orr model (1996, 2011, 2014). As pioneering neuroscientist Benjamin Libet, 
declares in a review of the journal: “there is clearly a need - or a demand - for an 
interdisciplinary journal devoted to the subject”, and that despite the fact it focuses 
on one topic, “it has the widest range of contributors of any academic journal he has 
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ever read”. This illustrates the extraordinary interest in the quest to find a theory of 
consciousness, deemed by many as the most puzzling scientific problem of this age.  
       However, it is proposed that paying attention to the insights of Kant would show 
that accepting that there is a hard problem of consciousness, at least in the way that 
is currently stated, is a philosophical mistake. Proponents of a hard problem have 
more or less substituted the Cartesian conception of mind as immaterial substance in 
favour of a materialist ontology, and this does not dissipate the inherent problems 
with the model. On the contrary, these very foundational commitments constitute the 
very source of the current difficulties. The “hard problem” is not just difficult to 
answer, it is impossible to answer as it is currently formulated. The way the problem 
is set up gives rise to dualism, as it involves a reification of the subjective awareness 
of qualia and creates the explanatory gap between subjectivity and information 
processes.  All efforts to “solve” the supposed hard problem and close the gap 
intrinsically risk both perpetuating its pre-eminence and further guaranteeing its 
insolubility. In fact,  it promotes, in a particularly powerful way, the continuation of 
the problem, and of keeping it alive indefinitely.  The following chapter fleshes out 
the modern day “hard” problem of consciousness along with the historical and 
philosophical background from which it emerged, in order to begin untangling the 
web of conceptual confusion in which it is enmeshed. 
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     5. The Problem of Consciousness and the Explanatory 
Gap 
It seems to me that science is increasingly giving us a viewpoint whereby 
organisms are able to be seen as physicochemical mechanisms: it seems that even 
the behavior of man himself will one day be explicable in mechanistic terms. 
There does seem to be, so far as science is concerned, nothing in the world but 
increasingly complex arrangements of physical constituents. All except for one 
place: in consciousness. That is, for a full description of what is going on in a 
man you would have to mention not only the physical processes in his tissue, 
glands, nervous system, and so forth, but also his states of consciousness: his 
visual, auditory, and tactual sensations, his aches and pains (J. J. C. Smart, 1959, 
p. 122). 
 
The above passage, written almost sixty years ago by J. J. C. Smart in his pioneering 
paper Sensations and Brain Processes,  marks the beginnings of the re-emergence of 
the old philosophical problem that was initiated three hundred years ago by 
Descartes. There had been an unbridgeable abyss between an immaterial res cogitans 
(thinking thing) and material res extensa (bodily thing) on Descartes’ account, and 
this chasm has been resurrected today, where is known as the problem of the  
“explanatory gap” (Levine,  1983) and which is linked to the closely related “hard 
problem of consciousness” (Chalmers, 1995).  Smart was one of the earliest 
proponents of identity theory. This is the view that all phenomenal experiences 
correspond to actual neurological states in the brain (such as the interaction of 
certain neurons and axons).  Mental states and events are identical with neurological 
states and events (literally) inside our brains.  For example, pain is literally the firing 
of c-fibres. The model here is empirical scientific identification: water with H2O, 
lightning with electrical discharge, and genes with segments of DNA molecules. The 
major proponents of identity theory were deeply influenced by the logical positivists 
of the analytic tradition such as Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Carl Hempel, and 
Bertrand Russell whose aim was to overhaul all of philosophy and convert it to a 
new scientific philosophy, and whose mission was to dispense with the mind-body 
problem and relegate it to the realm of speculative metaphysics, as discussed earlier. 
Proponents of identity theory thus regarded themselves as champions of the 
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scientific materialism that strictly limits knowledge to scientific findings and to a 
methodology free of a priori preconceptions and speculation.  
       From this point of view, the mind literally is the brain - they are identical in 
terms of kinds. David Armstrong was a later proponent of this view. In his 
influential book,  A Materialist of the Mind (1968),  he made the radical claim that 
all mental states (including intentional ones, i.e. beliefs, desires, etc.) are identical 
with physical states. The identity theorist, when asked why a certain conscious 
experience correlates with some physical state, would claim that the experience just 
is a physical state, and that there is nothing further to be explained. However, from 
this premise there began a period of on-going philosophical dispute. Adhering 
vehemently  to this scientific, materialist stance,  that  human beings are nothing 
more than physio-chemical mechanisms,  Smart, and to a lesser degree his 
contemporaries Place (1958) and Feigl (1958),  posed a challenge to philosophers of 
mind with the declaration that the task for philosophy was to work out an account of 
the mind which is compatible with this view. Thus, Smart helped lay the groundwork 
for future physicalist theories of the nature of mental states, even those that reject his 
specific proposal that sensations and brain processes are strictly identical. As 
Jaegwon Kim notes, “the brain state theory helped set the basic parameters and 
constraints for the debates that were to come…” (Kim, 1998, p. 2). At the root of 
identity theory is the following premise: “there is no conceivable experiment which 
could decide between materialism and epiphenomenalism”;  therefore, the statement 
“sensations are brain processes,” although not a straight-out scientific hypothesis, 
should be adopted on other grounds (Smart, 1959, p.156). Occam’s razor cited in 
support of this claim, that is, the invocation of the scientific rule of thumb which 
states that when you have two competing theories which make exactly the same 
predictions, the one that is simpler is the better. Since dualism is the view that there 
are two kinds of substances or properties in the universe, mind and matter; identity 
theory that there is one, identity theory wins. So the basis for the materialist position 
is empirical parsimony: that of the two competing theories, dualism and mind-brain 
identity, identity theory is the simpler since it commits to fewer entities.  
       This led more or less directly to the rise of functionalism; since the perceived 
virtue of functionalist theories of mind was that they avoid some pitfalls suffered by 
this naïve, simplistic physicalism, as they are based on the premise that cognitive 
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functions can be characterised on a high level of abstraction that would allow 
instantiation into any number of physically realisable systems, the thesis of multi-
realisability (Putnam, 1967). Hilary Putman convinced philosophers to reject strict 
identity theory, through his argument that mental states are multiply realisable and 
that multi-realisability is incompatible with it. This level of abstraction allowed the 
functionalist account freedom from the problems of strictly identifying 
consciousness with certain “type” or “token” physical states that constitute it in 
humans. Token identity is weaker than type identity: type identity is the claim that 
mental kinds themselves are physical kinds;  that mental states such as pain itself, 
and not merely instances of pain, are identical with physical states such as c-fibre 
stimulation. Token identity, on the other hand,  is the view that some individual 
instance, a token, of a mental state, a pain for example,  is identical with some 
individual token physical state, whatever that state may be; hence  argues that mental 
events are unlikely to have “steady” or definite biological correlates, e.g. the 
anomalous monism of Donald Davidson (1970). It is the claim that mental events are 
contingently associated with some physical property or another but says nothing 
about that relationship. The brain and mental states are still identical, but not in a 
way that can be directly typed: the same type of brain state may produce different 
types of mental states from token to token. As Fodor (1974) declares, token identity 
is entailed by but does not entail type identity. Functionalism thus avoided such 
problems as the finding of “the neural correlates of consciousness”, i.e. the actual 
neural representational systems whose contents systematically match the “contents 
of consciousness” and which cause specific conscious states. Furthermore, it seemed 
to promise that there are more possibilities for conscious systems than just human 
ones, i.e. for animal and machine consciousness.  
       As discussed,  the functionalist deals with questions about what the mind does, 
how its states are related, and what supposedly gives each type of mental state its 
own identity, whilst  ignoring what sort of physical matter there is, or what the 
system must be made out of.  Most functionalists are agreed that one of the biggest 
advantages of this approach is that it makes it possible to answer questions about the 
nature of consciousness by explaining that mental states are constituted by their 
causal relations one to another and to sensory inputs and behavioural outputs. As 
Jaegwon Kim writes: 
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Pain is to be understood in terms of its function as a causal intermediary between 
sensory input behaviour output, and other mental states……. This view of 
psychology (…) is, arguably, the received view of the nature of cognitive science 
(Kim, 1997, p. 580).   
 
       However, Kim (1993, 1989) is critical of functionalism precisely because it 
leads to the re-emergence of the mind-body problem, the problem of finding a place 
for the mind in a world that is fundamentally physical. For him, qualia, or 
phenomenal mental states such as the visual sensation of seeing red, or the olfactory 
sensation of the aroma of coffee, cannot be reduced to physical states or processes. 
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He holds a weaker version of functionalism, that something like functionalism or 
multi-realisability applies to intentional states but not to qualitative or mental states.  
Mental states are also species specific. Instead of pain, there is human pain, dog pain, 
pig pain, etc. Each such species-specific mental state or event is identical with some 
first-order physical or material state. Consequently, species-specific mental states are 
not multiply realisable. For Kim, it is the mental-state concept, rather than the mental 
state or physical event, that is multiply realised. What is significant in terms of this 
thesis is his famous causal closure thesis: “No physical event has a cause outside the 
physical domain” (Kim, 1993). No causal chain involving a physical event will ever 
cross the boundary of the physical into the non-physical: If x is a physical event and 
y is a cause or effect of x, then y, too, must be a physical event. In other words, 
materialism implies the causal completeness of physics. He writes, “to reject the 
closure principle is to embrace irreducible non-physical causes of physical 
phenomena. It would be a retrogression to Cartesian interactionist dualism, 
something that is definitive of the denial of materialism” (Kim, 1998, p. 47).  
       The physical causal closure thesis can take many forms, but at its simplest it 
states that if a physical event has a cause, then it must have a physical cause. A 
stronger version of the thesis, and one that is more widely held, is that all physical 
events ultimately have first-order physical causes; the possibility of there being 
novel, irreducible, second-order physical causal powers is eliminated. In short, the 
physical causal closure thesis is primarily a metaphysical framework to which 
materialists and physicalists are committed and which permits no place for what is 
metaphysically independent of the physical world to have any causal effects. Thus, 
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the study of the mind based on  the functionalist/physicalist  theory of mind gives 
rise to the problem of consciousness, where conscious properties are seen as nothing 
but epiphenomenal, caused by physical occurrences, but themselves causally 
redundant having no physical effect on the material world. 
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       The functionalist tries to infer, from a variety of methods, what sort of causal 
states must be connecting the two externally observable states (input and output). 
The resulting theory is testable in terms of the predictions it makes about a system’s 
behaviour, and can be modified, depending upon the sort of empirical evidence the 
investigation reveals about the functioning of the system. Some questions in 
cognitive science, such as those concerning the ability to discriminate, categorise and 
react to environmental stimuli, may be explicable to some extent by functionalist 
methods. They may be able to describe the causal process of what happens when one 
sees the colour red, smells the aroma of coffee, or remembers a sequence of events. 
However, this omits first-person phenomenal consciousness itself, which some take 
as a very significant omission. This kind of thinking led to the formation of the 
“explanatory gap”, the seemingly fathomless abyss between the physical and mental 
realms.  That is, the problem of understanding how something physical like the 
brain, can generate something non-physical, or how experience arises from this 
functionalist explanation. David Chalmers, and others, claimed that cognitive science 
and cognitive neuroscience can explain certain aspects of cognition and define them 
in functionalist terms as well as neural terms. However, consciousness per se cannot 
be given a purely functionalist definition. Only things defined in terms of 
functionality can be explained (e.g. the functional mechanism that explains memory 
function). The problem is that phenomenal consciousness, the “what it is like” to feel 
a certain way cannot be given a functional definition. In his seminal book The 
Conscious Mind, Chalmers suggests that scientists and philosophers should take 
consciousness seriously, and that “[t]o take consciousness seriously is to accept just 
this: that there is something interesting that needs explaining, over and above the 
performance of various functions” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 215).  For Chalmers, even if 
there is a full discovery of each and every neural mechanism that exists and the  
functions that are carried out, these mechanisms may explain all kind of 
psychological functions; the workings of memory, attention and so forth. Among 
these there will be functions associated with consciousness, such as when one is 
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experiencing a sharp stabbing pain or feeling hungry, in the sense that the function of 
pain is to bring one into an awareness that causes one to withdraw from whatever is 
causing it, or the function of the hungry feeling is to cause one to seek out food. The 
problem, he claims, is that the neural or functional mechanisms involved only 
concern transactions or correlation among states and not the phenomenal nature of 
the states themselves. That is, the neural or functional story fails to capture what is 
distinctive about pain, or hunger; precisely, the phenomenal sensation of  “what it’s 
like” to be in pain or to be hungry, the so-called “hard problem of consciousness”. 
The “hard problem” of figuring out what phenomenal concepts refer to is distinct 
from the “easy problem” of showing how psychological concepts of causal roles are 
physiologically or functionally realised. There would be no special challenge either 
about, say, understanding colour vision, if all that was required was the discovery of 
which physiological mechanisms realise the psychological colour responding 
differentially to coloured objects. This is also one of the easy problems; easy 
problems are easy precisely because they concern the explanation of cognitive 
abilities and functions. To explain a cognitive function, scientists need only specify a 
mechanism that can perform the function. The methods of cognitive science are 
well-suited for this sort of explanation, and so are well-suited to the easy problems of 
consciousness. By contrast, the problem of consciousness per se (what it’s like to 
experience red) cannot be given a neural or functional definition, and is the “hard 
problem”. 
       Chalmers’ point is that even if there is a full discovery of each and every neural 
mechanism that exists and the functions that are carried out, these mechanisms may 
explain all kind of psychological functions, for example, the workings of memory, 
attention and so on. They may also assist in developing neurophysiologic profiles of 
the mechanisms of sensory processing, which may serve as valuable biomarkers for 
diagnosis and monitoring of certain conditions, as well as for the monitoring of 
therapeutic interventions. However, the neural mechanisms only concern 
transactions or correlation among states and not the phenomenal nature of the states 
themselves. That is, the neural story fails to capture what is distinctive about pain, or 
hunger or thirst, namely the supposed sensation of “what it’s like” to be in pain, 
hungry or thirsty. The neural mechanistic explanation of the supposed pain would 
work just as well for a “zombie” which could possess the same mechanism to 
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indicate that it suffers damage (bleeding, bruising, writhing) or exhibit the hunger 
behaviour, by seeking out food, but be devoid of the subjective feeling of “what it’s 
like” to have the phenomenology. In other words, there could be “no one at home” 
despite empirical/observable evidence to the contrary. David Chalmers famous 
“zombie argument” is a thought experiment, the purpose of which is to argue that the 
neural or functional explanation is blind to the state of consciousness itself: its best 
explanations can only ever capture input-output causal relationships. In that way, 
neuroscience may explain certain aspects of experience/consciousness, but it cannot 
ultimately place consciousness in the material world. This, he claims, is a great 
unsolved problem in the science of the mind, and also the sciences in general. As he 
puts it: 
The problem of consciousness, also known as the Mind-Body Problem, is 
perhaps the largest outstanding obstacle in our quest to scientifically understand 
reality. The science of physics is not yet complete, but it is well-understood. The 
science of biology has explained away most of the mysteries surrounding the 
nature of life. Where there are gaps in our understanding of these fields, the gaps 
do not seem intractable; we at least have some idea of the direction in which 
solutions might lie. In the science of mind, things are not quite so rosy. Much 
progress is being made in the study of cognition, but consciousness itself is as 
much of a problem as it ever was (Chalmers, 1996, p. xi). 
 
       Chalmers was not original in pointing out that there is something quite peculiar 
about consciousness.  One of the first arguments meant to illustrate the problem of 
consciousness was given by Thomas Nagel, who claimed that since consciousness is 
subjective, i.e. directly and privately accessible solely by the person who has it, we 
are barred from ever understanding it fully, including the question of whether, and if 
so how, it could be physical. For even if we did know everything there possibly is to 
know about bat brains, we would never  know “what it’s like” to be one, simply 
because a bat’s conscious experience would be so very different from our own, as 
their means of navigating the world are through sonar and echolocation.  His famous   
“What it is like to be a Bat?” paper (1974) provides a now much used and repeated 
description of phenomenal consciousness; the “what it is like” criterion which aims 
to capture this subjective notion of being a conscious organism. According to Nagel, 
a being is conscious just if there is “something that it is like” to be that creature, to 
be a bat or to be a person. Later arguments put forward by Frank Jackson (1982) and 
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Joseph Levine (1983), hinged on the claim that this is a serious problem that needs to 
be taken into consideration if there is to be a cogent account of the mind.  
     It was Levine who first coined the term “explanatory gap”, when he transformed 
into an epistemological version a modal argument given by Saul Kripke (1980) 
against the identity theory of Smart, discussed above. This is that the explanatory 
gap opens up in identity theory since nothing in the physical or functional correlates 
of a mental state explains why this state subjectively feels a certain way.
 
A physical 
theory cannot explain the phenomena of consciousness in the way that it can explain 
the behaviour of water.  Reductive strategies to explain how something feels a 
certain way seem to leave a gap in the explanation, in that, strictly speaking, such 
explanations cannot really be understood. This notion, that there is somehow an 
“explanatory gap” between the physical and the mental is seen as leading current 
challenge to reductionist science.    
     Chalmers’ “zombie argument” is really a reworking of the Cartesian real 
distinction between mind and body in the Sixth Meditation
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 modernised for 
compatibility with contemporary modal logic, and which has given rise to a new 
form of dualism (property dualism).  It also leads to Cartesian-like attempts to prove 
the existence of a non-physical fact about consciousness; that there must be 
something real beyond the known physical world in order to account for it. 
Chalmers’ claim is that the body can exist without consciousness because we can 
conceive of a possible world containing our physical bodily duplicates but which 
lack phenomenal consciousness or minds. Levine accepts that Chalmers’ zombie 
argument might show that zombies are conceivable, but denies that this implies their 
possibility, that they could exist. He argues that “one’s ideas can be as clear and 
distinct as you like, and nevertheless not correspond to what is in fact possible” 
(Levine, 1993, p. 123). What the zombie argument shows for Levine is the presence 
of a gap that is not a metaphysical or ontological one, but simply a gap in our 
understanding. However, Frank Jackson and David Chalmers are “property dualists”. 
Property dualism is the view that non-physical, mental properties (sensations, 
emotions, beliefs) supervene on the material world.  
       Supervenience is a metaphysical notion introduced into analytic philosophy by 
R.M. Hare in the 1950s 
55
 and can be used to formulate relations of dependence 
between two different domains.  According to Chalmers, whereas all high-level facts 
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about natural phenomena are logically supervenient on the totality of physical facts, 
those about consciousness are not. That is, physicalism is true in all natural domains 
except for the mental. Chalmers claims that consciousness supervenes naturally on 
the physical, but not “logically” and that “psychophysical” laws will explain how 
these conscious experiences depend on physical processes.  Both Chalmers and 
Jackson view the zombie argument as ontological, rather than an epistemological - 
that physicalist and functionalist stories about the mind cannot capture the real 
qualitative features of experience. As Jackson puts it:  
 
Tell me everything physical there is to tell about what is going on in a living 
brain, the kind of states, their functional role, their relation to what goes on at 
other times and in other brains, and so on and so forth, and be I as clever as can 
be in fitting it all together, you won't have told me about the hurtfulness of pains, 
the itchiness of itches, pangs of jealousy, or about the characteristic experience of 
tasting a lemon, smelling a rose, hearing a loud noise or seeing the sky  (Jackson, 
1982, p. 127). 
In Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness, Chalmers writes:  
Consciousness poses the most baffling problem in the science of the mind. There 
is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious experience, but there is 
nothing that is harder to explain. All sorts of mental phenomena have yielded to 
scientific investigation in recent years, but consciousness has stubbornly resisted. 
Many have tried to explain it, but the explanations always seem to fall short of 
the target. Some have been led to suppose that the problem is intractable, and that 
no good explanation can be given (Chalmers, 1995a). 
The “easy” and “hard” problems of consciousness are distinguished thus:  
Researchers use the word “consciousness” in many different ways. To clarify the 
issues, we first have to separate the problems that are often clustered together 
under the name. For this purpose, I find it useful to distinguish between the “easy 
problems” of consciousness and the “hard problem” of consciousness. The easy 
problems are by no means trivial - they are actually as challenging as most in 
psychology and biology - but it is with the hard problem that the central mystery 
lies (Chalmers, 1995b). 
 
According to Chalmers, there are multiple “easy” problems of consciousness, but 
only one “hard” problem, namely that of explaining qualia, or the phenomenal or 
subjectively felt aspects of experience.  The easy problems are easy for Chalmers 
precisely because they concern the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions 
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[and] to explain a cognitive function, “we need only specify a mechanism that can 
perform the function”.  He gives the following example, amongst others: “To explain 
reportability (...) is just to explain how a system could perform the function of 
producing reports on internal states” (1995a).  As he writes: 
The easy problems of consciousness include the following: How can a human 
subject discriminate sensory stimuli and react to them appropriately? How does 
the brain integrate information from many different sources and use this 
information to control behavior? How is it that subjects can verbalize their 
internal states? Although all these questions are associated with consciousness, 
they all concern the objective mechanisms of the cognitive system. 
Consequently, we have every reason to expect that continued work in cognitive 
psychology and neuroscience will answer them. The hard problem, in contrast, is 
the question of how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective 
experience. This puzzle involves the inner aspect of thought and perception: the 
way things feel for the subject. When we see, for example, we experience visual 
sensations, such as that of vivid blue. Or think of the ineffable sound of a distant 
oboe, the agony of an intense pain, the sparkle of happiness or the meditative 
quality of a moment lost in thought (Chalmers, 1995b, p. 81). 
 
What makes the hard problem hard, then, is that no mechanical or reductive 
explanation of a cognitive process, however complex, would be able to account for 
the further question of why mental processes should be accompanied by felt 
experiences, the question of why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner 
life at all? This is a consequence of his commitment to property dualism, discussed 
below. 
 
5.1. Property Dualism 
 
Genuine property dualism occurs when, even at the level of individuals, the ontology 
of physics is insufficient to explain what there is. Chalmers claims that since 
cognitive science and neuroscience do not begin to explain how subjective 
experience emerges from neural processes in the brain, conscious experience must 
instead be understood in a new light, as an irreducible entity that exists at a funda-
mental level and cannot be understood as the sum of simpler physical parts. He 
proposes that consciousness be understood as a fundamental feature of the universe 
alongside such ontological categories as mass and space-time. It had once been 
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supposed that electromagnetism could be explained in terms of more basic 
mechanical processes. James Clerk Maxwell and his contemporaries realised that 
this was impossible, and so added electromagnetism to the list of basic elements of 
reality. Maxwell introduced new fundamental laws to explain the phenomena, as this 
was the only way it could be explained. The same should be the case for 
consciousness. Chalmers believes that consciousness is due to “proto-conscious” 
properties that must be ubiquitous in matter and that  “psychophysical” laws, will 
account for how conscious experience arises out of those properties. He writes: 
On this view, the world still consists in a network of fundamental properties 
related by basic laws, and everything is to be ultimately explained in these terms. 
All that has happened is that the inventory of properties and laws has been 
expanded, just as happened with Maxwell (Chalmers, 1995a. p. 113).   
For Chalmers, therefore, property dualism is the view that the world has physical 
properties which are “casually closed” (Kim, 1993) in addition to “non-physical” 
mental properties. Chalmers suggests that property dualism would allow the mental 
to “supervene” on the physical, and “consciousness” to be active in the world.  
       Some scientists and philosophers think that Chalmers is right to draw a 
distinction between the “hard” problem and the “easy problems” of consciousness, as 
if research is to move forward in this area, scientists must be clear that there is a 
difficulty here. But is this really so? The really hard problems we might think are the 
ones that the scientists are already dealing with, such as trying to find a cure for 
Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s disease; when these are discovered then these hard 
problems will have been solved. But what is being talking about here, of course, is a 
problem of a different kind, a philosophical hard problem, and it is suggested in the 
spirit of Wittgenstein that certain philosophical problems require dissolving rather 
than solving. This is because the whole distinction between the hard problem and the 
easy problems is the result of confusion in the conceptual scheme. As Wittgenstein 
noted, whenever a question appears difficult and seemingly intractable, this is often 
due to the fact that its philosophical underpinnings may not be formulated correctly, 
which requires philosophical, and not scientific analysis. The initial assumptions 
may need to be reinterpreted in radical ways in light of the analysis.  
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       It is of note that the greatest figures of the first two generations of twentieth-
century neuroscientists: Sherrington, Eccles and Penfield, were also Cartesian 
dualists. There was a distinction between on the one hand, an immaterial mind and 
the other, corporeal body. The third generation of neuroscientists retained the basic 
Cartesian structure, but transformed it into brain-body dualism: the Cartesian 
substance dualism was abandoned, but a kind of dualism still remains.  Although few 
neuroscientists openly endorse Cartesian dualism, a careful reading of  most 
neuroscientific texts, from prominent neuroscientific articles to books intended for a 
lay audience,  reveal implicit dualistic intuition in the sense that they ascribe  much 
the same kind of mental predicates to the brain as Descartes had to mind, and 
conceive of the relationship between thought and action,  experience and its objects, 
brain and person in much the same way, essentially by merely replacing the mind by 
the brain.  Benjamin Libet’s view of intentional action falls into this category, so 
does Damasio’s explanation of vision as the production of mental images in the brain 
(1994), also some of the theoretical work by Stephen Kosslyn (2005) on mental 
imagery. Chalmers belongs to this dualist tradition, although he views the mind or 
conscious experience as neither physical nor material, but a fundamental 
“property” and also a distinctively non-material entity.  However, it is neither 
obvious, nor even prima facie plausible to assume that the two ways in which we 
grasp physical and phenomenal properties, the former by descriptions of their causal 
role and the latter by a supposed “rigidly designating” direct awareness,  reflect two 
metaphysically distinct properties. There is an un-argued for assumption of dualism. 
It is already there in the language used to set up the problem. For example: “How do 
physical properties give rise to phenomenal properties?”, or “How could a physical 
brain made of lumpy grey matter produce consciousness?”.   Since writing The 
Conscious Mind in 1996 Chalmers has established himself as a significant figure in 
philosophy of mind and metaphysics. His primary weapon against materialism is the 
aforementioned “conceivability argument”, involving a thought experiment about the 
logical possibility of zombies to illustrate that there is no logical entailment from 
physical facts to facts about consciousness. Since then this argument has been 
reinforced against the standard means for debunking conceivability arguments by 
means of his 2D (two-dimensional) possible world semantics. Two-dimensionalism 
is an approach to semantics in analytic philosophy, a modal theory of how to 
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determine the sense and reference of a word and the truth-value of a sentence. The 
next section examines this in detail. 
5.2. Chalmers’ 2-Dimensional Semantics 
 
As mentioned above, Joseph Levine had different views of the metaphysical 
consequences of the explanatory gap than Frank Jackson and David Chalmers. 
Levine argued that the gap is epistemological, and compatible with the thesis that 
facts about consciousness supervene on the physical facts, whereas both Jackson and 
Chalmers argue that the fact that there can be no conceptual analysis of 
consciousness supports metaphysical dualism: consciousness is neither identical with 
nor logically supervenient on the physical, but is a further fact. Phenomenal 
properties naturally supervene on physical properties even though they do not 
logically supervene. It is significant that both Chalmers and Jackson make use of a 
two-dimensional appropriation of Kripke’s possible world semantics for modal 
discourse (Chalmers 2002a, 2002b, 2004, 2006, Jackson, 1998). Two-dimensional 
(henceforth  2D) semantics is a modal framework, introduced by Gareth Evans and 
developed by Martin Davis used to characterise the meaning of certain linguistic 
expressions and the entailment relations among sentences containing them.  In his 
2004 paper “Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics” Chalmers seeks to develop a 
version of 2D semantics which can vindicate the rationalist claim that there are 
constitutive connections between possibility, a priority and meaning.  There he 
appeals to a framework for connecting modal, epistemic, and semantic issues which 
he terms the “golden triangle”, the basic elements of which are “modal rationalism”, 
Kripkean semantics, and, what allegedly follows from them, the “a priori 
entailment” thesis (AE).  Kripke’s metaphysics of modality was created from the 
linguistic, conceptual realm of necessity, the realm in which rationalist philosophers 
since Descartes have made their home by way of mere stipulation. Rather than 
standing in for some description, as in Russell’s theory, names under Kripke’s theory 
“designate objects rigidly”, that is, in every possible world names pick out the same 
object. He argues that identity statements using alternative names for the same thing 
have a necessary truth: e.g. “Hesperus is Phosphorus”, “Tully is Cicero” and the 
natural kind identity statement “Water is H2O”. For Frege these only have 
contingent truth, but for Kripke any rigid designators used in an identity statement 
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are necessarily true, and necessarily true in all possible worlds, even if the statement 
is not a priori.  
56
  For instance, take the identity statement, “Water is H2O”; this is a 
necessary truth of physics, but it was an empirical discovery that this is the case, at 
one time this was not known; hence it is necessary a posteriori.       
       Possible world or intensional semantics is the view that we can model the 
representational properties of language by assigning intensions to terms and 
sentences. An intension is any property or quality connoted by a word, sentence or 
another symbol. Meaning is representational in the following manner: i) the literal 
meaning of a term or sentence can be equated with how the term or sentence 
represents things as being in the world, and ii) how a term or sentence represents 
things as being in the world is encapsulated in its truth-conditions, iii) Truth 
conditions are truth-value distributions over possible worlds, which are determined 
by the references or extensions of its terms, across all possible worlds (a possible 
world is a counterfactual alternative to the way the actual world is). The conclusion 
drawn by Chalmers is that the property referenced by the term “consciousness” 
cannot be reduced to any physical property. Consciousness does not supervene on 
the physical, according to Chalmers, because we can imagine another possible world 
where beings physically and functionally identical to us are not conscious; as 
mentioned earlier, Chalmers calls these beings zombies. According to Kripke’s 
original modal theory, something’s being conceivable does not entail that it is 
possible; however, Chalmers attempts to get around this by noting that  “many 
apparent problems that arise from these Kripkean considerations are a consequence 
of trying to squeeze the doubly indexed picture of reference into a single notion of 
meaning or necessity. Such problems can usually be dissolved by explicitly noting 
the two-dimensional (2D) character of reference, and by taking care to explicitly 
distinguish the notion of meaning or of necessity in question (Chalmers, 1996, pp. 
64-65).  
       According to Chalmers, mental states, like sentences, are the kinds of things that 
can have primary and secondary intensions, which seems to imply that mental states 
are underwritten by bearers of content that are in some sense analogous sentences in 
a natural language. Chalmers’ 2D argument for property dualism assumes that 
someone in possession of concept C has knowledge of how this concept applies in 
every possible world since they have already grasped the primary intension. The 
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primary intension represents the narrow, cognitive content of a concept. It captures 
the motivation for Frege’s notion of sense, namely that co-referential terms (such as 
Hesperus and Phosphorus) may have a different epistemic role, but the same 
meaning or sense. The concept’s application conditions for different scenarios 
(possible worlds) are a priori in that a person knows them in virtue of possessing the 
concept.  The main premise is that although we can be mistaken about the primary 
intension of the planet Venus, or the natural kind water, we can never be wrong 
about the primary intension associated with the term “consciousness”. We each 
know the primary intension associated with the term from our own cases. In his 
words, “[we] can say that a subject grasps an intension when the subject is in a 
position to evaluate that intension: that is, when sufficient reasoning will allow the 
subject to determine the value of the intension at any world” (Chalmers, 2002b, p. 
148). From this he goes on to say that we can conceive a logically possible world in 
which so-called zombies, beings that are physically like us, but which lack 
phenomenal consciousness, exist. Otherwise put, there are a priori epistemologically 
possible worlds where the term “consciousness” has an empty extension. For 
Chalmers, consciousness is a special case where it is not possible that we could be 
mistaken about the referents of our concepts, about our first-person experiences. A 
central premise of his argument is that conscious sensations, e.g. “what it’s like to 
feel pain” serve as both the primary intensions and secondary intensions of sensation 
terms, i.e. they coincide, (in contrast to, say, water, which might not be H2O). The 
secondary intension (or “property”) denoted by a sensation term just is the property 
of having a certain phenomenal feel.  Chalmers’ reasoning is as follows:  
 
What it takes for a state to be a conscious experience in the actual world is for it 
to have a phenomenal feel, and what it takes for something to be a conscious 
experience in a counterfactual world is for it to have a phenomenal feel. The 
difference between the primary and secondary intensions for the concept of water 
reflects the fact that there could be something that looks and feels like water in 
some counterfactual world that in fact is not water, but merely watery stuff. But 
if something feels like a conscious experience, even in some counterfactual 
world, it is a conscious experience (ibid., p. 118). 
 
       But it is not so clear how the phenomenal experience of, say, pain is the 
“primary intension” of pain. Chalmers says he just feels that functionalism leaves 
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something out. He has a gut intuition, something he has sometimes called “direct 
experience”. His method of conceiving his zombie world depends on gut intuitions, 
what he also calls a “brute intuition” (ibid., p. 96) which he considers is enough to 
establish that such a world is possible. It is arguable, however, whether a person’s 
“direct experience” or “gut intuitions” can count as evidence or grounding for 
philosophical conclusions; could a method of conceiving based on such intuitions 
ever be authoritative enough? Descartes called on the authority of God to guarantee 
his clear and distinct ideas, which gave rise to the so-called Cartesian Circle. 
57
 In a 
similar vein, what might be termed a secular version, Chalmers introduces the notion 
of  “ideal conceivability”,  by means of which he argues for the logical possibility of 
Zombie worlds by arguing that they are ideally conceivable, and asserting that 
something is logically possible if and only if it is ideally conceivable. 
58
  Or rather, 
for Chalmers it is ideally negatively conceivable that there is a Zombie world, which 
means that this Zombie world is not ruled out a priori, or that there is nothing 
contradictory following from this description. The leads on to its logical possibility,  
for what is negatively ideally conceivable is possible. However, all conceivability 
arguments rely on the notion of ideal conceivability, and ideal conceivability is a 
suspect notion at best. One could equally argue that what is conceivable actually 
depends on what theories one tacitly holds: in this case, finding zombies conceivable 
might very well count as evidence that one implicitly or explicitly holds a dualistic 
theory rather than showing what is possible. Moreover, Kripke’s idea of 
metaphysical, in addition to logical, necessity is a claim that obviously presupposes 
that logic is connected with metaphysical necessity.   However, on Kant’s analysis of 
the demarcation between logical and real (metaphysical) modality, the speculative 
metaphysician, although  they  may not commit any logical fallacy, do instead makes 
an illegitimate transcendental assumption of possible existence, as will be discussed 
below.  
       It is suggested that clever, technical rhetoric about rigid designation and 
necessary truths that apply to all possible worlds, as well as appeals to hunches, 
intuition and guesses are excuses for not dealing with difficult philosophical 
questions about the real world.  It is difficult enough to figure out what is true in this 
world, let alone a possible one. There is obviously no reliable way of establishing 
what is true in all possible worlds. An overarching difficulty with modal 
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epistemology is it is just not clear what it shows. The senses can tell you what is 
going on in the actual world: but how can hunches, intuition and conceivability tell 
you about other possible worlds? Conceivability is, after all, a subjective, 
psychological and epistemic property, while genuine logical possibility is usually 
taken to be a mind-independent, modal property, and it is not clear how this gap is to 
be bridged. Moreover, as Peter Van Inwagen (1998) has cogently stated, it is 
doubtful that philosophers have capacity to justify modal claims so far removed from 
everyday life. 
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 Chalmers insists that it can be, and has several complex arguments 
up his sleeve to back up this claim. Chalmers’ main argument, in a nutshell, is this: 
Zombies are conceivable, if zombies are conceivable then zombies are possible, and 
if zombies are possible, physicalism is false.  However, in some sophisticated papers 
on the topic, it has been shown that it is quite simple to neutralise the zombie 
conceivability argument by its own logic. In fact, a conceivability argument can be 
constructed that follows precisely the same logic of the zombie conceivability 
argument, yet reaches the opposite conclusion, i.e. that physicalism is true.  That is, 
Chalmers’ evidence against physicalism is given in the form of a priori 
conceivability arguments, but there are a priori arguments against Chalmers’ 
property dualism of exactly the same variety. Keith Frankish has presented one in an 
interesting paper on the subject, stating:  
 
The zombie argument is an elegant and seductive piece of philosophical 
argumentation. But the idea that we can determine the nature of consciousness by an 
exercise of the imagination seems too good to be true, and the fact that we can 
construct an anti-zombie argument suggests that it is not true. When zombies and 
anti-zombies meet, they annihilate each other, and in so doing reveal that 
considerations of conceivability have little role to play in debates about the nature of 
consciousness (Frankish, 2007, p. 15).   
 
       Frankish’s paper cleverly illustrates that the premisses of both zombie and anti-
zombie arguments are equally intuitively plausible. His argument proceeds from the 
thesis that anti-zombies are conceivable to the thesis that they are metaphysically 
possible to the opposite of Chalmers’ conclusion, viz., that physicalism is true. The 
argument hangs on the conceivability principle (CP), that whatever is conceivable is 
metaphysically possible. Property dualism holds that phenomenal properties are 
extra features of the world over and above the physical, so that consciousness does 
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not supervene metaphysically on the physical, and physicalism is false. Frankish 
holds that the converse entailment also holds - that if consciousness does supervene 
metaphysically on the physical, physicalism is true. Frankish goes on to describe 
anti-zombies as exact microphysical physical duplicates of human beings with all of 
their phenomenal experiences, but without any non-physical states: “I shall call an 
object x a bare physical duplicate of an object y if x is a physical duplicate of y and 
has no further properties of a non-physical kind. Then we can define anti-zombies as 
beings which are bare physical duplicates of us, inhabiting a universe which is a bare 
physical duplicate of ours, but none the less having exactly the same conscious 
experiences as we do”. They are exactly like Chalmers’ zombies in every way, 
physically and behaviourally, yet “the lights are on inside” (ibid., p. 4), they have 
subjective, conscious experience. In the anti-zombie world consciousness is a totally 
physical phenomenon supervening metaphysically on the physical.   
       Chalmers’ conceivability argument, simplified is: (i) zombies are conceivable; 
(ii) whatever is conceivable is metaphysically possible; (iii) therefore zombies are 
metaphysically possible. Frankish’s parallel argument is: (i*) anti-zombies are 
conceivable; (ii*) whatever is conceivable is possible; (iii*) therefore anti-zombies 
are possible. But (iii) and (iii*) cannot both be true, since if the purely physical facts 
about anti-zombies make them conscious, then the exactly similar physical facts 
about zombies make them conscious too, that is, they are not zombies after all (see  
Kirk, 2015). Frankish writes :“The anti-zombie argument was conceived as a tactical 
device to neutralize the zombie argument. Its primary function is to show that the CP 
(conceivability principle) thesis is a two-edged sword and should be rejected” (ibid., 
p. 14). What this means is that unless we wish to get involved in an endless clash of 
intuitions about which possibilities should be taken more seriously, we should 
conclude that this kind of conceivability argument is inconclusive. If we are to 
understand the nature of consciousness, we need something over and above a priori 
intuitions.  
       Moreover, there is the question of the analytic philosopher’s penchant for 
thought experiments as a good way of generating intuitive evidence. What evidence 
would that be? It is not possible to show any logical contradiction in the thought-
experiment or hypothesis that zombies exist, because those who postulate it have not 
made their claim falsifiable. There would be no observable difference between a 
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world with zombies versus one without such entities. One might even question why 
a philosopher would go to all those lengths to argue for something that has no impact 
on the world whatsoever, especially since they are supposed to address the scientific 
and ontological “problem of consciousness”.  Intuitions in philosophy are often seen 
to play the same role that observation does in science, but unlike in science their 
claim to usefulness is controversial. As Hilary Kornblith, contemporary 
epistemology’s most prominent proponent of naturalised epistemology avers, 
“philosophy cannot live up to its ambitions” if it continues to emphasise the use of 
intuitions, since they merely tell us about our concepts (Kornblith, 2006, p. 11).   
 
       So, let us recapitulate on what has been discussed thus far: Chalmers’ primary 
intensions are associated with the term “consciousness”, and his point is we can im-
agine so-called zombies, beings that are physically like us, but lack phenomenal 
consciousness. Expressed alternatively, there are a priori epistemically possible 
worlds where the term “consciousness” has an empty extension, though the world is 
inhabited by beings physically identical to conscious creatures like us. Put otherwise, 
our concept of consciousness does not have any a priori conceptual connections to 
any physical concepts; otherwise we could not rationally conceive of zombies. The 
conclusion that Chalmers (and also Jackson) draw is that the property picked out by 
the term “consciousness” cannot be reduced to any physical property. There is a 
question, however, over whether, and/or to what extent, possible world semantics are 
able to provide a substantive metaphysical grounding for scientific laws concerning 
consciousness.  Kripke’s semantics beg the question of what exactly a possible world 
is, and further, it leaves open where to fit one’s epistemology or ontology. Primary 
intensions, for Chalmers, are supposed to do the work of Fregean modes of 
presentation that determine reference. Frege had distinguished two aspects of 
meaning which he called Sinn (or “sense”) and Bedeutung (usually translated as 
“reference”) (Frege, 1892).  He had noted that the thing that a word refers to is not 
necessarily the same as the meaning of the word. To take the paradigmatic example, 
the planet Venus was once known as Hesperus by those who saw it in the morning 
and Phosphorus by those who saw it in the evening, yet both groups did not connect 
the two references to the same object. According to Frege this showed that although 
these two names have the same reference, Venus, they do not have the same sense. 
The reference based theory of meaning has been pursued by analytic philosophers 
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ever since, and the aim throughout has been to find the hook that connects our words 
to what they mean. For Frege, language serves to represent by means of sentences 
which say either truly or falsely how things are. The meanings of words are a 
function not of how things are, but rather, are grounded in the contribution they 
make to fixing the truth-conditions of those sentences in which they occur. The 2D 
semantics of Chalmers is a direct descendent of this. Chalmers thinks it is plausible 
that sentences express entities that are quite closely akin to Fregean thoughts.  As 
was discussed earlier, his 2D semantics entails the view that a sentence has, relative 
to a context, two sorts of meaning, one of which, its primary intension, is related to 
its epistemic properties and the secondary intension to its metaphysical or modal 
profile, which is much like the notions of  Fregean “sense”.  As Chalmers remarks:  
“An expression’s secondary intension (or what Jackson calls its C-intension) is just 
its familiar post-Kripkean intension, picking out the extension of the expression in 
counterfactual worlds” (Chalmers, 2006, p. 10).  
       Thus, Chalmers presents himself as vindicating a Fregean account of meaning 
and, in fact, uses a framework very similar to the one Carnap uses in Meaning and 
Necessity to define his “modal intensions” in order to provide a “metaphysical 
foundation” for Fregean senses.  His account also embraces the Kripkean notion of 
rigid designation and necessary truth, and he proposes an analysis of necessary a 
posteriori truths: a sentence is necessary a posteriori if it combines a necessary 
secondary intension with a contingent primary intension. For Kripke, “gold has the 
atomic number 79” is a necessary truth, rigidly designated in all possible worlds.  
However, empirical research is required to determine instances of actual gold. Hence 
“gold is the element with the atomic number 79” is a necessary a posteriori truth. In 
the case of pain, however,  it is possible for a person to have a mental property pain 
without its corresponding physical property of c-fibre stimulation because it is 
possible to conceive of the situation when the two come apart. This led to Chalmers’ 
anti-physicalist conclusion that there cannot be a relation of a posterior and 
necessary identity between consciousness and the physical world. However, there is 
the underlying assumption, as there is with all logic, that there is a relationship 
between names, signs or concepts and referents and the philosophical task is one of 
explaining how such language connects or hooks onto the world, what is termed the 
grounding problem (Harnad, 1990). Wittgenstein was very much aware of this 
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problem in connection with his “picture” theory of meaning in the Tractatus stating:  
“The difficulty of my theory of logical portrayal was that of finding a connection 
between the signs on paper and a situation outside in the world. I always said that 
truth is a relation between the proposition and the situation, but could never pick out 
such a relation” (Wittgenstein, 19e-20e quoted in Word and World, 2004.)  
 
       As David Papineau cogently claims, the line of thought which Chalmers pursues 
is a form of fallacy, which he has dubbed the “antipathetic fallacy” (Papineau, 1993).  
This ability to see the world from two perspectives,   does not give rise to the 
conclusion that there really are two metaphysically distinct things. Chalmers talks 
about subjective experience, the way things feel for the subject, “the ineffable sound 
of a distant oboe, the agony of an intense pain, the sparkle of happiness or the 
meditative quality of a moment lost in thought”. Although we often feel intuitively 
in the case of phenomenal experiences that something is left out, we should resist the 
anti-pathetic fallacy. The “having” of such feelings is just what it is to be in a certain 
material state when we are in those states rather than something extra over and above 
them. He writes: 
Chalmers supposes that all terms have a “primary intension”, in addition to their 
referents as normally conceived. This “primary intension” consists of those 
entities that the term would pick out in other possible worlds “considered as 
actual” (for example, “water” would pick out XYZ if the actual world’s watery 
stuff were XYZ rather than H2O). Chalmers then assumes that, if the claim that a 
≠ b is so much as conceivable (for example, water ≠ H2O ), this must be because 
“a’s and ‘b’s primary intensions diverge” (there must be worlds in which the 
terms “water” and “H2O” would pick out different items), from which it follows 
that there is a genuinely possible world corresponding to the thought a ≠ b . 
Applying this to the mind-brain case, we then get the Kripkean thesis that, if it is 
so much as conceivable that pain ≠ M, where “M” is some material concept, then 
there must be genuine possibilities where “pain” and “M” pick out different 
items. Moreover, if “pain” is a priori distinct from all material concepts, as the 
inflationist materialist assumes, then this must mean that “pain” must refer by 
invoking some distinctively non-material entity (Papineau, 2003, p. 8 n.1). 
 
Papineau denies the first premise: although we can conceive of a possible world 
where pain does not pick out a material property, this does not imply distinctness. 
The terms “a” and “b” may simply refer directly, which means that there will not be 
any “primary intension” that differs from their normal referents. Moreover, the 
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zombie argument supposes that a physical counterpart of “my” body can be devoid 
of phenomenal consciousness, and a subjective point of view. But this is 
conceptually flawed: the zombie argument  rests on “an illusion of contingency”, the 
mistaken conceptual intuition that a conscious subject’s actual-world body can have 
a genuine physical counterpart that is not subjectively conscious. This is because 
Chalmers has performed a logical sleight of hand and tacitly shifted an essentially 
indexical element (“my” body, “his” body, “her” body) to a non-essentially indexical 
rigid designator, David Chalmers’ body, viewed as an objective entity in a possible 
world describable in third person terms through science. According to David Kaplan, 
the originator of the 2D semantics framework for indexical and demonstrative 
expressions, essentially indexical terms cannot be replaced by descriptive terms, 
even rigidly designating  ones,  without loss of meaning. In Kaplan’s terminology, 
the meaning of an indexical term consists in a certain character, which takes into 
account the particular context in which it is uttered, in order to deliver an overall 
content to a proposition. “My” or “her” or “his” body in the actual world, therefore, 
would refer to an actual living and lived body, from which it follows that any 
physical counterpart in a possible world must also be one, complete with subjective 
experience and a point of view. For Chalmers, however, a physical counterpart of 
that body can be devoid of a point of view, as it lacks consciousness entirely. The 
problem is that he has generalised the 2D semantics framework for indexical and 
demonstrative expressions that were developed by Kaplan and used it to try to 
reinstate descriptivism in the philosophy of language.  Kaplan (1989a) showed that 
indexicals such as “me”, “you”, “he”, “she”, concern direct reference, i.e. that the 
content of an indexical, with respect to a context c, is the object to which it refers in 
c; its content is not a property or descriptive condition that determines the referent.  
In other words, that the contents of “I”, “he”, “she”, “you”, “that”, and similar 
indexicals, in contexts, are the actual individuals to which those terms refer, in those 
contexts. 
As Robert Hanna and Evan Thompson aver:  
 
Chalmers secures reference to the relevant actual-world body by means of a term 
whose semantics includes an element that is irreducibly indexical, and therefore 
by his own account not logically supervenient on the physical facts; and he then 
tacitly shifts to the use of a referring term lacking this semantic element, a term 
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whose semantics is logically supervenient on the physical facts. Or in still other 
words, Chalmers tacitly shifts from treating the relevant actual world body as a 
Leib to treating it as a Körper”( Hanna and Thompson, 2003, p.18). 
 
      Chalmers has shifted meaning from the actual living and lived body (Leib) to a 
body as an objective material thing that can be picked out in the world and defined 
third personally by science (Körper). However, it could be argued the body functions 
as an absolute indexical “here” in relation to which things appear from a point of 
view or are inherently perspectival.  The necessary condition of the conceivability 
argument is that it is logically conceivable that a counterpart of you, having your 
cognitive capacities could have no feeling of its own body and no pre-reflective 
awareness of its embodiment, i.e. that experience is causally or explanatory 
irrelevant to our lived lives in the world.  However, this purely analytic argument 
divorced from the real world is wrong-headed and technically flawed. According to 
Hanna  and Thompson,  philosophers should not be allowed to get away with simply 
asserting that the zombie scenario seems conceivable to them but need to spell out 
the scenario that would render such bold assertions intelligible; accordingly, the 
zombie argument should be rejected outright. Even from Chalmers’ own 
functionalist perspective, the sense perceptual capacities of the body in terms of the 
realisations of certain representational states, ones that are able to be studied from 
the third person perspective of science, necessarily depend on the subject’s lived 
experience.  Every phenomenal experience is not only correlated with a lived 
kinaesthetic experience of the body but is also functionally tied to that experience 
and cannot be separated from it. This is because they are co-constituted by a non-
analytic necessary equivalence relation between them, one which is also non-
reducible.  Humans understand the world and successfully live in it because they 
have individuated objects by means of their bodies, through a wide variety of 
sensory experiences and from a multiplicity of different points in space and time. 
Therefore, it is precisely because objects achieve their perceptual unity through 
bodily experience, that a functionally equivalent Zombie world could not exist.   In 
other words, a form of bodily self-experience is a necessary constitutive condition of 
ordinary perception, therefore there is ultimately no sense in the notion of a 
completely unconscious being (a “zombie”) “whose (functionally defined) 
perceptual abilities are exactly those of its (physically identical) conscious 
 172 
 
counterpart” (Thompson, 2007. p. 233). This is because there could be no supposed 
“zombie” that could conceivably be just like us in perceptual abilities, without also 
having the same kinaesthetic experience. But then, a zombie with bodily self-
experience is no zombie at all. 
       As mentioned earlier, it is often claimed that analytic philosophers can be 
narrow, trite and superficial in their treatment of philosophical problems.  There is 
often a failure to see beyond the technical methods to which their specialised training 
best suits them and readily appreciate the bigger picture - in this case to think 
through the implications of the Zombie argument. What Chalmers’ Zombie 
argument really boils down to is the claim that a physical counterpart of a conscious 
subject’s actual world body could have a bodily life indistinguishable in every 
respect but lack subjective consciousness. But since phenomenal consciousness 
entails the lived body, the argument fails. Chalmers’ quasi-Cartesian position insists 
that there is no logical connection between the mental and the physical, between the 
possession of a particular body and the capacity for consciousness. As Wittgenstein 
reminds us, the living human body in its everyday environment literally manifests 
consciousness and cannot be separated from it. He makes the following remark in the 
Philosophical Investigations “Only of a living human being and what resembles a 
living human being can one say it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is 
conscious or unconscious. (PI §281, see §§282–7, 359–61). This connects 
consciousness, not with biological life per se, but with what manifests or expresses 
it.  
      Chalmers maintains that Kant is right that there is a deep link between necessity 
and a priority and uses it to back up his arguments. In fact, however, for Kant any 
argument attempting to derive properly metaphysical results from logical analysis of 
modality is doomed to failure.  Kant was interested in modality throughout his 
career, in the Critique he talks of possibility, actuality and necessity and in the pre-
Critical works he distinguishes real possibility from logical possibility and gives a 
theory of what grounds real possibility. Kant’s theory of real possibility in the 
Critique is largely continuous with the pre-Critical theory. However, whereas his 
pre-Critical work concerned a metaphysical claim about two different kinds of 
modality, in the Critique it concerns an epistemic claim, and this is that logical 
possibility is not the same as real possibility. Real possibilities are grounded in 
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actuality. Contra Chalmers, Kant argues that the mere fact that a concept is logically 
consistent or logically possible is insufficient for the real possibility of its 
instantiation. Not only does it not tell us about actual objects, it does not tell us about 
possible objects either. The mere logical possibility of, say, freedom from 
contradiction of a concept does not suffice for its objective validity or real 
possibility. Real possibility would require that the properties or terms that constitute 
this concept are themselves possible or could be “given” in experience:  
 
A concept is always possible if it is not self-contradictory. This is the logical 
criterion of possibility, and by it the object of the concept is distinguishable from 
the nihil negativum. But it may none the less be an empty concept, unless the 
objective reality of the synthesis through which the concept is generated has been 
specifically proved; and such proof, as we have shown above, rests on principles 
of possible experience, and not on the principle of analysis (the law of 
contradiction) This is a warning against arguing directly from the logical 
possibility of the concept to the real possibility of things (A596/B624, footnote). 
 
This is also the claim that there are propositions that may be logically possible but 
not metaphysically possible (See also Kannisto, 2013). 
60
 Kant would have viewed 
Chalmers and other modern rationalist philosophers as falling into the same 
deceptive trap as his predecessors Descartes and Leibniz.  They would belong in the 
category of rationalist speculative metaphysicians who, even though they may not 
commit a logical fallacy, nonetheless would make an excessive, illegitimate 
transcendental assumption of possible existence.  In the Dialectic, Kant pursues a 
program of transcendental criticism, which champions pure reason’s detection and 
correction of its own excesses, excesses which occur because reason strives to go 
beyond the bounds of sense in its pursuit of knowledge. In Kant’s view, all such 
attempts to “soar above the world of sense by the mere power of speculation” (A 
591/B 619) are doomed to fail. As was discussed in Chapter 3, Kant says in the 
Paralogisms chapter that this kind of error is due to an unavoidable   “transcendental 
illusion” which is born when “we take the subjective necessity of a connection of our 
concepts, which is to the advantage of the understanding, for an objective necessity, 
the determination of things in themselves” (A 297/B 353). This illusion, which the 
even the wisest of men is not immune from, “does not cease even after it has been 
detected and its invalidity clearly revealed by transcendental criticism” and is the 
result of our readiness to mistake the “subjective necessity” of “a certain connection 
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of our concepts” for an “objective necessity in the determination of things in 
themselves”. For Kant “subjective” necessity,  as it concerns the connection of 
concepts to produce judgements falls under what he would term “logical” modality, 
whereas objective necessity, which concerns having a reference to objects or things, 
requires also categorical (transcendental/real) modality. He writes: 
 
 So long as the definition of possibility, existence, and necessity is sought solely 
in pure understanding, they cannot be explained save through an obvious 
tautology. For to substitute the logical possibility of the concept (namely, that the 
concept does not contradict itself) for the transcendental possibility of things 
(namely, that an object corresponds to the concept) can deceive and leave 
satisfied only the simpleminded (A 244/B 302). 
 
This division between mere logical or formal truth and transcendental modality is 
central to Kant’s critique of speculative metaphysics, as it marks the distinction 
between general and transcendental logic (see also Chapter 2.3). For Kant general 
logic determines the basic structure of the way we think, in that it specifies the forms 
of judgement on which the categories are based. However, he explains in Part Two 
of the Transcendental Logic section of the Critique, the Transcendental Dialectic,  
that “general logic, if viewed as an organon [...] teaches us nothing whatsoever 
regarding the content of knowledge” and is quite indifferent in respect of objects 
themselves. The goal of the Dialectic is to discover a natural illusion which results 
from the attempt to apply the principles of the understanding beyond the limits of the 
understanding to “objects which are not given to us, nay, perhaps cannot in any way 
be given” (A63/B88). It is worth quoting the passage in full: 
 
Now it may be noted as a sure and useful warning, that general logic, if viewed 
as an organon, is always a logic of illusion, that is, dialectical. For logic teaches 
us nothing whatsoever regarding the content of knowledge, but lays down only 
the formal conditions of agreement with the understanding; and since these 
conditions can tell us nothing at all as to the objects concerned, any attempt to 
use this logic as an instrument (organon) that professes to extend and enlarge our 
knowledge can end in nothing but mere talk - in which, with a certain 
plausibility, we maintain, or, if such be our choice, attack, any and every possible 
assertion (A61-2/B86) [My italics]. 
Moreover, in a tone of admonishment, he concludes:  
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Such instruction is quite unbecoming the dignity of philosophy. The title 
“dialectic” has therefore come to be otherwise employed, and has been assigned 
to logic, as a critique of dialectical illusion. This is the sense in which it is to be 
understood in this work. 
General logic abstracts from all relation to possible objects, therefore cannot offer 
criteria for metaphysical truth but only for formal truth. That is to say, general logic 
alone cannot be used to derive metaphysical results. Logic has no content and 
therefore is not transparent to the ontological structure of reality.  Thinking, being 
exclusively discursive, can provide itself with no content at all, which is given to us 
only through sensible experience. Kant says, disparagingly, that dialectic is the art of 
giving ignorance the colouring of a truth, a sophisticated art of empty pretensions or 
“sophistical illusion” (A64). 
       Thus, Kant’s own version of modality contrasts markedly with Chalmers’ whom 
he would possibly construe as someone well practiced in “the art of giving ignorance 
the colouring of a truth”, or perhaps merely one who confuses the merely “logical” 
necessity of ideas with the possible objective existence of their objects.  Chalmers’ 
version of 2D-semantics seeks to vindicate the rationalist claim that there are 
constitutive connections between meaning, possibility and a priority. From a Kantian 
perspective, even if one does accept, for the sake of argument, the complicated 2D 
framework of primary intentions, and descriptions of zombie world scenarios 
couched in semantically basic terms for phenomenal properties, logical operators, 
and so forth, it would tell us nothing about which properties are metaphysically 
basic, merely something about the conceptual repertoire used to set up the scenario. 
In other words, being picked out by a semantically basic concept does not make a 
property metaphysically basic. Therefore, the introduction of metaphysical necessity 
is gratuitous. There is no reason to presume that anything corresponds to it. This 
being the case, it cannot be used an avenue for solutions of the mind-body problem. 
As Joseph Levine, originator of the problem of the explanatory gap writes:    
The fact that one cannot infer from a description couched in terms of all the 
semantically basic terms but the phenomenal ones to a phenomenal description 
shows nothing about the metaphysical irreducibility of the phenomenal to the 
physical, but only that phenomenal concepts must be included in the class of 
semantic primitives.  In other words, being picked out by a semantically basic 
concept does not make a property metaphysically basic (Levine, 2011).  
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One could say the “modal rationalism” of Chalmers is akin to that of the “speculative 
metaphysician” whom, although perhaps not committing any logical fallacy, 
nonetheless makes an illegitimate transcendental assumption of possible existence. 
On that basis Chalmers’ attempt to derive properly metaphysical results purely from 
a logical analysis and intuition is found wanting, and his attempts to set up a 
concordance between epistemic conceivability and metaphysical possibility fails. 
According to Kant this would amount to no more than a mere “dialectic illusion”; the 
hard problem of consciousness arises from a kind of category mistake. The illusion 
that there is one is caused by Chalmers’ unbridled faith in the authority of 
“intuitions” and the pseudo profundity of his many pages of detailed technical 
rhetoric.  
 
       An alternative approach to constructing meaning is found in research in 
embodied cognition, which will be the topic of Chapter 6, which construes cognition 
as highly dependent on the physical capacities and actions of a cognitive agent. This 
abandons the notion that meaning is simply a connection or relation between sense 
and reference. More specifically, it is a way of viewing meaning as the coordination 
of action in order to achieve certain goals.  There is no need to look for the hooks 
that ground the reference and referents, the speech acts and what they are about. 
Instead it concerns the matching of goals and affordances (Gibson, 1979) i.e. what an 
agent wants to achieve and the opportunities afforded by a situation in order that the 
agent can achieve that goal. On this theory put forward by Gibson, cognitive scientist 
Arthur Glenberg (1997) proposed that cognition evolved to coordinate effective 
action; that is, action that enhances survival and reproductive success given the 
constraints of a particular type of body.  In this way cognition is naturalistic, 
involves no metaphysical concepts such as supervenience, and is not fundamentally 
different from perceiving and acting, but is dependent on the body, its sensory motor 
systems, action, and on context in the real world. In fact, the features of cognition are 
so deeply dependent on characteristics of the physical body of an agent, such that it 
plays a co-consitutive role in an agents cognitive processing (Barsalou, 2003, 2008; 
Clark, 2011; Laakso, 2011; Schubert, & Semin, 2009; Stapleton, 2013).  That is to 
say, if we are to understand cognition, it is more fruitful to think beyond the inner 
and outer distinction of mind/brain and world found on traditional accounts and to 
consider the natural unity that already exists between an organism and the 
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environment in which it is actively engaged. This way the hard problem is dissolved; 
living and lived experience is the point at which a theory begins.  
      Analytic, functionalist, traditional cognitive science construes meaning as 
something that arises from the syntactic combination of symbols and expressions 
that are arbitrarily related to that which they signify or refer. Chalmers views the 
cognitive system this way, in functionalist terms, in terms of semantics and 
information processing, and proposes that there is an explanatory gap which needs 
explaining through his semantic theory and naturalised metaphysics. But the 
traditional, functionalist picture will automatically generate the question as to how 
“information processing in the brain” connects to the real world, and then the 
philosophical task will be one of explaining just how it does so.  Part of Chalmers’ 
solution is that psychological words, such as: pain, belief, redness, have two 
completely different meanings - one where it refers to a non-conscious functionalist 
process and one where it refers to a state of consciousness. But as Wittgenstein 
reminds us, an embodied view of linguistic meaning conceives of meaning as what 
people do with language, about language use. Meaning is not reducible to a purely 
hypothetical construct (i.e., semantics) able to be studied from a formal objectivist 
perspective. Rather, embodied experience is a crucial part of linguistic meaning, 
because it is understanding or grasping the meaning of a linguistic expression, rather 
than being in a particular mental state as the result of an internal representation, that 
prepares people for situated action (Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008). On this view, 
meaning includes the perception of physical objects, physical events, the body, and 
other people in interaction in a real world. The meaningful use of language includes 
both a depiction of what has happened, potential perceptions and embodied actions 
that may take place in the future.  Put otherwise, linguistic meaning is essentially 
embodied, not only in the sense of what has happened, but in the sense of what is 
likely to occur next in a discourse situation. The primary problem with views of 
Chalmers and other analytic functionalists is that they conceive of meaning, as well 
as human cognition more generally, in terms of abstract and disembodied symbols or 
representations, and the mind as a syntactic engine that operates on them. It is this 
very fact that leads almost inevitably to property dualism. But this is to ignore the 
fundamental problem of how meaning is grounded in ordinary experience (the 
symbol grounding problem, Harnad 1990).  
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5.3. Functionalism plus Qualia 
 
Chalmers advocates the idea that the basic furniture of the world (its ontology) 
should be expanded in order to include experience as a new fundamental “property” 
besides the material stuff that is amenable to third person science (Chalmers, 1996, 
pp. 111-12). New laws should accordingly be formulated and enabled in order to be 
able to describe the relationship between the phenomenological/subjective and 
physical/objective features of the world. Moreover, Chalmers, as a functionalist, 
virtually equates the terms “functionalism” and “physicalism” in his ontology of 
mind. Everything apart from consciousness is physical, yet consciousness is taken to 
be a natural phenomenon, falling under natural laws. If so, he argues, then there 
should be some correct scientific theory of consciousness, whether or not we can 
arrive at such a theory. This is what results in the “hard”, seemingly intractable, 
problem; how to close a deep and puzzling explanatory gap. But with a little more 
care we might discover that it is the basic assumption that all mental processes are 
neural-computational that is the real problem, and the reason that it seems intractable 
is that Chalmers (and others) may be begging the question by presupposing that the 
sort of cognition that is being alluded to when considering thoughtful human activity 
is the sort that should be characterised in a mechanistic, “functional” or “information 
processing” manner.  
      Within cognitive science there have been many significant studies of components 
or aspects of cognition, to do with, for example: memory, observational learning, 
colour discrimination, decision making, reward prediction learning, attention control, 
etc. which have been made by modelling the various experimental results using ever-
more sophisticated computer programs. In this manner progressive inroads have 
been made into gaining a better understanding of these various aspects of cognition. 
The computer metaphor has also been transferred over the neuroscience where 
scientists have defined the fundamental features of the brain and its information-
processing capabilities in terms of computations’ mean firing rates at points in the 
brain cortex (neurons). In fact, the prevailing view in neuroscience is that neurons 
can be considered fundamentally computational devices.  In operation, such 
computationally defined neurons effectively sum up their input and compute a 
complex nonlinear function on this value; output information being encoded in the 
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mean firing rate of neurons, which in turn exhibit narrow functional specialisation.  
That is, the idea of a neuron as simply a computational device has crept into 
neuroscience from the implicit adoption of a computational theory of mind, and with 
it a concomitant functionalism with respect to the instantiation of cognitive 
processes. This computational understanding of mentality is what inevitably leads to 
the non-reductive functionalism with respect to consciousness that Chalmers, and 
others, adhere to. As Chalmers writes:   
 
When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information processing, but there 
is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something “it is 
like” to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we 
see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the 
experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other 
experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a 
clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to 
orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of 
emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of 
these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are 
states of experience (Chalmers, 1995) [my italics]. 
 
      What is significant here is that Chalmers writes that when we think and perceive 
there is a “whir” of information processing, and perhaps this is the clue as to the root 
of the misconception. Proponents of the hard problem take the unconscious whirring 
of neural cogs as being sufficient to explain everything that humans do. 
“Consciousness” is then defined as something else - an epiphenomenal veneer or 
accompaniment on top of the real neurological functions. This gives rise to the hard 
problem of consciousness and the question of why these whirring informational 
processes should be “accompanied” by any conscious experience, sensations, or 
feelings of  “what it’s likeness”.  But, to repeat, the real problem is that Chalmers 
(and others) are begging the question by presupposing that the sort of cognition that 
is being alluded to when considering  thoughtful human activity is the sort of thing 
that should be characterised in a mechanistic, “functional” or  “information 
processing” kind of way.  It is suggested that the “information processing” model of 
cognition is to blame for the confusion.   That is, it is a serious mistake to construe 
the mind as a machine, whether it is a “meat machine” or “metal machine”;  in fact, 
the brain and the whole organism in which it is embedded, although explicable in 
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mechanistic terms, may not be like a machine at all. Indeed, as has been discussed, 
functionalism was not motivated by investigations into the way organisms work, but 
by the knowledge of how computers do and the hypothesis that this could be 
generalised. It is suggested that the computer/machine metaphor was uncritically 
adopted as a model of cognition because it linked in with a certain narrative made 
popular by the rapid and advances in computer technology.    
       At the crux of Chalmers’ non-reductive functionalism is the Principle of 
Organizational Invariance, which asserts that  “given any system that has conscious 
experiences, then any system that has the same fine-grained functional organization 
will have qualitatively identical experiences” (Chalmers, 1995, p. 232).  
Consciousness does not arise from anything other than functional organisation - the 
only relevant properties of a system in determining its state of consciousness are 
functional, information processing ones. The argument for this is presented in the 
form of a reductio ad absurdum. He imagines how he could replace himself with a 
silicon copy and provides a couple of thought experiments on that basis: 
 
We can imagine, for instance, replacing a certain number of my neurons by 
silicon chips. In the first such case, only a single neuron is replaced. Its 
replacement is a silicon chip that performs precisely the same local function as 
the neuron. We can imagine that it is equipped with tiny transducers that take in 
electrical signals and chemical ions and transforms these into a digital signal 
upon which the chip computes, with the result converted into the appropriate 
electrical and chemical outputs. As long as the chip has the right input/output 
function, the replacement will make no difference to the functional organization 
of the system. In the second case, we replace two neighboring neurons with 
silicon chips. This is just as in the previous case, but once both neurons are 
replaced we can eliminate the intermediary, dispensing with the awkward 
transducers and effectors that mediate the connection between the chips and 
replacing it with a standard digital connection. Later cases proceed in a similar 
fashion, with larger and larger groups of neighboring neurons replaced by silicon 
chips. Within these groups, biochemical mechanisms have been dispensed with 
entirely, except at the periphery. In the final case, a chip has replaced every 
neuron in the system, and there are no biochemical mechanisms playing an 
essential role. We can imagine that throughout, the internal system is connected 
to a body, is sensitive to bodily inputs, and produces motor movements in an 
appropriate way, via transducers and effectors. Each system in the sequence will 
be functionally isomorphic to me at a fine enough grain to share my behavioral 
dispositions. But while the system at one end of the spectrum is me, the system at 
the other end is essentially a copy of a silicon robot (ibid., p. 237). 
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       This first thought experiment concerns fading qualia. We can imagine a 
continuum from Chalmers with full conscious experience to the Robot in which 
consciousness is absent. According to this principle, what matters for the emergence 
of experience is not the specific physical makeup of a system but the abstract pattern 
of causal interaction between its components. This purports to show that a creature 
whose causal patterns in its cognitive system are identical to those of a conscious 
person, but whose neurons are gradually replaced by silicon chips, will continue to 
make statements about his experiences which are identical to those of the conscious 
person, though his experiences will become different if he gradually loses 
consciousness as the replacements takes place. He concludes the fading qualia 
thought experiment by stating that it supports his theory that consciousness results 
from organizational invariance, a specific set of functions organised in a particular 
way. For Chalmers, systems which have identical experiences are functionally 
isomorphic; they could be water pipes, aliens or the population of China. 
61
 This is 
precisely what leads to epiphenomenalism, a kind of one way dualism in which 
consciousness is a by-product generated by functional processes in the brain but 
without itself being able to exert any causal effect on those processes. He writes, 
“We might put this by suggesting as a basic principle that information (in the actual 
world) has two aspects, a physical and a phenomenal aspect” (ibid., p. 286). As has 
been argued, this model of human mentality has led to the so-called “mystery” of the 
hard problem of consciousness, one supposedly in need of a scientific explanation.    
On this view, if you set out the premisses from the start, that phenomenal experience 
emerges from and/or accompanies and/or is correlated with neural functions, then the 
natural question will be to ask, as Chalmers does “why is the performance of these 
functions accompanied by experience?” (ibid., p. 8).  Why should physical 
processing give rise to a rich inner life? This question seems almost a natural 
consequence of this model or understanding of the mind.  
       Chalmers is not alone in thinking that consciousness is something “extra” over 
and above the physical features of reality.  Even cognitive scientists and theorists 
with explicit antagonism towards dualism, those who disavow it, often betray 
themselves when they start talking about the physical processes which “generate” or 
“cause” it, or “give rise to”  or “are correlated with”  it. These phrases may seem 
innocent enough, but they implicitly presuppose that conscious properties are some 
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extra feature of reality, which gives rise to a separate realm in need of explanation.  
This is to regress to the scientific, mechanistic perceptual model of Descartes and 
Hume, as discussed in Chapter 3, where the difficulty  for both was in assuming that 
the “I” or the mind functions like the objects of “outer sense” or perception. Hume’s 
difficulty arises from the fact that he seeks for evidence of a subject, an impression 
from which the idea of a self can be derived. Descartes’ error lies in supposing that 
in introspection one is aware of “a thinking thing”. Thus, the mistake of both 
Descartes and Hume derives from the supposition that consciousness of self must be 
an experience of something extra. Descartes inflates this idea into a reality, a res 
cogitans, a thinking thing or “substance” whereas Hume, finding no impression of it 
concludes that it does not, in some sense,  “exist” or if it does there is no more than 
the bundle of impressions.  Humean scepticism and Cartesian dualism are based on 
the perceptual model and the implicit assumption that in introspection we must be 
provided with extra facts about ourselves and because we are not we either assume 
we are non-bodily entities (souls/substances) or that we do not in some sense “exist” 
save as an idea of a bundle of impressions. This understanding of mentality 
continues today and has resulted in the object-metaphors of analytic philosophy of 
mind. For Chalmers, consciousness is understood as if it were a kind of entity. He 
says that “a theory of consciousness requires the addition of something fundamental 
to our ontology (Chalmers, 1995a, p. 210). “Scientists introduced electromagnetic 
charge as a new fundamental entity and studied the associated fundamental laws. 
Similar reasoning should apply to consciousness”. Consciousness is a “thing” (which 
we know as a brute fact) with properties in the way a table or a chair is an object 
with properties. He says that consciousness is “presented” to him, as if 
consciousness were an object in the visual field which we can come into contact with 
and manipulate; consciousness “exists”, just like an object in the world exists. He 
“experiences it” as if consciousness were something objective that we experience in 
everyday life.  He asks why cognitive functioning is always “accompanied” by 
consciousness, as if consciousness were some extant object which can either 
accompany us or not. “Even if every behavioural and cognitive function related to 
consciousness were explained, there would still remain a further mystery: “Why is 
the performance of these functions accompanied by conscious experience?” 
(Chalmers, 1995b. p. 201) [my italics]. It is this additional conundrum that makes the 
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hard problem hard. Consciousness is understood as a thing which exists and has 
certain properties such as ineffability, privacy, phenomenal feel.  
       It is contended, however, that this “hard problem of consciousness” is simply an 
artefact generated by the twin presuppositions: that i) consciousness is “something 
extra” and that ii) it is an effect of an underlying cause. There really is no hard 
question needing an answer as to why functional processes in the brain give rise to 
consciousness, as Chalmers insists. The related problem of closing the “explanatory 
gap” is based on two further assumptions: (i) that there is actually a gap between 
how we experience the world, our subjective or phenomenal consciousness, and the 
scientific explanation of the material causal mechanisms and forces that underlie it 
which constitute nature; and (ii) that the gap can be closed through an overarching 
scientific explanation. From a Kantian perspective, however, the gap does not exist. 
This is because there is an intimate reciprocal relationship between phenomenal 
consciousness and the intelligent thought and activity of human beings. The human 
capacity for conceptual understanding or thought is so inextricably bound up with 
the very capacity for phenomenal consciousness, that each necessarily presupposes 
the other and are mutually entwined. Phenomenal experience, far from being an 
accompanying factor, is a constitutive part of human cognition. For Kant the original 
consciousness of the identity of the self is at the same time a consciousness of the 
world. Conversely, the same consciousness which reveals the world to us also 
reveals the self, the self becoming conscious of itself by seeking out and bringing 
into consciousness its own contents. It is through synthesising the manifold of spatial 
conceptions, that we gain knowledge of things outside us and it is through this 
knowledge of outer things that the self can know itself. He writes:  
I am just as certainly conscious that there are things outside me, which are in 
relation to my sense, as I am conscious that I myself exist as determined in time 
(BxIi, note).  
       Thus,  for Kant, the world both requires and guarantees the subject, which 
means that a phenomenal experience, something “it is like”,  to be in pain,  taste a 
lemon, or smell a rose,  is not simply a “this,” but   rather, a “this-such-for-me,” by 
which is meant an experience which has already been conceptualised for a subject. 
Understanding something (it becomes an object for me) is only possible because it is 
classified in some way, by an act of judgment which brings the intuition (perceptual 
experience) under the concept. In the  Transcendental Deduction, Kant declared that 
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objects can only become objects for a subject insofar as they conform to the 
conceptual structures with which we cognise them. As he puts it, we must “make our 
intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts” (A51/B75). The 
consequence of this epistemology is that it is quite erroneous to suppose that the 
ascription of genuine thoughts is at all possible to an entity without the capacity to 
enjoy conscious experiences; therefore ascribing states with phenomenal or 
qualitative character to what are in effect “information processing machines” results 
in a conceptually flawed model. The informational or functional “states” of a 
reductionist, functional mechanistic account of human nature do not possess 
conceptually expressible content; but the beliefs, thoughts and judgements of human 
beings certainly do. Drawing on the insights of Kant, there is a strong disanalogy 
between a functionalist information processing model of the mind and the real 
experience of a living, human being.  The Kantian principle is that our human 
conceptual capacities, those of our ordinary concepts as well as those relating to such 
relatively abstract concepts as number and time, are so intimately tied up with the 
human capacity for perceptual experience, that each entails the other. Viewed this 
way, the hard problem of consciousness, which is essentially the question of  “Why 
should neural processes be “accompanied” by conscious experience?” is redundant. 
For the Kantian account presupposes consciousness and first person subjectivity, as 
it begins from the assumption that there is already “something it is like” to be a 
conscious, and cognising agent and gives an account of the necessary conditions for 
this.   
      The problem with the reductionist information processing model of human 
cognition is that it is conceptually confused from the start, and this is what generates 
the problem of consciousness, with its attending notions of qualia and the “hard 
problem” of “what it’s likeness”.  It also leads to the difficulty that “consciousness” 
has merely an epiphenomenal role to play, as a peculiar, “tacked on”, causally 
redundant feature of human cognition. According to Chalmers and other 
functionalists or “information processing”  theorists, everything about human 
cognition apart from for the fact of qualia can be or will one day in the future be 
explained in reductive (computational or neural) terms, the easy problems.  But this 
leaves “the hard problem” of explaining the qualia or phenomenal experience. 
However, the notion of functionalism and information processing is far too 
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impoverished to be of use in characterising the conceptually articulated structure of 
human thought and its intimate relation to our capacity for phenomenal 
consciousness. As Kant shows, although both thought and perceptual experience are 
necessary for cognition, these two aspects of human cognition are inextricably 
interrelated. Thought is more than just information-processing and perceptual 
experience is more than simply the subjective experience of phenomenal qualia: 
both are states which are conceptually articulated, necessary and sufficient 
conditions for consciousness and, each depends for its possibility upon the other.  
 
       Let us recapitulate on what has been said thus far: According to Chalmers, the 
“hard” problem is this: “Why doesn’t all this information-processing go on “in the 
dark”, free of any inner feel?” (1995b, p. 203). Since he believes that human thought 
and cognition in general are just a matter of “information-processing”, of a sort 
which could in principle go on in a mindless computer, he is left with the idea that 
all that is really distinctive about consciousness is its qualitative or phenomenal 
aspects (the “what it is like”, or “inner feel”), which leads to epiphenomenalism, and 
to the mysterious puzzle of why should we possess this sort of consciousness on top 
of all our capacities for thought and understanding; these capacities being, for 
Chalmers, simply capacities for certain sorts of information-processing and storage. 
Whatever a computer can do by way of information processing, is not by any means 
to be confused with what a real thinking human being can do. Here again is the 
spectre of the Cartesian reductionist idea that phenomenal consciousness is an 
epiphenomenon of cognition: due to the narrowness of reductionist science, and 
blindness to the consideration that human cognition may not a matter of computation 
at all but, on the contrary, thoroughly integrated within our own natures as embodied 
creatures, both acting upon and being acted upon by our physical environment and 
our social engagement in the world. An object of experience, for Kant, is not a mere 
“this,” not merely a given intuition, but a “this-such-for-me,” an intuition which has 
been conceptualised. We understand or become aware of something   (it becomes an 
object for us) when we can classify it in some way, e.g. as a figure or a triangle, or 
an equilateral triangle, by making a judgment which brings the intuition under the 
concept. This requires the unity of apperception, that which unites the thought. As he 
writes: 
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That the “I” of apperception, and therefore the “I” in every act of thought, is one, 
and cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects, and consequently signifies a 
logically simple subject, is something already contained in the very concept of 
thought (B407). 
 
A failure to appreciate the special and a priori character of the “I think” misleads us 
into thinking that there is a deep and puzzling explanatory gap for consciousness. 
But this is a cognitive illusion. There is no such gap and no such puzzle. 
 
          In concluding this section, those involved in the scientific study of 
consciousness  have claimed that conscious properties are material properties, firstly 
that they are strictly physical properties; that mental states are brain states, the 
identity theory of Place (1956), Smart (1959) and Feigl (1958). In protest at 
functionalism’s eliminative strategies denying consciousness, later theorising was 
motivated by a more or less explicit dualism, of conscious properties which 
supervene on strictly physical properties.  Supervenience can be understood on many 
levels, but at root it describes a relation of dependence between two properties, a set  
of higher level properties supervenes on a set of lower ones if the higher level 
properties depend on those lower level ones. Following this, Chalmers argued that 
consciousness is not logically supervenient on the physical in the sense that “all the 
microphysical facts in the world do not entail the facts about consciousness” (1996, 
p. 93). Chalmers argues explicitly that conscious properties are extra to any physical 
properties, and that the task of a theory of consciousness is to discover which 
physical process give rise to this extra realm of higher conscious properties. But the 
central question here is whether consciousness and its “properties” is an extra 
ingredient that we have in addition to our abilities to perceive, think or feel or is it an 
intrinsic part of being a human animal that can feel think or perceive? The 
contemporary world-view on the nature of cognition is a legacy of a scientific and 
philosophical tradition which has travelled down historically from Descartes, and has 
resulted in scientists and philosophers treating conscious experience as tractable in 
reductive terms, (identity theory) or as a process that has a mind-independent 
qualitative content, like mass in physics, and which should be taken as a fundamental 
feature of the world (Chalmers, 1995). As discussed, Chalmers assumes the mind is 
explicable in terms of a materialist, functionalist theory operating within the normal 
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laws of physics and he sees no particular barrier to the successful creation of 
consciousness in a computer. He writes, “Epiphenomenalism may be 
counterintuitive, but it is not obviously false, so if a sound argument forces it on us, 
we should accept it” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 159).  
       However, it is not at all clear that we should accept these premisses.  Problems 
often arise when scientists and philosophers try to resolve a paradox on its own 
terms, rather than question the foundational presuppositions that make it 
unavoidable. The presuppositions for the existence of a hard problem of 
consciousness are not theory-dependent and not neutral to the topic, at all. In fact, 
the truth of the key intuitions,  that something is “left out” presupposes the very 
existence of a hard problem, which cannot then be used to establish its existence. 
Each of the thought experiments which claim to establish the existence of a hard 
problem depends on certain intuitions and when we ask under what conditions these 
could be true, it turns out that they are true if the structure and function of mental 
states is insufficient to account for our phenomenal states. Chalmers claims that it is 
a conceptual point that functional explanations leave out consciousness, but it is a 
conceptual point only under the particular conception of consciousness he adopts, i.e. 
the “something it is likeness” criterion. Thus, he assumes a conclusion about the 
nature of consciousness, which although intuitive and widely accepted by many, is 
hardly robust enough to form a sound basis for a theory. He offers a prima facie 
simple critique against functionalist/reductionist explanations of consciousness; 
since we can conceive of it, there is the logical possibility that a world exists 
identical to our own in every way but which is populated by experience-free 
zombies. But the simplicity belies a vast complexity of detail and makes use of the 
conceivability principle, one of the foundational principles in analytic philosophy. It 
is of significance that this principle has been used to support a wide array of 
disparate and controversial philosophical positions. We can indeed imagine a world 
that has the same physical features but without consciousness, a world where 
zombies exist.  However, in order to do so we have to also imagine a change in the 
laws of nature, for if consciousness is a physical feature of brains then it follows that 
the absence of it is also a change in the physical features of the world. That is, his 
argument works to establish property dualism only if it assumes consciousness is not 
a physical feature. In other words, the argument only works by assuming that 
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consciousness is not a physical feature, but that was the very conclusion it was 
initially meant to prove. The zombie argument will work to establish property 
dualism only if it assumes consciousness is not a physical feature, but this is begging 
the question at issue, for this was the very proposal the argument was supposed to 
establish.  So, rather than posing the question of whether consciousness and its 
“properties” is an extra ingredient that  supervenes on the physical; a “something 
extra” that we have in addition to our abilities to perceive, think or feel, why not 
think, along with Kant,  of consciousness as an intrinsic part of being a human 
animal that can feel think or perceive. To explain cognition is not just specifying a 
mechanism that can perform a certain function. The functionalism-plus-qualia 
approach fails to provide an adequate explanation of mind because phenomenal 
experience is a constitutive part of human cognition and not an accompanying factor. 
Chalmers calls his position “naturalistic dualism”; “dualism” because, like 
Descartes, he views the mind as neither physical nor material, but fundamental.          
       According to Chalmers, the whole story about human cognition apart from the 
fact of qualia can be explained in reductive (computational or neural) terms.  But 
this leaves the problem of explaining qualia, the “what it’s likeness of experience”.  
However, for Kant, this is to misconstrue cognition and its intimate relation to 
concepts. Kant’s insight is that genuine thought, with real conceptual content, is only 
available to creatures with a capacity for perceptual experiences bearing not only 
intentional (that which perhaps can be captured in functionalist terms) but also 
phenomenal content, and that both imply the other. The notion of information 
processing is just too impoverished to be of use in characterising the conceptually 
articulated structure of human thought and its intimate relation to the capacity for 
phenomenal consciousness. Our everyday experience of the world as being 
meaningful is inseparable from our experience of it as looking (sounding, smelling, 
etc.) particular ways, captured in Kant’s well-known and widely-quoted phrase: 
“thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” 
(A51/B76). Chalmers’ characterisation of the mind as involving information 
processing of the sort that could go on in a computer brings about this strange notion 
of “leaving something out”,  the omission of immediate subjective experience itself. 
It then seems like a mystery how we could have this on top of our ability to process 
information.  He writes:  
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Experience is the most central and manifest aspect of our mental lives, and 
indeed is perhaps the key explanandum in the science of the mind. Because of 
this status as an explanandum, experience cannot be discarded like the vital spirit 
when a new theory comes along (Chalmers 1995, p. 206). 
 
       There is a distinct parallel here to the Cartesian Cogito Ergo Sum. Immediate 
subjective experience is the point at which all of our attempts to understand the 
world begin, because it is directly given to us as a brute fact and is “incorrigible”. 
This understanding of mentality also takes cognitive content to be mediated or 
inferential and leads to the view that there must be something called experience 
which is supposedly different from the things “out there in the world” being 
experienced.  Because this assumption is so persuasive, and Kant warns us that it is  
a natural illusion that “[e]ven the wisest of men cannot free themselves from” 
(A339/B397)  it usually becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy for those who accept it 
who end up seeing the world in these Cartesian/Chalmersian terms.  For Kant, 
however, this way of understanding is to misconstrue cognition and its intimate 
relation to concepts.  As Wilfrid Sellars has persuasively argued in his important and 
influential book Science, Perception, and Reality, against what he terms “the Myth 
of the Given”:  
(...) instead of coming to have a concept of something because we have noticed 
that sort of thing, the ability to notice a sort of thing is already to have the 
concept of that sort of thing and cannot account for it (Sellars, 1963, p. 176).  
 
We do not come to have the concept of subjective experience because we have 
introspected and “noticed” that we have subjective experience. Rather, the ability to 
note that we have a subjective experience is already to have the concept of it.   
 
    Those involved in the scientific study of consciousness have claimed that 
conscious properties are material properties, as in the identity theory of J. J. C Smart, 
Place, Feigl and Armstrong (brain states), or functional properties which supervene 
on strictly physical properties.  But as has been discussed, the central question then 
became whether consciousness and its “properties” is an extra ingredient that we 
have in addition to our abilities to perceive, think or feel or is it an intrinsic part of 
being a human animal that can feel think or perceive? The former way of 
conceptualising the problem gives rise to the explanatory gap. It has been argued that 
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proponents of a hard problem have substituted the Cartesian conception of mind as 
immaterial substance in favour of a materialist ontology, and this does not dissipate 
the inherent problems with the model. On the contrary, these very foundational 
commitments constitute the source of the current difficulties. The “hard problem” is 
not just difficult to answer, it is impossible to answer as it is currently formulated.  It 
has been noted that the very language used to set up the problem is dualistic. For 
example: how do physical properties in the brain give rise to phenomenal properties? 
We all experience an intuition of mind-brain (or body) distinctness, and it is this 
“feeling” or intuition which lends a spurious plausibility to the arguments against 
functionalism, materialism and reductionism that there is an explanatory gap. 
Chalmers argues that the existence of an explanatory gap justifies the ontological 
conclusion that phenomenal consciousness is a fundamental property in addition to 
the fundamental physical properties - thus begging the question.  He has moved from 
the existence of distinctive non-physical ways of thinking, to the ontological 
conclusion of the existence of a non-physical property. As mentioned earlier, the 
very idea of a hard problem to be solved depends on the combination of these twin 
notions: (i) that phenomenal consciousness is something left out of the scientific 
explanation that needs explaining over and above the performance of various 
function  and (ii) that there is somehow an “explanatory gap” between the physical 
and the mental that needs to be closed.   Although there may be a logical sense to the 
conceivability argument; we can imagine a scenario or possible world where there 
could be my Zombie twin, a being physically like me with “no one at home”, this 
does not mean it is metaphysically possible. As was argued in Section 2, if it is at all 
logically possible that such a doppelganger exists, she will share all my physical 
properties and therefore my conscious properties, i.e. not be a zombie at all. There is 
ultimately no sense in the notion of a completely unconscious being whose 
functionally defined perceptual abilities are exactly those of its physically identical 
conscious counterpart,  simply because there could be no supposed “zombie” that 
could conceivably be just like me in perceptual abilities, without also having the 
same kinaesthetic experience. Moreover, even accepting the logical possibility of 
zombies,  it turns out that the question of whether zombie are  “accessible”  (as used 
in possible world semantics) to our world is equivalent to the question of whether 
physicalism is true at our world. As Gualtiero Piccinini states:  
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By assuming that zombie worlds are accessible from our world, proponents of 
the zombie conceivability argument beg the question of physicalism. In other 
words, it is a mistake to assume that the metaphysical possibility of zombies 
entails that physicalism is false at our world. This would seem to indicate the 
futility of such reasoning in coming to an understanding the nature of 
consciousness (Piccinini, 2015). 
 
As Kant would diagnose it, such a problem of consciousness rests upon a 
misrepresention or “subreption” of ideas concerning the nature of human cognition 
and sensory experience and their intimate interrelationship, and it fails to take 
account of a vitally important insight. This is that how we conceive of physical 
objects is inextricably bound up with how they appear to us in perception - how they 
look, sound, feel and so forth. Thus, to repeat, although conscious thought is 
obviously not the same thing as perceptual experience, the conceptual content of 
thought is intimately related to the content, both phenomenal and intentional, of 
perceptual experience. The Kantian duality of receptivity and spontaneity leaves no 
gap between mind and world as human conceptual capacities become involved in all 
experience. Kant’s famous slogan (A51/B76) encapsulates this necessary cognitive 
complementarity and semantic interdependence of intuitions, which derive from 
perceptual experience, and concepts, which come from the understanding. Moreover, 
Kant’s closing words in the first Critique, emphasised the point that reason is 
immanently self-developing (A835/B863). This suggests that human cognition 
involves a necessary relation between the elements of cognition and its overall grasp 
by a human subject or active agent. This is an integral relationship, and one which is 
often described by Kant as “purposive”. Kant took it be the case that such 
“purposive” relations were not available to “machines” and this is an important topic 
within the Critique of Teleological Judgment, and in his On the Use of Teleological 
Principles in Philosophy where he argued that if experience is real, then those who 
are in possession of experience must be understood as purposive beings that are also 
capable of positing their own purposes into nature according to the basic powers of 
will and understanding with which they are equipped. This leads to the conclusion 
that experience presupposes purposive beings, i.e., organisms, for only such 
purposive beings are empirically accessible. In other words, Kant recognised that 
rational human agents are necessarily also rational human living organisms, i.e. 
biological animals capable of intentionality whose rational mindedness and rational 
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directedness towards objects in the world, other real persons, and themselves, is fully 
continuous with this. As he wrote in the Critique of the Power of Judgement: 
 
It is quite certain that we can never adequately come to know the organized 
beings and their internal possibility in accordance with merely mechanical 
principles of nature, let alone explain them; and this is indeed so certain that we 
can boldly say that it would be absurd for humans ever to make such an attempt 
or to hope that there might yet arise a Newton who could make comprehensible 
even the generation of a blade of grass according to natural laws (CPJ 5:400).  
 
       Chapter 6 examines the implications of this to an alternative view of the mind 
that has quite recently started to emerge, that of embodied or enactive cognition. 
From this perspective the brain appears as part of a dynamical process (and not a 
syntactic one) of real time variables with the capacity for self-organisation (and not 
as representational machinery). Chalmers has hypostatised consciousness in the 
manner of Descartes, and taken its direct and ineffable nature to imply that it can 
logically float free, and this gives rise to dualism. But if we take a different 
perspective and view conscious experience as an activity, something we do, as Kant 
suggests, we can begin to understand that conscious experience is an activity, 
especially if we consider and attend to our experiences carefully. Then we can also 
ascertain what sort of activity it is, and obtain an understanding of how our 
consciousness relates to the world in which our whole person, and not just our 
minds, are a part. The rationale behind this is the radical insight that the things that 
we understand directly are not simply qualia, i.e. the phenomenal feel  of “what it is 
like to see the colour red” but, rather,  are related to the activities that we ourselves 
undertake and which we have learned in our normal development as embodied, 
involved, active human beings. Such understanding derives from our very nature, 
and from the symbiotic co-constitution of ourselves and the objective world around 
us through which, and in which, we have developed. 
       This chapter has presented a philosophical analysis of the modern day problem 
of consciousness in order to illustrate that Kant’s theory of the transcendental 
subject, though written over two hundred years ago is still relevant today. 
Proponents of a “hard problem” have reintroduced the Cartesian conception of mind 
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as immaterial substance in favour of a materialist ontology, but this does not 
dissipate the inherent problems with the model.  Chalmers’ “zombies argument” is, 
in fact, a reworking of Descartes’ argument in the Sixth Meditation (1641) where he 
notes that since he can “clearly and distinctly” conceive of himself existing apart 
from his body (and vice versa), and since the ability to clearly and distinctly 
conceive of things as existing apart guarantees that they are in fact distinct, he is in 
fact distinct from his body. Similarly, Chalmers uses a conceivability-based rational 
argument to separate mind and body; his “zombic” claim is that the body can exist 
without consciousness: this is because we can conceive of a possible world 
containing our physical bodily duplicates but which lack phenomenal consciousness 
or minds. Chalmers belongs to the dualist tradition, since he views mind or 
conscious experience as neither physical nor material , but a fundamental 
“property” and also a distinctively non-material entity.  However, as discussed, it is 
neither obvious, nor even prima facie plausible to assume that the two ways in which 
we grasp physical and phenomenal properties, the former by descriptions of their 
causal role and the latter by a supposed “rigidly designating” direct awareness,  
reflect two metaphysically distinct properties. There is an un-argued for assumption 
of dualism. Antoine Arnauld in his famous intellectual exchanges with Descartes 
questions the inference from the ability being able to clearly and distinctly conceive 
of mind and body as separate to their actually being separable.
62
   “How does it 
follow”, he asks, “from the fact that he is aware of nothing else belonging to his 
essence that nothing else does in fact belong to it?” A similar question can be asked 
of Chalmers today. In fact, the kind of objection that Arnauld directs towards 
Descartes is a central problem for all conceivability-based accounts of the 
epistemology of modality (see Stephen Yablo, 1993, p. 2). What Arnauld’s objection 
illuminates is a profound difficulty with modal arguments in coming up with an 
internally verifiable criterion for conceivability that does not admit of counter-
examples. The notion that we can determine the nature of consciousness simply 
through an exercise of the imagination is wanting, not least because anti-zombie 
arguments can also be constructed using the same strategy employed in Chalmers’ 
zombie argument (Frankish, 2007).  
             It has been argued that the central mystery about a hard problem of 
consciousness supposedly in need of explanation is a reaction to and an artefact 
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produced by adherence to the analytic/functionalist orthodoxy in which 
consciousness is reducible to or explicable by a set of functional cognitive processes 
realised in the brain. Such a view or picture creates an artificial explanatory gap 
between function and phenomenology in the first place. Chalmers argues that the 
existence of an explanatory gap justifies the ontological conclusion that phenomenal 
consciousness is a fundamental property in addition to the fundamental physical 
properties.  However, this argument from the explanatory gap or epistemological 
“something is left out” claim to the dualist ontological conclusion is vehemently 
denied by others. There are therefore two broad camps: those who view “the problem 
of consciousness” as a tractable question and those who deny that there is anything 
answering to our conception of consciousness to the extent that it goes beyond 
structure and function.  Daniel Dennett belongs to the latter camp, and just as it has 
been suggested that Chalmers is the modern counterpart of Descartes, Dennett takes 
on the role of the empiricist Hume, as a type of scientifically-oriented empiricist, for 
whom the self does not, in some sense, “exist”.  Dennett is the self-proclaimed 
captain of what he terms “the A team” of reductive materialists, (along with Patricia 
and Paul Churchland, Quine, Rorty, Hofstadter, the Churchlands, Lycan, Rosenthal, 
and Harman,  who also argue against the reliability of introspective “evidence” about 
the inner workings of the mind, and declares that Chalmers is the captain of “the B 
team”, whom along with Nagel, Searle, Fodor, Levine, Pinker, Harnad and others 
have a “gut intuition” that the B team leaves something out (Dennett, 2001, p. 2).  
Dennett is an analytic functionalist, like Chalmers,  but regards the self as nothing 
beyond the various “subagencies and processes”  in the nervous system that compose 
us, and as is typical in functionalist accounts, he thinks of qualia as the part of an 
experience left over once all the objective parts are eliminated, and which are in 
some sense “illusory”. According to Dennett’s functionalism, we live in a 
mechanical universe, and our minds are replicable within reasonable accuracy on a 
universal Turing machine; we are simply machines, with no place for the mind. 
Although changing in detail, he has kept true to this understanding of cognition 
throughout his philosophical career. Since Dennett’s anti-Cartesianism is largely 
Humean in nature, Kant’s depth of insight into the sources of our cognition can be of 
great significance in the debate; specifically, in addressing the impasse between 
those who claim there is a “hard problem” to be addressed by a science of 
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consciousness (Chalmers and “the B team”) and others who deny there is anything of 
the sort; consciousness is an “illusion”. This eliminativism about consciousness is 
the topic of the next section. 
 
 
5.4. The No-Self Theorists 
 
In his 1991 book Consciousness Explained,  Dennett had taken on the Humean 
position that consciousness is an illusion, there is no inner self, and what we call 
mind is in reality the causal underpinnings of behaviour distributed across a 
collection of autonomous subsystems operating without any centralised supervision. 
For him, minds are simply “fictions” of folk psychology; the “hard problem” is a 
theorist’s illusion (Dennett, 1996b, 1998), something inviting therapy, not a real 
problem to be solved with any supposed revolutionary new science of consciousness. 
Computers explain consciousness perfectly well, in terms of subsystems, each of 
which possesses its own small and specialised task, rather like a worker on a factory 
assembly line. He claims that Hume had been the first to suggest impressions, ideas, 
memories and imagination as “subsystems” that explained consciousness and who 
believed that “something, somewhere, somehow, just must unite them to explain 
awareness,” and struggled with the problem.  Dennett terms this “Hume’s  Problem”, 
or the homunculus problem, which was how to get ideas “to think for themselves” 
(Dennett, 1978, p. 122). As Dennett diagnoses it, Hume’s trouble was that it did not 
occur to him that there might be increasingly smaller subsystems, which think their 
simpleton thoughts. Dennett’s answer to Hume’s problem is that the sum total of 
these increasingly smaller subsystems eventually discharges the homunculus or 
“little man” that is the supposed locus of thoughts. In later writings, Dennett 
conceptualises consciousness neuroscientifically, in terms of its supposed 
computational architecture in which each of our hundred billion neurons essentially 
function like tiny organic robots. He writes: 
 
As I like to put it, we are robots made of robots–we’re each composed of some few 
trillion robotic cells, each one as mindless as the molecules they’re composed of, but 
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working together in a gigantic team that creates all the action that occurs in a 
conscious agent (Dennett, 2001, p.13). 
 
       Dennett regards himself as Hume’s successor in making philosophy pay 
attention to science, especially brain science. As discussed in Chapter 3,  for Hume 
cognition pertains to “ideas”,  and not directly to external objects; there is a “veil of 
perception”, i.e. that when one perceives an object one is not immediately aware of 
the object itself but of one’s sensory experience representing the object.   What is 
significant in terms of the aims of this thesis is that empiricists adopted this 
Cartesian view about perception as self-evident, and this notion, of ideas 
representing or standing for something in the mind was again adopted, again 
uncritically, by scientists at the start of the mid 20
th
 century cognitive revolution, and 
where they were translated into the mental representations of cognitive science, and 
conceived of as “mental causes”,  the interactions of which are said  to constitute 
mental processes that constitute a mind.  Dennett, as a successor of Hume, developed 
the Intentional Systems Theory,  in which he holds a moderate realism about the 
nature of representations and claims that beliefs and desires are constituted by 
patterns of observable behaviour, what he terms “the intentional stance”, which is “a 
theory-neutral way of capturing the cognitive competences of different organisms (or 
other agents) without committing the investigator to overspecific hypotheses about 
the internal structures that underlie the competences” (Dennett, 2009, p. 344). In 
other words, Dennett’s theory is an attempt to naturalise the mind and to reduce 
mental phenomena to simple physical systems. He claims the advantage of the 
intentional stance is that it can be used “to explore models that break down large, 
sophisticated agents into organizations of simpler subsystems that are themselves 
intentional systems, sub-personal agents that are composed of teams of still simpler, 
‘stupider’ agents, until we reach a level where the agents are “so stupid that they can 
be replaced by a machine” (Dennett, 2007, p. 88). 63 For Dennett, “the self” is merely 
a metaphor for the unity of distributed neural events, which create the illusion of 
consciousness with its associated feelings of autonomy and freedom. We have the 
illusion of agency which simply derives from our genetically and mimetically 
nuanced ability to “take-up the intentional stance.”  Thinking is simply the process 
underlying natural selection among “memes” which he regards as the cultural 
analogue of genes.  
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       The intentional stance meets the criteria for algorithms - it is a “mechanism” that 
produces results regardless of the material used to perform the procedure, i.e. it is 
multi-realisable. He writes that “the power of the procedure is due to its logical 
structure, not the causal powers of the materials used in the instantiation” (Dennett, 
1995, pp. 50-51).  Dennett claims that cognitive science is badly in need of 
philosophy, as cognitive scientists are in the grip of delusions and confusions about 
human cognition and that cognitive science is a “land of plenty” for philosophers 
since so many of their questions are “ill thought out”. As he writes: 
 
One of the reasons cognitive science is such a land of plenty for philosophers is 
that so many of its questions—not just the grand bird’s-eye view questions but 
quite proximal, in-the-lab-now questions — are still ill thought out, prematurely 
precipitated into forms that deserve critical re-evaluation (Dennett, 2009, p. 233).    
 
In fact, he claims, “cognitive scientists [...] are often just as much in the grip of the 
sorts of misapprehensions and confusions as outsiders succumb to, and being down 
in the trenches sometimes makes them even more susceptible” (ibid., p. 231). 
Dennett is fully aware of the difficulty of accounting for consciousness in an 
information processing model of cognition and how it can lead to conceptual 
difficulties, and in particular, what he terms, the Myth of Double Transduction 
(Dennett, 1996, 1998, 2015).  
The idea [of information processing] sometimes leads to serious confusions. The 
most seductive confusion could be called the Myth of Double Transduction: first, 
the nervous system transduces light, sound, temperature, and so forth into neural 
signals (trains of impulses in nerve fibers) and second, in some special central 
place, it transduces these trains of impulses into some other medium, the medium 
of consciousness! That’s what Descartes thought, and he suggested that the 
pineal gland, right in the center of the brain, was the place where this second 
transduction took place–into the mysterious, nonphysical medium of the mind. 
Today almost no one working on the mind thinks there is any such nonphysical 
medium. Strangely enough,  though, the idea of a second transduction into some 
special physical or material medium, in some yet-to-be-identified place in the 
brain, continues to beguile unwary theorists. It is as if they saw — or thought 
they saw — that since peripheral activity in the nervous system was mere 
sensitivity, there had to be some more central place where the sentience was 
created. After all, a live eyeball, disconnected from the rest of the brain, cannot 
see, had no conscious visual experience, so that must happen later, when the 
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mysterious x is added to mere sensitivity to yield sentience (Dennett, 1998, p. 
72).     
       Dennett rightly dismisses what he terms the “Cartesian Theatre”,  the place in 
the brain where “everything comes together” for  “central processing”. There is no 
fixed point in the brain where this happens; this is simply one of the most seductive 
delusions about consciousness, the idea that somewhere in the brain there is a place 
where a picture of the world is displayed for a “control centre” to deal with.  
Dennett’s alternative theory is that the idea of self-consciousness is a product of a 
“centre of narrative gravity” or to use his later metaphor “fame in the brain” - there is 
no such thing as a conscious self.  He is eliminative about consciousness; it is an 
illusion in the sense “that it is not what it is supposed to be”.  A fortiori Dennett 
denies there is “a problem of consciousness”; that is, consciousness characterised in 
terms of “what it’s like for the subject,” and no need to account for qualia, the 
private, incommunicable redness of red or indescribable sight and smell of a 
beautiful rose. As a functionalist, he regards the self as nothing beyond the various 
“subagencies and processes” in the nervous system that compose us and qualia as 
the part of an experience left over once all the objective parts are eliminated.  For 
instance, when we look at a deep scarlet, there are two things that occur: one is the 
sensory information that there is deep scarlet, (access consciousness or A-
consciousness according to Ned Block, 1995) and the other is that we also see deep 
scarlet (Block’s phenomenal consciousness or P-consciousness). And that, the 
phenomenal experience of seeing the deep scarlet colour, is the part that Dennett, 
against Chalmers and others in the “B team” dismiss as illusion.  
       Dennett conceptualises consciousness neuroscientifically in terms of its 
computational architecture in which each of our 100 billion neurons essentially 
function like little organic robots. There is nothing a human being can do that a 
computer cannot. His model of the mind is as software parallel processing in the 
“virtual machine” of the mind, with massive memory capacity to store programs for 
any imaginable purpose. There is no locus of consciousness, he claims, and this is 
because we just know empirically that there is no such place. If you look at the brain 
all you see are spike trains and nerve pulses, no colours, or sounds, no homunculus. 
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        Dennett’s critique can be taken on two levels, dualistic (mind-body 
interactionism) and materialistic (a place in the brain).  At the dualist level all the 
information is supposed to somehow be taken to a point in the brain and then 
mysteriously communicated to the incorporeal mind of the subject, which then 
directs the body, which entails that there must be a material place in the brain 
responsible for the observer/judge/act process of thought, a homunculus, or brain 
organ (the Cartesian Theatre). Since mind and body are distinct things there is the 
problem of interaction in that the sense organs, via the brain must inform the mind; it 
must present it with data of some kind and the mind must then direct the body in the 
appropriate action. The locus of interaction for Descartes was the pineal gland or 
epiphysis cerebri.  On noting that information from the eyes, as well as the other 
sense organs, seems to have merged somehow,  he hypothesised that there must be a 
single place in the brain where it all comes together before entering consciousness.  
According to Dennett, this unquestioning commitment to the Cartesian theatre is 
what theorists either explicitly or implicitly retain. In Consciousness Explained  
Dennett writes: 
Let’s call the idea of such a centered locus in the brain Cartesian materialism, 
since it’s the view you arrive at when you discard Descartes’ dualism but fail to 
discard the imagery of a central (but material) Theater where it “all comes 
together” (Dennett, 1991, p. 107). 
 
        Dennett, with his strong background in computer science and artificial 
intelligence, continues to seek a “computational”, information processing model of 
the mind based on software parallel processing in the hardware or “virtual machine” 
of the mind. Like modern computers the mind is nothing but hard wired processing, 
with “memory” for storing programs for almost any imaginable purpose.  In his 
earlier work, Brainstorms (1978), he had described and defended the classic GOFAI 
(Good Old Fashioned AI) strategy that came to be known as “homuncular 
functionalism”, or the task of replacing the little man in the brain with “a committee” 
of simple agents. Later he used the term “self-organizing systems”, of which the 
termite colony is a prime example. These are systems in which apparently 
coordinated activity arises from the joint operation of autonomous subcomponents.  
He writes: 
 200 
 
The behavior of a termite colony provides a wonderful example of it. The colony 
as a whole builds elaborate mounds, gets to know its territory, organizes foraging 
expeditions, sends out raiding parties against other colonies, and so on....Yet, in 
fact, all this group wisdom results from nothing other than myriads of individual 
termites, specialized as different castes, going about their individual business—
influenced by each other, but quite uninfluenced by any master-plan (Dennett, 
1998, pp. 39–40). 
He recently changed his mind and this “micro agency” is now at the level of neurons 
which he calls “neuronal subagents”. Neurons have agency, in the form of metabolic 
selfishness, in the sense that there is competition going on between them for 
resources.  Although he had been expecting that his chain or hierarchy of homunculi 
would end up with the kind of simple switch that a neuron was then widely taken to 
be; he now thinks that he underestimated the complexity of neurons and their 
behaviour, and holds that neurons should be considered agents in their own right, 
competing for control and resources in a kind of pandemonium.  “[E]ach neuron, far 
from being a simple logical switch, is a little agent with an agenda, and they are 
much more autonomous and much more interesting than any switch” (Dennett, 
2013). In other words, intelligent control of behaviour is still a computational, 
functional process.  A mind is still merely a metaphor for the unity of distributed 
neural events, which create the illusion of consciousness. Computation eliminates the 
self by providing an account of how separate yet interconnected subsystems or 
neurons in the brain generate coordinated behaviour without the need for any central 
supervision, or “a place where it all comes together”. The basic idea is that there is a 
level of abstraction where the brain can be described in terms of hundreds, 
thousands, or even millions of little modules, more or less independent of each other, 
each with its own functional purpose or goal.  This is the hallmark of functionalism, 
as has been discussed: a commitment to multiple-realisability and to the insistence 
that what matters are the workings of the mind, what it can do rather than how it is 
constituted, or in Dennett’s well known phrase “handsome is as handsome does”. 
       Dennett rightly criticises the Cartesian conception of consciousness, which he 
calls Cartesian Materialism, in which the mind is pictured as a tiny theatre in the 
brain “where it all comes together”, and acknowledges the seductive conceptual 
appeal of the “I” as the locus of thoughts, as does Kant. However, he is not blessed 
with the richness of Kant’s insights. The locus of functionalism is not mind or 
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consciousness but mind’s infrastructures or the causal mechanisms underlying 
mental phenomena. Properly interpreted, results on infrastructural processes are 
supposed to enhance our understanding of mind; but it is clear that when Dennett 
(and other functionalists) talk about computation or the computational mind, they 
refer to causal processes, not the mind itself. For Dennett, the mind is merely a 
metaphor for the unity of distributed neural events, which create merely the illusion 
of a punctuated consciousness.  If we relate this back again to the discussion in 
Chapter 3, Kant agrees with Hume (and, by implication, Dennett) that when we 
introspect we find no unitary self. “No fixed and abiding self can present itself in this 
flux of inner appearances” (A107). For Kant too, the way to model the mind is on 
how it works. The categories can be viewed as the most generic logical constraints 
on the formation of concepts and the “I” of transcendental apperception is that which 
unifies them. This is an abstract description of the mind formed by reflecting on its 
conceptual activities, in the sense that they are logically different from descriptions 
of actual composition. Kant says that nothing can be known from them about the 
actual nature of that which realises these states; not even something as basic as 
whether it is simple or complex (A353).  As was discussed in Chapter 4, Kant’s 
insistence on the unknowability of the self and his emphasis on abstract 
“transcendental” and “necessary conditions” for all cognitive pursuits does imply an 
agreement with functionalists’ assertions. However, there are also significant 
differences. For Kant, the elements in Hume’s bundle of perceptions has a unity, a 
unity which results from the amalgamating activity of a subject, (an x) of which we 
can say nothing but which plays a certain role in our cognitive abilities and which 
necessarily exists and provides the explanatory power missing in the Humean 
account. The crucial point is that for Kant “judgment” requires  “a transcendental 
subject of thought = x”, a unified, identical self that is the locus of such judgment.  
The same self that is affected by sensibility must also synthesise and judge, and 
therefore must possess all the faculties and receive all of the data that contribute to 
that subject’s experience.  The transcendental unity of apperception is this ground or 
grund in which all of the necessary components of having experience come together. 
Kant calls the transcendental unity of apperception the “first principle of the human 
understanding” (B139). This is the transcendental “I” which implies “identity” and 
which lies behind the ever changing flux of experience as something which remains 
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unchanged throughout.  Judging empirical objects also requires that the subject have 
a faculty of self-ascription.   
       Dennett, following his “favourite philosopher” Hume, holds a particular form of 
determinism called compatibalism (Dennett, 2003).  This is the view that free will 
should be redefined so that it no longer involves a free choice among alternatives and 
can be made compatible with the mechanistic/reductionist model of science. 
Thinking is the process underlying natural selection among memes in the same way 
that biological reproduction is the process underlying natural selection among genes 
(He takes this idea of memes from Richard Dawkins, 1976, 1989). Dennett’s aim is 
to show how evolutionary thinking can account for everything “from senseless atoms 
to freely chosen actions”.  However, he assumes that causality is simply a relation 
between two events,  such as when the motions of atoms at one moment cause their 
motions at the next, or when the firing of axons in the brain and nervous system 
causes the arm to move, etc.  That is to say, his analysis of causality is mostly 
restricted to relations where one event can be said to have caused another, chemical 
reactions, nuclear fission and fusion, magnetic attraction, hurricanes, volcanoes, etc.  
An alternative view is that causality is a relationship, not simply between one event 
and another, but between a cognitive agent and their actions in the world. Actions are 
self-generated or in Kantian terminology, spontaneous.  Although the contraction of 
a muscle can, on one level, be regarded as being caused by the nature of the 
muscular and nervous system, at another level it transcends it, through the ability to 
weigh up alternative courses of action and the capacity for genuine choice. However, 
this is totally in accordance with the principle of causality and does not contradict it 
in any way. Such agency is an expression not just of our embodiment in nature but is 
also definitive of the capacity to transcend it.  It is an expression of an agent’s 
existence not simply as a natural, biological creature, but also as a historical, 
political, culturally embedded human being. Dennett does not see this - for him agent 
causation is a “mysterious doctrine”. In Freedom Evolves he writes: 
 
How does an agent cause an effect without there being an event (in the agent, 
presumably) that is the cause of that effect (and is itself the effect of an earlier 
cause, and so forth)? Agent causation is a frankly mysterious doctrine, positing 
something unparalleled by anything we discover in the causal processes of 
chemical reactions, nuclear fission and fusion, magnetic attraction, hurricanes, 
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volcanoes, or such biological processes as metabolism, growth, immune 
reactions, and photosynthesis (Dennett, 2003, p. 100). 
 
       As discussed in Chapter 4, for Kant causality and freedom refer to two different 
ways of viewing things. Although theoretical philosophy cannot establish that we are 
free from spatio-temporal causation, Kant frequently mentions that we do not regard 
ourselves as agents whose actions are to be explained this way. Although under the 
“phenomenal perspective”, mental activities are causally determined, to engage in 
cognitive activities means to consider ourselves not as “objects”, but 
“transcendentally”, as “subjects” of experience. This means that we must therefore 
consider ourselves apart from the conditions to which all objects of experience are 
subject, as rational free agents.  Here the definition of freedom is purposive, the 
power to spontaneously originate behaviour and generate a new causal series.  
Transcendental freedom thus refers to how a rational agent can, “from itself” (von 
selbst) (A533/B561), be the spontaneous mental cause of certain natural events or 
processes.  In other words, it is how certain natural events or processes in physical 
nature are, as Kant says in the second Critique, in meiner Gewalt, literally, “under  
my control” or “in my power” (CPrR 5:58). It is this crucial status of the 
transcendental subject, that adds richness to the Humean account and it is one which 
also stands in stark contrast to the tendency of contemporary functionalism to 
minimise the differences between minds and other things.  It is clear from Kant’s 
later work,  particularly his Critique of Judgement and the Opus Postumum that for 
him human persons are also rational human animals, and that the capacity for free 
will is fully metaphysically continuous with their animality:  
 
The human being, as animal, belongs to the world, but, as person, also to the 
beings who are capable of rights—and, consequently, have freedom of the will. 
Which ability essentially differentiates [the human being] from all other beings; 
mens is innate to [the human being] (OP 21:36). 
 
This will be expanded upon in Chapter 6, on embodied, enactive cognitive science. 
 
       Dennett is one among many in adhering to the fundamental notion that the 
mental and neural are one; the conscious mind is a solely biochemical phenomenon, 
hence consciousness is an illusion and can be eliminated. In his magnus opus Being 
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No One (2003), Thomas Metzinger referred to “the science of phenomenology” as an 
impossible theoretical endeavour. This is because, “[f]irst-person access to the 
phenomenal content of one’s own mental states does not fulfil the defining criteria 
for the concept of ‘data’” (Metzinger, 2003, p. 591). In fact, he avers, it is a 
contradiction in terms. Instead of the transcendental subject, what literally observes 
or experiences the world is a whole conscious system, a system that incorporates 
sensory information into a constantly updated overarching self-world representation. 
What makes this a phenomenal, conscious representation, is that it possesses a 
certain minimum set of representational, informational, and functional properties, 
e.g., global availability of information for action control and the integration of 
representations. What we take to be selves are simply the results of ongoing 
computational processes that satisfy certain conditions and produce a self model. The 
“no-self thesis”, as he calls it, follows from a specific neurobiologically grounded 
theory of consciousness, which Metzinger terms the Self-Model Theory of 
Subjectivity or SMT. No such things as selves exist in the world. For all scientific 
and philosophical purposes, the notion of a self, as a theoretical entity, can be safely 
eliminated. In fact, not only the self, but also the world it perceives are illusions; 
neurophysiological processes are all that really exist. Metzinger asserts that 
interdisciplinary empirical work must replace “armchair” a priori intuitions into the 
nature of reality; nonetheless, his own position rests upon numerous, unquestioned a 
priori assumptions about the nature of reality. 
       Metzinger’s approach is one based on a teleofunctionalist and naturalist view of 
consciousness which has been viewed as a neurological updating of Kant’s project. 
Instead of the “conditions” of possible experience, Metzinger deduces the 
“constraints” constitutive of phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness. 
Unlike Kant, however, he does not describe consciousness in a single, unitary way. 
His view is that with the advances in psychology, neuroscience and phenomenology, 
we can now achieve a much more detailed and nuanced view of consciousness, and 
dismisses transcendental notions as unnecessary. The time for pure philosophy has 
gone, what is now needed is an interdisciplinary approach to consciousness, in which 
the empirical sciences reign supreme and philosophy takes a back seat. He argues 
that phenomenal selves are “appearances” produced by the ongoing operations of a 
“phenomenal self-model” that simulates, emulates, and represents aspects of the 
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system’s states to itself (Metzinger, 2003, pp. 160-162).  In short, Metzinger’s thesis 
is that the self is nothing beyond a special kind of dynamic representational content. 
His conclusions about the nature of the self are solidly founded on a set of inferences 
derived from the scientific method, and on scientific data, which  “are things that can 
be extracted from the physical world by technical devices like telescopes, electrodes 
or functional MRI scanners” (Metzinger, 2003, p. 606) whereas first person access to 
one’s own mental states does not fulfil the inter-subjectivity criterion of data, since 
group mediation of independent verification does not exist. Thus described, the brain 
is to be viewed as a system which constantly hallucinates at the world and creates the 
content of phenomenal experience (ibid., pp. 51-52).  
       One of the most significant aspects of Metzinger’s teleofunctionalism is the 
integration of deficient forms of phenomenal consciousness, ones where a particular 
constraint may be absent as the result of neurological damage. The end result is a set 
of necessary and contingent constraints for consciousness to occur. The addition or 
subtraction of a particular constraint leads to entirely different forms of 
consciousness. The upshot is, as is typical of functionalist accounts, consciousness 
has been eliminated. No such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or 
was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves or “appearances” as they appear in 
conscious experience (Kant calls them appearances also). Metzinger argues that the 
phenomenal self is not a thing (as did Kant)  but an ongoing process. What we think 
of as a self is simply the content of a “transparent self-model” and we are confused if 
we regard this model as a genuine self.  Metzinger writes:  
This phenomenally transparent representation of invariance and continuity 
constitutes the intuitions that underlie many traditional philosophical fallacies 
concerning the existence of selves as process-independent individual entities, as 
ontological substances that could in principle exist all by themselves, and as 
mysteriously unchanging essences that generate a sharp transtemporal identity for 
persons. But at the end of this investigation we can clearly see how individuality 
(in terms of simplicity and indivisibility), substantiality (in terms of ontological 
autonomy), and essentiality (in terms of transtemporal sameness) are not 
properties of selves at all” (ibid., p. 626). 
 
       On Metzinger’s view, the self, the feeling of identity, of being a subject in 
charge of the physical body, is simply a module within the mind activated by the 
brain’s neural processing. The self is categorically not some substantial, essential 
invariant entity, like a soul, spirit or homunculus. As he emphasises, there are no 
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such things as substantial selves.  Metzinger’s point is similar to Kant’s in many 
ways. All three properties of the self (i) the substantial “I,” (ii) the simple soul and 
(iii) numerical identity over time are expressly similarly described by Kant as being 
“illusions”  However, Metzinger does not seem to be familiar with the Paralogisms 
where Kant discusses the self. This is evident from the following passage where he 
claims that Kant: 
[C]onclude[d] from the fact that, in standard situations, all of us experience 
ourselves as initiators of our own thoughts or that the “I think” can, in principle 
and in the large majority of phenomenal configurations, accompany all states of 
consciousness, that some kind irreducible entity (e.g., a transcendental subject) 
must exist (ibid., p. 446).  
 
       However, just the opposite is true of Kant; the unity of apperception does not 
exist as an empirical reality or entity, but as an “x” that necessarily precedes 
experience yet also encompasses it.  In fact, as discussed in chapter 3, the 
Paralogisms comprised pages of  detailed, explicit arguments to that effect. Self-
consciousness as inner sense or receptive consciousness of what we passively 
“undergo” (as we are affected by the play of our own thought) is differentiated  from 
consciousness of our activity, i.e. of what we are “doing” in synthesising or unifying 
our experience.  Nevertheless, the Kantian element of his work is noted and praised 
by eliminative materialists Paul and Patricia Churchland who write  in an editorial of 
his book: 
Being No One is Kantian in its scope, intelligence and depth. Steeped in 
contemporary neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, the book gives the 
unsolved Kantian problems of inner self and outer world a new look, a new life, 
and a new route to solution. Metzinger’s story is understandable, compelling, 
and, quite simply, very very smart.  
But they misconstrue Kant: It is important to realise that Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy sought to reflect on the conditions of possibility of experience and 
cognition, which is epistemic, not phenomenological, i.e. to do with the study of  the 
structure of various types of experience. Thus, it is no coincidence that Kant 
categorically rejects the attempt to equate the notion of “intuition” with a type of 
inner experience or introspection. The unity that Kant calls the transcendental unity 
of apperception is stable identity. Empirical apperception, however, is the 
“[c]onsciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner 
 207 
 
perception [which is] (...) always changing”. He also calls this “inner sense”, and its 
meaning is most adequately rendered by the Cartesian “ego cogito”, the preceding 
condition of which is transcendental apperception, which he describes as “that unity 
of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions, and by relation to which all 
representation of objects is alone possible” (A107). 
       Kant claims that this type of apperception has the nature of pure, original and 
unchanging consciousness, the deepest “transcendental ground of the unity of 
consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, and consequently 
also of the concepts of objects in general” (A106). Through his epistemic analysis he 
brings forth the idea of the deepest principle of being and knowledge, by means of 
which we are able to be responsible and free. Metzinger pours scorn on freedom of 
the will and is concerned to find the cognitive mechanisms that underlie action at an 
abstract level, or how “mental processing” occurs among representations at the 
neural level. His view is that the phenomenal self is nothing more than the ongoing 
operations of a complicated information-processing system. On Metzinger’s model, 
our experience of “being someone” is simply a paradox:  we have the experience of 
“being someone”, yet there is no self having this experience. It can all be explained 
away in representational terms, and what we call “self” can be substituted by 
“phenomenal self-model”. As he puts it on the first page of his book: “No one ever 
was or had a self. All that ever existed were conscious self-models that could not be 
recognized as models. The phenomenal self is not a thing, but a process (ibid., p. 1).   
         It is clear that Metzinger’s work is the integration of deficient forms of 
phenomenal consciousness only, of inner sense. He writes “the phenomenal self is 
not a thing, but a process, and the subjective experience of being someone emerges if 
a conscious information-processing system operates under a transparent self-
model… You don’t see it. But you see with it’” (ibid., p.1). In an interview with 
Being Human journalist Michael Taft he states, “Ultimately, it’s a physical process. 
Today, the best way to describe self-consciousness still is as a representational 
process: an image that is sometimes generated in the brain, an internal placeholder 
for the system as a whole, a neuro-computational tool” (Metzinger, 2012).   
 208 
 
       Thus, Metzinger regards apperception as redundant and unnecessary.  In his 
eyes, Kant’s views of subjectivity have been falsified by recent empirical discoveries 
in neuroscience. Neuroscientists today have attempted to define the fundamental 
features of the brain and its information processing capabilities in terms of (i) mean 
firing rates at points in the brain cortex (neurons) and (ii) computations, so that 
today, the prevailing view in neuroscience is that neurons can be considered 
fundamentally computational devices. Metzinger applies this metaphor of 
computation to the physical organism as a whole. He both reduces things down to 
micro-foundations and expands things up into a final functional effect. There is no 
epistemic justification for our mental states. Rather, “we have those states because 
they were functionally adequate from an evolutionary perspective” (ibid., p. 115). 
The “self illusion” is nothing but a causally generated cognitive phantasm generated 
by the physical organism as a whole. There are two major assumptions at play here: 
i) that phenomenal experience is generated by inaccessible sub-personal process, and 
ii) that something generated by dynamical processes must be an illusory reification. 
His purpose is to eliminate metaphysics in favour of his own preferred domain of 
neuro-pathological reflections.   
       It is suggested that many ideas are touted as those we need in order to be 
scientifically rigorous, when, in fact, they are simply the dogmatic acceptance of 
certain philosophical premisses.  Metzinger’s view is that the self is nothing more 
than the ongoing operations of a complicated information system, an  “illusion” 
causally generated by the physical system as a whole. But a physical organism is not 
just a collection of parts; it is a whole, and it is this whole that we ordinarily (“folk 
psychologically”?) call a self. As he views it, conceptual confusions can only be 
avoided if we stop referring to the self in a naive realistic way. As with Dennett, 
Metzinger’s conclusions are based on the scientific dogma that if something has 
causal antecedents, then only those antecedents can have independent reality. 
Moreover, as is often the case, his reasoning is question begging, he makes use of the 
latest scientific results to justify an ontology that was in large part already 
presupposed in his interpretation of the scientific data.  
       Metzinger’s approach dissolves the conscious self into what is embedded within 
the whole brain. Although “I” control my actions, the “I” is reconceived as the 
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coalition of my brain processes. Instead of saying that my consciousness (me) is 
making the decisions, it turns out that we should say that “I” am conscious of the 
parts of my brain that are making the decisions.  Metzinger claims that “all selves are 
either hallucinated (phenomenologically), or elements of inaccurate, reificatory 
phenomenological descriptions’ (ibid., p. 462).  “There is no single entity in or 
outside the system that directly corresponds to the primitive, pre-reflexive feeling of 
conscious selfhood” (ibid., pp. 564-565).   As discussed, this notion of a non-
reifiable sense of self had already been prefigured by Kant over two hundred years 
ago.  However, it did not follow from this that we ourselves do not exist or were 
merely “appearances”. While it is clear that believing the self is an immaterial entity 
or that it has an anatomical counterpart or core in the brain where everything comes 
together (homunculus) is incorrect, as Dennett points out,  it is not so clear that the 
self itself can be so eliminated.  
       It is significant that Metzinger claims that a disembodied but appropriately 
stimulated brain in a vat could, phenomenologically, enjoy exactly the same kind of 
conscious experience as an embodied one. “In principle, it would even suffice to 
properly activate just a subset of this brain, the minimally sufficient neural correlate 
of your present state, to make a “phenomenological snapshot” of exactly the same 
kind of conscious experience emerge” (ibid., p. 547;  see also pp. 295, 335, 462). 64 
For a real sense of consciousness, however, there needs to be an attached body with 
sensorimotor and autonomic (sympathetic and parasympathetic) systems, and the 
release of hormones and neurotransmitters, producing a sophisticated interplay of 
bio-chemicals that give rise to gut feelings,  emotions and a sense of embodiment 
and agency.  Metzinger claims that it is possible that “attentional and cognitive 
agency can functionally be de-coupled from the process of autonomic self-regulation 
and the spatial self-representation necessary for generating motor behaviour”  (ibid., 
p. 499). But, this is where the argument is extremely weak; the activation of neural 
correlates of experience would simply be a “phenomenological snapshot” and would 
not describe what it is like to be conscious self, in which a necessary defining feature 
is continuity and change. Neither is it simply a matter of “stimulating neurones to 
create an explicit body image”.  If there were not a biological lived body attached to 
the functioning brain, there would be no conscious self at all. Consciousness is not 
an illusion or hallucination, since it is itself generated by real embodiment, and by a 
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brain that is part of a real bodily system, which, in turn, is part of a real world. The 
brain and the body are, structurally and dynamically, so deeply entangled that they 
are explanatorily inseparable. It is therefore highly questionable whether 
consciousness per se can be understood by considering the actions of neurones apart 
from the body, for even if it were even possible to set up a brain in a vat, there could 
be no synthetic apparatus as sophisticated as a real human vascular system in its 
structural features and functional capacities. Experiments have shown that the very 
shape and design of the body contribute directly to sensory and bodily awareness. 
For instance, the position and design of the eyes and of the ears constrain sight and 
hearing respectively. Hearing experience, for example, is constrained by the shape 
and location of the ears which direct sound through the amplification and filtering of 
specific inputs (Chiel and Beer, 1997). 
       “The self”, therefore, far from being an “illusion created by the operations of a 
complicated information system”, is understood more cogently as intimately related 
to the agency of an organism and given a biological or social-psychological 
definition that “makes sense of the data”. For if one considers the fact that an 
organism can distinguish itself from both the environment in which it dwells and 
from other organisms that exist, then the case is strong for a naturally-occurring and 
biologically evolved “sense” of self.   This insight is to be found in the philosophy of 
Kant. Kant believes that all the threads of his transcendental philosophy come 
together in this “highest point” (B134), the transcendental unity of apperception, 
which in Kantian epistemology is the deepest principle of being and knowledge. It is 
clear that although Kant writes that the self of apperception involves the notion of 
the existence of a unitary subject, he also thought it was more than this.  He writes in 
the Paralogisms, for example: “The proposition “I think” insofar as it amounts to the 
assertion “I exist thinking” determines the subject (B429), and also that the “I think” 
is “something real that is given (...) something which actually exists” (B423n) [my 
italics]. In the Transcendental Deduction he states “my existence is not mere 
“appearance” (much less mere illusion)” (B157). For Kant, we have a sense of self, 
which forms an integral and ubiquitous part of our experiential life. And the mind 
that senses is the same as the mind that possesses or intuits. And that mind must be 
the same as the mind that employs the table of categories, that contributes empirical 
concepts to judgment, and that synthesises the whole into knowledge of a unified, 
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empirical world. Most importantly, for Kant, “the unity of consciousness” by which 
we judge that such and such is not the ultimate end point. Rather, it is the human (or 
animal) organism’s spatiotemporal perspective or “unique point of view” which is 
fundamental to the subjectivity of its experience.  
       There has recently begun a growing trend in Kantian literature, which brings to 
light his thesis on embodiment where awareness can be regarded as pre-figuring the 
spontaneity involved in the  “formal intuition” of the I think.65  This has been termed 
“transcendental embodiment” and it is seen as providing “the unifying thread of 
Kant’s epistemology, moral philosophy, aesthetics and teleology of living nature” 
(Nuzzo, 2008, pp. 8, 9).  His views on embodiment can already be seen in his pre-
critical essay entitled Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of 
Regions in Space, among others, where he refers to the ability to distinguish between 
our left hand and right hand which he calls incongruent counterparts, objects that are 
conceptually identical apart from being mirror images of each other.  He also refers 
to incongruent counterparts in The Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783) 
which he describes as a paradox resolvable by his own theory of space as mind-
dependent.  His argument is that there can be two conceptually indistinguishable 
objects that we can nonetheless tell apart because they differ in spatial orientation, 
i.e. we can tell them apart not because of any difference in the objects themselves but 
rather because we represent space as a form of intuition that renders such differences 
palpable. A human observer experiences himself as intersected by three planes and 
as having three sets of “sides”, which he describes as up and down, back and 
forward, and right and left. But which direction is right and which is left can only be 
established by a conscious, embodied being. This suggests that the body for Kant is 
the “transcendental ground” for our cognition, the locus or site for our “sensibility. In 
other words, the first person perspective-ness or me-ness of conscious cognitive 
content is not simply the apperceptive self awareness of “judgement” that is reliant 
on the categories, and divorced from the world,  but is also necessarily bound up 
with spatial orientation and temporal asymmetry in an embodied biological system.  
       Although he does not say too much about it in the first Critique, Kant’s 
“logical” or  “apperceiving” subject, can be viewed as necessarily embedded in the 
world, an idea that is also found in the later work, published after his death, the Opus 
postumum where he writes that the organism plays an essential role in the process of 
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acquiring knowledge, in the sense that the actions performed by the organism belong 
to the universal principles of the possibility of experience, so that the subject affects 
itself and “makes itself an object of experience” (OP XXII 373: 30–3).  He also 
refers to it in the Critique of Judgment (1790) where he presents a strikingly modern 
self-organisational account of life. There he claims that life cannot be derived at all 
from the mechanistic laws of Newtonian physics, which merely postulate “efficient 
causes and not “end causes”. This is a teleological explanation of 
cognition involving active agency: our knowledge of the world is connected with the 
purposiveness of that world via the organism. Metzinger’s self-model theory of 
subjectivity is a sparse and limited view where selves and subjects are the illusory 
outcomes of biological processes and do not form part of the ontology of the world.  
His claim that “attentional and cognitive agency can functionally be decoupled from 
the process of autonomic self regulation and the spatial self-representation necessary 
for generating motor behaviour” (ibid. p., p. 499) is a case in point. But this cannot 
explain how it is that this particular body that sits at this desk, typing this thesis right 
now, gives rise to my first person phenomenological, subjective experience, my 
unique point of view.  Metzinger imagines I could have been someone else, because 
the self that is the subject of my experiences could have been paired with a different 
body, and that the “contingency intuition [that I could have been someone else] is 
not even based on a phenomenal possibility” (ibid., p. 612).  But even if it is granted 
that it is phenomenally possible for me to coherently imagine that I could be 
someone else, it remains true that my actual existence qua subject (and hence qua 
self) is not contingent in the sense that it necessarily depends on the existence of this 
particular body. He describes the process of generating experience in terms of the 
activation of a set of minimally sufficient NCCs, which as he admits, would generate 
only a snapshot of experience. But lived experiences are more than mere snapshots 
and the reductionist picture cannot capture the irreducible nature of continuity and 
change of lived, embodied experience.  Metzinger begs the question by assuming 
that the self model theory is true and the selves are fictitious illusions. According to 
him the feeling of self is simply caused by a representational self model that we 
mistakenly confuse to be selves. Selves are such an artifact that they can be 
eliminated by Occam’s razor, which is the favoured tool of analytic philosophy and 
positivism, for “under a general principle of ontological parsimony it is not 
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necessary (or rational) to assume the existence of selves, because as theoretical 
entities they fulfil no indispensable explanatory function” (ibid., p. 337).  As 
aforementioned, his reductionism is founded on the materialist dogma that if 
something has causal antecedents, then only those antecedents can have independent 
reality. Perhaps this materialist, and some would argue, “scientistic” stance has 
blinded him to the fact that even if the self can be described functionally and 
causally, as generated by the physical-organism-as-a-whole, this does not lead to the 
conclusion that it is nothing but a group of disconnected nerves and cells.  
 
       In summary, cognitive science, in the main, has adopted this view of the mind as 
functioning according to a set of deterministic mechanical laws, a fact that is 
inevitable given the presupposition of classical physics on which it is based. 
However, this is to ignore the fact, as Kant was the first to show, that judging 
something is inexorably linked to human action. In the third antimony of The 
Antinomy of Pure Reason,  part of the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant addresses the 
question of whether mechanistic determinism is reconcilable with the ascription of 
rational free agency to human beings. In it he states that human actions differ 
categorically from events, the latter which could be given a causal explanation, differ 
from the former. This is because descriptions and explanations of  human actions  
are part of what Wilfrid Sellars has termed “the space of reasons” - they are actions 
insofar as they are part of  exchanges in a social world which involve giving and 
asking for reasons (in the sense of rationale, or justification), i.e. it is  intrinsically 
connected to meaning. Therefore, perhaps the correct conclusion to draw from the 
fact that “the self”  is not found in experience, is neither to accept Dennett’s nor 
Metzinger’s mechanistic/eliminativist view, nor to resort to Chalmers inflated 
ontology concerning a “hard problem”. The reason thought experiments about 
qualia-free zombies have gained so much traction among philosophers of mind is 
due to the pervasive “the mind is a computer” metaphor. According to the standard 
computational approach, mental processes do their work by manipulating symbols 
with algorithms that take perception as input and produce behaviour as output. On 
this account what supports the spectrum of cognitive activities is a diverse collection 
of mechanisms in the brain sharing a common representational system. If one rejects 
this picture, however, one  can come to understand  that our everyday experience of 
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the world as being meaningful is inseparable from our experience of it as looking 
(sounding, smelling, etc.) particular ways, ways in which the idea of qualia do not 
even enter the picture. What is needed is a theory that captures this and is not beset 
by the various worries which result from the computational framework in which 
meaning is constructed through the input from an information laden word to the 
inside of an organism’s head.  
       There is little empirical evidence supporting the presence of computational 
symbols in cognition; functionalism was simply eagerly adopted because it was able 
to provide elegant and powerful formalisms for representing knowledge, also 
perhaps, because it captured a theorist’s intuitions about the symbolic character of 
cognition, and the fact that they could be readily implemented in exciting new 
Artificial Intelligence programs. A problem with traditionalist functionalist theories 
is that they cannot readily explain how cognition thus defined interfaces with 
perception, action, and meaning, what is also termed the meaning or symbol 
grounding problem. This was largely triggered by Searle’s Chinese Room thought 
experiment (1980) in which he showed that if the Turing Test were conducted in 
Chinese then he, in a room, could carry out the very same program as a computer, of 
manipulating symbols, without knowing what any of the words he was manipulating 
meant. This was meant to show that abstract symbols such as words need to be 
grounded in something other than relations to more abstract symbols if any of those 
symbols are to be meaningful. According to Searle, an adequate explanation for 
meanings or intentionality can only be material, biological one, and the solution to 
the meaning-grounding problem is sensorimotor grounding.
66
 The abstract  
functionalist, symbol view of meaning is pervasive in cognitive theories and yet it is 
arguably “one of the most remarkable misunderstandings in the history of science” 
(Edelman, 1992. p. 228). As Steven Harnad formulates the problem:  
 
How can the semantic interpretation of a formal symbol system be made intrinsic 
to the system, rather than just parasitic on the meanings in our heads? How can 
the meanings of the meaningless symbol tokens, manipulated solely on the basis 
of their (arbitrary) shapes, be grounded in anything but other meaningless 
symbols? (Harnad, 1990, p. 335). 
67
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       Fortunately, an alternative approach to traditional functionalist cognitive science 
is to be found in recently emerging research into embodied cognition, which 
understands cognition as highly dependent on the physical capacities and actions of a 
cognitive agent. According to this new embodiment perspective, it is impossible to 
understand the self or consciousness without grounding it in action. In grounded 
cognition theories, cognitive processing, even in abstract domains such as language 
acquisition and mathematics, are dependent on sensorimotor skills and bodily 
resources. More specifically, it is a way of viewing meaning as the coordination of 
action in order to achieve certain goals. There is no need to look for the hooks that 
ground the reference and referents, the speech acts and what they are about. Instead, 
cognition concerns the matching of goals and affordances.  Moreover, the hard 
problem is solved because cognition is naturalised, but it is also dissolved, in that its 
initial motivation is shown to be ill-founded. Affordances (Gibson, 1979) are ways 
in which a perceiver with a particular type of body can interact with an object, or are 
to do with what an agent wants to achieve and the opportunities afforded by a 
situation in order that the agent achieve that goal. For example, a cup affords 
grasping, lifting, and tilting, allowing the user to drink from it. Such motor 
affordances are proposed to be central to conceptual knowledge (Borghi, 2005; 
Glenberg, 1997, 2008). In fact, Glenberg proposed that cognition evolved to 
coordinate effective action; that is, action that enhances survival and reproductive 
success given the constraints of a particular type of body.  In this way cognition is 
naturalistic, and not considered as something fundamentally different, but rather as 
dependent on the body, its sensory motor systems, and on context in the real world 
(Barsalou, 2008; Clark, 2011; Laakso, 2011; Schubert, & Semin, 2009; Stapleton, 
2013). Traditional theories place all the responsibility for generating behaviour in the 
brain; perception is input into a computational, representational system that mentally 
transforms the input into output or behaviour. Embodied cognition replaces the 
representational/functional model with agential activity and emphasises the role of 
the body and its place in the environment in creating cognition, arguing that even the 
most abstract of concepts are rooted in characteristics of our bodies and in our 
embodied interactions with the environment.   This idea, of embodied, embedded 
enaction also has its roots in Kant. This is the topic of the next chapter. 
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    6. Kant and Embodied Enactive Cognitive Science   
Enaction was first proposed as a model for understanding cognition by F. J. Varela, 
J. Thompson, and E. Rosch in their 1991 book The Embodied Mind.  As two of the 
originators of embodiment theories, Varela and Thompson had also surmised that 
“what the organism senses is a function of how it moves, and how it moves is a 
function of what it senses” (Thompson and Varela 2001, p. 242). Varela, in his 
ground-breaking paper “A Science of Consciousness as if Experience Mattered” 
(1997) advocated a dissolution of the hard problem as a result of this new 
methodological approach. The hard problem, as discussed, consists of finding a place 
for conscious experience within nature, as it is supposedly described by our best 
scientific theories.  Varela argued, against such traditional accounts that conscious 
experience is not a thing or feature that one has, but what one lives and what one 
dwells in as an embodied organism. In addition, he points out, in a manner akin to 
Kant, that third-person objective science assumes the very fact of experience, in 
order to extract from nature invariants that can validate hypotheses; therefore one 
should not expect from it a convincing derivation of what is their most basic 
condition of possibility, experience itself.  Instead, what is conventionally thought of 
as “subject” and “object” are co-constituted or co-arising, as the mind is embodied 
and arises out of  “an active handling and coping with the world”; that “whatever 
you call an object (...) is entirely dependent on this constant sensory motor 
handling”, which means that an object is not independently “out there”, but “arises 
because of your activity, so, in fact, you and the object are co-emerging, co-arising” 
(Varela, 1999, pp.71-72). The mind thus construed cannot be separated from either 
the entire organism or the outside environment. “Knower and known, mind and 
world, stand in relation to each other through mutual specification or dependent co-
origination” (Varela et al., 1991, p.150)....and also “organism and environment 
enfold into each other and unfold from one another in the fundamental circularity 
that is life itself” (ibid., p. 217).   
       Embodied enactive approaches to cognitive science have become increasingly 
popular over the past twenty or so years (Varela et al., 1993; Varela, 1997; Glenberg, 
1997; Clark, 2011, 2016; Anderson, 2003; Thompson, 2007; Barsalou, 2008; Semin 
 217 
 
and Smith, 2009; Shapiro, 2011; Stewart, Gapenne & Di Paolo, 2010; Di Paolo and 
Thompson, 2014; Noë, 2016). Although there are different empirical and theoretical 
strands to each approach, they all share in common the challenge to traditional 
approaches to cognition, in which mind is comparable to the software of a computer.  
From the standpoint of traditional cognitive science, if an agent is to successfully 
perceive and engage with the world, he/she must operate on “internal 
representations” of a world that is considered external and separate. Here the central 
idea is that to perceive is to be in an internal state that just happens to be caused by 
an external world. However, according to the embodiment thesis, this is an 
inadequate and one-sided understanding of cognition. The mind is already embedded 
in the world in a deep way; in fact, it is constitutionally so through the body’s 
situatedness and active engagement with its environment. Accordingly, if we are to 
understand cognition, it is more fruitful to think beyond the inner and outer 
distinction of mind and world found on traditional accounts and to consider the 
natural unity that already exists between an organism and the environment in which 
it is actively engaged. This is because any purported “internal representation” that 
occurs in an actual embodied brain is a priori, as a direct result of its relationship to 
the environment through its embeddedness within an active organism. There is 
neither subjective supremacy over the objective nor is the subjective absorbed into 
the objective realm of traditional mechanistic science.  Rather such science returns to 
the experiential realm from which the very dichotomy between subjectivity and 
objectivity arises, and then establishes within it a system of mutual constraints.       
        Contemporary functionalist theories tacitly assume a profound difference 
between consciousness and biological life (hence the penchant for assuming as, 
Chalmers does, that the right kinds of computation are sufficient for the possession 
of a conscious mind). The basis of mind shrinks to “representations” which are in 
principle multi-realisable and the body is reduced to a kind of input–output device. 
This kind of short-circuit between mind and brain, as they are thus considered,  leads 
into a conceptual and methodological impasse, for it misses the essentially 
embodied, relational, biological and biographical character of mindedness. By way 
of example, let us take the existence of “place cells”,  neurones discovered by John 
O’Keefe, (O’Keefe, 1976) which are located in the CA1 and CA3 regions of the 
hippocampus and which fire when the organism occupies a specific location within 
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the environment. They are called place cells because their firing is primarily location 
specific (Muller et al, 1987) and may be independent of other descriptions of the 
organism’s behavioural state, such as head direction.  Different place cells have 
different “place fields” and together they provide a cognitive map which enables the 
organism to navigate and orient itself in space. O’Keefe also thought the function of 
the map was not simply to permit spatial navigation, but to also act as a memory 
framework upon which the significant items and episodes of experience could be 
superimposed (O’Keefe, J., Burgess, N., Donnett, J. G., Jeffery, K. J., & Maguire, E. 
A., 1998). Studies on place cells have shown that the organism’s active locomotion 
and the specific environmental constraints on that locomotion have a fundamental 
bearing on the various facets of place cell activity. For instance, the firing frequency 
of a place cell is highest when the organism enters into the location equated with the 
centre of its place field and gets progressively lower as it moves towards the 
periphery: conversely, the firing rate of the cell increases as the organism moves 
from the periphery and back again towards the centre of its place field. Thus, the 
activity of the place cell is dependent upon and indicative of the active movement of 
the organism through the environment. In other words, the organism does not merely 
passively perceive the “external” environment so as to generate an “internal” model 
or map that governs action, as on traditional accounts, but rather its embodied action 
coupled with its species specific sensory capacities enables place cell activity to be 
sensitive not only to the environment, but also to the unique trajectory of action 
within the environment.  Other cells, for example,  Head Direction (HD) cells fire 
rapidly only when the head of a freely moving organism points in a restricted range 
of angles in the horizontal plane. They therefore share with the hippocampal place 
cells the property of signalling an aspect of the spatial relationship between an 
animal and its environment. O’Keefe specifically refers to Kant’s understanding of 
cognition and, especially his understanding of incongruent counterparts in his book 
“The Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map”,  and, in particular, as necessarily involving 
absolute Newtonian space:  
 
The major evidence Kant used in support of the necessity for a notion of absolute 
space concerned objects which were similar but incongruent, such as left and 
right hands, left and right screws. The parts of these objects and their internal 
relations had exactly the same description and yet they could not be 
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superimposed on each other because the three-dimensional space they occupied 
was different. In other words, part of the description of a left hand involved a 
reference to the space in which it was set. If there were only one hand in the 
universe, it would be impossible to say whether it was a left or right hand without 
recourse to an absolute spatial framework. At this point Kant was still thinking 
about absolute space in the Newtonian way, as a property of the physical world.  
His shift to a psychological interpretation of absolute space was due to Leonhard 
Euler’s influence (O’Keefe, 1978, p. 20).  
 
Kant’s mature notion of absolute space was not as a property of the external world, 
but part of the human mode of perceiving. O’Keefe makes the point that this a priori 
mode of perception must have some correspondence to the physical if it is to be 
useful to the organism. 
 
       Evidence in evolutionary biology suggests that the first neurones evolved in 
order to organise and coordinate action. As the mind evolved it was not merely an 
improved reaction to stimuli from the environment that mattered, rather, it required 
the grasping of complex wholes or situations. A living being situated or embedded in 
its environment grasps a situation, and in so doing grasps itself in relation to it. In 
this way an attenuated self-hood or at least “sense making” goes all the way down in 
that there is a tenuous first person perspective in all biological organisms, and not 
simply human ones. The mind is formed bi-directionally, between organism and  
environment, creating our sense of an embodied being in the world, and involves an 
integrated evaluation of the meaning of a situation in order to weigh up options 
available for action.  In later evolutionary stages, the development of tools and 
language would have enabled symbolic representations of meaning to be 
constructed, such as self, world, etc.  On this understanding the mind creates wholes, 
which allows the organism to represent its relationship to the environment, (sense-
making) and thus to act not merely in an automatic manner, but instead in a 
meaningful or purposeful way. It is interesting that Kant attributed the capacity for 
objective perceptual awareness to non-human animals, despite their lack of 
conceptual capacities.  In Section 6.2  it will be argued that there is room in the 
Kantian system for the possibility of objective conscious awareness in non-rational 
animals, a form of awareness that is perceptual without being essentially conceptual 
in nature.  That is to say, the underlying nature of cognitive content is not exhausted 
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by its logico-conceptual components. This is because the formal, intuitional, 
spatiotemporal structure of conscious cognitive content just is its subjective or “first 
person” character, and this is achieved prior to the use of the categories in 
apperception.  This kind of a priori spatial and temporal cognition first hypothesised 
by Kant, is supported by the discovery by O’Keefe (et al) of the distinct class of 
neurons discussed above, whose firing is tuned to an organism’s location, position 
and orientation in space. These exist independently of and prior to experience of the 
spatial world and form the framework or scaffolding that underpins the coherent 
organisation of experiences. This neural representation of “allocentric” space, 
supported by cells in the hippocampus and other brain areas can thus be seen as 
vindicating a Kantian synthetic a priori framework,
68
 in that they encode a type of 
abstract spatial structure which is imposed on the environment without regard for the 
features of the environment. That is, they required no empirical or sensory 
experience for their validation.  
       Thus, the discovery of these place cells and grid cells can be viewed as a 
neurological updating and vindication of Kant’s original theory that Euclidian space 
constitutes a synthetic a priori structure that is constructed by the mind without 
information from the external world. It is important to note that the organism’s active 
locomotion and the contextual specificities of the environment as it relates to that 
have a direct influence on various facets of place cell activity. So, although place 
cells may be regarded as some kind of internal representation that acts as a cognitive 
map, enabling coordinated navigational activity of an organism, they are also 
modified and altered by the activity of the organism through a two-way reciprocal 
relationship.  That is, although one could indeed speak of the coordinated activity of 
place cells in the brain as an internal representation, in the sense that they are brain 
processes that covary and carry information about the environment, this misses the 
following two points: Firstly, place cells do not encode a true depiction of a separate 
environment, but rather encode how relevant features of the environment relate to 
the organism and its embodied action. Secondly, the perceptive processes that enable 
the formation of place fields are not passive but intrinsically and fundamentally 
indebted to embodied action. Significantly, there is a Kantian reversal of approach 
to traditional cognitive science: internal place representations are not the condition 
for the possibility of experience, but human action is the condition for the possibility 
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of representations. 
69
 There is a two-way reciprocal relationship - action enables the 
formation of stable place fields (perception), which in turn orients and enables the 
organism’s further action with regard to where it has been and where it can continue 
to move and act. Buzsáki and Moser have also recently proposed that mechanisms of 
memory and planning have evolved from mechanisms of navigation in the physical 
world and hypothesise that the neuronal algorithms underlying navigation in real and 
mental space are fundamentally the same. In general agreement with Kant, space 
perception has an a priori nature in the sense that place cells and grid cells in the 
entorhinal cortices determine how we perceive and remember our position in the 
environment, as well as the events we experience in the environment  (Buzsáki, G., 
and Moser, E.I., 2013).  
       If we follow this line of thinking, we cannot regard consciousness as something 
merely epiphenomenal to the “real” processes that underlie it. On the contrary, 
subjective experience plays an absolutely central role in the systemic interaction of 
an organism and its environment. For this is what enables the organism to enter into 
a relationship with the environment at a higher level of meaning at all. Traditional 
functionalist accounts posit internal processes or representations as a starting point 
for explaining cognition and frame questions accordingly: How does the mind (or 
brain) use internal models to perform various cognitive acts? By framing the 
question this way, however, theorists are forced into explanations that ultimately 
depend upon the existence of internal representations for their coherence.  However, 
a Kantian reversal of approach would amount to the question:  How does 
embodiment provide the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience?  The 
answer is that there is a coupling between organism and environment, instead of a 
one-way process of external impingement on the senses from an external world as on 
traditional accounts. An organism constructs and picks out its environment, just as 
the environment picks out the traits of an organism. Both form a constitutive 
feedback loop such that each is constantly shaping and defining the other, it is 
constitutive because the organism is partially the result of this two-way process of 
picking out. On the embodied enactive perspective organisms and environments are 
regarded as constitutionally intertwined and integrated, rather than considered as 
separate from each other. Internal representations can be a useful heuristic in 
cognitive science,  and many valuable contributions have been made, but using them 
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as the foundation for cognitive science is limited. This is because human beings are 
biological organisms, and all biological organisms evolve through interaction with 
the environment. In other words, “their being is their doing”, and as has been pointed 
out (Di Paolo, 2005, 2009),  the circularity of the  living, in the sense that their very 
being is their doing, is at odds with the functionalist concern of providing a 
substrate- independent account of the operations of representations.  
       Evolutionary biologists hypothesise that acts and action emerged prior to any 
purported internal representations, since behaviour evolved before nervous systems. 
For example, according to Gaspar Jékely, precursors of nervous systems arose to 
improve control of ciliary locomotion by means of division of labour and economies 
of scale, and that as a result, the first nervous systems arose, consisting of combined 
sensory-motor neurons directly translating sensory input into motor output, initially 
on locomotor ciliated cells and eventually steering muscle cells (Jékely, G. 2011). 
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If indeed the first neurones evolved in order to organise and coordinate action, then it 
follows that higher level cognitive functions must have evolved out of and be 
dependent upon the processes of embodied action. As evolutionary biologist Peter 
Godfrey-Smith avers:  
 
The basic pattern found in the evolution of cognition is a pattern in which 
individual organisms derive an advantage from cognitive capacities in their 
attempts to deal with problems and opportunities posed by environmental 
complexity of various kinds. Cognitive capacities confer this advantage by 
enabling organisms to coordinate their behaviour with the state of the 
environment. Cognition itself should be thought of as a diverse “tool-kit” of 
capacities for behavioral control, including capacities for perception, internal 
representation of the world, memory, learning, and decision-making” (Godfrey-
Smith,  2001, p. 24). 
 
       The “hard problem of consciousness” of how mind emerges from the “wetware” 
of the brain is a result of a functionalist view which tacitly assumes a profound 
difference between consciousness and biological life.  However, the problem only 
arises if mind and life are conceptualised this way, as separate or separable and 
intrinsically excluding one other. The underlying problem in traditional cognitive 
science, then, is one of relating a level of system or process to one of meaning. The 
conventional approach of isolating and splitting off these two levels leads directly to 
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the mind-body or mind-brain problem which is irresolvable when viewed through 
the orthodox lens of analytic philosophy and the associated Cartesian-mechanistic 
framework in which it is entrenched. To find our way out of this impasse, and to 
release ourselves from the perplexing difficulties that arise from this dualism, the 
problem needs to be reconceptualised and this is possible by taking into account the 
phenomenon of life, including the organism, the lived body and the world in which 
both mind and brain are embedded.  If mind is construed as essentially embodied in 
the living organism then no longer will reductionist claims such as, ‘‘You are but a 
pack of neurons”,  ‘‘You are a set of functions", or “You are a brain” be relevant. 
Both statements would be seen as biologically unsound and as prime examples of a 
category mistake.  
 
       As discussed earlier, according to traditional accounts the first main task for a 
“science of consciousness”  is to find the NCCs, specifically, the minimal neural 
correlates for the phenomenal correlates of consciousness. Once these brain states 
are discovered there will be isomorphism between them and conscious states, even 
without the existence of body. As functionalist Ned Block put it “if the relevant brain 
state were to come about—somehow—the experience would be instantiated” (Block, 
2005, p. 265).  On this picture, it is possible that you could have a functioning brain 
in a vat (see earlier discussion of Metzinger, Chapter 5.4). Philosophers are fond of 
engaging in thought experiments and the brain in a vat scenario is one that is easy to 
imagine on the functionalist model. However, this overlooks the importance of the 
physiology of an organism in which the functioning brain is subordinate to the 
maintenance of bodily homeostasis.  Moreover, a functionalist methodology such as 
Marr’s (see chapter 4) is said to make available a complex  map of the “localisation 
of function” that are within the brain, along with a set of mathematical/ 
computational functions that formally describe the inner “mechanics” of the 
correlated brain regions.  This is a problematic understanding of mentality as the 
brain activity underlying specific cognitive processes are distributed across many 
brain areas, making it practically impossible to localise functions to specific brain 
areas in the first place. There is the further confounding fact that the same brain area 
may be responsible for many different functions (see Uttal, 2001, later in this 
chapter).   On the embodiment thesis, however, conscious experience is part and 
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parcel of a life regulation processes involving neural mappings of the body, which 
constitute a core self that grounds not only that neural activity overall but also the 
specific neural activity relevant to subjectivity.   This forms an invariant basal 
awareness that remains constant across the constant flux of sensory changes and 
alterations. Or, in Kantian terms, this invariant basal awareness is the “I think”, the 
original unity of apperception, the grund or ground of self-reflective awareness that 
endures through change. Self-reflective awareness implies an understanding of a self 
as enduring through time and through changes in states.  But, crucially, it is the fact 
of embodiment that makes it possible to experience in the first place.  Kant stresses 
that we intuitively relate things to the orientation of our body in order to argue that 
space can neither be perceived by the senses nor grasped by the intellect. Therefore, 
it is argued, he must have conceived of the oriented human body as a “transcendental 
ground for our cognition” in its own right.  On the embodiment paradigm, 
consciousness is the result of the life regulation processes brought about by the 
nervous system. Brain and body co-evolved through a history of species specific 
adaptive behaviour co-constituted and bound by environmental constraints (See 
Aboitiz 1990, 1996;  Chiel and Beer, 1997). Therefore, there is already a strict 
correlation between cognition and consciousness on the one hand, and real, 
biological and neurologically animated bodies-in-the-world on the other.  Here the 
central idea is that to perceive is to be in an interactive, co-constitutional, dynamic 
relationship with the world, not to be in an internal state that happens to be caused by 
the external world. There is also the closely related “grounded” theory of cognition 
(Barsalou, 2008), which whilst employing the same constraints and characteristics of 
embodied situated cognition, posits the inclusion of the higher cognitive abilities: 
categorising, reasoning, numeric and linguistic processing, as well as theory of mind, 
all of which are grounded in the brain’s modal sensory systems. For Barsalou a 
concept can be viewed as a dynamical distributed system in the brain that represents 
a category in the environment or experience, and which controls interactions with the 
category’s instance, whether in the actual environment or in thought.  
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6.1. On the Tension Between Traditional and Enactive views. 
 
Despite growing support for this enactive view, there is a tension within the 
philosophy and science of consciousness as most cognitive scientists still adhere to 
the traditional “brainbound” view, and the philosophical assumption that the head is 
where consciousness resides (See Evan Thomson and Diego Cosmelli (2011) for a 
discussion of this).  They prefer to reassert a sense of mystery about the emergence 
of conscious experience from matter, and champion the quest for a science of 
consciousness that would close the seemingly unbridgeable gap between the physics 
of the brain and phenomenal experience (See especially Koch, 2012). There are 
those who declare that present science has already an explanation in store, e.g. in 
some exotic interpretation of quantum mechanics (Penrose and Hameroff, 1996, 
2014; Stapp, 2009, 2014).  Others express their faith in some future, but 
unforeseeable, scientific advance that will dispel the riddle (Chalmers, 1996).  Kant’s 
transcendental enquiry continues to be relevant to this ongoing debate. He held a 
fundamentally different view of human nature in marked contrast to the reductionist, 
deterministic, and mechanistic picture that is painted by contemporary accounts. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, although like modern functionalist cognitive scientists, Kant 
was concerned with the “functions” or conditions needed for functions to work, his 
philosophy transcends this in ways that are significant in addressing the ensuing 
“hard problem of consciousness” that arose from functionalism itself. This had led to 
the ongoing quest for a scientific understanding of consciousness, where it was 
presupposed that the brain itself is the ultimate seat of consciousness and where in 
some peculiar sense, it resides. Whereas there is intuitive plausibility in such a 
position, a quite natural assumption, given that we obviously need a brain to think 
and also that changes to the brain through mechanical manipulation have been shown 
to cause changes in phenomenal experience, this is a problematic understanding of 
consciousness, as has been discussed thus far.  As noted in Chapter 2.1., recent 
empirical work in cognitive neuroscience claims to be able to support this continuing 
scientific endeavour to find “consciousness in the brain” through its program to 
discover the NCCs (Crick and Koch, 1995, 1998; Chalmers, 2000; Metzinger, 2000, 
2003, 2011; Koch 2004; Block 2005; Bayne 2007, 2010; Tononi and Koch 2000, 
2008, 2015; Hohwy 2007; 2009; Kiverstein 2009. Oizumi, Albantakis, Tononi  
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(2014), Hohwy & Bayne (2015). The notion of NCCs is founded on some early work 
in neuroscience on epileptic patients. Direct stimulation to the cortex in conscious 
subjects had been shown to bring about experiences with a very particular 
phenomenology (Penfield 1954, 1958). The fundamental idea of finding the NCCs is 
that this can be applied more generally; once more is known about the brain, 
scientists will discover precisely how consciousness comes about.  This endeavour to 
find the neural correlate of consciousness has become a sustained, intense focal point 
for scientific research on consciousness.  Francis Crick and Christof Koch, on 
presenting their conception of an NCC stated: “Whenever some information is 
represented in the NCC it is represented in consciousness” (Crick and Koch, 1998, p. 
98).   
      The search for NCCs is specifically a search for the neural correlates of transitive 
contents of consciousness, as when looking back and forth between red and blue on a 
screen, a conscious percept is correspondingly shifting from a red percept to a blue 
percept. The goal of the NCC paradigm is to find the minimal set of neuronal events 
that correlates with this subjective shift from redness to blueness. That is, the main 
purpose is to uncover the neural representational systems whose contents 
systematically match the contents of phenomenal consciousness. Indeed, as 
discussed earlier, Francis Crick avers that philosophy is superfluous and has gone so 
far as to proclaim that “No longer need one spend time attempting (…) to endure the 
tedium of philosophers perpetually disagreeing with each other. Consciousness is 
now largely a scientific problem”  (Crick, 1996, p. 486). However, the question of 
what it means to be a neural correlate of consciousness is actually far from 
straightforward, and  as has been a consistent fundamental premise throughout this 
thesis, the study of consciousness involves not only empirical, and methodological 
issues but also  philosophical questions about the nature of consciousness and its 
relationship to the brain. Even if it were discovered that, say oscillations at 40 Hz in 
a certain brain area, correlate perfectly with behavioural measures of consciousness, 
the problem simply regresses a further stage: the question would now become, why 
and how should coherent oscillations ever generate consciousness? After all, 
coherent oscillations are observed in many other branches of science, where they do 
not give rise to consciousness. The same would apply to Roger Penrose and Stuart 
Hameroff’s Orch Orr theory of quantum computation in microtubules, where 
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consciousness is said to be based on non-computable quantum processing performed 
by qubits formed collectively within cellular microtubules, and amplified in the 
neurons. Despite it being a new physical theory of quantum computation, the 
problem still remains as to what exactly it is about microtubules that allows them to 
generate consciousness, when other physical mechanisms do not. Moreover, if the 
quest for the NCC involves searching for elusive notions like qualia, phenomenality, 
or experience, it is not really clear what that would entail. The subjective privacy 
implicit in the concept of phenomenal experience renders it difficult to even 
operationalise, let alone explain. The usefulness of operational definitions in science 
is, after all proportional to the extent they have a solid basis in physical reality. The 
main worry about operationalising a notion as vaguely defined as “consciousness” is 
that different theorists have come up with radically different operational definitions. 
There would therefore seem to be a fatal problem at the heart of the quest for the 
NCCs; this is because there is no clear and distinct idea of what exactly is being 
sought.  As discussed in Chapter 5.2.  it is doubtful whether there is even any sense 
to the notion that “consciousness” actually “picks out” a well defined natural kind, as 
Chalmers and others claim. Although the search for  NCCs sounds reasonable, as it 
concerns taking the usual, well worn scientific route of starting with correlations 
before moving on to causal ones, it is fully dependent on the intuition that 
consciousness is something “extra” and different from the physical processes on 
which it depends. On the one side of the correlation is the measurement of neural 
activity using E.E.G. fMRI or other brain imaging technology, on the other 
“subjective experiences” or “consciousness”, and it is not at all clear how the two 
domains can be connected.   
        Daniel Dennett is well aware of the lure of Cartesian dualism that beguiles even 
the most tough-minded and relentless scientific reductionists, and is able to explain 
clearly and perspicuously, in his own inimitable style, the redundancy of the Neural 
Correlates of Consciousness research program, that begins from the assumption that 
consciousness is somehow “produced” or “generated” in the brain. As he notes, 
scornfully, and with more than a hint of sarcasm: 
An area of philosophical naivete´ in the cognitive  science of consciousness 
concerns the quest for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness (NCC). It has 
seemed obvious to quite a few scientists aspiring to solve the mystery of 
consciousness that there has to be an NCC, the necessary and sufficient 
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conditions, characterized in terms of locatable neural activity, for conscious 
experiences. How indeed could there not be one, if materialism is true?” 
(Dennett, 2009, p. 232). 
 
He makes the observation that the quest for the NCC is in all probability “a wild 
goose chase”; for although states of consciousness obviously do causally depend on 
states of the brain, one can nevertheless wonder in what sense there is, or could be, 
such a thing as a NCC and how this could occur at all. Firstly, there is a difficulty in 
the view that there can be an isomorphism of mental states to brain states and 
secondly and most significantly, there it is questionable assumption that the 
cognitive mechanisms supporting conscious experience are located completely 
within the skull. In The New Phrenology (2001) psychologist Dr William R Uttal, 
Professor Emeritus at Arizona State University and Professor Emeritus (Psychology) 
at the University of Michigan, addresses this question of localisation, i.e. whether 
psychological processes can be defined and isolated in a way that permits them to be 
associated with particular brain regions. He likens neuro-imaging research to the 
practice of phrenology of the 19th century and argues that the reason it would be 
difficult to localise functions to specific brain areas is that the brain activity 
underlying cognitive processes is widely distributed, much of the brain responding to 
any stimulus, making it difficult to localise functions to specific brain areas. Also, 
there is the problem that every brain area participates in multiple functions, which 
means that asking where a given function occurs in the brain is simply the wrong 
question.   
       Others have also questioned the “brainbound” view in ways that render doubtful 
whether there is any sense at all to the notion of a minimal neural substrate or NCC 
sufficient to produce experience. Susan Hurley, in her 1998 book Consciousness in 
Action, as well as in many articles, asked why it should be considered that the 
boundary of skin and skull is significant when it comes to explaining consciousness.  
Hurley defended “vehicle externalism”, the view that cognition does not necessarily 
have to be explained in terms of internal processes. “Brains are in continuous causal 
interaction with their bodies and their environments” so “[w]hy should dynamics 
distributed within a pre-specified boundary be capable of explaining qualities, while 
those beyond not? (Hurley, 2010, p. 116). Similarly, Alva Noë, following Thompson 
and Varela, brings out the insight that perceptual content depends on the skilful 
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activity of the whole animal or person acting in time and spatial orientation, making 
use of its capacities for eye, head, and whole body movements and for directed 
attention (Noë, 2010). He claims that although it is trivially true that states of 
consciousness causally depend on states of the brain, for everyone needs a brain to 
function, there is no reason to think that the neural states that have been shown 
experimentally to be correlated with conscious experiences match those experiences’ 
content.  It is perfectly obvious that something has to be happening in neurons every 
time an animal has an experience, but this something is neither identical to nor 
necessary and sufficient for the experience. 
        According to Chalmers, “the neural subsystem N will be sufficient for the 
occurrence of the conscious state under conditions C. The NCC will be the neural 
state that is minimally sufficient for the corresponding conscious content” 
(Chalmers, 2000, pp. 24-5). Metzinger, in the same volume, also assumes that 
empirical claims about NCCs will be formulated as laws stating which conscious 
contents will follow “with nomonological necessity” from the activation in 
subsystem N ( Metzinger, 2000, p. 285).  However, if we consider the notion of 
egocentric space, the space within which the perceiving organism acts in terms of 
vision, (the study of NCCs focuses on the study of visual perception), one of the 
most obvious things to note is that people are generally free to move about when 
viewing an object.  The structurally coherent content with which we are concerned in 
visual perception is that as of a figure-on-a-ground that is located within egocentric 
space (see Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 101). This egocentric space, within which we 
visually perceive an object,  is defined by one’s whole body and the possible ways it 
can move. It is significant that Merleau-Ponty acquired this idea from Kant and 
Varela and colleagues built on Merleau-Ponty’s work to develop their enactive 
approach.
71
 In fact, Merleau-Ponty gives an argument for this thesis which 
corresponds closely to Kant's argument regarding space and time in the metaphysical 
expositions of the Transcendental Aesthetic: the body's permanence cannot be “a 
necessity of fact, since such necessity presupposes it”, and “factual situations can 
only impact upon me if my nature is already such that there are factual situations for 
me” (ibid., pp.  91). Thus, Merleau-Ponty, in extending the notion from Kant of 
spatial consciousness, brought out the implicit notion that to have a spatialised self-
consciousness is to experience oneself as a body, i.e. an agent.  
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     In the Metaphysical Exposition of Space of the first Critique Kant stated that our 
experience is necessarily spatial, as of a world presented outside of us:  
 
In order that certain sensations be referred to something outside me (auf etwas 
außer mich) (…) and similarly in order that I may be able to represent 
(vorstellen) them as (als) outside and alongside one another (…) the 
representation (Vorstellung) of space must be presupposed (A23/B38). 
 
In his Phénoménologie de la Perception Merleau-Ponty takes this notion of 
spatialised self-consciousness and extends it as the self consciousness of a body, and 
his discussion heightens this Kantian notion: as bodies, we are not just “in” space, 
but are “of” it; that is, self-consciousness is the self-consciousness of a body, 
something inherently extended in space.   
 
       In everyday experience, although we are prone to separate spatial experience 
and self-consciousness, rendering the former “the world of things”, the other the 
world of consciousness, these are not two different realities that might somehow 
come together, but at a fundamental level, they cannot be defined separately from 
each other. When we think of ourselves as embodied agents, we have a rather 
different sense of “self-consciousness” than when we think of ourselves as mere 
introspectors. If we take this bodily agency as the primary form of self-
consciousness, then we are able to see self-consciousness not as a clear and isolated 
imaging or objectifying of the self, but as a lived sense of practical engagement. We 
can see that the embodied experience of an agent in his or her environment plays a 
fundamental role in human thought, which in turn sheds light on the cognitive 
abilities that we display every day. Also, we can appreciate that many of the abilities 
that enable us think about the world, for example, language use and gesture, actually 
originated in the bodily experience of individuals as members of a species. Merleau-
Ponty views the body as not simply an object in the world like other objects but, 
following Kant, as the very condition of the possibility for understanding the world. 
Without the body providing the centre or situatedness for experience and agency 
there would be no perception or conceptualisation of the world. The body as a whole 
is a priori in the sense that it precedes and upholds all experience. Noë, following 
Varela and Merleau-Ponty/Kant, questions whether there is any coherent sense in the 
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idea of a neural representation having, as part of its “content”, a stimulus with which 
it usually causally covaries.  As he writes “Although neural systems causally enable 
the animal as a situated agent to orient itself in its egocentric space, they themselves 
do not inhabit this space, nor do they have any access to it as such” (Noë, 2004.  p. 
15).  Perceptual content is intrinsically first person experiential, in the sense that the 
content of an experience is always the content as represented from a particular point 
of view. Thus, to have a visual experience as of a book on a table is to have an 
experience as of the book as standing in a certain egocentric spatial relation to the 
perceiver and as standing out against a background relative to them. In other words, 
although the brain and brain processes are necessarily involved in the interactive 
relationship that constitutes awareness and perception, they are not sufficient for 
them. The brain and body are so dynamically entangled in the causation and 
realisation of consciousness as to be explanatorily inseparable from it.  Equally, this 
knowing of what we might term “the self-as-body” is inherently spatial. When we 
eat a meal, we know where our knives and forks are in our hands with respect to the 
food on the plate and how to manoeuvre it into our mouths. The act of eating is 
necessarily spatial navigation, and the spatiality involved does not just characterise 
the relationship of me to what is external to me, but equally characterises the 
relationship of me to myself, as an embodied agent. The upshot of this way of 
thinking is that our experiences are not things that happen in our heads, but are what 
happen in agent-environment systems. That is, embodied cognition construes 
conscious experiences in terms of when situated agents pick up information about 
“affordances” (Gibson, 1979) through coupled and dynamic interaction with the 
environment in which they are embedded. 
       The NCC research programme,  as heir of the Cartesian tradition, in which 
consciousness and brain-processes are considered as separable from each other,  rests 
on the assumption that something can be found out about cognition through 
assimilating consciousness to snapshot-like phenomenal episodes in the brain   
(Metzinger, 2003). Yet mental states heavily depend on information from the body 
and on its developmental history within its own lifetime as well as on fluid 
interaction with its physical and social environment in the present. It is not possible 
to individuate conscious states without at least tacitly taking these past or present 
interactions into consideration. The fundamental message from embodied enactive 
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cognitive science is that in order to understand consciousness it is not sufficient to 
simply consider the brain. There is need to consider the embodied, situated life; the 
biological substrate of consciousness is the whole organism in its dynamic 
interaction with the environment, not the brain taken in isolation from the bodily 
situatedness in which it finds itself. Neuroinformatics and computational 
neuroscience makes use of increasingly sophisticated technology, from neural 
modelling and numerical data analysis to study the brain, as well as ultra 
sophisticated imaging techniques: electroencephalography, fMRI (functional 
magnetic resonance), near-infrared spectroscopic and chemical shift imaging. 
Nevertheless, measuring devices or brain imaging technology, no matter how 
cleverly constructed, will not reveal consciousness because that is not where 
consciousness is. This is the wrong level of analysis. What we call consciousness is 
not something that happens in the head but unfolds in the dynamic coupling or 
relationship between embodied action and the world.  
 
       It is often said that Kant was not at all concerned with qualia, since his main 
enterprise was concerned with the question of how knowledge is possible, i.e. the 
objective aspect of the Critique which is epistemological, and that he does not in any 
way commit himself to an ontological claim regarding the nature of consciousness. 
However, according to Steven Palmquist, this is wrong. Kant “appeals throughout 
the Aesthetic to various examples of perceived objects, as being externally given to 
the human subject in the process of experiencing them, and he suggests that 
“intuition” refers to the requirements of our bodily functioning” (Palmquist, 2013, p. 
8) which is another term for what we might nowadays call qualitative sensation 
processing, so that Kant’s “forms of intuition” are an account of the structure of our 
embodied perspective on the world. On this reading, Kant’s basic claim in the 
Aesthetic is that “the forms of intuition are not mental operations performed on sense 
data but are the formal structure of spatio-temporal relations in which objects stand 
in relation to the body. As such, this first stage of Kant’s theoretical system sets out 
the basis for a rudimentary physics that is primarily ontological and thus physical in 
its emphasis, not merely epistemological and mental” (ibid., p. 9). Matthew 
Rukgaber also claims for the significance of embodiment in Kant’s thought: “[t]he 
ideality and subjectivity of space is concluded to be an account of the perspective 
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relative nature of the figure-ground relationship or how it is that objects emerge for 
us in empirical experience as being orientated in a spatio-temporal field”  (Rukgaber, 
2009). There are several passages in the Critique where it is implied that a discussion 
of the senses is to be understood as a discussion of the body, such as when Kant 
describes a representation of sense as “a force of nature” (A294/B350).  Viewed this 
way, the transcendental psychology in the Critique can be regarded as first stage of 
Kant’s theoretical system that sets the foundations for a theory of mind that is also 
ontological and thus physical in its emphasis, not merely epistemological. In other 
words, Kant’s theory of the “forms of intuition” can be considered as the beginning 
of an account of the structure of our embodied perspective, which was what 
Merleau-Ponty understood from his reading of Kant and subsequently taken up by 
Varela and others.72 Weber and Varela (2002) also cogently note that in Kant’s third 
critique, the Critique of Judgment (1790) he presents a strikingly modern self-
organisational account of life. There he claims that life cannot be derived at all from 
the mechanistic laws of Newtonian physics, which merely postulate “efficient 
causes” and not “end causes”.    
 
        One of the aims of this work is to defend the point that Kant was the first post- 
Newtonian philosopher to attempt to fully address the basic philosophical problem of 
reconciling free-will with universal natural determinism.  Kant, from the beginning, 
was a convinced Newtonian in physics and natural philosophy, and his project in the 
Critique of Pure Reason was to provide it with a philosophical foundation (See 
Friedman, 2013). 
73
 Of particular significance is a small treatise written by Kant, the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, in which he presents the principles 
that are specifically required for experience of material nature. These principles 
include what Kant calls the “laws of mechanics”, which determine how a material 
body communicates motion to another by means of its moving force. According to 
Michael Freidman (Freidman, 2013) it was Kant’s aim in this treatise to provide a 
deeper philosophical understanding of Newton’s work by providing it with a 
metaphysical foundation using a radically transformed version of Leibnizian 
metaphysics.  Kant clearly shows considerable interest in various attempts to 
reconcile certain aspects of Leibnizian metaphysics with the Newtonian view of 
nature. But, Kant claimed, we cannot envision explaining generation or organic 
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growth mechanistically and decried Leibniz’ idea of a monad as “spiritual 
automaton”, as no more than a “freedom of the turnspit” (CPrR 5: 97) which reduces 
man to a “marionette” (CPrR 5:101), and morality to a figment of the imagination. 
We can indeed view ourselves as machines, responding to the environment in 
predetermined ways. However, we are not compelled to do so, and are able to regard 
ourselves as agents who initiate trains of events. Kant was concerned throughout his 
lifetime with the question of how to make sense of living things and came to regard 
biology as a non-mechanistic life science that supplements Newtonian, determinist, 
mechanistic science with the teleological concept of a natural purpose (CPJ 5:369 
415). This is intimately connected to his thesis that there exists an irreducible 
explanatory gap between inert “mechanical” nature and living nature (CPJ 5:369  
415).  
He writes: 
It is quite certain that we can never adequately come to know the organized 
beings and their internal possibility in accordance with merely mechanical 
principles of nature, let alone explain them; and this is indeed so certain that we 
can boldly say that it would be absurd for humans ever to make such an attempt 
or to hope that there might yet arise a Newton who could make comprehensible 
even the generation of a blade of grass according to natural laws (CPJ 5:400). 
 
By this is meant that since our human mental lives entail our biological lives, since 
in order to think there needs to be a biological body, there can also never be a 
Newton of the human mind. So again, our psychological lives; including, 
importantly, our power of choice, is free from the determining influence of 
mechanistic causality.  Kant’s insight into the “transcendental subject” is his way of 
reconciling a mechanistic-reductionist, hence deterministic theory of mind with the 
idea of human freedom.   Kant rejects scientific or reductive naturalism, which says 
that science is, as Wilfrid Sellars formulates it, “the measure of all things” (Sellars, 
1963, 1991). Newtonian classical physics had inspired a belief in a deterministic 
universe external to the human observer who has a passive role to play. In the second 
Critique, the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant attempts to unite the idea of human 
freedom with the mechanistic laws of nature. In so doing he articulates a law of a 
possible order of nature that is beyond the realm of experience. This super-sensible 
aspect of nature provides not only the determining grounds for the existence of 
objects, but also at the same time becomes the freedom of a rational being. Kant is 
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here committing to the thesis that even allowing for the existence of universal, 
transcendental laws of nature, and also for the existence of general mechanistic laws 
of nature, it does not automatically follow that there are specific empirical laws of 
nature “all the way down”.  Robert Hanna has made the point that for Kant 
transcendentally free rational human choices produce what he calls  “natural causal 
singularities” (Hanna, 2006b) and one-time laws, and thereby freely complete nature. 
As he writes in an exchange with A.W Moore:  “T]ranscendentally free agents thus 
create new unique empirical causal-dynamic laws of nature that fall under, and are 
permitted by, but are not compelled or necessitated by, the general laws of natural 
mechanism” (Hanna, 2007, p. 121). This is because, he claims, Kant regards 
biological life and spontaneity of the will as conjunctive and intrinsic structural 
properties of personhood and rational agency.
74
  At the end of the first Critique, in 
the Canon, he emphasised the point that reason is immanently self-developing 
(A835/B863).
75
 This suggests that human cognition involves a necessary relation 
between the elements of cognition and its overall grasp by a human subject. This is 
an integral relationship, and one which is often described by Kant as “purposive”. 
Kant took it be the case that such “purposive” relations were not available to 
machines and this is an important topic within the Critique of Teleological Judgment 
in the third Critique. Also in the section of the first Critique entitled The Exposition 
of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in Harmony with the Universal Law of Natural 
Necessity, Kant discusses the notion that rational human agents are necessarily also 
rational human living organisms, i.e. biological animals capable of intentionality 
whose rational mindedness and rational directedness towards objects in the world, 
other real persons, and themselves, is fully continuous with this.  
       After writing the first Critique Kant realised that not everything could be so 
neatly subsumed under the a priori principles of pure reason. This fact apparently 
concerned Kant more than many of his followers, who did not see beyond the 
theoretical frame of the Critique of Pure Reason. But for Kant himself it was a 
concern. It was especially the empirical and not a priori character of biology that 
posed a grave problem. In his last philosophical writings, the Opus Postumum, he 
refers to the work undertaken in the Critique of Pure Reason. Without invalidating 
the a priori categories that had been the possibility of all knowledge, he finds an 
entirely new foundation for them: the lived body.  On the Kantian picture of physical 
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nature presented in the Opus postumum, the complete set of general causal laws 
provides a skeletal causal-dynamic architecture for human nature.  His main point is 
that we cannot understand ourselves as having experiences in the first place if we 
were not organisms equipped with our various senses. Here Kant emphasises the fact 
that transcendental philosophy cannot depend on the object given in intuition but 
must produce it in order for it to be “for-a-subject”; the organism mediates between 
the object and the faculty of the understanding, but the mediating organism does not 
receive its organisation by being affected by the object, but rather through the 
spontaneous self-affection or action by which the subject produces its own object of 
knowledge. He writes: “The subject (object in the appearance) affected by empirical 
intuition is, insofar as it affects itself according to concepts, an organic body intuited 
according to the five senses” (OP XXII 388: 3–6). The organism does not receive its 
actuality from the affecting object, nor from sensual intuition, but from the fact that 
the organism is necessary for the sake of experience. Kant is very clear that for the 
sake of a doctrine of natural science “in the subject an organic principle of the 
moving forces” is presupposed “in [the form of] universal principles of the 
possibility of experience” (OP XXII 373:1–4). This does not contradict the strictures 
of his transcendental idealism as he makes clear that we can neither prove nor 
postulate the possibility of our organisation (OP XXII 481:8–9) and that we simply 
know ourselves “in experience as an organic body” (OP XXII 481:10). 
      For Kant mind is explanatorily and ontologically continuous with life, in the 
sense that whatever is metaphysically required for a human mind is also present in its 
biological life. 
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 The thesis of epigenesis in biology says that biological material is 
initially unformed and that form gradually emerges through the non-predetermined 
or relatively spontaneous operations of an innate endogenous organisational or 
processing device in interaction with its environment.  As mentioned on pp. 40-41, 
Kant would endorse this and explicitly defends the theory that biological life is 
epigenetic.
77
 He extends this theory analogically to his theory of cognitive innateness 
(CPJ 5: 424) (B167). There is also in Kant’s writings a strong continuity between 
biological life and the spontaneity of action,  combined with an emergentist and non-
reductive approach to biological life: In the third Critique, the Critique of the Power 
of Judgement, in order to explain the behaviours and natures of living organisms, 
including the behaviours and natures of rational human animals, Kant claimed that 
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there is a theoretical obligation to posit the existence of causally efficacious 
emergent properties that naturally arise from self-organising complex dynamical 
systems.   
 
Life without the feeling of the corporeal organ is merely consciousness of one’s 
existence, but not a feeling of well- or ill-being, i.e., the promotion or inhibition 
of the powers of life; because the mind for itself is entirely life (the principle of 
life itself), and hindrances and promotions must be sought outside it, though in 
the human being himself, hence in combination with his body (CPJ 5: 278). 
 
For a body to be judged as a natural purpose in itself and in accordance with its 
internal possibility, it is required that its parts reciprocally produce each other, as 
far as both their form and their combination is concerned, and thus produce a 
whole out of their own causality, the concept of which, conversely is in turn the 
cause (in a being that would possess the causality according to concepts 
appropriate for such a product) of it in accordance with a principle; consequently 
the connection of efficient causes could at the same time be judged as an effect 
though final causes. In such a product of nature each part is conceived as if it 
exists only through all the others, thus as if existing for the sake of the others and 
on account of the whole, i.e., as an instrument (organ), which is, however, not 
sufficient (for it could also be an instrument of art, and thus represented as 
possible at all only as a purpose); rather it must be thought of as an organ that 
produces the other parts (consequently each produces the others reciprocally), 
which cannot be the case in any instrument of art, but only of nature, which 
provides all the matter for instruments (even those of art): only then and on that 
account can such a product, as an organized and self-organizing being, be called 
a natural purpose (CPJ 5: 373-374). 
 
Strictly speaking, the organization of nature is (…) not analogous with any 
causality that we know (CPJ 5: 375). 
 
It might always be possible that in, e.g., an animal body, many parts could be 
conceived as consequences of merely mechanical laws (...) Yet the cause that 
provides the appropriate material, modifies it, forms it, and deposits it in the 
appropriate place must always be judged teleologically, so that everything in it 
must be considered as organized, and everything is also, in relation to the thing 
itself, an organ also (CPJ 5: 37). 
 
       The computationalist, or functionalist conception of cognition is necessarily 
reductionist; mind is akin to some form of computational mechanism, i.e. the mind is 
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the software and the brain the hardware. The basic tenet here is that all cognitive 
functions are at bottom a set of rules for handling symbolic entities that represent 
items of the world. Computationalist/ functionalist or neuro-reductionist approaches 
generally lead to a paradoxical eliminativism, i.e. the elimination of consciousness as 
the domain of our subjective experience during the very process of explanation.  
From this point of view, the mind is necessarily “in the head”, but is reduced to 
representational mechanics, a system of inputs and outputs. This is problematic as 
consciousness itself is seen as an illusion or a fiction.  The  “I” that is supposed to be 
the proper subject of experience, thought, and action doesn’t exist. Functionalists 
like Dennett and Metzinger claim that cognitive neuroscience eliminates the self as 
bearer of consciousness and controlling agent by revealing the complex, 
decentralised functional activity in the brain that is actually responsible for 
behaviour. Chalmers, on the other hand, avers that consciousness cannot be thus 
eliminated, it is an irreducible feature of reality; hence the “hard problem” that arose 
in cognitive science of explaining how the amazing, private world of consciousness 
emerges from neuronal activity in the brain. However, from this new embodied 
perspective, cognition appears as a dynamical process (and not a syntactic one) of 
real time variables with the capacity for self-organisation (and not as representational 
machinery). Moreover, the mind is not “in the head” since its roots are in the body as 
a whole and also in the extended environment where the organism finds itself. This 
means that the constitution of a mind is always concurrent with the extended 
presence of other minds in a social network and the environmental world. In fact, 
what is present in Kant, finds a convergent development from current philosophy of 
biology and the scientific notion of autopoiesis. On this view instead of  describing  
consciousness as an illusion, as is commonplace in reductionist science, there is a 
new understanding of mind in the form of immanent teleological “presence” with 
truly  biological features, inevitably intertwined with the self-establishment of a 
conscious identity which is at the same time the living process. It is argued that this 
understanding of cognition has its beginnings in Kant, who was committed to an 
active, “sensorimotor” view of consciousness, realising the spontaneity of a rational 
agent through acts of “synthesis” or binding in an embodied biological system. He 
views the human mind as metaphysically continuous with biological life, recognising 
that rational human agents are necessarily also rational human living organisms, i.e. 
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biological animals capable of intentionality whose rational mindedness and rational 
directedness towards objects in the world, other real persons, and themselves, is fully 
continuous with this (see Hanna and  Maiese, 2009).   
        One pertinent philosophical question that has risen from enactivism is whether 
or not a machine could be conscious. Questions about artificial consciousness have 
important social and moral ramifications as more and more robots and artificial 
human-like agents are produced. This is the topic of the next section. 
 
6.2. Conscious Machines 
 
The previous section discussed the modern theory of enactive, embodied cognitive 
science, which is anti-dualist; perception is inherently active and cognition is 
embodied and situated.  According to the original founders of enactivism  (Varela, 
Thompson, & Rosch, 1991), the body is not only the living structure to experiences, 
but also the setting for cognition, no longer to be viewed as the manipulation of 
symbols, but as the regulation and coordination of emergent autonomous animal 
agency. Consciousness is defined in terms of an autonomous agent which, through a 
self-producing network of processes, constitutes its own identity (Ziemke, 2007b, 
Thompson, 2007).   This means that consciousness arises as part of the process of an 
embodied entity interacting with the environment in precise ways that are 
determined by its physiology. The agent does not represent the world “in the head” 
or brain, but produces it through the nature of its unique way of interacting with its 
environment. The seeds of this theory can be readily discerned in Kant’s Critique of 
Judgement  in the way in which he also views the mind as an autonomous system 
whose interaction with the world furnishes it with an intrinsically meaningful 
perspective on its environment. Since the enactive framework incorporates both 
biological agency and phenomenological subjectivity, it allows the traditional mind-
body problem that is a direct descendant of Descartes to be recast in terms of what 
has recently been called the “body-body problem” where “[t]he scientific task is to 
understand how the organizational and dynamic processes of a living body can 
become constitutive of a subjective point of view, so that there is something it is like 
to be that body”  (Thompson, 2007, p. 237).  
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       However, importantly, enactivism is pursued in two different styles: 
sensorimotor enactivism (Alva Noë et al) and autopoietic enactivism (Evan 
Thompson et al.). Both types take it to be a fundamental commitment that cognising 
agents are to be viewed as situated in an irreducibly meaningful world, where 
meaning is “enacted” or constituted through the tightly-coupled dynamic relationship 
between an agent’s brain, body, and environment. Sensorimotor enactivism, 
however, makes a constitutive claim; that perceptual consciousness is constituted by 
the exercise of sensorimotor capacities (O’Regan & Noe, 2001, O’Regan, 2011; 
Denegaar & O’ Regan, 2015). This makes use of the notion of “sensing” capacities 
of the sort that can be displayed by simple artifacts; for example, as with artificial 
sensing devices such as missile guidance systems that are said to “sense” their target.  
Human beings, in a similar way, through the use of the bodily senses, also have the 
capacity to engage with the environment and to express their “sense capacities” in a 
broad range of behaviours. The claim of sensorimotor enactivism is that perceptual 
capacities depend on the implicit grasp of sensorimotor dependencies. However, it 
seems evident that full-blown consciousness requires, in addition to this, that the 
perceiver should be able to potentially use information from the environment in 
rational planning, goal directedness and deliberation on deciding a course of action. 
In short, it seems that consciousness involves additional criteria or constraints 
beyond mere perceptual capacity. The stronger theory of autopoietic enactivism 
harnesses the notion of autonomous agency that proposes additional criteria related 
to the origin of the system’s tendencies. As Evan Thompson notes, sensorimotor 
capacities must be the capacities of an agent or self and “agency and selfhood require 
that the system be autonomous” (Thompson, 2007, p. 417) which he spells out in 
autopoietic terms. Moreover, conscious experience or “first person givenness” 
involves self awareness for experiences to be “phenomenally manifest as mine” 
(ibid., p. 420).  
       As discussed earlier, Chalmers claims that artificial consciousness might be 
possible, since the right kind of computations are sufficient for the possession of a 
conscious mind. At the crux of Chalmers’ non-reductive functionalism is the 
Principle of Organizational Invariance, which asserts that  “given any system that 
has conscious experiences, then any system that has the same fine-grained functional 
organization will have qualitatively identical experiences” and also that “[s]ystems 
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with the same causal topology (...) will share their psychological properties” 
(Chalmers, 1995, p. 232.)  This kind of argument supports strong AI, that artificial 
silicon creatures with the right functional organisation could be in possession of a 
conscious mind. The idea of strong AI ignores the essential role of the body and its 
dynamic, goal directed movement in giving rise to the feeling of consciousness.  
Sensorimotor enactivism goes beyond this and emphasises the constitutive role of 
action for “consciousness in general” based on three principles: (i) the body is not an 
object that can be represented; (ii) the presence of the body is the presence of the 
body in the world, and (iii) the body we experience is the body in action. In other 
words, that in order for a machine to have first person phenomenal experience, it 
would require a body with a sensory system, a nervous system, the ability to move 
and sense its environment, react to it and bring about further changes within its 
world as a result (see Stuart, 2007, 2007b). It is claimed,  by Jan Denegaar and Kevin 
O’Regan, that sensorimotor enactivism forms a default position for an enactive 
account of perceptual consciousness, and that even “the particular quality of 
experience e.g. what makes an experience the experience of red, lies in particular 
patterns of sensorimotor engagement”   (Degenaar & O’Regan, 2015, p. 2).  This is 
said to offer a framework for thinking about perceptual consciousness that applies 
both to living organisms, as well as, potentially, to artificial systems. On this 
sensorimotor view, autopoietic organisation, although relevant in living organisms, 
is not itself essential for perceptual consciousness. But one difficulty with this is that 
sensorimotor loops alone cannot provide the conceptual means of distinguishing 
between the intentional action of an autonomous agent and mere accidental 
movement. Perceptual consciousness is linked to purposive behaviour that is 
intrinsically meaningful for the system. If we refer back to the example of the target 
seeking missile it is clear that, unlike a living organism, it lacks purposive agency.     
       As Hans Jonas notes in his critique of cybernetics, autonomous agency depends 
on “whether effector and receptor equipment – that is motility and perception alone – 
is sufficient to make up motivated animal behavior” (Jonas, 1966, p. 117).  This 
further depends on “whether the mechanism is a “whole”, having an identity or self-
ness that can be said to be the bearer of purpose, the subject of action, and the maker 
of decisions” (ibid., p. 118). This is because in order for effector and receptor to 
constitute intrinsically purposive action there must be interposed between them a 
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centre of “concern”. An artificial system consisting only of sensors and motors that 
are coupled together in some manner, and which for reasons of design does not have 
to continually bring forth its own existence under precarious conditions, cannot be 
said to be an individual subject in its own right in the same way that a living 
organism can. To quote Ziemke “despite all biological inspiration today’s adaptive 
robots are still radically different from living organisms. In particular, despite their 
capacity for a certain degree of self organisation today’s so-called “autonomous 
agents” are actually far from possessing the autonomy, and consequently the 
embodiment of living organisms” (Ziemke, 2001, see also Ziemke, 2016). He points 
out that when we refer to both robots and living organisms as autonomous agents it 
is important to keep in mind that their respective “autonomy” and “agency” is 
fundamentally different. We should adopt a position of “caveat spectator” and not 
take similarity of behaviour for similarity of underpinning. The underpinnings, the 
biology, the internal constitution and regulation are crucial because “the way an 
organism constructs itself also shapes the way it constructs its self” (Ziemke, 2007a). 
       At a 2001 workshop called Can a Machine be Conscious, organised by the 
Swartz Foundation, it was declared that their mission statement was “to explore the 
application of mathematical physics and computer engineering principles to 
traditional neurobiology, as a path to better understanding the brain/mind 
relationship”. The universal consensus of philosophers, neurologists and computer 
scientists attending this workshop was that “we know of no fundamental law or 
principle operating in this universe that forbids the existence of subjective feelings in 
artifacts designed or evolved by humans” and “that one day computers or robots 
could be conscious” (Koch 2001), which is currently considered an “open question”. 
In fact, Professor Steve Torrance, founder member of the Centre for Research in 
Cognitive Science at Sussex University (COGS), avers:  
 
It is a matter of some dispute whether the defining properties of autopoiesis can 
be found outside the realm of the truly biological, and it is thus an open question 
as to whether there is any sense in which computationally based constructs could 
ever be seen as being assimilable to an autopoietic framework – that is as original 
self-enacting loci of meaning and purpose, or indeed of consciousness (Torrance, 
2005). 
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Since then, although the possibility of conscious machines as well as the ethical 
ramifications of such an eventuality has been frequently discussed, nobody has 
claimed that anything close to consciousness has occurred in an artefact or machine. 
As Merleau Ponty theorised in the Phénoménologie de la Perception, there is a sense 
of an a priori that belongs to living existence itself, and this is prior to scientific 
reflection, in fact, prior to all reflection. This is the sense of embodiment, often 
referred to as the body schema. Merleau-Ponty, extending the notion from Kant of 
spatial consciousness, brought out the implicit notion that to have a spatialised self-
consciousness is to experience oneself as a body, i.e. an agent. A body schema is a 
pre-attentional, sub-consciously monitored “real time representation of the body in 
space, generated by proprioceptive, somasensory, vestibular and other sensory inputs 
(Schwoebel et al., 2001) which form a core consciousness or self. The body schema 
is the embodied understanding of the whole of the organism’s parameters and the 
constraints of embodiment as such. This idea can be seen in Kant where he infers 
that mind is inexorably linked to the life of the organism. Although he discusses the 
notion of the representation of biological life in The Critique of Judgement in 
mechanistic terms, as having a kind of semantic content of a kind that might be seen 
to be capable in principle of being instantiated in a Turing machine or of being 
functionally describable,  he also emphasises the first personal phenomenal character 
of experience, which as we have seen, he calls “the feeling of life” and which is what 
gives rise to the purposive, goal-directed or teleological behaviour of an organism. 
Kant’s idea appears to be that both the semantic or mechanistic content of the 
representation of biological life and the phenomenal character or consciousness of 
the feeling of life are necessarily and mutually bound up with each another; that 
consciousness and intentionality are mutually intertwined via the neurobiological life 
of an embodied animal mind. The first person perspective-ness or “me-ness” of 
conscious cognitive content is not simply the apperceptive self-awareness of a 
“judgement” that is reliant on the categories, as in the first Critique but is also 
necessarily bound up with the spatial orientation and temporal asymmetry of a self 
regulating biological organism. In other words, the formal intuitional spatiotemporal 
structure of conscious cognitive content just is its subjective character, and this is 
achieved prior to the use of the categories in apperception. Moreover, it seems likely 
that cognition is coextensive with homeostatic metabolic and visceral processes and 
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that a non-homeostatic, artificial silicon creature, even one with “the right kind of 
functional organisation” could not be said to truly be in possession of a conscious 
mind. Mechanistic robots are simply cognitive tools or models rather than entities 
endowed with cognition and true agency.  Furthermore, human intentionality is 
intrinsic, that of mechanistic artefacts, derived. 
78
 This has a bearing on how we are 
to understand enactivism and the benefit of this “Kantian” construal is that it would 
also help explain consciousness in non-human animals. This is the topic of the next 
section. 
 
6.3. Animal Consciousness and Non-conceptual Content  
 
Although Kant wrote that intuitions and concepts are cognitively complementary and 
semantically interdependent for the specific purpose of constituting objectively valid 
or empirically meaningful judgments (A50-51/B74-76), it is argued that it does not 
follow that there cannot be “empty” concepts or “blind” intuitions outside that. 79  
Kant also held the view that receptive experience is necessarily conditioned by 
bodily orientation in space and time in a manner which is necessarily non-
conceptual, therefore the content of perception is also partially sub-rational. In other 
words, it is the human or animal organism’s spatiotemporal perspective or “unique 
point of view” that is fundamental to the subjectivity of its experience, not “the unity 
of consciousness” by which we judge that such and such. It is obvious that non-
human animals are conscious and function in the world without having the capacity 
to make conceptual judgements, and this would account for this capacity in non-
human animals, which no one would deny. Construed this way we can see that for 
Kant the underlying nature of cognitive content is not exhausted by its a priori 
functional components.  The pure a priori forms of intuition, space and time are 
involved in both rational cognition in which we make perceptual judgments by 
means of the categories of the understanding but also in sub-rational cognition. 
Although formal intuition or judgement strictly requires a capacity for self-conscious 
rational cognition and self ascription, the latter is shared by all biological creatures, 
not simply humans.  That is, Kant held a certain non-conceptualism about intuition, 
which entails that judgmental rationality has a pre-rational or sub-rational cognitive 
grounding in more basic non-conceptual cognitive capacities that both humans and 
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animals share. As Robert Hanna avers, non-conceptualism says that “(a) there are 
certain cognitive capacities which are not determined (or at least not fully 
determined) by conceptual capacities, and (b) that the cognitive capacities which 
outstrip conceptual capacities can be possessed by rational and non-rational animals 
alike, whether human or non-human” (Hanna, 2006, pp. 84-85). 80  
       Kant’s  thesis of non-conceptual content is to be located in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic section of the first Critique where he  traces back to the forms of space and 
time,  the pure “forms of intuition”, which are the necessary a priori conditions of 
every mental representation generated by sensibility.  These representations of space 
and time are not only presupposed by all non-conceptual content but also account for 
the existence, cognitive significance (“objective validity”), and psychological 
coherence of our world.  In Kant’s earlier argument from incongruent counterparts 
(to be found in his pre critical essay “Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the 
Differentiation of Directions in Space,” (Kant, 1768))  it was clear that some parts of 
our cognition of objects in the world must depend on how they are given to us in a 
manner that is necessarily non-conceptual. Also in the Metaphysical Exposition 
section of the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant demonstrates that the pure formal 
intuitions of space and time already underlie any representations, for we cannot even 
perform geometrical or mathematical calculations in the head without their 
possibility (A19/B33-A49-B66).  That is, there is a second constitutive element of 
cognition beyond the intellect - we can have direct non-conceptual representations of 
the forms of intuition, what he calls “pure intuitions” and sometimes “formal 
intuitions” of space and time.   Spontaneous apperception through the application of 
the pure categories cannot be what exhaustively presents the world to us. This mean 
that for humans, the for me-ness of conscious cognitive content is essentially bound 
up with a pre-rational intuition of spatial orientation and temporal asymmetry.  As 
mentioned, the formal intuitional spatiotemporal structure of conscious cognitive 
content just is its subjective or “first person” character, and this is achieved prior to 
the use of the categories in apperception. Therefore, Kant is, in effect, saying that in 
light of the cognitively basic nature of non-conceptual content, a necessarily 
concept-related capacity for the unification of “a manifold” is not necessary. Rather, 
it is an animal’s spatiotemporal perspective or unique point of view that is basic to 
the subjectivity of its experience. This accounts for animal consciousness; non-
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human animals are obviously conscious and function in the world without having the 
capacity to make conceptual judgements through the application of the categories of 
the understanding. Kant attributed the capacity for objective perceptual awareness to 
non-human animals, despite their lack of conceptual capacities, i.e. there is room in 
the Kantian system for the possibility of objective conscious awareness in non-
rational animals that is perceptual without being essentially conceptual in nature. 
That Kant allows that animals have the capacity to represent their environment can 
be gleaned from the following passage in the Critique of the Power of Judgment: 
 
Yet from the comparison of the similar mode of operation in animals (the ground 
for which we cannot immediately perceive) to that of humans (of which we are 
immediately aware) we can quite properly infer in accordance with the analogy 
that animals also act in accordance with representations [Vorstellungen] (and are 
not, as Descartes would have it, machines), and that in spite of their specific 
difference, they are still of the same genus as human beings (as living beings) 
(CPJ 5:464). 
 
Also in the recently translated Lectures on Metaphysics, he writes:  
 
We call an animal alive because it has a faculty to alter its own states a 
consequence of its own representations. Someone who maintained that in animals 
the principle of life has no power of representation (vim repraesentativam), but 
rather that they act only according to general laws of matter, was Descartes, and 
afterwards also Malebranche, but to think of animals as machines is impossible, 
because then one would deviate from all analogy with nature... (Metaphysik 
Volckmann (1784–5) LM 28:449; cf. An 7:212). 
 
For it is the two forms of intuition,  space and time that are involved in both rational 
cognition and in the sub-rational cognition of  both human and non-human animals. 
The former constitutes an objective unity of consciousness by virtue of its conceptual 
logical form, requiring a capacity for self-conscious and self-ascription and by which 
we make perceptual judgments by means of the categories of the understanding,  the 
latter is shared by all biological creatures, rational and non-rational animals alike. 
Thus Kant held a certain non-conceptualism about intuition, which entails that our 
capacity to form “judgements” has a pre-rational cognitive grounding in more 
fundamental “non-conceptual” cognitive capacities that we share with various non-
human animals. As Bermúdez states, “allowing that a creature’s representational 
 247 
 
capacities can outstrip its conceptual capacities makes it possible for philosophers 
and cognitive scientists to study aspects of cognition and behavior that remain 
outside the scope of more traditional approaches”  (Bermúdez, 2003).     
 
 
6.4. On the Role of the Imagination. 
 
As mentioned earlier ( Section 3.4.), the role of imagination is a contentious issue in 
Kantian exegesis but can be interpreted as playing a significant role in the pre-
reflective self-awareness and orientation of our bodily selves in the environment. 
According to Susan Stuart, it is imagination that enables us to build up a pre-
reflective bodily expectation about how our experiential world will continue to be, 
and can be thus interpreted as playing a role in both the intellectual and the non-
intellectual pre-reflective awareness of our bodily selves in the world. So, besides the 
reproductive imagination and the productive or cognitive imagination, there is also a 
bodily or muscular pre-reflective imagination. In fact, she writes, from the point of 
view of the agent’s conscious resources, it “makes more sense that a bodily or 
muscular imagination acts in a pre-reflective sensory, that is, visual, olfactory, 
audial, gustatory, tactile, and kinaesthetic manner. It is an imagination that makes 
our bodily consciousness possible because it facilitates the experiential 
interdependence between our thoughts – unity of consciousness – and our world – 
consciousness of unity, and it is the perceiving and reacting body, the enactive 
system, which occupies this illusory position being both subject and object of 
consciousness”(Stuart, 2008, p. 8).81  
       That is to say that imagination in the Kantian framework can be interpreted as 
playing a significant role in the non-intellectual “grasping”, pre-reflective self-
awareness, and orientation of our bodily selves in our world. In a similar vein, 
Angelica Nuzzo proposes that imagination is pre-discursive and embodied: i.e. 
“transcendental embodiment” refers to the “pure, a priori dimension of our 
sensibility (cognitive, practical, and aesthetic) – a dimension that is irreducible to 
purely mental activity and is necessarily embodied” (Nuzzo, 2008. p. 7).  According 
to Nuzzo, Kant grounds the “humanity of reason” in the distinctly human 
experiences made possible by the a priori dimension of human body. Both Stuart’s 
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and Nuzzo’s positions tie in with Merleau-Ponty’s development of Kant in 
Phénoménologie de la Perception, where he argues that we are not just “in” space, 
but are “of” it; that is, self-consciousness is the self-consciousness of a body, 
something inherently extended in space.   
       Others would dispute the idea that the body plays a role in Kant’s theory of the 
productive imagination, in particular, its schematising activities, since he aligns inner 
sense with the sphere of the mental (Aquila 1992; Longuenesse 2006, Ginsberg, 
2008; Melnick 2009; McDowell, 2009). It is useful here to elucidate Kant’s 
distinction between “productive” and “reproductive” imagination. Productive 
imagination concerns the possibility of cognition a priori, whilst reproductive 
imagination, whose synthesis is subject to empirical laws, is concerned with 
psychology, and the laws of association. This involves the retention of earlier 
intuitions in such a way that certain other representations can “bring about a 
transition of the mind” to these earlier representations, even in the absence of any 
current representation of them (A100). The reproductive faculty of the imagination is 
“merely empirical” (A121). Productive imagination, on the other hand, implies a 
fundamental grounding of all cognitive capacities in imaginative acts. It does not 
concern itself with the connection of given intuitions, but rather, with the unified self 
that is necessary for any experience whatsoever. Kant regards the productive 
imagination synthesis speciosa, “figurative synthesis” or “transcendental function of 
the imagination” as the bridge between understanding and sensibility (A124). 
Through imagination, the principle of the synthetic unity of apperception is the 
principle of figurative as well as intellectual synthesis.  
       It is in the Deduction that Kant distinguishes between the two kinds of synthesis: 
“intellectual synthesis” (synthesis intellectualis), which is the manifold of an 
intuition in general, and “figurative synthesis” (synthesis speciosa) which is the 
synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition, which is necessary a priori and 
depends on the faculty of sensibility. It is the product of the imagination, which, 
though spontaneous, itself  “belongs to sensibility” (B151).  Kant talks of figurative 
synthesis or synthesis speciosa, as “an action of the understanding on sensibility and 
is its first application” (B152).  This synthesis is also called the transcendental 
synthesis of the imagination “in order to be distinguished from the merely 
intellectual combination” (B151). The transcendental use of the imagination resides 
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in its role in schematising - in producing a schema in order to subsume intuitions 
given by sensibility under a concept. Combination, however, proceeds prior to 
imagination and, it is only through the synthesis speciosa that “the categories, in 
themselves mere forms of thought, obtain objective reality…” (B150).  Thus, 
figurative synthesis, synthesis speciosa, or transcendental or productive imagination 
accounts for the possibility of perceptual knowledge of spatio-temporal objects.  
Figurative synthesis is here presented as a condition for the objective reality of the 
categories, and, although an exercise of spontaneity in accordance with the synthetic 
unity of apperception, for the unity of this synthesis must presuppose it, it is a level 
of spontaneity which, as the “first application”, does not yet properly consist in any 
concepts.  Its function is only to “determine the sense a priori in respect of its form 
in accordance with the unity of apperception”. That this synthesis is given prior to 
concepts is confirmed in a footnote at B160-1 which parenthetically directs the 
reader to §24, and to the outline of synthesis speciosa: 
 
Space, represented as object (as we are required to do in geometry), contains 
more than mere form of intuition; it also contains combination [gathering-
together [Zusammenfassung]  of the manifold, given according to the form of 
sensibility, in an intuitive representation, so that the form of intuition gives only a 
manifold, the formal intuition gives unity of representation. In the Aesthetic I 
have treated this unity as belonging merely to sensibility, simply in order to 
emphasise that it precedes any concept, although, as a matter of fact, it 
presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses but through which 
all concepts of space and time first become possible. For since by its means (in 
that the understanding determines the sensibility) space and time are first given 
as intuitions, the unity of this a priori intuition belongs to space and time, and not 
to the concept of the understanding (B160-61n). 
 
On this understanding of synthesis speciosa, the pre-intellectual syntheses of 
experience is subordinate to and aligned with the “intellectual” or formal synthesis of 
understanding, and ensures that conceptual form percolates all the way down. Most 
importantly, the definition given by Kant (“the faculty of representing in intuition an 
object that is not itself present” (B151), identifies the imagination’s activity with 
sensibility’s capacity to give pure intuitions of space and time as conditions for the 
possibility of given representations (Nuzzo, p. 28). In other words, imagination’s 
spontaneity ultimately derives from Kant’s transcendental doctrines on space and 
time as our forms of receptivity. On this view, we can think of Kant as implicitly 
holding the view that there is something like the “a priori of the human body”, or 
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that the body is “the transcendental site of sensibility” which “displays a formal, 
ideal dimension essential to our experience as human beings” (Nuzzo, ibid., pp.8-9). 
Kant also calls productive imagination a “hidden art in the depths of the human 
soul” [my italics]. It is instructive that the term art is a technical term for Kant.  In 
the Critique of Judgement, for example, he defines it as not a product, a beautiful 
painting, but as the activity of an agent engaged in the act of painting, and is 
distinguished from theoretical knowledge as the activity of skilled know how (CPJ  
5:303). 
82
 This implies a pivotal role of the body in perceptual experience, that 
perception can take place only if there is imaginative and bodily activity prior to 
judgement. 
        In his pre-critical essay Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation 
of Directions in Space (1768), Kant discusses the existence of left-and right-handed 
objects (which instantiate pairs of “incongruent counterparts”, objects which are 
identical in their parts but still different in the sense that they cannot be enclosed by 
the  same surface, such as is the case with a pair of gloves.  Kant refers to the sense 
of orientation that allows us to intuitively distinguish our right hand from the left. He 
claims that this proved that space does not depend on relations between things, but 
on the points of view of subjects of perception, or rather on the relationship between 
perceiving subjects and objects. Kant stresses the fact that we intuitively relate things 
to the orientation of our body in order to argue that space can neither be perceived by 
the senses nor grasped by the intellect, but must depend on the transcendental ground 
for cognition.  Kant’s account of left/right orientation in this earlier work is relevant 
to his more or less implicit conception of embodiment in the Critique. For 
orientation is only possible where there is an embodied subject of perception, i.e. it is 
the fact of embodiment that makes it possible to experience objects in the first place, 
and it has been suggested that since embodiment can neither be reduced to the forms 
of intuition nor to a merely empirical fact, Kant must have conceived of the oriented 
human body as a “transcendental ground for our cognition” in its own right. 
Angelica Nuzzo’s account of embodiment in Kant is that  “the body is not the site of 
the empirical senses but the reference point of our formal sense for spatial 
orientation” (ibid., p. 36). Nuzzo’s interpretation and in-depth analysis of all three of 
Kant’s critiques is guided by what she terms Kant’s “transcendental embodiment” 
which refers to the “pure, a priori dimension of our sensibility (cognitive, practical, 
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and aesthetic) - a dimension that is irreducible to purely mental activity and is 
necessarily embodied” (ibid., p. 7). On this reading, the problem of Cartesian mind-
body dualism is dissolved since the pure a priori dimension of our cognitive, 
practical and aesthetic sensibility is irreducible to purely mental activities and is 
necessarily embodied. In other words, phenomenologically, the organism 
experiences itself as a unified whole acting and interacting in the world to achieve 
goals:  there is an irreducible me-ness involved with the possession, ownership and 
agency of the bodily starting point for activity. This zero-point orientation is not 
simply bodily position or physiology, but necessarily involves the interactive 
element of sensorimotor activities that require both the tacit and explicit 
intentionality of a cognising agent.  
        From the above considerations it is suggested that for Kant the biological 
substrate of consciousness is the whole organism in its dynamic interaction with the 
environment; consciousness is inherently intentional, necessarily neurobiologically 
embodied and engaged with the natural world. He would not have been in agreement 
with the ideas of analytic/ functionalist cognitive science where the brain is taken in 
isolation from the non-neural body and environment, and which entails that 
consciousness could, in principle, be restricted to a brain in a vat rather than a body 
in a world.  
 
As Stephen Palmquist remarks:  
 
Neuroscience will begin to dovetail nicely with philosophy when it recognizes 
that wisdom comes to us once we recognize that the brain itself trusts the body 
for virtually all of its functioning, just as Jung says the ego must trust the Self-
archetype (Palmquist, 2013, p.3n).  
.  
Kant’s ultimate goal in philosophizing was to articulate an idea of human nature 
as a unified whole ( ibid., p. 4). 
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   7. Conclusion. 
 
After the demise of the “anti-mentalistic” attitude in cognitive science during the 
first half of the twentieth century due to the rise of behaviourism, and the restoration 
of “the mind” to respectability in the second half through the “cognitive revolution”, 
a functionalist-computational mind emerged, which was rendered scientific at the 
cost of removing from it its most fundamental characteristic: consciousness, or 
phenomenal, first-person experience. Following from this, when consciousness, or 
the “what-it-is-like-to-be” problem inevitably reappeared on the scientific scene, it 
was the “hard problem” of explaining this within a materialistic framework that 
caught the imagination of scientists and philosophers alike. The quest was on for 
what had become the holy grail of cognitive science, a materialistic, scientific 
understanding of phenomenal consciousness. David Chalmers was among the first to 
oppose such a reductionist scientific theory of mind and proposed a division of the 
problems of consciousness into the “easy” ones and the “hard” ones, the former 
being explicable in terms of functional/computational or neural mechanisms and the 
latter turning on the fact that consciousness and its attendant “qualia” resist any sort 
of functional definition. One reason for this is the physical causal closure thesis 
(Kim, 1993).  No causal chain involving a physical event will ever cross the 
boundary of the physical into the nonphysical: If x is a physical event and y is a 
cause or effect of x, then y, too, must be a physical event. The physical causal closure 
thesis is primarily a metaphysical framework to which materialists and physicalists 
are committed and which permits no place for what is metaphysically independent of 
the physical world to have any causal effects. Thus it was that the study of the mind 
based on the functionalist or information processing model gave rise to the hard 
problem of consciousness, since it produces a dichotomy of “function” or brain 
activity, and phenomenal consciousness where conscious properties (qualia) are seen 
as nothing but epiphenomenal, caused by physical occurrences, but themselves 
causally redundant, having no physical effect on the material world. This led to a 
proliferation of attempts by scientists and philosophers to solve the deep problems 
and paradoxes of phenomenal consciousness, such as: What is the evolutionary 
advantage of consciousness? How can consciousness arise from mere matter? Could 
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there be a zombie, a creature that looked human in every way but without 
consciousness? How does one bridge the explanatory gap between brain activity and 
phenomenal consciousness? The principle tenet of a “science of consciousness”, that 
there is “something it is like” to have an experience, that consciousness is essentially 
characterised by reference to there being “something it is like” to be in a certain 
mental state is what has given rise to the explanatory gap between mind and matter. 
This problem seems as intractable as ever, no credible solution has been found 
despite the vast amount of literature and studies on the subject. It has been suggested 
that this is because philosophers have attempted to resolve a paradox on its own 
terms, rather than question the presuppositions that make it unavoidable. The aim of 
this thesis has been to demonstrate the contemporary relevance of Kant’s 
transcendental psychology in this regard; to show that it is an invaluable conceptual 
tool for confronting some of the puzzles in contemporary debate. It therefore rails 
against the orthodoxy of the dominant analytic school of philosophy, according to 
which Kant had little to say about the mind that was correct or useful, and also 
against analytic functionalists and “brain bound” theories. Admittedly, Kant’s 
transcendental psychology,  in several important respects, can readily be seen as an 
early form of functionalism or a proto-functionalism about the mind, as has been 
noted by several scholars. However, crucially, it also transcends this in several 
important ways, ways that can be made fruitful in addressing the puzzling features 
that arose from functionalism itself.   
        In order to bring this to the fore, the historical context within which Kant 
developed his ideas was examined; it was argued that adopting a historical 
perspective was particularly called for because the many conceptual problems that 
have plagued the quest for a scientific understanding of consciousness are the result 
of the lasting influence of this largely forgotten or neglected philosophical heritage. 
Cognitive science is based on the problematic rationalism of Descartes,  where the 
mind is viewed as something inner (the brain/ mental processes) disconnected from 
other people and from the outer world.  There is the Cartesian manner of thinking 
about consciousness as a stream of consciousness in the “theatre” of the mind. A 
successful science of consciousness must be able to give an account of the contents, 
the stream, the unity and the continuity. It is also based on the Cartesian/Humean 
notion that all we perceive are “ideas” (nowadays, representations) which mediate 
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between us and the external world. On this traditional picture of cognition, the mind 
just is a complex system constituted by mental representations, operating on or 
processing information, whether in abstract workings or functions of the mind or 
later, in cognitive neuroscience, in the “wetware” of the brain.  It was shown that this 
model eventually gave rise to the hard problem of consciousness and resulted in a 
dichotomy of views between those that view the hard problem as a tractable 
question, a real problem answerable in broadly neuro-scientific terms and those who 
deny that there is anything answering to our conception of consciousness to the 
extent that it goes beyond structure and function.  This had led to a kind of 
philosophical and methodological impasse where the arguments go back and forth 
without solution, all based on the idea that consciousness is kind of super-property 
added onto mechanistic physical properties of the brain.  
       A Kantian analysis, however, shows that the modern mind-body problem is the 
result of a kind of category error, where the a priori, transcendental character of 
subjectivity is confused with psychological “facts” amenable to scientific 
explanation. It shows that the nature of  subjective experience and its phenomenal 
qualities is impossible to understand in terms of  dualism of substances or properties 
and addresses the problem of trying to explain introspective first-person aspects of 
mental states (the mind) and consciousness in general in terms of third-person 
quantitative neuroscience (the brain/body). For Kant, there is a deep confusion with 
the idea of “mind” and “body” as conceptually separable. The nature of the question 
is misleading and leads us to believe that there is something tractable that can be 
substantiated in the realm of empirical knowledge. He held that certain mistaken 
beliefs about the mind and consciousness arise from reification of first person 
phenomenal experience, because certain philosophers (Descartes) have projected the 
particularity of private, first person experience onto a third person entity called “the 
mind”  or “thinking substance”. This is not to deny that consciousness involves self-
awareness, it is to deny that self-awareness can be accounted for on analogy with our 
consciousness of extra-mental objects, i.e. in terms of a subject-object relationship. 
Although some contemporary philosophers do recognise and criticise the hidden 
assumptions underpinning much of cognitive science and neuroscience, it  has gone 
largely unrecognised that the radical critique of  this model or understanding of the 
mind began with Kant, whose powerfully innovative transcendental inquiry into the 
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necessary a priori conditions for cognition was not only a major philosophical 
breakthrough in his own time, but still surpasses contemporary anti-Cartesian/ quasi-
Humean (e.g. Dennett’s) efforts today.  
       Again, with the emergence of the embodied, enactive view of the mind as an 
alternative to traditional, representational theories of cognition, this idea was 
prefigured by him over two hundred years ago. On this view, instead of either trying 
to solve the hard problem of consciousness, (Cartesian) or describing consciousness 
as an illusion, (Humean) as is commonplace in reductionist, functionalist accounts, a 
newer understanding of a form of immanent teleological “presence” involving truly 
biological features is now on the horizon, inevitably intertwined with the self-
establishment of a conscious identity which is at the same time the living process. 
Kant was committed to an active, sensorimotor view of consciousness, realising the 
spontaneity of rational agent through acts of “synthesis” or binding in an embodied 
biological system. His views on this, to be found in his later work, the Critique of 
Judgement, depict the human mind as metaphysically continuous with biological 
life,  and display his recognition that rational human agents are necessarily also 
rational human living organisms, i.e. biological animals capable of intentionality 
whose rational mindedness and rational directedness towards objects in the world, 
other real persons, and themselves, is fully continuous with this.  In his last 
philosophical writings, the Opus Postumum, Kant refers to the work undertaken in 
the Critique of Pure Reason. Without invalidating the a priori categories that had 
been the possibility of all knowledge, he finds an entirely new foundation for them, 
and this is the lived body.  For Kant, mind is explanatorily and ontologically 
continuous with life, in the sense that whatever is metaphysically required for a 
human mind is also present in its biological life.  The thesis of epigenesis in biology 
says that biological material is initially unformed and that form gradually emerges 
through the non-predetermined or relatively spontaneous operations of an innate 
endogenous organisational or processing device in interaction with its environment.  
It has been argued that Kant would endorse this view and in fact explicitly defends 
the theory that biological life is epigenetic. Importantly,  he also extends this theory 
analogically to his theory of cognitive innateness (CPJ 5: 424; B167). Although 
Kant is often conceived as having offered little attention to the fact that we 
experience the world in and through our bodies,  there is evidence that  not only does 
 256 
 
Kant, throughout his career and in works published before and after the Critiques, 
reflect constantly upon the fact that human life is embodied, but the Critique of Pure 
Reason itself may be read as a critical reflection aimed at exploring some significant 
philosophical implications of this fact. Although there can be little doubt that in the 
Critique reference to consciousness or thoughts is abstract and conceptual, in the 
Opus Postumum he suggests that nothing but the body can be the basis for the a 
priori principles postulated. Thought depends on the proper workings of the senses, 
and for sensory input to be ordered in such a way so as to make possible the 
formation of coherent thoughts, an agent must be dynamically coupled to the 
environment. Accordingly, if we are to understand cognition, it is more fruitful to 
think beyond the inner and outer distinction of mind and world found on traditional 
accounts and to consider the natural unity that already exists between an organism 
and the environment in which it is actively engaged. On this understanding, there is 
neither subjective supremacy over the objective nor is the subjective absorbed into 
the objective realm of traditional mechanistic science.  Rather such science returns to 
the experiential realm from which the very dichotomy between subjectivity and 
objectivity arises, and then establishes within it a system of mutual constraint. 
 
As Evan Thompson writes in the preface of Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, 
and the Sciences of Mind: 
Where there is life there is mind, and mind in its most complex forms belongs to 
life. Life and mind share a core set of formal or organizational properties, and the 
formal and organizational properties distinctive of mind are an enriched version 
of those fundamental to life. More precisely, the self-organizing features of mind 
are an enriched version of the self-organizing features of life (Thompson, 2007). 
 
This is a fundamentally different perspective of ourselves, in stark contrast to the 
reductionist, deterministic, and mechanistic portrayal of human nature that is given 
in  contemporary accounts, where a picture of humanity is emerging that threatens to 
undermine the sense of our own freedom and agency. This new vision of human 
cognition is potentially liberating, providing room for freedom, morality and 
reaffirming our understanding of what it is to be human. As was stated at the outset 
of this work, Kant is not merely a long-deceased philosopher, whose ideas have been 
superseded, but cognitive science’s intellectual godfather and also fellow worker in 
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the field.  He was a revolutionary, with novel and compelling ideas about the mind, 
human freedom, the place of mankind in nature, and of the irreducible but also non-
dualistic mindedness of embodied creatures, whose mental properties are as basic in 
nature as biological properties, and metaphysically continuous with this. Kant was 
the first post-Newtonian philosopher to attempt to face up directly and fully to the 
philosophical problems of consciousness, and also of reconciling free will with 
universal natural determinism. Scientists and philosophers concerned with the 
problem of consciousness would benefit greatly from a proper understanding of his 
views - concerning the mind’s synthesising powers, about its various mental unities  
(in particular, the unity of consciousness), and about consciousness of self.  
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Appendix 1. Notes 
                                                 
1
 Patrica Kitcher writes “Through his analysis of the prerequisites of cognition, Kant discovers a 
connection that links cognitive states. Even the most minimal cognitive task….demands a synthesis of 
states ... in further states, but acts of synthesis both create and presuppose relations among cognitive 
states. Synthesis creates a relation of dependence. The resulting state depends for its content, and so 
for its existence as a particular cognitive state, on the existence of earlier states”. (Kitcher, 1990, 
p.117)  
 
2
 This is in reference to a famous essay by Thomas Nagel called “What is it Like to be a Bat?”(1975), 
which has become almost synonymous with the formulation of “the hard problem of consciousness”. 
 
3
 Daniel Dennett regards what he terms “heterophenomenology”, (the observation and recording of 
the mental lives of others as it is publicly expressed or manifested) as a way of bridging the 
subjective-objective divide. He writes  “[Heterophenomenology] is the neutral path leading from 
objective physical science and its insistence on the third-person point of view, to a method of 
phenomenological description that can (in principle) do justice to the most private and ineffable 
subjective experiences, while never abandoning the methodological scruples of science (Dennett, 
1991, p. 72). But his argument has many flaws. 
 
4
 The clearest account of this distinction is in the Anthropology where Kant writes. “Inner sense is not 
pure apperception, consciousness of what we are doing; for this belongs to the power of thinking. It 
is, rather, consciousness of what we undergo as we are affected by the play of our own thoughts.”  
(1798, Ak. vii, p. 161) 
 
5
 Importantly, intuitions for Kant are not sense experiences; an intuition “is not as such as can itself 
give us the existence of objects....[i]t is derivative (intuitus derivativus) not original (intuitus 
originarius)” (B 72).  He argues that our knowledge of objects is grounded in the transcendental unity 
of apperception: an object is “that in the concept of which a manifold of a given intuition is united” 
(B137). He describes the “manifold of a priori sensibility” as the “material for the concepts of pure 
understanding” without which the latter would be “without any content” (A77).  This means that 
before they are synthesised, various given intuitions form a manifold, by being “received” by the a 
priori forms of sensibility (time and space). This suggests that empirical objects are “constructed” in 
the synthesis that unifies the manifold (see also A190/B235). The manifold of a priori sensibility is 
thus the material for synthesis, as opposed to the modes of transcendental unity, the categories, which 
are the form. Kant characterises an empirical intuition as a representation that is related to the object 
through sensation, where sensation is defined as a subjective representation that refers to our state 
insofar as we are “affected by objects” (A19–20/B34, A320/B377).  
 
 
6
 These two concepts of consciousness, empirical apperception or ‘inner sense’ and ‘transcendental 
apperception’, generate two very different questions about the relation between consciousness and 
nature. On the one hand, there is the question of how mentality is related to physical nature; on the 
other hand, there is the question of how “spontaneity” is related to the whole of nature. 
 
7
 The passage reads: “One of the reasons cognitive science is such a land of plenty for philosophers is 
that so many of its questions—not just the grand bird’s-eye view questions but quite proximal, in-the-
lab-now questions—are still ill thought out, prematurely precipitated into forms that deserve critical 
re-evaluation.”  
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8
 In Strawson’s own words “Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our 
thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure”.  
However, the details of “the actual structure of the thoughts about the world” that Strawson wants to 
reveal through his descriptive metaphysics are cashed out in terms of his psycho semantic linguistics, 
the structure of which can be revealed by digging “beneath the surface of any natural language” 
(Strawson, 1959, p. 9). 
 
9
 As Strawson writes: “A major part of the role of the Deduction will be to establish that experience 
necessarily involves knowledge of objects, in the weighty sense” (1966, p. 88).  
 
10
  Strawson himself regarded The Bounds of Sense is “a somewhat ahistorical attempt to recruit Kant 
to the ranks of the analytical metaphysicians, while simultaneously discarding those metaphysical 
elements that refused any such absorption”. He writes that his intention in writing it was “to preserve 
and present systematically what I took to be the major insights of Kant’s work, while detaching them 
from those parts of the total doctrine that, if they had any substantial import at all, I took to be at best 
false, at worse mysterious to the point of being barely comprehensible” (Strawson, 2003, pp. 8-9)  
 
11
 Hanna writes in Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy: “It has been forcefully argued 
by several leading contemporary philosophers that analytic philosophy has now reached a stage of 
crisis in its development. This crisis arises from the very unsettling fact that many and perhaps even 
most analytic philosophers now question the defensibility and ultimate intelligibility of the very idea 
of analysis. But how can there be analytic philosophy without a cogent and coherent conception of 
philosophical analysis? In this sense, the analytic consensus in contemporary philosophy—as 
intellectually vigorous, institutionally secure, and one might even say bull-marketish, as it 
undoubtedly is— is speeding towards a crash. Michael Friedman has very plausibly traced the origins 
of this crisis back to analytic philosophy’s rejection of Kant, via its intimate but stormy relationship 
with logical positivism.”  (Hanna, 2004, p.11). 
  
12 In Remnants of Meaning (1987) Steven Shiffer presents a devastating criticism of analytic 
philosophy, and claims  that the kinds of semantic linguistic projects at the heart of contemporary 
analytic philosophy are incoherent and impossible, thus undermining the whole enterprise.  
 
13
 “It seems to many people that consciousness is a mystery, the most wonderful magic show 
imaginable, an unending series of special effects that defy explanation. I think that they are mistaken: 
consciousness is a physical, biological phenomenon—like metabolism or reproduction. . . .” ( 
Dennett, 2005. p.57) 
 
14
 Intuitions are said to be elicited in response to thought experiments or the description of possible 
case scenarios. Using intuitions about possible cases is central to the methodology of much 
contemporary analytic philosophy. The idea that intuitions can provide us with access to the truth is 
currently a hot topic in analytic philosophy.  
 
15
 In his book Fashionable Nihilism: A Critique of Analytic Philosophy, Wilshire criticises the 
impersonal nature of analytic philosophy, and how it is overwhelmingly accepted by contemporary 
academia as being beyond reproach.  
 
16
 Brian Leiter is co-editor of The Philosophical Gourmet Report (also known as the Leiter Report or 
PGR) which is a ranking of graduate programs in philosophy in the English-speaking world. 
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17
 An excellent resource is to be found in Hatfield’s 1992 paper “Empirical, rational, and 
transcendental psychology”, where he discusses the complexities of psychology as a science in Kant’s 
view. 
 
18
 Glock distinguishes stronger from weaker historicist claims, and concludes that analytic philosophy 
is no more subject to reasonable objections on the basis of historical considerations than any other 
systematic approach to philosophy. Weak historicism is when a study of the past is useful without 
being indispensible. However, as Bernard Williams, one of the most venerated practitioners of 
analytic philosophy avers, the study of philosophical history is not simply an aid to contemporary 
philosophical analysis, but essential to it since the genesis of certain concepts or beliefs is crucial to 
their content and validity (Williams, 2002. See also Alvarez, 2011). 
 
19
 The causal closure thesis is the characteristic principle of physicalism or materialism and states that 
“[n]o physical event has a cause outside the physical domain” (Kim, 1993, p. 280). Also formulated 
as “all physical effects have only physical causes” (Vincente, 2006, p. 150. 
 
20
 The Paralogisms chapters are concerned with the rationalist philosophers who “succumb to a 
powerful illusion grounded in the very nature of reason itself (A298/B354). 
 
21
 He writes: “There is a minimally sufficient neural correlate for the content of consciousness at any 
given point in time. If all properties of this local neural correlate are fixed, the properties of subjective 
experience are fixed as well. Of course, the outside world could at the same time undergo 
considerable changes. For instance, a disembodied but appropriately stimulated brain in a vat could – 
phenomenologically -enjoy exactly the same kind of conscious experience you do right now while 
reading this book” (Metzinger, 2003, p. 547). 
 
22
 Autopoietic systems, whether simple unicellular or more complex organisms act to further their 
existence, through the appropriate exchange of internal components with surroundings, and via the 
maintenance of boundary conditions. 
 
23
  In Kant’s Organicism Mensch argues persuasively that Kant’s epistemological reflections should 
be understood against the background of eighteenth century biology, which significantly impacted his 
philosophical development.  
 
24
 Wilfrid Sellars is an early, if not the earliest, contemporary functionalist in the philosophy of mind 
and described mental states as individuated by the inferential roles they play in thought, 
independently of their physical realization. 
 
25
  It is later argued that the faculty of reason is inherently constrained by the particular contingent 
conditions of our human animal embodiment. 
 
26
  The key to the difference between functionalist and neural models is that functionalism reduces 
consciousness to a role, whereas neural models identify consciousness with a physical or biological 
property that implements or realises that role in humans. 
 
27
 An NCC is a minimal neural system N such that there is a mapping from states of N to states of 
consciousness, where a given state of N is sufficient, under conditions C, for the corresponding state 
of consciousness. An NCC (for content) is a minimal neural representation system N such that 
representations of a content in N is sufficient, under conditions C, for representation of that content in 
consciousness (Chalmers, 2000, p. 31). 
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28
 To bring this out, Kant claims that the unity of thought might be the result of a collective unity of 
substances acting together just as “the [single] motion of a body is the composite motion of all its 
parts” (A353) and the continuity of thoughts might be based in a series of substances that pass their 
states from one to another, just as “[an] elastic ball which impinges on another similar ball in a 
straight line communicates to the latter its whole motion, and therefore its whole state” (A363n).  
29
 In Kant’s Organicism, Jennifer Mensch makes a case for how the concept of epigenesis, a radical 
theory of biological formation, lies at the heart of Kant’s conception of reason, and that it was  not 
simply a metaphor for Kant but centrally guided his critical philosophy (Mensch, 2013). It should be 
noted that this view is controversial and that there are objections to Mensch’s view.  Hein van den 
Berg (2014), for example, questions the validity of the organicist interpretation, since, according to 
her, it is unclear what the use of biological terminology would add to the understanding of Kant’s 
deduction of the ideas of reason. Why would Kant take epigenesis, a theory which he often criticised, 
as a model for his transcendental philosophy? She draws attention to historians of science who 
emphatically disagreed with this view, since epigenesis would pose significant problems for Kant’s 
philosophy, and argues that Kant was never fully comfortable with it. Epigenesis was a theory of 
generation giving expression to the fundamental eighteenth-century intuition of hylozoism, the idea of 
radical spontaneity in matter itself, which, it is claimed, Kant denies (Zammito, 2003, 2007).  In 
defending herself from this charge, Mensch notes that Zammito recounted and re-evaluated this view 
in his reader’s report on Kant’s Organicism for the University of Chicago Press in the Autumn of 
2011, stating “I can still cling to my view that Kant was never quite comfortable with epigenesis, but 
as a theory of nature, while I will concede with alacrity that he may well have been far more 
enamoured of it as a basis for metaphysics than I had conceived.”   Zammito (2003) had previously 
argued that, in spite of Kant’s employment of the term epigenesist, his position contained many traits 
of the direct rival theory, preformationism. Mensch, however,  is of the opinion that historians of 
science must uncouple Kant’s writings on generic preformation from the use he makes of epigenesis 
with respect to reason, which were written during the so called “silent period”, and argues that Kant’s 
letters, lectures,  notes, and the marginal notations he made alongside the textbooks he used for his 
classes should not be ignored in an attempt to understand his views, as they are a valuable source of 
what lies behind Kant’s theoretical endeavours. She notes that they are frequently made use of by 
many other Kantian scholars: Wolfgang Carl, Paul Guyer, Beatrice Longuenesse, and Patricia 
Kitcher, to name a few.  She also argues, persuasively, that van der Berg appears to ignore Chapter 7 
which is the main focus for her position, where she describes Kant’s account of “transcendental 
affinity” as the key to understanding the manner in which an epigenetic reason is ultimately necessary 
for the success of the Transcendental Deduction. Boris Demarest (2017) has also convincingly argued 
against Zammito, that Kant’s version of epigenesis is more like classical epigenetics than 
preformationism, and gives a detailed argument as why it was that he clung to preformationist 
terminology.  
 
30
 In Naming and Necessity Kripke argues for the non-identity of pain and C-fibre stimulation on the 
basis that each can be conceived of as existing without the other. Kripke’s intuitions are, in this sense, 
Cartesian. 
 
31
 Glock identifies Kant as the one who genuinely sets the table for the analytic conception of 
philosophy. In Kant we find a priori metaphysics, the centrality of epistemology, and the vision of 
philosophy as autonomous from the special sciences while remaining a cognitive discipline. 
 
32
 Whereas there was a certain conceptual muddiness in the A edition version, in the B edition version 
of the Deduction, the two sides of the A Deduction, the objective side and the subjective side, are 
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integrated into a single line of argument.  
 
33
 See Michael Dummett Origins of Analytical Philosophy, where he writes that the rejection of 
psychologism by Frege leads more or less inevitably to the linguistic turn and analytic philosophy 
(Dummett, 1993, p. 25). 
 
34
 The problem with this narrow interpretation of Strawson’s is that it overlooks Kant’s view that 
analysis in the Critique is just part of a much broader argumentative framework. As Graham Bird has 
written of a putative Kantian descriptive metaphysics: “Kant’s descriptive metaphysics is a 
descriptive metaphysics of science, including psychology, and of ordinary experience” (Bird, G. 
2003, p. 77). 
 
35
 As Robert Pippin points out in a recent paper, for Kant logic had no content of its own, but was the 
“form” of the thought of any possible content. In addition, the unit of meaning, the truth-bearer, or 
judgment, was essentially apperceptive. Judging was implicitly the consciousness of judging. This 
was for Kant a logical truth (Pippin, 2014). 
 
36
 Hanna claims the Critique is first and foremost about the nature of human Erkenntnis or “cognition” 
and “its anthropocentric, real metaphysics, transcendental idealism, it is not a treatise in what has 
come to be known in the neo-Kantian and Analytic traditions as Erkenntnistheorie or “epistemology,” 
except as a secondary by-product.” See Robert Hanna, The Limits of Sense and Reason: An Analytic 
and Critical Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (2015, unpublished). 
 
37
 Kant writes: There are only two ways in which we can account for a necessary agreement of 
experience with the concepts of its objects: either experience makes these concepts possible or these 
concepts make experience possible. The former supposition does not hold ... There remains, therefore, 
only the second supposition – a system, as it were, of the epigenesis of pure reason – namely, that the 
categories contain, on the side of the understanding, the grounds of the possibility of all experience in 
general (B 166-67). 
 
38
 Notably, of  the early analytic philosophers, Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus did not make this 
interpretive mistake, and  even went to so far as to assert that logic is transcendental:  6.13 Logic is 
not a theory but a reflexion of the world. Logic is transcendental” (TLP 169). 
 
39
 Rosenberg claims that transcendental logic “is a species of pure specialized logic” because it is 
“concerned with the most general principles of our thinking about objects experienced as in space and 
time” (2005, p. 90). 
40
 In the Principles of Philosophy (1640) Descartes wrote: “By the word ‘thought’ (‘pensée’) I 
understand all that of which we are conscious as operating in us”. 
41
 It should be noted that Descartes does not consistently adhere to classical substance dualism. For 
instance, he writes:The soul is really joined to the whole body, and . . .we cannot properly say that it 
exists in one part of the body to the exclusion of the others. For the body is a unity which is in a sense 
indivisible because of the arrangement of its organs, these being so related to one another that the 
removal of any one of them renders the whole body defective. And the soul . . . is related solely to the 
whole assemblage of the body’s organs. (Descartes, Passions of the Soul, 339, AT 351). 
 
42
 For example, Peter Hacker writes: “[T]he larger part of the multitudinous philosophical writings of 
the consciousness studies community, and a considerable number of neuroscientific writings, rest on 
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fundamental conceptual confusions”… “The so called “hard problem of consciousness” and the 
plethora of related puzzles that arise from this mistaken understanding are simply conceptual 
confusions masquerading as empirical questions” (Hacker, 2012). Similarly, Paul Thagard claims 
that, contrary to commonly held views, philosophy is extraneous to cognitive science, it has a crucial 
role to play (Thagard. 2009). 
 
43
 Kant writes: In every syllogism I first think a rule (the major premise) through the understanding. 
Secondly, I subsume something known under the condition of the rule by means of judgment (the 
minor premiss). Finally, what is thereby known I determine through the predicate of the rule, and so a 
priori through reason (the conclusion). The relation, therefore, which the major premiss, as the rule, 
represents between what is known and its condition is the ground of the different kinds of syllogism. 
Consequently, syllogisms, like judgments, are of three kinds, according to the different ways in 
which, in the understanding, they express the relation of what is known; they are either categorical, 
hypothetical, or disjunctive (A304/B360-1). 
 
44
 It is useful here to elucidate Kant’s distinction between “productive” and “reproductive” 
imagination. Productive imagination concerns the possibility of cognition a priori, whilst reproductive 
imagination, whose synthesis is subject to empirical laws, is concerned with psychology, and the laws 
of association. 
 
45
 See Susan Stuart (2008) who claims that imagination in the Kantian framework can be interpreted 
as playing a significant role in the non-intellectual grasping, the pre-reflective self- awareness, and the 
orientation of our bodily selves in our world. Also Angelica Nuzzo’s idea that imagination is 
prediscursive and embodied: i.e. it is “transcendental embodiment, which refers to the “pure, a priori 
dimension of our sensibility (cognitive, practical, and aesthetic) – a dimension that is irreducible to 
purely mental activity and is necessarily embodied” (Nuzzo, 2008. p.7). In addition, Michael 
Thompson’s in his 2012 paper ‘Embodied Cognition: Kant’s Conceptual Architecture’,   puts forward 
the view that the table of logical judgements are drawn directly from the power of the imagination 
through a “formal” bodily component in space and time, i.e. they derive from the very structure of 
embodiment, but in a way that Kant can still insist upon the universality and necessity of the basic 
architecture of consciousness. 
 
46
 Allison, for example,  refers to the following passage in the Critique:Understanding is, to use 
general terms, the faculty of cognitions (Erkenntnisse). They consist (bestehen) in the determinate 
relation of given representations to an object: and an object is that in the concept of which the 
manifold of a given intuition is united. Now all unification of representations demands unity of 
consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently it is the unity of consciousness that alone 
constitutes the relation of representations to an object, and therefore their objective validity and the 
fact that they are cognitions (Erkenntnisse): and upon it therefore rests the very possibility of the 
understanding (B137) ( trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood). 
 
47
 As he writes in his book Consciousness Explained or what critics nickname  “Consciousness 
Explained Away”,  “the self, according to my theory, is an abstraction defined by the myriads of 
attributes and interpretations (including self-attributions and self-interpretations) that have composed 
the biography of the living body whose Center of Narrative Gravity it is” (Dennett, 1991). 
 
48
 As Dan Zahavi has noted: The growing disenchantment with higher-order theories made people 
look elsewhere for a viable alternative, and within the last couple of years quite a few have taken a 
closer look at Brentano  (Zahavi,  2004, p. 71). 
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49
 It should be mentioned that in his later years Putnam had little patience for either computational 
functionalism or its underlying philosophical agenda. 
 
50
  Putnam wrote: 
Consider what the brain state theorist has to do to make good his claims. He has to specify a physical-
chemical state such that any organism (not just a mammal) is in pain if and only if (a) it possesses a 
brain of a suitable physical chemical structure; and (b) its brain is in that physical-chemical state. This 
means that the physical-chemical state in question must be a possible state of a mammalian brain, a 
reptilian brain, a mollusc’s brain . . . etc. At the same time it must not be a possible state of the brain 
of any physically possible creature that cannot feel pain. Even if such a state can be found, it must be 
nomologically certain that it will also be a state of the brain of any extraterrestrial life that may be 
found that will be capable of feeling pain before we can even entertain the supposition that it may be 
pain . . . Finally, the hypothesis becomes still more ambitious when we realize that the brain-state 
theorist is not just saying that pain is a brain state; he is, of course, concerned to maintain that every 
psychological state is a brain state. Thus if we can find even one psychological predicate which can 
clearly be applied to both a mammal and an octopus . . . but whose physical-chemical “correlate” is  
different in the two cases, the brain-state theory has collapsed (Putnam, 1967, pp. 436-7) 
 
51 Kant speaks of three different selves: the “phenomenal” or “empirical” self, the “noumenal” or 
completely unknown self, and the self of transcendental apperception (Bxxvii-xxix). However, 
commentators have noted that there is some ambivalence over his views as he also writes:  “The I 
think expresses an indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e., perception. (...) [S]omething real that is 
given, given indeed to thought in general, and so not as appearance [phenomenon], nor as thing in 
itself (noumenon), but as something which actually exists, and which in the proposition “I think “ is 
denoted as such...(B422-23n).  I think this ambiguity can be resolved by the thesis of “transcendental 
designation”. Kant also says, in consciousness of self “nothing manifold is given” (B135) This is a 
reference to self whereby we “denote” ourselves without noting any quality of ourselves.  Kant’s 
focus here is on the logical or apperceptive actus of transcendental designation, of reference to oneself 
as “I”. In this kind of reference to self we denote ourselves, purely “intellectually”, the empirical 
representations supplying the material by which to do so.  
 
52
 “Intrinsic qualities of qualia are not functionalizable and are therefore irreducible, and hence 
causally impotent. They stay outside the physical domain, but they make no causal difference and we 
won't miss them." Kim claims that “phenomenal mental properties are not functionally definable and 
hence functionally irreducible” (Kim, 2005, p. 29). 
 
53
 Interestingly, in Physicalism or Something Near Enough Kim questions whether the unsolvability 
of both the problem of consciousness and the problem of mental causation mean that there is some 
hidden flaw somewhere in the functionalist system of concepts and assumptions? He writes “Some 
philosophers would be willing to take this as a sufficient ground for urging us to abandon our present 
system of concepts in favor of a cleansed and tidier one, claiming that the conundrum of mental 
causation and consciousness is reason enough for jettisoning our shared scheme of intentional and 
phenomenal idioms, with its alleged built-in “Cartesian” errors and confusions” (Kim, 2005 p. 8).  He 
does not abandon functionalism, though, for him there are mental properties that can be captured by a 
functional definition, whereas qualitative aspects of some mental phenomena cannot be and are 
therefore irreducible and epiphenomenal, i.e. they lie outside the physical domain. Hence physicalism 
isn’t the whole story. 
 
54
 Descartes’ early modal argument for substance dualism is in the Sixth Meditation (1641) where he 
notes that since he can “clearly and distinctly” conceive of himself existing apart from his body (and 
vice versa), and since the ability to clearly and distinctly conceive of things as existing apart 
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guarantees that they are in fact distinct, he is in fact distinct from his body. 
 
55
 R. M. Hare is credited with being the first to use the term to characterise the dependence of moral 
properties on natural properties. In the 1970s Donald Davidson used it to describe the relation 
between the mental and the physical. 
 
56
 He writes: When I use the notion of a rigid designator, I do not imply that the object referred to 
necessarily exists. All I mean is that in any possible world where the object in question does exist, in 
any situation where the object would exist, we use the designator in question to designate that object. 
In a situation where the object does not exist, then we should say that the designator has no referent 
and that the object in question so designated does not exist (Kripke 1971, p. 146). 
 
57
 A great deal of scholarship has gone into trying to solve the problem of the Cartesian Circle, and 
there are probably as many solutions as there are commentators. 
 
58
 What it is to be a logically possible world is to be a “conceptually possible” world, where 
“conceptual possibility” is defined as: “conceivable on ideal rational reflection,” or “ideally 
conceivable” (1996, p. 35). 
 
59
 “Modal sceptic” Peter van Ingawen regards confidence in intuitions as little more than the product 
of a philosophical culture that has become used to accepting such claims without question. He accepts 
we have much basic, everyday modal knowledge but denies we have the capacity to justify modal 
claims that are far removed from this basic knowledge, i.e. that are far out. (See Van Ingawen, 1998). 
 
60
 See Toni Kannisto’s review of Kant’s analysis of modality which he says can be applied today to 
those analytic philosophers that have attempted to derive properly metaphysical results from mere 
logical analysis of modality. 
 
61
 This kind of argument supports strong AI, which is that artificial silicon creatures with the right 
functional organisation could be in possession of a conscious mind. Strong A1 is a version of 
functionalism in which the computational state of a computer is exactly like a functional state in a 
brain. Mental states are information processing states of (a program implemented in) the brain. 
 
62
 Arnauld offers a counterexample: “Suppose someone knows for certain that the angle in a semi-
circle is a right angle, and hence that the triangle formed by this angle and the diameter of the circle is 
right angled. In spite of this, he may doubt, or not yet grasped as certain, that the square on the 
hypotenuse is equal to the squares on the other two sides; indeed he may even deny this if he is misled 
by some fallacy. But now, if he uses the same argument as that proposed by our illustrious author, he 
may appear to have confirmation of his false belief, as follows: ‘I clearly and distinctly perceive’, he 
may say, ‘that the triangle is right-angled’; but I doubt that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to 
the squares on the other two sides; therefore it does not belong to the essence of the triangle that the 
square on its hypotenuse is equal to the squares on the other sides” (CSM II, pp. 141-142/AT VII, pp. 
201-202). 
 
63
 “The idea is that, when we engineer a complex system (or reverse engineer a biological system (like 
a person or a person’s brain), we can make progress by breaking down the whole wonderful person 
into sub-persons of sorts agent-like systems [sic] that have part of the prowess of a person, and then 
these homunculi can be broken down further into still simpler, less person-like agents, and so forth—a 
finite, not infinite, regress that bottoms out when we reach agents so stupid that they can be replaced 
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by a machine”. Daniel Dennett, “Philosophy as Naive Anthropology: Comments on Bennett and 
Hacker,” in NP, p. 88. 
 
64
 “All such a system would experience would be the presence of one unified world, homogeneous 
and frozen into an internal Now as it were. Neither a rich internal structure nor the complex texture of 
subjective time or the perspectivalness going along with a first-person point of view exists at this 
point. We could call this ‘Selfless Snapshot Consciousness’”(Metzinger, 2005, p. 3). 
 
65
 See Matthew S. Rukgaber The Key to Transcendental Philosophy, Space, Time and the Body in 
Kant”, 2009, and Angelica Nuzzo’s Ideal Embodiment: Kant’s Theory of Sensibility, 2008, which 
gives a thorough exegetical account of embodiment throughout all three Critiques.  Also Helge 
Svare’s Body and Practice in Kant, 2006, where she argues that Kant’s critical philosophy is a 
reflection on what it means to be embodied. 
 
66
 Searle writes: “Whatever else intentionality is it is a biological phenomenon, and it is as likely to be 
as causally dependent on the specific biochemistry of its origins as lactation, photosynthesis, or any 
other biological phenomena” (Minds, Brains, Programs, 1980). 
 
67
 Even though nowadays artificial systems are able to acquire autonomously their own methods for 
grounding concepts and hence the symbols, it is nevertheless still a human being that supplies the 
symbol systems and the conceptualisations of the world for the system by drawing them from an 
existing human language. 
 
68
 Kant maintains that space is a necessary a priori form of intuition which, though not derived from 
the world, gives certain knowledge of that world. It is the pure  a priori form of “outer sense”, i.e. that 
by which we represent objects “as outside us “, i.e. in space.  This is illustrated by the fact that we 
have synthetic a priori knowledge in geometry, the “science that determines the properties of space” 
(B41) which we could not have arrived at by analysis of concepts alone, for “in a triangle two sides 
together are greater than the third, can never be derived from the general concepts of line and triangle, 
but only from intuition, and this indeed a priori, with apodeictic certainty (A25/B38).  Likewise time 
is the pure a priori form of inner sense, our awareness of our inner states, as they “appear” to us as 
“inner determinations”.  “We cannot think a line without drawing it in thought, or a circle without 
describing it. We cannot represent the three dimensions of space save by setting three lines at right 
angles to one another from the same point. Even time itself we cannot represent, save in so far as we 
attend, in the drawing of a straight line...and in so doing attend to the succession of this determination 
in inner sense” (B154).  At B150 Kant had distinguished between intellectual synthesis, or synthesis 
intellectualis and figurative synthesis or synthesis speciosa, i.e. transcendental acts of the productive 
imagination. Concrete determination in intuition requires figurative synthesisis, a pre-intellectual 
synthesis of experience, subordinate to and aligned with the intellectual or formal synthesis of 
understanding. This productive synthesis is the application of the understanding to sensibility to either 
inner or outer sense, as the above passage illustrates. Moreover, the acts of the productive imagination 
through which we construct geometric figures are acts of a motor subject, i.e. the motion of the 
subject is that which renders possible the determination of inner sense:  “Motion, as an act of the 
subject (not as a determination of an object), and therefore the synthesis of the manifold in space, first 
produces the concept of succession - if we abstract from this manifold and attend solely to the act 
through which we determine the inner sense according to its form. The understanding does not, 
therefore, find in inner sense such a combination of the manifold, but produces it, in that it affects that 
sense” (B 155). These passages illustrate Kant’s a priori framework and the interdependence within 
determination in the synthesis of outer sense (space) on the determination of inner sense (time). 
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69
 Theories of active perception also emphasise that a full and exact adaptation to the world requires 
action produced sensory feedback.  Sensory stimuli are not experienced passively but gathered 
actively through interaction with the environment - action deployment structures the way humans 
develop sensory awareness. For example, Held and Hein (1963) showed that if developing kittens 
experience the world only passively, they develop suboptimal perceptual awareness. 
 
70
 It is of interest that Jékely and his team discovered that when Platynereis larvae sense different 
physical environmental conditions such as changes in light, temperature or the chemical composition 
of the water they alter their movement accordingly through the triggering of neuronal signals that 
regulate ciliary movement. The researchers found that the nervous circuitries responsible for this are 
built in an unusually simple way: the sensory nerve cells also have motor function, which means that 
they send the motion signal directly to the ciliary band.  
 
71
 That Merleau Ponty derived the ego-centric space idea from Kant is highlighted by this passage: 
“The idea of a single space and a single time, being grounded upon that of a summation of being, 
which is precisely what Kant subjected to criticism in the Transcendental Dialectic, needs in 
particular to be bracketed and to produce its genealogy from the starting point of our actual 
experience” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962. p. 256). There is ample evidence in that it was through the 
influence of Lachièze-Rey’s interpretation of Kant that Merleau Ponty came to see the discussion of 
schematism as a resource to develop his own theory of the body schema (Merleau Ponty, pp. 403–
8/443–8). One of the main features of  Lachièze-Rey’s interpretation was the claim that, for Kant, 
schematism, perception, and embodiment are intimately interconnected (See Matherne, 2016) 
 
 
72
 Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception can be viewed as a phenomenological rewriting of 
the Critique of Pure Reason from within the paradoxical structures of lived experience, effectively 
merging Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic.  This is not surprising, given 
the neo-Kantian context of Merleau-Ponty’s education (Husserl and Heidegger) and the fact that he 
aimed to establish the phenomenal ground between empiricism and intellectualism.  
 
73
 Kant’s theory of the exact sciences has quite recently been rediscovered and re-evaluated, and is 
enjoying a revival of interest in contemporary scholarship. See, e.g., Brittan, Kant’s Theory of 
Science; Butts (ed.), Kant’s Philosophy of Physical Science; Edwards, Substance, Force, and the 
Possibility of Knowledge: On Kant’s Philosophy of Material Nature; Friedman, Kant and the Exact 
Sciences; Friedman, Kant's Construction of Nature; Plaass, Kant’s Theory of Natural Science; 
Warren, Reality and Impenetrability in Kant’s Philosophy of Nature; and Watkins (ed.), Kant and the 
Sciences. 
 
74
 In fact, according to Hanna, Kant in the third Critique points out that  “in order to explain the 
behaviours and natures of living organisms, including ... the behaviours and natures of rational human 
animals, we are theoretically obliged to posit the existence of causally efficacious emergent properties 
that naturally arise from self-organizing complex dynamical systems”(Hanna, 2007, p. 121). 
 
75
  “Systems seem to be formed in the manner of lowly organisms, through a generatio aequivoca 
from the mere confluence of assembled concepts, at first imperfect, and only gradually attaining to 
completeness, although they one and all have had their schema, as the original germ, in the sheer 
self-development of reason” (A835/B863). 
 
76
  Hanna makes the point that according to Kant we have teleological inner sense intuitions of our 
own biological lives. He writes: for Kant “biology adds the notion of what I will call natural causal 
singularities, and correspondingly the concept of the non-linear non-equilibrium thermodynamics 
(also known as ‘‘complex systems dynamics’’) of self-organizing systems to the familiar classical 
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notions of mechanistic natural causal regularities and the linear equilibrium dynamics of inertial 
physical systems” (Hanna, 2006, p. 437). After Varela, he understands the Kantian thesis as meaning 
that biological life is literally identical to non-conscious or conscious mind. So that “non-conceptual 
phenomenal affective-emotional consciousness in inner sense entails embodied biological life: 
conscious beings are necessarily also living organisms” (ibid, p. 435). 
 
77
  Kant explicitly adopted epigenesis as a scientific theory of generation in the Critique of Judgment. 
However, he specifically followed Johann Freidrich Blumenbach’s conception of epigenesis, with his 
separation of the realm of the living from the non-living, which lent Kant the tools he required to 
demarcate his metaphysics from theories of the natural world. Kant thought Blumenbach’s theory 
provided an appropriate scientific explanation for generation, one which he considered as having a 
“great advantage (…) on experiential grounds” over preformation (Kant. 1790 CPR 5. p. 424). The 
attraction of this theory was that it did not require an appeal to divine or supernatural forces in nature,  
but emphasised the notion of  immanent development, or in Kant’s words, “self producing” (selbst 
hervorbringend) nature. It has been cogently argued that he adopted this specific model of epigenesist 
due to his disagreements with Herder regarding the independence of reason and nature; naturalisation 
and corresponding elimination of metaphysics, especially bothered him (see D. Helbig, D. Nasser, 
2016, pp.  98-107). Also, as Mensch writes: “It was the unity of purposes within organic life, the fact 
that organisms could be both self-sustaining and vigilant regarding the need for repair, that made 
natural products amazing, not the mechanical operations themselves. For Kant it was thus the 
principle of life, the capacity for a being’s generation and self-organization that needed explaining, 
and recourse to neither supernatural nor purely mechanical grounds of explanation could satisfy that 
need” (Mensch, 2013, p. 64) 
 
78
 Dennett claims that human intentionality is also derived, because it is explained by the way it was 
designed, that is, by natural selection “which is just as real- but just less easily discerned because of the 
vast difference in time scale and size”. His arguments are not convincing (Dennett, 1987, p. 318, see 
also Dennett, 1990, p. 62). 
 
 
79
  Kant writes, for example: Appearances might very well be so constituted that the understanding 
should not find them to be in accordance with the conditions of its unity... But since intuition stands in 
no need whatsoever of the functions of thought, appearances would nonetheless present objects to our 
intuition (A90-91/B123). 
 
80
 Conceptualists claim that Kant’s slogan “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without 
concepts are blind” shows the necessary requirement of concepts for intuitions in such a way that 
sensible representations would lack representational content without the guidance of understanding. 
However, non-conceptualists claim that, in Kant's view, concepts are required only “for the specific 
purpose of constituting objectively valid judgments” (Hanna, 2013, p. 93). 
 
81
 Susan Stuart writes in a footnote that although it is clear that for Kant thoughts are conceptual 
things “their underpinning is very definitely the proper working of the senses, and for sensory input 
that can be ordered and unified in such a way that makes possible the formation of a posteriori 
concepts, the agent will need to be dynamically coupled to her environment.” 
 
82
 Art as a skill [Geschicklichkeit] of human beings is also distinguished from science [Wissenschaft] 
to be able [Können] from to know [Wissen]), as a practical faculty is distinguished from a theoretical 
one, as technique [Technik] is distinguished from theory (CPR 5:303). 
